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The United Kingdom’s acceptance of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
refugees has been heralded as a progressive shift in asylum law. Indeed, the scope for 
the protection of sexual minorities under the Refugee Convention has expanded. The 
interpretation of the Convention definition of refugee in Article 1A(2) has been 
continuously adapted, especially the “particular social group” (PSG) category as well 
as the recognised scope of “well-founded fear of being persecuted.” This thesis 
interrogates how “gay” refugees have been accepted under the Convention. 
The analysis considers the ways judicial decision-making has constructed the 
PSG and persecution of sexual minority asylum seekers. The sample consists of 22 
appeals from 1999-2011 which were identified as major legal developments, 
beginning with the first significant recognition of “homosexual” refugees. Several 
additional tribunal determinations and key international cases are also considered. A 
socio-legal approach is taken to study the tensions between fluid sociological images 
of gender and sexuality and the fixed notions of identity found in the law (whether 
arising from individual cases, formal practice, or state imperatives). Through an 
examination of the legal discourse in the texts examined, the research deconstructs 
the jurisprudential debates in order to assess their impact on sexual minorities 
seeking asylum. This contextual, rather than doctrinal, approach reveals how the 
jurisprudence often obscures sociologically problematic assumptions made by 
adjudicators.  
This analysis offers an original contribution, concluding that UK protection is 
grounded on the assumption that sexual and gender identity are “immutable.” Far 
from opening the UK to persecuted sexual minorities, the prevalence of this 
assumption significantly narrows the apparently “inclusive” construct of the refugee. 
Building on the findings, the thesis proposes that adjudication should focus on the 
persecutory intent to suppress non-conforming acts and identities (or norm deviance) 
in order to identify sexual minority refugees rather than the categories of LGBT. 
Additionally, framing determination in the terms of relational autonomy develops a 
better understanding of the conditions necessary to realise a non-conforming sexual 
and gendered life free of persecution. The concept of norm deviance decentres the 
assumption of a knowable truth of identity, and relational autonomy asserts that the 
deprivation of self-determination and rights to relate may constitute a well-founded 
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Introduction – The “gay” refugee 
“A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country…”1  
This thesis concerns how the definition of refugee in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as applied by the 1967 Protocol, has 
been interpreted in relation to asylum claims in the United Kingdom (UK) that are 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity.2 Hathaway (2005, 63–64) suggests 
that the “interpretive challenge” in refugee law is that states are obliged to interpret 
the historical legal context of refugee rights so that these protections can be 
guaranteed in light of contemporary challenges and the needs of people seeking 
asylum today. Seen through a different lens, Tuitt (1996, 14) has described the on-
going task of refugee law as constructing the identity of “refugee.” Building on these 
perspectives, this research explores the ways in which the recognition of sexual 
minority refugee status has expanded over time, and how “gay” refugees have been 
recognised as being persecuted, and have had their identities constructed in judicial 
decision-making. This introduction will outline the study but for the sake of clarity 
and by way of background, first offers illustrative examples of the treatment of “gay” 
refugees, discusses what is meant by the fear of being persecuted, and foregrounds 
some recent developments pertaining to sexual minorities seeking asylum in the UK. 
In 2008 and 2009, the asylum claim of John “Bosco” Nyombi was well 
publicised in the UK leading up to his deportation, as members of his church and 
campaigners sought to prevent his removal (see e.g. Bolton 2008; Davies 2008),3 and 
when it was found that his removal from the UK was “manifestly unlawful” (N 
[2009], para 11; see also Dugan 2009; Verkaik 2009).4 When Bosco arrived in the 
UK in 2001, he claimed asylum and was detained for four months. When he initially 
presented to the Home Office he was asked: “why did you leave your country?” and 
why he could not “change” or be “discreet” if he knew he could be persecuted for 
                                                 
1 Article 1A(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 137.  
2 Appendix I lists acronyms and abbreviations, e.g. UK, LGBT, and so on. 
3 Local television stations also aired the story. 
4 Full case citations and abbreviations can be found in Appendix IV.  
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being gay in Uganda (Thiam 2012). UK adjudicators acknowledged that Bosco was a 
homosexual, and this fact remained uncontested throughout his appeals (N [2009], 
para 2). 
Bosco lived and worked in Portsmouth and Southampton from 2002 to 2008 
while his claim was being appealed until he eventually exhausted the asylum appeals 
process. Advocates emphasised his upstanding character to the press, that he had 
been in continual employment, paid his taxes, and always checked in with police as 
per the requirement of his temporary leave to remain (Portsmouth News 2008a; 
2008b). However, the public attention proved to be dangerous to him when a leading 
Ugandan newspaper featured a story entitled “Gay refuses to return to Uganda” on its 
front page prior to his deportation, coverage which closely mirrored UK media 
reporting (New Vision 2008). In Uganda homosexuality was already a criminal 
offence before recent efforts to introduce harsher restrictions and sentencing (Lazaro 
2012), and Bosco’s family had disowned him because of his sexuality (Portsmouth 
News 2008b; Alcock 2011).  
At one of Bosco’s usual check-ins at a local police station he was arrested 
and turned over to the Home Office.5 Bosco was told he was going for an interview 
when in fact he was being secretly detained and deported. Bosco’s phone was 
confiscated so he would be unable to contact supporters. Campaigners called, but 
they were told Bosco was not in the detention facility. Denied access to his lawyer 
and the immigration officer, the UK authorities forcibly boarded Bosco on to a flight 
to Uganda (N [2009], para 13-14, 17; see also Dugan 2009).  
“Four of them overcame me, one knelt on my chest and punched me 
in the groin. This took the strength out of my legs and they put leg 
splints on... I was then carried onto the plane. Still with the leg splints 
and handcuffs, I was seated between two Officers. I was still in tears 
but I wanted to hide myself from the other passengers” (Fair 
[unpublished], 22). 
Upon landing, the “overseas escorts” left Bosco at passport control with money to 
bribe the agent. “We know all about you and we have read everything,” threatened 
                                                 
5 I have somewhat simplified the events of his return and time in Uganda with the help of personal 
correspondence with John Bosco, Fair [unpublished], and Thiam (2012). I am grateful to John Bosco 
Nyombi for our discussion, and Alan Fair for his assistance and permission to cite the unpublished 
biography. 
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the border officer (Fair [unpublished], 23). The officer asked Bosco why he had 
adopted “the European culture” and asserted, “they do not have gay people in 
Uganda” (Fair [unpublished], 23; see also Museveni 2014). But the officer also 
denied Bosco’s Ugandan citizenship as he did not have official papers as a result of 
the hasty deportation, though eventually he was able to get through with a bribe. In 
hiding for months, Bosco was apprehended and imprisoned twice (see N [2009], para 
29-31). On one occasion he was beaten by prison officers who reiterated the adage 
“they don’t have gay men in Uganda, [he] was not [a Ugandan]” (Fair [unpublished], 
26). Later released again on a bribe, he was told to report to the police to answer the 
charges relating to the New Vision article regarding his sexual orientation.  
The High Court later ruled Bosco’s removal was “manifestly unlawful,” and 
that he be brought back (N [2009], para 11, 28, 34-35). It was argued on behalf of the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) that a fresh claim would lack 
merit and be rejected too, that the New Vision article had been “manufactured” to 
bolster his claim, even that his treatment by Ugandan authorities was the result of his 
lacking official documentation and not his homosexuality (N [2009], para 32-33). 
The judge disagreed and ordered the SSHD “to secure the return of the claimant to 
the United Kingdom” (N [2009], para 35). In the fresh claim the Immigration Judge 
(IJ) granted Bosco refugee status until 2014 (Fair [unpublished], 37), and he was 
granted indefinite leave to remain that year, thirteen years after first claiming asylum 
in the UK.6 However, Bosco’s harrowing story is unfortunately indicative of the 
challenges facing sexual minority asylum seekers, and the potential consequences of 
a state’s failure to recognise the refugee status of at-risk persons.  
“The last year has been torture. I’ve never done anything wrong and 
what the Home Office did was illegal. All the things I went through 
are because of them” (Bosco in Dugan 2009). 
The traumas of Bosco’s case show the very real risk of being persecuted upon return 
to a country of origin, faced by many asylum seekers who await determination or 
                                                 
6 Prossy Kakooza, Twitter correspondence, 12 September 2014, available at: 
https://twitter.com/Pkakooza/status/510460788130480128 [Last accessed 11 November 2015].   
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have been refused asylum (see e.g. Shidlo and Ahola 2013).7 The risks to asylum 
seekers upon being forcibly repatriated could be shame, hiding, rejection by their 
family, and discrimination in employment and wider society – the effects of which 
cumulatively can amount to persecution. And asylum seekers may be forced to live a 
life defined by a persistent anxiety and fear of harm, whether in the form of targeted, 
random, or systemic acts of violence because of their actual or imputed gender or 
sexual identity. As noted by Lord Justice (LJ) Dyson (para 30) in Sivakumar [2001], 
all “asylum cases call for consideration with ‘the most anxious scrutiny,’” because 
“at stake…is fundamental human rights, including the right to life itself.” 
Refugee status determination (RSD), in this context, the determination of 
sexual minorities’ claims, precariously balances stated human rights and protection 
aims with the perceived needs of immigration control (see in particular chapter five). 
A major study of RSD in the United States memorably describes seeking asylum as 
“refugee roulette” as the researchers found that determination varies considerably 
between adjudicators around the country at all levels (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009). 
Similar observations have been made of the UK (Persson 2013; Yeo 2013), and I 
would argue that the practical impossibly of a perfectly fair and consistent 
determination regime must be acknowledged (see in particular chapter three; Gray 
and McDowall 2013, 25). As Sedley LJ (para 4) puts it in AK [2008], “two 
conscientious fact finders can reach opposite conclusions on the same evidence.”  
This thesis does not directly examine the legal process of claiming asylum. 
The analysis considers the possibilities of proof, practices of adjudication, and the 
assumptions of the case law in the construction of a “genuine” sexual minority 
refugee from the perspective of social research and theory. But behind these more 
abstract legal discussions are real people, whose human rights and lives are at stake. 
Inherent problems of proof, credibility, and judicial subjectivity aside, the arguments 
in chapters six and seven propose a framework for a more appropriate determination 
of refugee – one that accounts for the lived experience, struggle, and pain of asylum 
seekers like John Bosco. 
                                                 
7 It should be noted, however, that in strictly legal terms the emotional state of an asylum seeker is not 
central to the determination – the Convention’s “use of ‘fear’ was intended to emphasize the forward-
looking nature of the test,” and not the “claimant’s state of mind” (Hathaway 1991, 69). 
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1 The global and national context: The struggle for 
sexual minority human rights and refugee status 
Before bringing into focus the purpose of this study and outlining the thesis, it is 
helpful to set out the broader context of why sexual minorities are seeking asylum, 
and the political landscape and challenges of gaining refugee status in the UK. More 
than seventy states have anti-homosexual laws with sentences ranging from 
imprisonment to the death sentence (Stewart 2015). In these states and others without 
explicit prohibitions, sexual minorities may face discrimination and violence in their 
everyday lives (UNHCR 2011a; OHCHR 2012a). “You faggot. We should stone you 
just like the Bible says,” said one of three men who randomly attacked a young 
Kenyan, because they perceived him to be gay (Kaleidoscope 2015, 20). 
Explanations for the phenomenon may vary across states but there has been an 
apparent increase in trans- and homo-phobic rhetoric globally, which includes calls 
to enforce existing prohibitive laws and pass new measures. At minimum, it would 
seem the visibility of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights issues 
has increased and been followed by less welcome attention. For example, Christian 
fundamentalists in several African countries have advocated for anti-homosexual 
laws which have been embraced by (ironically) anti-colonial discourses such as the 
case with recent Ugandan bills (Alcock 2011; Mugisha 2011; 2014; Lennox and 
Waites 2013; Akullo 2014), and there is a similarly toxic mix in the post-Soviet 
revival of the Orthodox Church and Russian nationalism (Khazan 2013; Parkinson 
2014; Persson 2014; VICE 2014; Wilkinson 2014). Islamists and other religious 
fundamentalists have also incited violence against perceived homosexuals, and 
imposed horrific punishments (see e.g. Ravichandran 2009; Canning 2010; Ali 2013; 
Khan 2015; Zaccour 2015). 
World leaders both for and against sexual minority human rights have 
intensified the substantive and rhetorical debate (see e.g. Swiebel 2009; Clinton 
2010; Roberts 2013a; Obama 2014; Reid 2014). In 2010, then-US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton evoked her iconic speech on women’s rights in 1995 and proclaimed 
that “human rights are gay rights and gay rights are human rights” (Clinton 2010). At 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in 2011, UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron floated a proposal that development aid should be linked to 
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countries’ human rights records which provoked “fierce resistance” from states with 
anti-homosexual laws as well as some sexual minority activists who feared 
repercussions (Kaleidoscope 2015, 11). 
Sexual minorities’ global struggle for acceptance and social inclusion has 
generated a significant amount of international interest and action (see e.g. Cox 
2010; Nassar 2011; Onziema 2014; Quesada et al. 2014). The United Nations has 
also been increasingly vocal on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex 
(LGBTI) human rights and refugee issues (see e.g. Wilkes 2010; Kirchick 2012; 
OHCHR 2012b; Knight 2013; see also Sen 2015). The increasing global visibility of 
LGBTI issues seems to have strengthened the political imperative to support human 
rights abroad (Lazaro 2012), and increased public awareness of sexual minorities 
seeking asylum in the UK. This is only a brief consideration of global developments, 
but a key aspect of the construction of “refugee” is transnational, as will be further 
discussed (see in particular chapters four and five). International and domestic 
dialogue is critical to the advancement of sexual minority human rights but the 
rhetorical affirmation should not “pinkwash” failures to act in tangible ways, for 
example, to protect refugees.  
HJ and HT [2010] was a landmark ruling of the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) 
for the recognition of “gay” refugees. The decision affirmed rights to expression and 
association, and clarified that refugee status could not be refused on grounds that a 
sexual minority could be “discreet” to avoid being persecuted. Prior to the UKSC’s 
ruling in HJ and HT, the Government’s Coalition Programme stated that the UK 
would “stop the deportation of asylum seekers who have had to leave particular 
countries because their sexual orientation or gender identification puts them at 
proven risk of imprisonment, torture or execution” (Coalition 2010, 18; see also 
Lanchin 2010; Gray and McDowall 2013, 23). Commenting on HJ and HT, Home 
Secretary Theresa May noted that the Government had already promised 
improvements and added, “I do not believe it is acceptable to send people home and 
expect them to hide their sexuality [i.e. be discreet] to avoid persecution” (Meikle 
2010; see also BBC 2010; Telegraph 2010). In the 2015 general election, the 
Conservatives’ platform did not contain a pledge comparable to the 2010 Coalition 
Programme but instead touted the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 and 
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promised measures to restrict migration (Conservative Party 2015, 28–31, 46). In the 
same election, Labour issued a supplementary LGBT manifesto in which it was 
noted that there had “been too many cases of discriminatory and offensive treatment 
of LGBT people claiming asylum,” and the party pledged to “review the procedures 
to ensure the rules are upheld fairly and humanely” if it was elected (Labour Party 
2015, 10; see also Robins 2015). 
  It seems that refugee and asylum issues are politicised and command public 
interest, but it is helpful to focus in on some critical points within current political 
discourses. For better or worse, sexual minority claimants have also received a 
generous amount of media coverage. Provocatively titled stories in The Sun, “Say 
you are gay if you want to stay in UK,” and The Daily Mail, “Posters tell migrants 
they can lie about their sexuality to claim asylum,” recently claimed that migration 
activists had been coaching migrants at Calais on how to get into the UK (Wilkinson 
2014; Smith 2015; see also Jimenez 2004).8 Similarly in 2012 the Daily Times of 
Nigeria published “How to get asylum,” offering sardonic instructions like gender 
identity is easy to fake “if you are an effeminate man,” and if there are any pride 
events “attend and be in the line of fire of the cameramen” to bolster your claim to be 
gay (Stewart 2012).9 Another short-lived scandal involved a Ugandan man who had 
been convicted of raping a woman in the UK, who then claimed asylum as a gay man 
in order to “exploit the situation” in Uganda in an attempt to remain in the UK 
(PinkNews 2011; McGivern 2012). In spite of more sensationalist press, a 
preponderance of media has sought to humanise the struggles of sexual minority 
refugees as well as revealed Home Office malpractice (see e.g. Bayer 2011; BBC 
2011; 2012; Burns 2011; McVeigh 2011a; Kirby 2015).   
While generally outside the scope of this thesis, other developments should 
be briefly highlighted for context of the obstacles facing sexual minority asylum 
seekers. The most pressing concerns include that asylum seekers have been subjected 
to homophobic verbal abuse and sexual harassment in detention centres, in addition 
                                                 
8 Other countries clearly share similar anxieties about the migration “floodgate” and gay asylum 
seekers, e.g. Jimenez (2004) in the Globe and Mail has since been edited on the website but the title, 
“Gay refugee claimants seeking haven in Canada” was originally followed by the subtitle, “Bogus 
applications partly account for surging number, refugee experts say” (Morgan 2006, 142). 
9 The paper has since removed the piece so I was happy to rediscover excerpts on Stewart’s (2012) 
blog and indispensible resource, Erasing 76 Crimes, available at: http://76crimes.com/. 
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to the already traumatic effects of the asylum process as well as harsh treatment at 
the hands of border officers and contracted employees (Bryant 2014; Morgan 2014; 
Strudwick 2015; UKLGIG 2015; see also Tabak and Levitan 2013; Faiola 2015). 
The detained fast-track (DFT) procedure has been more widely criticised, and there 
are specific concerns relating to sexual minority claimants. Among other hurdles 
there can be difficulties in disclosing gender and sexuality (Shidlo and Ahola 2013), 
discussing culturally relative and sensitive topics, and establishing credibility under 
the pressurised timescale of DFT (McVeigh 2011b; Raj 2014; Vine 2014; Batchelor 
2015). These examples seem to turn the concept of a “safe” country for sexual 
minority asylum seekers on its head, and highlight claimants’ needs and 
vulnerabilities (see chapter seven).   
The public revelations that asylum seekers had been submitting sexually 
explicit media when faced with mounting pressure to “prove” their sexual 
orientation, and had been subjected to shockingly intrusive questioning, briefly 
captivated the media’s attention (see e.g. Elgot 2013; Stanbridge 2013; Taylor 2013; 
Taylor and Townsend 2014; Townsend and Taylor 2014; Yeo 2014). Other EU 
Member States have faced similar scrutiny of their recognition and handling of 
sexual minority asylum seekers (see e.g. Chompsky 2013; Day 2013; Eigenraam 
2013; Badcock 2015). In decisions affecting UK practice, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), now called the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), has 
also weighed in on anti-sodomy laws and the testing of credibility (Amnesty 
International 2013; BBC 2013; Smith 2014; API 2015, 6, 8, 10, 21).10  
Finally, sustained pressure on the Home Office to release statistics of how 
many LGBT asylum claims were made has failed to force compliance with previous 
commitments to do so (McVeigh 2011b; Bowcott 2013; Roberts 2014). A crude 
estimate placed the number of LGBT asylum seekers in 2008 between 1,200-1,800 
(Bell and Hansen 2009, 64). In 2013, Chief Inspector Vine (2014, 8–9, 40) reported 
283 or 1.4% of asylum claims had been flagged for sexual orientation grounds, but 
noted that the figure is likely to have been higher due to inconsistent reporting. To 
date, no complete official statistics are available; however, even in the event they 
were, their veracity can be doubted given Vine’s concerns about flagging claims 
                                                 
10 X, Y, and Z [2013] on prohibition and persecution; A, B, and C [2014] on credibility.  
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made on sexual identity grounds until UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) 
demonstrates consistency in its reporting. Stakeholders and other researchers may 
find such statistics useful in setting out successful and refused claims (e.g. Gray and 
McDowall 2013, 124), and I discuss the controversy here for general context and to 
indicate a direction taken in domestic legal advocacy.  
However, knowing the particular numbers of claimants is not as important in 
the present research, which concerns itself with the “who” and “what” questions of 
identity and persecution in the construction of a genuine “gay” refugee.  The primary 
research question to be addressed asks: (1) How do UK legal institutions construct 
“legitimate” or “genuine” sexual minority asylum seekers in judicial decision-
making? Bringing aspects of that question into focus, the sub-questions first 
consider the two necessary conditions in the Convention definition of refugee: (a) the 
fact that one is seeking refuge “for reasons of” an Article 1A(2) category, in 
particular here “membership of a particular social group;” and (b) having a “well-
founded fear of being persecuted.” These questions ask: (a) How does law identify 
sexual and gender identity in the transnational context of asylum? (b) How is 
the persecution of sexual minorities understood in legal and political discourse? 
A third sub-question (c) is posed to address the challenges raised by identity in the 
transnational context of seeking asylum: (c) What are the implications of this 
research for theories of sexual and gender identity and, in particular, for sexual 
autonomy? The next section situates these questions in the structure of the thesis. 
2 Overview of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into three parts. The three background chapters in Part I 
consider gender and sexuality, refugee law, and the research questions and design. In 
Part II the case law analytical chapters, four and five, present an analysis of the 
concepts “particular social group” and “persecution” as they relate to sexual minority 
asylum seekers in the case law. Finally, I offer a critical appraisal of the findings in 
Part III, and set out a normative argument for an alternative way forward, based on 
using the concepts of norm deviance and relational autonomy. 
In LGBT asylum cases, the adjudicator’s first problem to consider is 
“whether there is such a thing as a transnationally recognizable gay identity” (Miller 
2005, 165; see also Miller 1999). Chapter one establishes that a range of empirical 
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evidence indicates that gender, same-sex behaviour and identities are historically 
contingent and culturally relative. I conclude that presupposing universal meaning 
and values should be avoided, and that the current reification of identities in 
advocacy and law is a pressing problem in transnational decision-making. Of course 
asylum seekers may identify as L, G, B or T, but adjudicating a sexual minority 
asylum claim requires sensitivity to context so as not to impose our own categorical 
stereotypes. As opposed to a more finite “LGBT” category, I often use “sexual 
minority” to evoke indeterminacy in describing the broader range of behaviour- and 
identity-based categories of gender and sexuality, which in a transnational context 
should not be conflated but are also not always mutually exclusive (see Walker 2003; 
Rehaag 2009). I also use the term “SOGI” for sexual orientation and gender identity 
(e.g. Yogyakarta 2007; Kollman and Waites 2009, 5). 
Chapter two explores the historical background of human rights and refugee 
law as is relevant to international instruments and institutions, and the UK’s asylum 
system. The scope for the protection of sexual minorities and their human rights 
under the Refugee Convention has expanded. Here, the most relevant part of the 
1951 Convention definition of refugee set out in Article 1A(2) is “[a] person who 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of…membership of a 
particular social group [emphasis added].” Since sexual and gender identity are not 
specified grounds for protection, SOGI-based claims have been “read-in” under the 
“particular social group” (PSG) category. The legal discourse however suggests that 
UK protection is qualified by the assumption that sexual and gender identity is 
“immutable,” something “innate” and “unchangeable.” The case law analytical 
chapters will show that, far from opening the UK to persecuted sexual minorities, the 
prevalence of this assumption narrows contemporary asylum law.  
Part I concludes with the research design and methodology. Chapter three 
explains the socio-legal approach to the study, theory of constructivism, the choice of 
the perspective of discourse analysis, and the purposive sampling of the case law 
considered. This chapter also sets out the research questions in further detail, having 
first contextualised their significance in chapters one and two.  
In Part II, the case law analytical chapters, chapter four considers identity and 
chapter five addresses persecution. Many other “Western” or “liberal” states (for lack 
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of better terms) recognised sexual orientation or identity as a PSG in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, as did the UNHCR in 1995 (Walker 2000; Millbank 2002, 149; 2005; 
Johnson 2007, 105). The UK House of Lords (now Supreme Court) initially accepted 
sexual minorities, or “homosexuals,” under the Convention category PSG in the case 
of Islam and Shah [1999]. But in practice a decade of case law shows that 
adjudicators systematically undermined asylum claims made for reasons of sexual 
orientation (see in particular chapter four). By expecting asylum seekers to be 
“discreet” or to “conceal” their sexual identity upon return, adjudicators often found 
it was unlikely that the feared persecution would occur in countries of origin (Weßels 
2013, 55). In other words, discretion undermined the necessary “well-founded fear” 
in the definition of refugee (see in particular chapter five).  
In HJ and HT [2010] the Supreme Court rejected the discretion approach to 
determination, and ruled that claimants should not have to conceal their sexuality to 
avoid persecution. However, in the analysis of this case in chapters four and five I 
draw on historic cases as well as more current examples to illustrate how the 
construction of identity has been exclusive, or narrowed the application of who might 
be considered a sexual minority at risk of persecution. In doing so, I want to identify 
some of the problematic assumptions about immutability made by adjudicators, as 
well as the determination of persecution against sexual minorities. 
Finally, in Part III, chapter six articulates that PSG could be more 
appropriately framed by emphasis on the claimant’s norm deviance – deviance from 
sex, gender, and sexuality norms, the transgression of social conventions, such as 
defined sex/gender roles or legal rules, or simply by being identified by wider society 
as “perverse” or “deviant.” In particular, what concerns us here is the asylum seeker 
whose particular figuration(s) of sex, gender, and/or sexuality may place them at risk 
of discriminatory persecution; not who is “truly” LGB or T. I do not argue that 
identity is irrelevant (in the sense of people claiming to be LGB or T), but that it 
should be understood differently and defined in part by the behaviour of the 
persecutors, or persecutory intent, to suppress non-conforming sex/gender and 
sexuality. In a sense, this is a new concept, but it is grounded in social theory and is 
in some ways complementary to existing interpretations of refugee law.  
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Chapter seven then argues that individual autonomy is necessary for sexual 
minorities to be free of persecution, but it is also insufficient, because it is relational 
autonomy that ensures the conditions of human flourishing which make autonomy 
related to gender and sexuality possible. Having the capacity to realise one’s own 
“identity” is dependent on relations with others, and sexual minorities thus require 
equal treatment of their rights, including both privacy and access to the public sphere 
to achieve meaningful autonomy. Relational autonomy challenges us to think about 
rights differently. RSD should focus on how rights can be emptied of meaning and 
significance through the denial of relationships. That is to say, the loss of relational 
autonomy would constitute a well-founded fear of persecution. 
3 Argument and contribution 
D’Emilio (1998a, 244–245) observes that by claiming an innate identity, 
homosexuality rhetorically becomes a “poor second choice,” so “[w]e must not slip 
into the opportunistic defence that only homosexuals become homosexuals.” 
Applying this to refugee status I wonder if rights to self-determine same sex-
relationships, gender non-conformity, and whether to be private and access the public 
on our own terms, are not valid life choices to exercise free of persecution without 
laying claim to an essential LGBT personhood? A truly inclusive construction of 
refugee would not have to rely on the exclusive determination of categories.  
Chief Inspector Vine’s (2014) report into the Home Office’s handling of 
sexual orientation-based claims recommends that adjudicators should focus on open 
questions that “[enable] the applicant to provide a narrative about realisation of their 
sexuality” (Vine 2014, 19), and quotes an Immigration Judge who said that questions 
regarding sexual orientation “should focus on an ‘individual’s inner life’” (Vine 
2014, 20). However, adjudicators cannot really know a claimant’s “true” inner 
identity, whether it is immutable or not; what asylum law can affirm is a right to 
choose, which in practice is not too dissimilar from “choosing” religion or political 
opinion. An asylum seeker’s human capacities to choose to identify with and practice 
different ways of being sexual, gendered, doing family, or being in love, as well as 
whether to be in or out of particular communities (Nedelsky 1996a, 79; Lacey 1998, 
119), should be a focal point of the “social group” of sexual minorities and how this 
results in persecution. 
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This thesis aims to set out that – in spite of the flaws of any subjective 
judicial process and because of the imperatives of protection – we can and should 
accomplish the protection of sexual minority refugees with a more appropriate 
framework. This thesis will conclude by arguing that refugee protection should not 
rely on the prescriptive framework of “immutability” or “protected characteristics” 
that creates legally unnecessary categories into which asylum seekers must “fit,” but 
should instead focus on individual difference and the essential need to relate if one is 
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Part I – Background 
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Chapter One – A transnationally recognisable 
“gay” identity? 
Establishing the “nature” of sexuality is a principle issue in understanding the 
grounds on which sexual and gender identity-based asylum claims are included 
within “particular social group” (PSG). In determining asylum claims, the UK 
government and decision-makers are endowed with “the epistemological authority to 
know and to designate what (and who) a homosexual is” (Halley 1993, 88). This 
chapter will explore how “knowing” a homosexual may be complicated by global 
sexual diversity. In the determination of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) asylum claims, the adjudicator’s first problem to consider is “whether there 
is such a thing as a transnationally recognizable gay identity” (Miller 2005, 165; see 
also Miller 1999). Authors such as Millbank (2009a), McGhee (2000), Walker 
(1996) and others have shown it is often necessary to look or act gay, or to fit the 
adjudicator’s stereotype of the identity claim in asylum proceedings. 
“Institutionalised” LGBT identities may be at odds with sexual diversity in asylum 
proceedings where adjudicators may expect claimants to validate certain (Western) 
traits in an identity claim, or otherwise impose conduct-based approaches relating to 
sexual acts. This chapter suggests the global heterogeneity of ways in which sexual 
behaviours and identities manifest problematises the Western cultural lens that 
adjudicators may deploy to determine the “legitimacy” or “genuineness” of a sexual 
minority asylum claim.  
Part one of this chapter considers the historical contingency of sexuality, the 
“creation” of the homosexual “species” in the West, and briefly touches upon how 
political identities sprung from organised gay rights movements. These culturally 
relative categories, i.e. the “gay identities” developed in Europe and North America, 
are potentially at odds with alternative paradigms of sexuality in transnational 
contexts.11 Part two considers the possibility of “gay history,” and multicultural 
examples of sexual behaviour and identity. Finally, part three explores sexuality and 
globalisation, and the possibility of a transnationally recognisable “gay” identity.  
                                                 
11 I will be using “transnational” to describe the processes of migration, the relevance of the nation-
state, as a synonym for “diasporic,” the possibility of a particular form of postcolonialism, and the 
importance of social movements (Grewal and Kaplan 2001, 664–65). In later chapters (especially four 
and five), I consider how refugee status determination (RSD) is itself a transnational process. 
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1 Historically contingent 
The first task of this chapter is to deal with the historical contingencies of sexual and 
gender identity. Here, this section will expose “modern,” or “institutionalised” gay 
identities as historically situated products of European and North American origin 
that have inscribed particular meanings to sexuality in medical and legal practice. A 
review of the literature demonstrates that gay, lesbian, and bisexual identities are 
(socially) constructed categories, and their creation and proliferation is related to 
modernisation and contemporary social movements. 
1.1 Defining “homosexuality” 
The Homosexuals, a mainstream television documentary first broadcast in the United 
States in 1967, investigates the “homosexual menace” (Rubin 1993, 5), and claims 
that the “condition” is medically diagnosable and morally contrary to social 
decency.12 The documentary provides an unflattering depiction of the “homosexual 
lifestyle,” and a barometer of the world before gay liberation movements, when 
increasing calls for rights met with bewildered heterosexual bigotry. Notable 
journalist Mike Wallace concludes the programme with a summary of the 
(perceived) reality of homosexuals: 
“The dilemma of the homosexual: told by the medical profession he is 
sick; by the law that he’s a criminal; shunned by employers; rejected 
by heterosexual society; incapable of a fulfilling relationship with a 
woman, or for that matter with a man. At the center of his life he 
remains anonymous. A displaced person. An outsider” (Wallace, 
1967).13  
Here, I seek to trace the history of this dialogue, as well as the movements spawned 
from the corrosive atmosphere of homophobia as typified by Wallace’s statement. 
These social stigmas, scientific classifications, and legal prosecutions were formative 
influences on current “gay identities,” which were particular to the socio-political 
and economic realities of advanced industrial states.  
                                                 
12The contemporary docudrama A Very British Sex Scandal (Reams 2007) covers roughly the same 
time period in Britain; there are significant thematic similarities and The Homosexuals interestingly 
references England’s impending decriminalization homosexual activity as if it may be something to 
“learn” from. See also Christian (1961), D’Emilio (1998b), and Weeks (1990, 156–182). 
13 See also Uganda’s President Museveni’s (2014) reasons for signing legislation for tough restrictions 
on homosexuality.  
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A number of authors have traced the development of ideas on homosexuality 
through history, and a general consensus is that “new conceptualisations” or, rather, 
specifications of certain sexual acts and identities appeared in the late nineteenth- 
and early-twentieth century (Weeks 1981, 102). Plummer (1992, 5) proposes that 
“homosexual” was coined in 1869 by a Hungarian doctor, K. M. Kertbeny,14 and 
Halperin (1990, 15) describes how the word came into English through translations 
of medical work on sexual deviance. Before the term homosexuality came into 
usage, “sexual inversion” applied to a range of gender-nonconformity including, but 
not specifically denoting, same-sex desire (Escoffier 1985, 135). Halperin (1990, 15) 
credits Charles Gilbert Chaddock with introducing “homo-sexuality” into the Oxford 
English Dictionary in 1892. Instead of being “essential” or “natural” categories, the 
homosexual/heterosexual distinction “represents a peculiar turn in conceptualizing, 
experiencing, and institutionalizing human nature” (Halperin 1990, 25). The 
categorisation of “homosexuals” accompanied modern scientific and regulatory 
discourses, and was particular to Europe and North America. The classification of 
sexuality in medical practice, criminal surveillance, and the subsequent influence 
over popular conscience prompted social change, “both in the ways a hostile society 
labelled homosexuality, and in the way those stigmatized saw themselves” (Weeks 
1990, 3; see also Jamieson 2002, 511–512). In this way, modern society labelled 
deviant sexualities, and gay, lesbian, and transvestite (generally transgender today) 
identities came to be used in subcultures and nascent social movements. 
Leaving aside a detailed discussion of the religious prescriptions against 
sodomy and criminal sanctions inflicted on sexual deviants, I move to consider how 
medical science ascribed labels to “abnormal” sexual practices and the supposed 
consequences. Through medical definitions of sexual deviance, the “homosexual” 
came into being through specifications of the meanings of homosexual behaviour 
and, particularly, “sexual object choice” (Halperin 1990, 15). In other words, sodomy 
had been a criminal offence rooted in (biblical) sin, but medical definitions created a 
“homosexual” in classifying same-sex desire as an intrinsic, individual, and deviant 
condition. These processes, especially through the turn of the nineteenth century, 
contributed to the rise of a “class” of people that had previously only committed act-
                                                 
14 cf. Weeks (1990, 3), who claims that the term was “coined by a Hungarian, Karoly Maria Benkert,” 
and that “inversion” was not common until the same period as “homosexual.”  
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based indiscretions of moral turpitude. The persistent relevance of Foucault’s History 
of Sexuality should be addressed here, not least for the seminal importance of his 
work in subsequent scholarship on topics of sexuality, but also his astute descriptions 
of these discourses and their effects. To quote at length perhaps the most oft-cited 
passage: 
“As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a 
category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than 
the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century homosexual 
became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in 
addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology with an 
indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology… 
Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was 
transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior 
androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul. The sodomite had been a 
temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species [emphasis 
added]” (Foucault 1990, 42).  
Although others had made similar observations, Weeks (1981, 6, 10) describes the 
most significant artefact of Foucault’s work is the “recognition of the constant 
struggles within the definitions of sexuality.” Foucault detached sexuality from 
biology, interpreting it instead as a cultural production and peculiar deployment of 
social (power) relations (Halperin 1990, 7). 
Foucault’s works also overturned the dominant “repression hypothesis,” 
instead positing that sexual behaviours were governed by “the powers of 
‘incitement,’ definition and regulation” (Weeks 1981, 5). One of his many insights 
that has generated academic research and discussion is that specifications of sexual 
identities, such as “homosexual,” are not inherently liberating but may also act as 
mechanisms of social control (Weeks 1981, 5). Although I am not intending to 
endorse Foucault’s conclusions or adopt these positions uncritically, he asks 
important questions, draws fundamental, if controversial, conclusions, and his 
methods have been applied to a range of later works (e.g. as in feminist and queer 
theory). Definition, regulation, as well as resistance will be implicitly revisited in 
part three of this chapter regarding homophobia and the growth of LGBT 
communities. 
Although it is apparent that a taxonomy of sexuality can (and often has) 
function(ed) as a mechanism of control, these identities were seized in counter-
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discourses and used to organise around a common banner in gay rights movements.15 
Weeks (1981, 102) argues that just as medical, psychological, and legal 
categorisation defined “a new subject of social observation and speculation,” this 
historical juncture also created new possibilities in self- and community-articulation. 
Certainly, the production of sexual “conditions” was repressive in that medicine was 
“acting as the moral policemen of the mind and body” (Weeks 1990, 31), but in the 
latter half of the twentieth century this position was challenged in multiple arenas, 
such that it became more and more untenable. Crucially, the so-called “medical 
model” has been influential in the “individualisation of homosexuality” (Weeks 
1981, 105; see also 1990, 23–32). However, I suggest that economic factors were 
equally if not more important in the creation of modern sexual identities – capitalism 
fostered the conditions for independence from traditional family structures and other 
crucial social changes. Building on the implications of medical discourses of 
sexuality and the ascription of same-sex acts onto “homosexuals,” I will now 
consider the importance of sexual political economy in the birth of gay identities.  
 
1.2 Capitalism and sexual identities  
Gay liberation began in the late 1960s without knowledge of a “gay history” with 
which to “fashion [its] goals and strategy,” so gay men and lesbians “invented a 
mythology” (D’Emilio 1998a, 239). Rejecting the myth of the “eternal homosexual” 
that gays and lesbians are everywhere, have, and always will be, D’Emilio asserts in 
an influential essay, “Capitalism and Gay Identity” (first published in 1983), that gay 
identities in the West are a “product of history,” and more specifically, wage labour 
capitalism:  
“Their emergence is associated with the relations of capitalism; it has 
been the historical development of capitalism… that has allowed large 
numbers of men and women in the late twentieth century to call 
themselves gay, to see themselves as part of a community of similar 
                                                 
15 I am aware this usage of “counter-discourse” can be problematic. Foucault’s usage of this term 
acknowledged counter-discourses “exist but apparently as little more than demonstrations by subjects 
of their successful internalisation of knowledge/power and their ability to police themselves” (Evans 
1993, 13). I use courter-discourse here in the sense that sexual minorities have seized labels in order to 
make claims. That is, if labels can be controlling, it is also possible that through counter- or reverse-
discourse “homosexuality can begin to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or 
‘naturality’ be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was 
medically disqualified” (de Vos 2000, 199–200).  
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men and women, and to organize politically on the basis of identity” 
(D’Emilio 1998a, 240). 
A number of authors have linked the emergence of gay identities to the 
socioeconomic conditions of the industrial (or post-industrial) liberal democratic 
states including, but not limited to, McIntosh (1992), Weeks (1990), D’Emilio (1983; 
1998a), Escoffier (1985), Evans (1993), Altman (2001), Cantú (2009), and to a 
certain extent, regarding urbanization, Rubin (1993). Evans (1993, 35) persuasively 
argues that “the sexualisation of modern societies,” and in this instance the creation 
of gay identities, is rooted in the “material dynamics of late capitalism” and its 
effects on social and political life. However, that is not to say a materialist approach 
alone explains these social changes. Although it is important to flag the significance 
of socioeconomic forces, I want to avoid unwittingly creating an “undeveloped” 
versus “developed” narrative of sending and receiving countries in asylum law. 
Cantú (2009) makes an important contribution to the literature on “sexual political 
economy,” by bringing in characteristically “queer” concerns. In addition to being 
“dependent upon social location for interpretation,” gay identities have been shaped 
by the social shifts associated with “capitalist development and the intersecting 
influences of race, class, and gender” (Cantú 2009, 166). Cantú (2009, 29) terms his 
approach the “queer materialist paradigm,” which is helpful in understanding the 
distinction between the emergence of Western sexual identities from the industrial 
experience on the one hand, and global sexual diversity on the other. Identities may 
be shaped by economic imperatives but in conjunction with culturally specific 
interpretations of race, class, gender, religion, and other social signifiers (see further 
Cantú 2009, especially 55–73). The production (and acknowledgement) of sexual 
and gender identities is particular to the state and social context. 
In short, I would suggest that economic change proved crucial in the 
formulation of modern gay identities from homosexual behaviours. Organised gay 
and lesbian movements and the associated “institutionalised” identities emerged 
when these groups gained the economic resources and political traction necessary to 
compete in the public arena (Escoffier 1985, 119–120). Weeks (1990, 173) claims 
“puritan moral codes began to crumble” in the 1960s during the “climax…of 
economic expansion and affluence,” and Evans (1993, 68) elaborates the “permissive 
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moment” of sexual liberation occurred in “a period of unprecedented judicial reform, 
affluence, and leisure and lifestyle consumerism which challenged fundamental 
norms of monogamous marital heterosexual love and rational fidelity.”16 From the 
beginning of industrialisation, to urbanisation, and beyond: “Capitalism has created 
the material condition for homosexual desire to express itself as a central component 
of some individuals’ lives” (D’Emilio 1998a, 244). Altman (1996, para 6) argues 
similar connections are evident between the growth of consumerism and the visibility 
of gay and lesbian identities internationally (discussed below in part three of this 
chapter). Out of the stigmatising labels of law, psychology and medicine, in the 
favourable economic conditions of (post-)industrial liberal democracies, gay 
liberation and refracted movements that followed created the ideological conditions 
for people to “come out of the closet,” and enabled choices in the articulation of 
identities and alternative lifestyles.  
 
1.3 Institutionalised identities 
Recalling The Homosexuals above, which describes an anonymous, displaced 
person, this section will consider how “coming out” created public identities and 
challenged polities to tolerate and accept sexual minorities. Of course, I am not 
claiming the absolute equality of sexual minorities in the UK; rather, an excavation 
of this question reveals a non-linear, slow, and on-going process.17 Here, I will 
explore the role social movements played in rights claims, and how the not-too-
distant repression of sexual minorities in the West spawned political resistance and 
aided the consolidation of “gay” identities.18 
Social acceptance of homosexuality involved “coming out” on a personal 
level for thousands of gay people but, on another level, coming out also involved “a 
                                                 
16 Although Weeks is specifically referring to the UK and Evans focuses mainly on the UK, I interpret 
these assertions also apply to, or have relevance in, other (post-)industrial economies.  
17 It should be noted, however, that the notion of “progress” is contested. If the “advancement” of 
LGBT rights has been built upon homonormativity and sameness, it is not “progress” in the queer 
sense of affirming diversity; for instance, the recognition of same-sex marriage as akin to the 
“traditional,” heteronormative model of a family cannot be said to be “progress” in this second, queer 
sense of the word that would highlight “alternative” constructs of family.  
18 In this section, I have not fully accounted for gay liberation movements in great detail; especially 
regarding the role of transvestite/transgender activists who were first on the frontlines, and then 
excluded by “mainstream” gay pride such as Sylvia Rivera. Instead, my concern is to acknowledge 
that identity-based movements have helped to consolidate Western “gay” identities.  
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historical process, [and] the gradual emergence and articulation of a homosexual 
identity and public presence” (Weeks 1990, vii). Even though the homosexual 
community was fragmented, organisations had taken root before 1969, especially in 
urban areas. World War II had dislocated millions from the traditional model of 
family structure and economic changes spurred growth of homosexual subcultures 
(D’Emilio 1983; 1998a; Escoffier 1985; Weeks 1990, 5–6, 156–158). Developments 
in gay subcultures created a shared social identity through cultural mediums and 
commercial activities, as well as political mobilisations that pressured governments 
on the validity of gay rights (Escoffier 1985, 142). In this period, homosexuals began 
to define themselves by their sexual deviance, including the notion that sexuality was 
an essential “condition.” MacIntosh aptly observes in “The Homosexual Role,” first 
published in 1968: 
“It is interesting to notice that homosexuals themselves welcome and 
suppose the notion that homosexuality is a condition. For just as the 
rigid categorization deters people from drifting into deviancy, so it 
appears to justify the deviant behavior of the homosexual as being 
appropriate for him as a member of the homosexual category” 
(MacIntosh 1992, 28).  
The homosexuals’ shared deviancy prompted subcultural cohesion allowing 
“outsiders” to formulate their own norms and reject that this identity was a choice or 
social pathology. In 1969, the growing gay and lesbian communities of the Postwar 
Era reached a watershed moment in the United States. In New York City, the 
Stonewall Riots politically mobilised a large number of young men and women 
under a shared homosexual identity to challenge their second-class status (D’Emilio 
2000, 35).19 After Stonewall,20 protests and Pride Marches ushered in overtly public 
                                                 
19 Stonewall was a critical juncture in the history of the gay movement, both symbolically and in 
instigating the latent movement, but I would like to note the perspective that sexual liberation 
movements from the late 1960s to early 1970s “in much of the Western world, had no single source 
origin” (Weeks 1981, 283; see also 1990). I have taken this somewhat out of context for brevity. For 
example, elsewhere D’Emilio (1998a, 243) suggests that the “massive, grass-roots liberation 
movement could form almost overnight…because communities of lesbians and gay men [already] 
existed” and had grown and stabilised in the Postwar Era.   
20 Notably, while it is uncertain who instigated violent resistance at Stonewall, some say it was a gay 
man named Jackie Hormona and other accounts stress that it began spontaneously, it is also possible 
that “the first one to throw a stone at a policeman” was Marsha P. Johnson (Carter 2010, 298); at 
minimum, she was one of the first (Kasino 2012). Johnson was a black drag queen, femme gay, 
transvestite (see Carter 2010, 65–66; Kasino 2012) or, possibly, trans woman in today’s terms. 
Regardless, drag queens and transvestites were key players in the resistance at Stonewall (Carter 2010, 
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gay rights movements. Mobilised against prejudices such as a psychological 
homosexual illness and perceived criminality (e.g. paedophilia), gay liberation 
movements drew upon the strategies of the anti-war and counterculture movements 
of the 1950s and 1960s (Escoffier 1985, 186). Altman (1993, 121) writes in 
Homosexual: Oppression and Liberation, first published in 1971, that, “Gay 
liberation is a phenomenon that exists only in modern Western industrialized 
countries, and like the contemporary women’s movement is born of the technological 
and social conditions of such countries.” Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand soon had similar 
movements based on “inspiration and rhetoric” of the US, but local activists adapted 
the strategies of gay liberation to address the specific socio-political challenges of 
their own states (Weeks 1990, 189).  
Modern sexual identities coalesced around this newfound visibility, and class 
consciousness spawned a renaissance of gay social and political organisations (see 
e.g. Rimmerman 2000). Altman (1996) argues that the influence of the media is 
evident in the transmission of particular lifestyles and trends, as indicated by both the 
various shifts from gay male “camp” to “macho” in the 1970s and the creation of 
“lipstick lesbian” in the 1990s. These examples show a certain fluidity or malleable 
potential of sexual identities over time, which are not necessarily “immutable” or 
predetermined by the mere fact of same-sex desire (see further chapter six). 
Especially since 1969, commercial activity and socio-political activism has solidified 
more coherent “modern” identities and alliances between lesbians, gay men, 
bisexuals, and transgendered persons.21 The economic and social developments 
shaped community building, and led to the “institutionalisation” of social action and 
commercialisation of gay news and venues (Weeks 1990, 207–230). “Coming out” 
of the closet, LGBT persons fashion(ed) a tangible minority community challenging 
the social and legal discriminations of their common experiences, but often at the 
                                                                                                                                          
162–163), and trans people played an important but often unacknowledged role from the very 
beginning of “gay” liberation. 
21 Here, I am not claiming a singular “modern” model of “gay” identities and recognise that this is 
simplified to make the point that the “Western” (and within the West there are substantial national, 
community, and individual differences) LGB and T identities are generalised, contemporary, 
constructed categories. As I move to consider gender and sexuality transnationally, like Walker (2000, 
61), “I am suggesting that there is a socially dominant model of gay identity, one that is intrinsically 
bound up with commercial markets, that is being exported to non-western countries,” or the 
possibility thereof.  
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cost of reifying these identities, sanctioning the “essentialist” myth of the eternal 
homosexual (D’Emilio 1998a, 240). 
Before shifting to a discussion of global diversity, it is interesting to note a 
general absence of women in histories of sexuality, especially regarding 
criminalisation of same-sex acts. This is also, to a certain extent, evident in asylum 
law. This is not to suggest there are no “lesbian” refugees, but other authors have 
noted the scarcity of lesbian claims for various reasons, as will be discussed in the 
case law analytical chapters (four and five). Weeks (1981; 1990) writes of the 
historical “invisibility” of lesbians in Europe. Not only did early theorising of 
homosexuality focus on male same-sex desire, but lesbianism was also ignored in 
criminalisation (Weeks 1981, 105). In many states, anti-homosexual laws continue to 
apply incongruently to male and female same-sex acts (Walker 1996, 585; HDT 
2016). Weeks (1990, 89) offers a summary of the European experience that seems 
especially relevant in consideration of continuing gender inequalities, especially 
globally. He writes that attitudes toward lesbianism must be understood within the 
matrix of “the role that society assigns to women; the ideology that attempts to 
control this; the prevailing definitions of female sexuality; and the actual expression 
by women of their sexual nature” (Weeks 1990, 89). Evans (1993, 265) indicates a 
crucial turn towards the sexual revolution occurred in the separation of reproduction 
and sexual pleasure in the 1950s and 1960s that heralded the arrival of, or the 
potential for, radical feminism. Avoiding for the moment the intricacies of a rich bed 
of feminist theory and lesbian history, I believe it should suffice, at least for the 
present purposes, to point back to materialism.  
Consider, for example, that if indeed capitalism influenced the development 
of gay identities, the economic opportunities which existed for men to live 
independently of the traditional family structure did not equally apply to women who 
may also have desired same-sex relationships (D’Emilio 1998a, 442). Regarding the 
gendered expectations of female sexuality, “[i]t is an oversimplification to suggest 
that all cultures organize sexuality around the enhancement of male pleasure above 
female, but it is rare to find cultures where the reverse is true” (Altman 2001, 5). I 
would argue at minimum that what is clear is that disparities between the sexes in 
capitalist states can be attributed to men having greater social, economic, and 
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political power. Thus, “it is inevitable that specific terms of sexual citizenship have 
developed, as did general citizenship before, more dramatically amongst men than 
women” (Evans 1993, 88). These social and material considerations and 
corresponding inequalities between men and women are historically reflected in the 
development of gay male identities (and parallel commercial projects), but also in the 
effects of criminalisation. To summarise the contemporary position of women in 
post-industrial states: women have gained economic freedoms and a corresponding 
capacity to construct their own lifestyles, norms, and sexual freedoms (Evans 1993, 
41). But just as the historical experience of Western lesbians and gay men should, 
where possible, not be conflated, I propose that an awareness of the historical 
formation of “modern” lesbian identities sensitises the project in locating the lesbian 
“other” in transnational, refugee contexts of the specific limitations that may burden 
women in expressing same-sex desire. As Walker (2000, 61) has noted, “the spread 
of a western lesbian identity seems to be far less pronounced than the spread of a gay 
(male) identity,” and this may “in part [be] because of the social and economic 
constraints under which women find themselves in both western and non-western 
countries” (see also Walker 1996).  
The historical and contemporary invisibility of female sexual minority 
asylum seekers has particular significance in RSD (Miller 2005, 141). Country of 
origin information (COI) often has “little or no information” on women with same-
sex desire or gender non-conforming people, and this has been taken by adjudicators 
to indicate an “absence of threat” to these asylum seekers (Bach 2013, 35). Whether 
it can be said that there is a “transnationally recognisable lesbian” may then be 
especially problematic, and this inquiry should treat the legal discourse on the cases 
of refugee women with heightened sensitivity.  
 
2 Culturally relative 
“We cannot claim any particular knowledge of the ways of 
homosexuals, still less of Iranian homosexuals…”22 
In discussing the medical model, political economy of sexuality, and gay rights 
movements, I have shed some light on how, as Weeks (1990, 35) puts it, 
                                                 
22 A UK Immigration Judge, quoted in O’Leary (2008, 87). 
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“homosexuality” has been “institutionalised.” The following discussion of global 
sexual diversity demonstrates that, in addition to being historically contingent, 
sexuality is culturally relative. The literature on sexual diversity suggests that 
culturally relative categories of sexual orientation and gender identity complicate 
transnational asylum claims if the law assumes “essential” or “immutable” sexual 
minority categories. I use studies of “gay history” to understand what can be known 
about gender and sexuality cross-culturally. The following section will highlight 
empirical examples from the literature to convey the fluidity of sexual and gender 
identity that challenges judicial decision-making in the asylum process.  
2.1 Gay history 
In order to envisage “global gays,” it is helpful to contextualise sexual diversity 
within the debate between “universalists” and “neo-evolutionists” (Plummer 1992, 
15–18).23 A neo-evolutionist suggests that although sex “is a natural fact, sexuality is 
a cultural production: it represents the appropriation of the human body and of its 
erogenous zones by an ideological discourse” (Halperin 1990, 25). In this sense, 
gender and sexuality are socially constructed rather than an innate or essential 
property. A universalist approach, by contrast, asserts that certain sexual behaviours 
are more fundamental or essential but manifest differently across cultures (see e.g. J. 
Boswell 1992). The notion that sexual and gender identity are culturally constructed 
has long been asserted, and it has been through empirical social research, especially 
in history and anthropology, that this view can generally be said to be the established 
consensus in spite of debates on whether these categories are to some degree innate 
or biologically rooted. Whether we can “know” gay people in history sheds light on a 
contemporary question about the “knowability” of a gay refugee. Instead of 
becoming entangled in more esoteric questions of a “gay history,” I will interrogate 
the general, established consensus that homosexuality is a constructed category, and 
the dynamic between sexual behaviours and identities in a multicultural setting.24 
                                                 
23 Elsewhere, I have used the terms “essentialist” and “constructivist.” Here, I find that Plummer’s 
(1992) “universalist” and “neo-evolutionist” terminology better captures the local and global 
dynamics between institutionalised gay identities (often presumed to be universal or immutable) 
versus cultural construction of sexuality. 
24 The consensus I allude to refers mainly to social science, but does not reject that certain aspects of 
same-sex desire or gender identity may be based on biological factors (see e.g. Halley 1994). 
However, especially in psychology and neuroscience, many scholars emphasise biology and continue 
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I would support the position on “gay history” as argued by Halperin (1990), 
because the empirical evidence indicates that same-sex behaviour is culturally 
relative. Sexuality is mediated through regulations of gender and sexual relations 
such as social customs and legal rules. Although sexual acts or behaviours may be 
similar, the meanings ascribed to sexual activity can be profoundly different (Weeks 
1981, 97). Therefore, “[t]here is no abstract and universal category of ‘the erotic’ or 
‘the sexual’ applicable without change to all societies” (Padgug 1992, 54). In various 
cultures, sex has been appropriated for religious and pedagogic functions, and there 
exists a range of other configurations that defy “traditional” Western sexualities, 
including reproductive and class-based models of sexual activity (Weeks 1981, 11).  
In opposition to law’s tendency toward rigid and even essential categories, 
the dominant position on sexuality in social science rejects the idea of a “natural” 
homosexual category. Institutionalised, Western gay identities presuppose a range of 
social relations and attitudes, and are historically situated products of contemporary 
society. “To ‘commit’ a homosexual act is one thing: to be a homosexual is entirely 
different” (Padgug 1992, 58). For instance, the assumption that homosexual 
behaviour in itself defines a homosexual would wrongly label New Guineans where 
sexual man-boy relationships were once common in parts of the country (Whitehead 
1993, 500). Whitehead (1993) compares this temporary arrangement to ancient 
Greek pederasty, and bringing to manhood younger males through an explicitly 
erotic relationship. Both physical and cultural, this institutionalised homosexual 
behaviour performs the function of transmitting manhood between generations 
(Whitehead 1993, 500). Neither the erotic relationships of the ancient Greeks (see 
generally Halperin 1990) or New Guineans (Whitehead 1993) are burdened by the 
same Westernised concept of a “homosexual” and corresponding identity, stigma or, 
for that matter, implicit suggestion of exclusive same-sex desire. Rather, these forms 
of pederasty must be understood in their particular contexts. These examples, among 
others considered below, highlight a central problem of considering sexuality in a 
                                                                                                                                          
to search for a “gay gene” (see e.g. LeVay 2011). But these “facts” and similar conclusions are 
contested. For example, while science has often asserted that essential gender differences extend 
beyond sexual characteristics into the structure of the brain (e.g. op cit. LeVay), recent research has 
suggested the sex/gender, male/female brain features which govern various behaviours are rarely 
binary but are in fact “mosaics” of the purported neurological spectrum in most individuals (Joel et al. 
2015).    
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global context, as is done in the adjudication of asylum claims. “While it is clear that 
acts that look homosexual to a contemporary western gaze are by and large universal, 
the emergence of a homosexual social identity—‘gayness’—as we know it needs to 
be carefully historically and geographically bracketed” (Hoad 2000, 151).  
While at first these arguments may seem overly historical, deconstructing the 
monolithic “gay” category has continuing relevance. Even in the most violently 
homophobic states today, a person who engages in same-sex acts is not necessarily 
labelled a homosexual. The difference between homosexual behaviour and the 
homosexual identity can create a “messy” picture of the likelihood of sexual 
minorities being persecuted. Purported tolerance or non-prosecution of certain 
homosexual acts can percolate through the evidence and into decision-making. For 
example, despite harsh laws against homosexuality, experts have informed 
adjudicators that in Iran “differing levels of homosexual activity” may be tolerated; 
in “rural areas” men having sex with men (MSM) “can be considered socially to be 
compensatory sexual behaviour for heterosexual intercourse and the practitioners are 
held not to be homosexuals” (RM and BB [2005], para 19). In another case experts 
went so far as to define the identity as distinct from the behaviour in the context of 
Iran where “homosexuals” are “willing passive partners,” and claimed that 
lesbianism is lesser known and in practice is “relatively unimportant” (HS [2005], 
para 86). The following examples will show how this issue complicates “knowing” 
homosexuality as a transnational, stable category.  
2.2 Global diversity 
Although I will explore some of the cultural possibilities of sexuality, I do not 
purport to have presented a complete account of global sexual diversity. Borrowing 
the cautious tone of Aldrich (2003, 8) regarding his investigation of European 
imperialism and homosexuality, he clarifies that his project is not about the 
“colonised ‘other’” and he does not “claim to see into the ‘native’ mind.” Similarly, 
this project is primarily concerned with the UK’s conceptions of sexual minorities 
and recognition of asylum for persecution on these grounds. The purpose here is to 
sensitise the inquiry into the construction of “legitimate” or “genuine” sexual 
minority refugees to a broader spectrum of sexual behaviours and identities than are 
(typically) known by an UK adjudicator, raising potential challenges in asylum law. 
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 Although not all societies, “traditional” or “modern,” have articulated a 
“role” for what from a Western perspective may be considered a “transgender” 
identity, a common feature of sexuality between many societies is a diverse range of 
sex/gender configurations. In the “West” transgender and gender identity are often 
used as umbrella terms to describe non-conformity to gender as assigned at birth, and 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual or sexual orientation are used to describe sexual desire and 
identity.25 In other parts of the world this binary between gender and sexuality is not 
as distinct. Some examples include “Indonesian waria, Thai kathoey, Moroccan 
hassas, Turkish kocek, Filipino bayot, [and] Luban kitesha in parts of Congo” that 
are “characterized by both transvestite and homosexual behavior” (Altman 2001, 90). 
Historically, berdache gender-crossers were common throughout the indigenous 
cultures of North America (Whitehead 1993, 502; see also Nibley 2009). The 
berdache form of “institutionalised homosexuality” is that of a biological male 
adopting a female identity and social role (Whitehead 1993, 502).26 These diverse 
“traditional” models seem loosely related to the “sexual inversion” models that 
preceded the category of homosexuality in the West. Through medical classification 
the “homo-sexual” emerged as science increasingly began to distinguish homosexual 
desire (or sexual perversion in nineteenth-century terms) from gender-nonconformity 
(or inversion).  
 Hijras in Pakistan and India also occupy a particular gender role. Nanda 
(1993, 544) writes of Indian hijras that they begin life as “incomplete men,” and 
many self-identify as neither man nor woman despite adopting a woman’s 
appearance. Unlike North American berdache who historically moved between 
genders without necessarily disrupting the male/female binary, Pakistani hijras, for 
instance, often occupy a more transgressive niche by performing (dancing and/or 
singing), begging, or prostituting themselves (Obaid-Chinoy 2011). Similar to the 
spiritual validity of berdache Native Americans, hijra sexualities are not inherently 
antithetical to religion. Although hijra origins are rooted in Hinduism, Islam 
“provides a powerful positive model of an alternative gender” (Nanda 1993, 550). 
                                                 
25 See Appendix II on “gender identity” and “sexual orientation.”  
26 Although I have presented this as a historical category, the contemporary documentary Two Spirits 
(Nibley 2009) explores modern engagement with the berdache identity and a particular case of violent 
conflict between “traditional” and “modern” identities through the murder of sixteen-year-old Fred 
Martinez. 
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Pakistan and India have made significant, if somewhat incremental advances toward 
the contemporary social inclusion of their hijra communities (Feder 2014; 
Kaleidoscope 2015, 53; see also chapter six).  
 Non-conforming gender identities have been implicated in global migration. 
In an ethnographic study of “gay” men in the Fillipino diaspora, Manalansan (2003, 
25) describes the complexity of bakla, which “conflates the categories of effeminacy, 
transvestism, and homosexuality and can mean one or all of these in different 
contexts, the main focus of the term is that of effeminate mannerism, feminine 
physical characteristics…and cross-dressing.” Bakla and the other identities 
examined here do not neatly “fit” into Western categories, complicating transnational 
refugee claims. “Modern” homosexual identities may incite persecution in refugees’ 
countries of origin, but “they also threaten the position of ‘traditional’ forms of 
homosexuality, those which are centered around gender nonconformity and 
transvestism” (Altman 2001, 88). Thus, this cursory glance at sexual diversity incites 
questions as to how the case law and institutions of asylum can account for the 
variety of ways sexual and gender identity exists in cultures around the world and the 
persecutions that may affect “genuine” sexual minority refugees. 
3 Sexuality and globalisation 
This section explores what can be known empirically about the possibility of a 
transnationally recognisable gay identity. First, I consider colonialism and criminal 
regulation of sexuality, as well as anti-colonial homophobia and the “white man’s 
disease.” The second section discusses the globalisation of gay identities. I conclude 
that indigenous gay movements may appeal to universal rights, and implicitly 
Western gay identities, in order to challenge homophobic rhetoric and laws. 
However, I argue that the globalisation of identity categories should not erase local 
histories and cultural experiences. The problems of articulating a valid universal 
framework of gay rights in these cases parallels the challenges of “knowing” a global 
gay identity in RSD. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of terms and categories, 
and how this thesis incorporates an analysis of gender and sexuality in light of the 
discussions in this chapter. 
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3.1 Colonialism  
Sexuality and colonialism strikes an interesting chord in contemporary, homophobic 
political discourse that homosexuality is a “European phenomenon,” or disease that 
has effectively been introduced to former colonies, including states that produce 
sexual minority refugees. As discussed above, there is an unsettling grain of truth to 
this claim in relation to how modern LGBT identities have been “institutionalised” in 
the West. To some degree, it is also apparent that these identities have been exported 
through globalisation. Historical research suggests the globalisation of sexualities is 
not an exclusively modern phenomenon, because “colonial law brought with it a 
discourse of morality which was very significant in the construction of individual 
subjects (in possession of a ‘sexuality’)” (Phillips 2000, 19). For example, explorers 
in the early colonisation of Australia were horrified to discover men in marriage-like 
relationships with boys and other pederastic practices (Aldrich 2003, 218). In an 
attempt to regulate homosexual behaviour overseas, British laws were extended to 
Australia and other colonial possessions (Aldrich 2003, 408), and many former 
colonies retain these laws, which perpetuates a continual justification for 
homophobia and persecution (Altman 2008, 153; Kaleidoscope 2015). This 
discussion of tensions over gay identities is somewhat simplified for clarity, but is in 
reality more nuanced, and particular to socio-political contexts. Other anti-
homosexual rhetoric may be more or less concerned with prohibiting “gay” identity 
than its propagation and perverted “practices” – or as Wilkinson (2014, 368–370) 
articulates in the case of Russian anti-homosexual propaganda laws, “prohibiting 
sins, not sinners.”  
 A number of researchers have acknowledged the postcolonial implications of 
gay identities, such as Altman (2001), Hoad (1999; 2000), and Spruill (2000). 
Studies on the globalisation of sexualities indicate that gay identities may in fact 
carry neo-colonial baggage, “but given that many anti/postcolonial movements and 
governments deny existing [indigenous] homosexual traditions it becomes difficult to 
know exactly whose values are being imposed on whom” (Altman 2001, 95). A 
recurrent example of gay identities and anti-colonialism in the literature is President 
of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe’s 1995 assertion that homosexuality is a white man’s 
disease (see e.g. Phillips 1997; 2000; Spruill 2000; Altman 2004, 67). 
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 Phillips (1997; 2000) claims that while the President’s public homophobia 
considerably increased the number of people identifying as “gay,” there was not a 
“flood” of gay men and lesbians coming out of the closet following Zimbabwe’s 
crackdown.27 However, it is apparent that Mugabe unwittingly became a publicist for 
gay identities and indigenous rights groups (Phillips 2000, 31). Instead of ostracizing 
a fringe group, Mugabe introduced their platform of minority rights into the public 
discourse – where the homosexual-heterosexual binary had previously been unknown 
or unacknowledged. Mugabe’s condemnation of homosexuality inadvertently 
reproduced the sexual identity he labelled as a Western import, giving credence to an 
identity “that is individualized, sexualized and, in this form, historically 
marginalized” (Phillips 2000, 31). Recalling Weeks (1990, 3), Mugabe’s anti-
colonial homophobia defined a class of people, and his rhetoric had the effect of 
changing “the way those stigmatized saw themselves.”  From a group defined by 
indigenous social markers, the introduction of entrenched Western identity categories 
“[allowed] for an appeal to specific late-twentieth-century notions of rights” (Phillips 
2000, 31). This example demonstrates an interesting dynamic between Western gay 
identities, postcolonial discourse, and how specific rights claims (and possibly 
persecution) may arise. As Altman (2001, 50) observes, “[t]he clash between 
universal concepts of human rights and essentialist views of African tradition 
captures some of the basic contradictions of globalization.” The irony of Mugabe’s 
claims also implicates the colonial introduction of Christianity and legal regulation, 
not just the “white man’s disease” in isolation. Any assertion of “colonial 
contamination” must also consider that sexual regulation was an instrument of 
colonialism (Altman 2001, 52).  
 Spruill (2000) gives a broad account of the dynamics between colonial laws 
criminalising homosexuality, and how identities have been deployed in different 
contexts both for and against gay rights in colonial and post-colonial South Africa. 
Reminiscent of D’Emilio’s (1998a) eternal homosexual myth, Spruill (2000, 12) 
                                                 
27 Regarding the prosecution of homosexual offences in Iran, the state has gone to great lengths to 
ensure, for various reasons, that the frequency is underreported. Consider, for example, RM and BB 
[2005]: evidence presented to the Tribunal suggested that “Islamic clerics insisted that [anti-
homosexuality] cases remain private to try and protect the Islamic society from being corrupted, and 
that publicity might cause other people to commit these sinful activities” (para 46, see also 81, 83). 
See also Kouri (2012). 
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writes that “[b]lack lesbian and gay South Africans insist that same-sex sexual 
conduct has always existed.” Spruill argues that in this community there is a 
romanticised image – in the sense that the examples may be obscured by political 
imperatives – of same-sex sex occurring on “hunting trips,” lesbian relationships 
“among co-wives of polygamous marriages,” and an occurrence of relationships 
between rural women when their husbands were away at the mines (Spruill 2000, 
12–13). Spruill (2000, 13) concludes that the “desire to find a pre-colonial gay self 
may be read as specifying a historical identity by conflating conduct and identity.” 
Possibilities of pre-colonial homosexual behaviours and identities aside, African 
“gay” identities/behaviours, as in the experiences of South Africa and Zimbabwe, are 
marred by competing discourses in which rights claims are made and “colonial 
contamination” has significant postcolonial connotations.  
 It should be acknowledged that anti-homosexual rhetoric and laws also seem 
to have been motivated by a reaction to a sort of figurative colonialism and 
globalisation, in addition to the literal colonial legacy of, for example, Zimbabwe. As 
in the case of Russia, states may assert a sort of “moral sovereignty” through anti-
homosexuality, challenging the relationship between human rights and morality 
(Wilkinson 2014; see also Khazan 2013; Persson 2014). In other words, the 
globalisation of gay identity presents an opportunity to “challenge contemporary 
international human rights norms, buoyed up by longstanding discontent over the 
West’s perceived domination of the international system and imposition of culturally 
alien norms on sovereign states” (Wilkinson 2014, 373). But at root and relevant to 
the asylum cases considered in chapters four and five, “traditional” practices of 
sexuality and gender are, as in the former colonies of Africa, the Caribbean, and 
Pacific, complicated by the historical interaction of colonial authorities and pre-
colonial culture, as well as the result of mass migrations during European 
colonialism (Altman 2001, 43). Sexual behaviours and identities vary widely and are 
dictated by multiple “local” and “global,” or in this case, colonial, discourses. 
Therefore, in most cases sexuality possesses not one source of origin, but many. This 
historical trajectory has continued and accelerated in contemporary globalisation.  
3.2 The possibility of transnational identities 
It seems apparent that refugee protection would be under-inclusive if determinations 
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were based on a restricted, Eurocentric reading of sexual and gender identity. I would 
conjecture, as Plummer (1992, 17) writes that “each national and local culture brings 
its own richness, its own political strategies, its own uniqueness.” However, many 
domestic rights claims appeal directly to international human rights discourses that 
are premised on Western LGBT categories, such as the slogan that “gay rights are 
human rights” (Clinton 2010). Local appeals to universal gay identities and rights, 
transnational social movements and activism, and the dissemination of Western 
“ways to be gay” through media have all raised the possibility of a “transnationally 
recognisable gay identity.”  
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has had the affect of proliferating global discourses 
on sexuality, which draw heavily on Western knowledge and, inevitably, ideas of 
what it means to be gay (Altman 1996, para 17). Altman (1996; 2001; 2008) uses his 
extensive experience in activism and research to elucidate examples of how Western 
sexual categories have globalised through HIV/AIDS discourse. HIV/AIDS 
education makes use of categories such as “sex worker,” “gay,” and “bisexual,” and 
thus plays a significant role in magnifying the influence of Western sexualities 
(Altman 2001, 74). International non-governmental organisations and local 
prevention campaigns help to construct “gay” identity transnationally through the 
distribution of liberal Western sex-education material (Altman 1996, para 18). 
Altman’s (2001, 75) research leads to the conclusion that “while recognizing the 
diversity of sexualities, and the fact that for most people behavior does not 
necessarily match neat categories, there is a gradual shift toward conceptualizing 
sexuality as a central basis for identity in most parts of the world.”  
The spread of Western ideas of being “gay” also appears to have been 
accelerated by economic globalisation. Empirical histories and ethnographies have 
demonstrated global sexual diversity, but modernity and globalisation have injected 
local cultures with (Western) gay identities. Grassroots, indigenous gay rights 
movements have rhetorically adopted Western gay identities in order to make 
universal appeals to international conventions, but often at the expense of appearing 
to reject local traditions (Phillips 2000, 34). However, in South Africa for example, 
many self-identifying gay men and lesbians refuse the notion that their claims 
contradict tradition, especially given that globalisation and modernisation of their 
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contemporary societies make the pre-colonial model untenable (Spruill 2000, 15). 
Perhaps globalisation, including connectivity and economic growth, is the most 
significant factor of a “transnational gay identity,” as it has increased the 
proliferation of Western ideas of “gayness” globally.  
Recalling the sexual or queer political economy in developing economies, 
discussed above, there appears to be an important distinction between people with 
same-sex desires, and their ability to realise their sexuality relative to their poverty or 
affluence (Murray 1992, 32). Regarding the elaboration of gay identities, Murray 
(1992, 36) substantiates the claim that “economic opportunity and security” 
contributed to the emergence of modern gay identities in the “developed” world, but 
also that dependence on traditional family structures in places like Thailand and 
Mexico do not afford similar opportunities to sexual minorities in the “developing” 
world. Therefore, it may be that the spread of these particular gay identities is linked 
to the English-speaking middle-classes in locales as diverse as Mexico City, Istanbul, 
and Mumbai where individuals identify as part of a “gay community,” in a Western 
sense (Altman 2001, 93).  
To reiterate, I am not claiming that “modern” homosexuality takes a singular 
form, or that “undeveloped” societies are necessarily “backwards.” Such an opinion 
would have the effect of contributing to a binary formulation in which the “West” is 
figured as economically developed and therefore politically progressive, whereas the 
“Rest” are presumed traditional, backward, and sexually repressive (Grewal and 
Kaplan 2001, 669). Rather, I mean to highlight that “modern” gay identities are, in 
various ways, linked to socioeconomic realities and the difficulties this may 
introduce into the discourse of asylum law. In the construction of a “genuine” sexual 
minority, possibly in relation to someone who is “out” or in possession of a particular 
and cognisable identity, asylum recognition may replicate a “developed” versus 
“undeveloped” narrative of sending and receiving countries if it is not attentive to the 
nuances of sexuality and constraints placed on refugees in countries of origin. Global 
gay rights movements have (and will) develop alternative paradigms of activism and 
ways of living differently sexual and gendered lives (Altman 1996, para 16). For this 
inquiry, these global claims to gay rights and the spread of Western identities are 
important, as they may obscure sexual difference in positing universal goods, such as 
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rights. Furthermore, the difficulty in articulating universal rights in activism based on 
relative identities parallels the judicial quandary of locating a “transnationally 
recognisable ‘gay’ identity” in an asylum claim.   
3.3 Sexual and gender identity: Terms, acronyms, and 
categories 
I have argued in this chapter that categories of gender and sexuality are social 
constructs, and this constructivist perspective will be extended to other social groups, 
legal concepts and processes in this thesis. Notably, as I will set out in chapter three, 
the perspective of constructivism in this research asserts that “people have one self 
but many identities” (Jamieson 2002, 507). This section will briefly address 
individual subjectivity and its relation to multiple identities and social groups, 
because categories of gender and sexuality, however fragmented or incomplete, are 
necessary to define the scope of this project and its analysis. Yet, any term or 
acronym is going to be inadequate to describe gender and sexuality, global diversity 
and individual subjectivity. Both in the “real” world, such as activism and the 
expression of solidarity, and in the study of that social world, which involves 
categorisation on some level, terms and acronyms are indefinite and contested 
including the ubiquitous “LGBT.” A category can be under-inclusive if it excludes or 
invisibilises people who experience similar oppressions or, rather paradoxically, if 
one employs an umbrella or catchall category it may be over-inclusive and erase the 
personal histories and struggles of the minority within the minority. Therefore, it is 
necessary to clarify why and how I consider both sexual orientation and gender 
identity in this thesis. This is primarily because I do not find these constructs to be 
necessarily mutually exclusive, but there are also practical reasons that sexual 
orientation and gender identity or “SOGI” and “sexual minority” have particular 
appeal in the transnational context of seeking asylum. 
 First, however, it should be noted that others have found that for the purposes 
of refugee law sexual orientation and gender identity are discrete and should be 
considered separately. Some legal scholars writing on sexual minority asylum have 
chosen to exclude transgender and intersex asylum seekers from their analyses, 
observing that gender identity claims are or should be adjudicated differently (e.g. 
Schutzer 2012; Bach 2013). Others have considered the jurisprudence of gender 
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identity or transgender to be a separate body of case law (e.g. Jenkins 2010; Berg and 
Millbank 2013). Gender identity has been more extensively considered in other 
jurisdictions (e.g. Mohyuddin 2001; Neilson 2004; Landau 2005; Benson 2009), but 
less has been written on this ground for seeking asylum in the UK (e.g. Bach 2013; 
Berg and Millbank 2013). The UKBA’s Asylum Policy Instructions formerly 
outlined both sexual orientation and gender identity in a single guidance note until 
2011, when separate instructions were created (API 2010; 2011a; 2011b). As we will 
see, in the UK gender identity has been recognised as grounds for asylum through the 
interpretation of jurisprudence on the “particular social group” recognition of gender 
and sexual orientation rather than transgender being articulated by the courts as its 
own distinct category. On one level, I can see that if I have not adequately dealt with 
gender identity issues I may actually be contributing to the erasure of gender non-
conformity by subsuming these categories into an analysis of sexuality. On the 
contrary, I argue that by not engaging gender identity this thesis would be foregoing 
a critical opportunity to engage the persecution and protection of gender non-
conforming persons, even if that consideration is empirically limited by the 
availability of case law (i.e. there are few reported gender identity cases; see further 
chapter four). For these reasons, gender identity is considered alongside sexual 
orientation, but due attention will be given not to conflate them where that is possible 
and relevant to the analysis. 
 Regarding the choice of terms, “SOGI” has been used in international activism 
to address the discrimination faced by people self-identified as or perceived to be 
sexually and/or gender non-conforming (notably, Yogyakarta 2007). “Sexual 
minority” has been used in transnational and local activism. A few real-world 
examples of its use includes Sexual Minorities Uganda or “SMUG,” a local 
organisation that has attracted international attention (e.g. Zouhali-Worrall and 
Wright 2012); the term has also been used by the International Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association or “ILGA,” seemingly without distinction 
between sexual and gender identity (Itaborahy and Zhu 2013); finally, the Global 
Commission on HIV and the Law uses “sexual minorities” in a report as inclusive of 
gender identity in-text but acknowledges “gender minorities” separately in a footnote 
(UNDP 2012, 52, 129). The Global Commission’s definitions are helpful in 
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explaining the utility of this terminology in spite of the fact that in practice its report, 
like this thesis, collapses both into “sexual minority.” “‘Sexual minorities’ refers to 
people who identify themselves largely [emphasis added],” that is, not exclusively, 
“around their preferred sexual acts and the communities of those who seek out 
similar pleasures,” so it is one of their identities; and “‘[g]ender minorities’ are 
people who are more comfortable living social roles or appearances that do not 
conform with those conventionally assigned to their biological bodies; they may not 
in fact identify as either men or women” (UNDP 2012, 129). These are broad, fluid 
definitions that leave open the possibility for overlaps between the two, and the 
second specifically rejects that gender solely refers to a binary man/woman 
distinction. In short, “the term ‘sexual minorities’ includes all individuals who have 
traditionally been distinguished by societies because of their sexual orientation, 
inclination, behavior, or nonconformity with gender roles or identity” (Wilets 1997, 
990).  
 This chapter has considered “gay history” and global diversity, which 
suggested that the relationship between sexual and gender identity is deeply 
intertwined in many local cultural contexts. “Gay” history and gender identities are 
not discrete. It has been shown that societies throughout history and gendered 
diversity in the contemporary world evidence that there are many different ways of 
conceiving both gender and sexuality, and that these categories are often co-
constructed. Even “homo-sexuality” was at one stage medically described as 
“inversion” in the West (Escoffier 1985, 135). Gender non-conforming people 
undoubtedly have different social and material needs, and political goals that exist 
independently of non-conforming sexualities and vice versa, but one cannot be 
understood without the other. 
 As discussed above, some theorists may argue that gender identity and sexual 
orientation are mutually exclusive, but I will now attempt to further problematise this 
view, especially as applied in a transnational context, by way of a few illustrative 
examples. As we have seen in this chapter many local cultural contexts have 
“traditional” models of gender non-conformity such as hijra. However, in 
contemporary societies it has been questioned whether in some circumstances these 
actually facilitate sexual non-conformity, as in the case of Iran’s de jure acceptance 
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of transgender while that state continues to persecute homosexuals (Eshaghian 2008; 
McFarland 2014; see further chapters four and six). Of course, not all transgender 
people seek medical intervention, but consider, for instance, the account of one trans-
women who chose not to have vaginoplasty specifically because she was a sex 
worker. The Turkish woman cited her clientele, who she claimed were mostly closet 
homosexuals (Dooley 2016). How is it that her sexuality, even if that is also 
entangled in work, is not intimately tied to her gender identity?  
 Further to an individual’s subjectivity (one’s self), we must consider how they 
are perceived by and interact with others (their identities). This is one way in which 
sexual orientation and gender identity may be mutually constitutive. For example, 
someone assigned male at birth may be attracted to women, but once they have 
transitioned to a female gender identity they may then be sexually attracted to men. 
So while many would argue that sexual and gender identity are separate, mutually 
exclusive categories, and while that may be “true” in certain contexts and 
individually subjectively authentic, the lived experience of others may well tell a 
different story. Therefore, what matters in avoiding presupposing universal 
categories, is individual subjectivity, and highlighting that, if gender and sexuality 
can be independent, they may also be co-dependent.  
 This seems to be especially complicated by social interaction. One’s sexual 
orientation may be (or become) deeply intertwined with gender identity, discursively, 
even if one feels one’s gender and sexuality are discrete. Gender non-conforming 
individuals may feel the need to justify themselves, or one aspect of their identities, 
and their bodies, to others in order to gain the desired recognition as, for example, 
“gay” or “straight” in addition to their gender identity. A gay-identified trans-man 
might be asked, “Doesn’t that just make you straight?” Or a straight-identified trans-
woman might be asked, “Doesn’t that just make you gay?” Of course, these are 
culturally specific and (somewhat) inconsequential questions, but the broader 
implication is that one’s gender and sexual identity can be challenged everyday by a 
spectrum of interactions ranging from the benign to more malicious and threatening 
exchanges. The concept of gender identity cannot be wholly understood without the 
dimension of sexuality, or defined solely by one’s subjectivity and a desire to 
embody one’s gender(s). Even if gender is experienced by an individual as distinct 
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from their sexuality, these identities are also constructed by how one is perceived, 
rightly or wrongly, in social interaction.  
 Likewise, sexual orientation or identity cannot be wholly understood without 
the dimension of gender non-conformity. The oppression, discrimination, and 
persecution faced by both sexually non-conforming and gender non-conforming 
people “is, to a great extent, gender oppression” (Wilets 1997, 991). Making certain 
analytical claims on the assumption that sexual and gender identity are wholly 
exclusive categories can become untenable if the apparently self-evident distinction 
is closely scrutinised.  
 Sexual minorities are seeking asylum in the UK from many different countries 
of origin, so particularly in this context I do not find rigid classifications of gender 
and sexuality useful. In this context both sexually and gender non-conforming 
asylum seekers may be persecuted based on the (mis)perception of their gender 
identity or, conversely, sexual orientation. 
 In short, I claim that the legal construction of sexuality also directly engages 
the construction of gender. One cannot be understood without the other. In later 
chapters of this thesis I will explore examples of the ways in which the two interact 
in the asylum context. For example, where adjudicators considered whether an 
effeminate man (e.g. JM [2008]), or woman who rejects her subordinate position in 
society (e.g. Amare [2005]), could be “discreet” about their sexualities, these “gay” 
cases are also necessarily about gender. Similarly, gender identity in the asylum 
context can involve sexuality where, for example, a transgender claimant could fear 
persecution because their society may perceive them to be gay (e.g. AK [2008]).  
 Finally, I should add mention of the alleged “inclusive guise of ‘gay’ asylum” 
which I will argue is precisely that – an approach to asylum that seems inclusive but 
that invisibilises other sexual minorities. As we will see in chapters four and five the 
reported case law primarily concerns gay male claims. Transgender, lesbian, 
bisexual, and other sexually and gender non-conforming people are sidelined in the 
judicial discourse. As such, “gay” is used repeatedly throughout the thesis as the 
default, somewhat ironically, and specifically with reference to the argument that 
will be made in later chapters that the archetypal and most readily recognised sexual 
minority refugee is a gay male political activist fleeing state persecution. 
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4 Conclusion 
This chapter raised questions about the construction of legitimacy in asylum, and 
underlined how the recognition of “gay” refugees may be under-inclusive if it does 
not account for global diversity. Parts one and two demonstrated that certain 
universal appeals that appear inclusive may in fact generate rigid constructions and 
expectations that disadvantage asylum seekers, especially in light of cultural 
differences. I have highlighted concerns between accepted “gay identities” against 
transnational “others,” and that the possibility that sexual minorities threatened with 
persecution on account of their actual and/or assumed behaviours or identities may 
not be comparable to Western “gay identities.” As stated in the thesis introduction, 
LGB and T are political identities with a source, history, and cultural baggage. 
Morgan (2006, 154) quotes a Canadian lawyer who observes that adjudicators’ 
questions inevitably descend into “Gay 101” about pride and clubs, and research into 
UK practice suggests a similar tendency (see e.g. Bennett and Thomas 2013; Vine 
2014; Bennett 2015). In many receiving states, proving that you are a gay refugee 
has “focus[ed] more on knowledge of gay trivia than on actual experiences and 
culturally relevant identity markers” (Morgan 2006, 154–155; see also LaViolette 
2007; Millbank 2009b; Murray 2014).   
Despite the (general) consensus among many scholars that gender and 
sexuality are, at least, to some degree socially constructed and contingent, in the 
legal arena it is often (apparently) necessary to make certain essentialist claims; for 
example, as has been done in past asylum claims to meet the nexus requirement 
between the fear of being persecuted and the PSG under the Refugee Convention 
(see further chapter four).28 Queer theorists have argued against reifying sexuality, 
positing the problematic that “[t]he very insistence of the epistemological frame of 
reference in theories of homosexuality may suggest that we cannot know – surely or 
definitively” what (and who) is gay (Fuss 1991, 6). If we apply Western sexual 
minority categories (e.g. LGBT) in transnational refugee and asylum issues, we 
should be aware that they are narrow, arbitrary classifications, but may be, as Weeks 
terms (1995, 99), “necessary fictions.” But if there is no transnationally recognisable 
                                                 
28 The nexus requirement is that a claim falls within one or more of the five protected groups, defining 
a refugee as a person who has “a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” See Appendix II.  
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“gay” identity, and no “immutable” universals, how does asylum law recognise and 
protect the rights of sexual minorities? The next chapter will consider the ways in 
which sexual minority claims have been constructed in the “PSG” category, and 
through the concept of persecution under the Convention in refugee law.  
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Chapter Two – Refugee law: Establishment, 
concepts, and practice 
Chapter one explored how particularistic Western conceptions of “gay identities” 
may complicate legal understandings in the transnational context of refugee law. 
Before analysing the domestic case law that recognises sexual minority refugees in 
the United Kingdom (UK), we must first look to the broader, international 
framework and origins of refugee law as well as how it has been implemented in the 
UK. This chapter will explore the international regime of refugee law and the 1951 
Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter the Convention) at 
the core of the international refugee regime, define relevant concepts in human rights 
and refugee law, and frame the discussion historically. In doing so I will set out the 
relationship between key international texts, including conventions, declarations, 
treaties, and guidance notes, to establish the context for this study.  
Past research has elaborated the formative importance of international law to 
state-based asylum recognition, and its historic and continuing significance in 
establishing international norms. However, many have argued that it appears that the 
human rights treaty system privileges fixed identity categories (Miller 1999, 297) of 
the kind that were problematised in chapter one. That is not to say that refugee law is 
necessarily static. This chapter will place the investigation of UK recognition of 
sexual orientation- and gender identity-based refugees in the broader context of 
international refugee law, providing the necessary background for the case law 
analytical chapters by highlighting the interrelations between domestic and 
international instruments and processes of granting protection. In sum, the 
international refugee framework may help us to understand how the persecution and 
protection of sexual minorities have been “read into” domestic refugee law. 
Part one first considers the history and establishment of relevant international 
institutions and law. The history of the Convention is considered to establish the 
“original” extent of refugee protections, including the foundational importance of 
consensus amongst states to share the “burden” of refugees, and the meanings of 
“social group” and “persecution.” An analysis of the definition of “refugee” 
concludes this section. Part two then considers international law in practice. The 
importance of international treaties, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
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Refugees (UNHCR), and the European Union (EU) are discussed in relation to the 
application of refugee law. Finally, I turn to the UK system of implementing 
international refugee law, and then summarise how the establishment, theory, and 
practice of refugee law have created spaces for change in application of its 
principles. 
1 The establishment of international human rights 
and refugee law 
Part one will consider the history of human rights and refugee law, the international 
instruments, and institutions for the protection of refugees. The 1951 Convention and 
its travaux préparatoires (“preparatory works”) will be considered to interpret, if 
possible, the “original” meanings of the document, including the purported limits to 
the definition of “refugee” which is challenged by the ambiguity of the “social 
group” category and “well-founded fear of persecution.” First, the historical 
evolution of the refugee concept must be established, as well as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights that preceded the Convention. 
1.1 A short history of the “refugee” and human rights 
Different commentators have emphasised various socioeconomic and political 
conditions following the Second World War that spurred international cooperation 
on refugee issues, culminating with the 1951 Convention.  Here I will outline some 
key facts of the interwar precursor to the current refugee regime, and events that 
prompted the establishment and terms of the 1951 Convention (see generally 
Hathaway 1991, 1–13). The two World Wars resulted in conflict and genocide which 
killed millions, and the destruction in war-torn states caused millions more to be 
displaced across Europe and other regions around the world (Marrus 1988, 23–25). 
On the one hand, accounts have been given that emphasise the postwar establishment 
of conventions and institutions as the international community’s attempt to 
standardise states’ recognition of refugee rights to guarantee minimum protections 
(Hamilton 2006). On the other hand, historical accounts problematise over-idealistic 
explanations of a causal relationship between genocide and refugee protection. 
Instead, a number of scholars have argued that the development of refugee law may 
have had more to do with state interests in resettlement, and political and economic 
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stability, with parallel rather than core humanitarian aims. Drawing from the 
literature reviewed, I will argue that the interwar refugee framework, initial postwar 
institutions and Cold War objectives, and the Convention’s travaux préparatoires 
expose deeper state anxieties and interests in the standardisation of refugee 
recognition. This suggests the “original” construct of “refugee” was not based in 
human rights, but that consideration for rights was secondary to states’ geopolitical 
concerns. While the UNHCR mandate and the Convention established minimum 
rights to protection for refugees, they also “reflected the hesitancy of nation states to 
extend their efforts on behalf of refugees” (Gallagher 1989, 580). In sum, the 
interwar framework sheds light on the history of certain concepts of refugee law, 
such as the meaning of “refugee” itself, that remain relevant today.29  
Historical analyses suggest that there was “no single moment at which the 
identity of ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ were…separated into separate groups by 
international policy-makers” (Long 2013, 21) to create the construct of refugee. The 
actions of states and the international community during the interwar years (1919-
1938) and immediate post-Second World War period to manage displaced and 
stateless persons shaped the contemporary social and legal meaning of “refugee.” 
Briefly tracing this history will recount two distinct shifts leading up to our present 
refugee regime. First, the interwar League of Nations treaties primarily facilitated 
population exchanges and transfers in response to shifting national boundaries. This 
system laid the groundwork for later instruments, but the responsibilities of 
repatriation and resettlement were left almost exclusively to governments that 
categorised migrants on the basis of political and economic interests. The second 
juncture occurred after the Second World War as the UN and Convention Signatories 
specified categories of individuals in possession of “rights” under the Convention 
definition of a refugee; however, the right to seek asylum does not supersede the 
sovereignty of states. The construct of refugee and international regime evolved from 
successive developments in administration, regulation, and definitions of classes of 
people in need of protection (Malkki 1995). Rather than seeing the “refugee” as 
                                                 
29 e.g. Article 1A(1) of the Convention first states that “refugee” applies to persons who have “been 
considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the 
Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 12 September 1939 or the 
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization.”  
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originating in a concern for human rights, I am persuaded by accounts of history that 
suggest that states were motivated by a desire to control and limit migration, and to 
privilege categories of people in order to limit state obligations. 
The mass influx of displaced and stateless persons in Europe became a 
significant international crisis partially as a result of governments around the world 
introducing new immigration restrictions (Zolberg et al. 1989, 18–19; Hathaway 
1991, 1–2; Long 2013, 11). 30 The conclusion of First World War “ushered in the age 
of the passport and of greater control of movement across borders” (Schuster 2003, 
86). In the 1920s, many countries began to impose stricter immigration controls, 
including the UK (Good 2007, 6), spurring cooperation between states to deal with 
people stuck in “grey areas,” displaced and/or without nationalities (see Hathaway 
1991, 3). The interwar League of Nations created the High Commissioner for 
Refugees (HCR) in reaction to mass displacement caused by nationalistic wars, 
especially in Eastern Europe, and that raised humanitarian concerns and required an 
international response (Holborn 1956, 2–6; Schuster 2003, 86–89). The HCR 
facilitated mass population transfers of ethnic groups (Marrus 1985), and “[r]efugees 
tended to be viewed as an inevitable by-product of the consolidation of new states, 
rather than individual victims of persecution” (Boswell 2000, 546; see also 
Hathaway 1991, 2–3). The Nansen passport system was developed to assist in 
providing stateless persons with travel documents, which was done en masse, and 
this in an “entirely political” manner (Skran 2011, 10; see also Long 2013, 8–11). It 
increasingly became apparent through the 1920s that the Nansen system was 
inadequate, and an idealistic and pragmatic movement “emerged to give the system a 
conventional foundation in treaty law” (Skran 2011, 14).  
The 1933 Convention was the “first comprehensive refugee convention,” was 
formal, binding, and “expanded the rights of refugees” (Skran 2011, 14). Refugee 
status continued to be focused on the resettlement of displaced ethnic and national 
“groups” rather than on an individual basis (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 16; 
Skran 2011, 18). The League of Nations treaties generally termed a refugee as 
someone “outside their country of origin and…without the protection of the 
government of that State” (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 16). A further League 
                                                 
30 Zolberg et al. (1989, 18) claim the restrictions placed on immigration “amounted to the imposition 
of a new international regime,” where refugees had no place to go.  
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of Nations Convention was adopted in 1938 in reaction to the thousands of Jewish 
refugees fleeing Germany, and the reluctance of governments to grant them 
protection. The 1938 Convention added another key criteria to the definition of 
“refugee,” which identified a separate category of migrants needing protection 
against migrants leaving Germany for “personal convenience” (Skran 2011, 26–35; 
see also Hathaway 1991, 4, 99).31 The interwar refugee framework developed these 
concepts and others that were expanded in the postwar era, including the issuing of 
travel documents, non-refoulement,32 and various provisions for socioeconomic 
rights. As Zolberg et al. (1989, 20) write, the “interwar developments were 
significant in that they distilled the concept of refugee from the European historical 
experience to date and made it concrete by establishing a specialized set of 
agencies.”  
The specification and individualisation of the refugee category progressed 
dramatically in the postwar instruments (Hathaway 1991, 5–6). The “refugee” in our 
full, modern usage came into being after the Second World War “as a specific social 
category and legal problem of global dimensions” that in many ways did not exist 
before (Malkki 1995, 497–498). States created international institutions and law to 
“share the burdens” of the “refugee problem,” and means to identify those in 
continued need of protection and assistance.33 The formalisation of an international 
legal and administrative category of “refugee” was not to facilitate “unlimited 
migration” of people in need, but instead complicated by “growing numbers, 
restrictive immigration policies, and limited availability of aid” that required criteria 
for the determination of particular persons deserving of asylum and assistance 
(Zolberg et al. 1989, 3). 
After the Second World War, a succession of international organisations was 
created to aid and settle those not repatriated by military forces, including the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the International 
Refugee Organization (IRO), and finally the UN established a permanent High 
                                                 
31 This concept is revisited in chapters four and five in cases where adjudicators distinguish between 
sexual minorities that might find the UK more open to their “lifestyle” as a matter of convenience, as 
opposed to those that might actually be deemed to fear persecution in their country of origin. 
32 Article 33 of the 1951 Convention prohibits the expulsion or return (“refoulement”) of a refugee “to 
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 
33 See further Hathaway (1991, 8–9) and chapter five of this thesis on “burden sharing.” 
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Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNRRA focused on “relief, 
rehabilitation and repatriation,” whereas the IRO primarily focused on resettlement 
(Gallagher 1989, 579). Under the IRO, “people were not necessarily designated 
refugees, but rather as people whom governments had recognized a special interest to 
assist with their relocation,” including growing East-West tensions and the economic 
recovery of Europe (Gallagher 1989, 579; see also Loescher 1989, 16; Hathaway 
1991, 66–67). The High Commissioner’s Office for Refugees was created in 1949 to 
discharge the IRO’s functions due to the on-going refugee crisis (Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem 2003, 93–94). The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted 
the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 
1950 to establish a permanent specialised agency for these duties, creating the 
UNHCR as subsidiary organ of the UNGA (Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, 93–
94). Under the UNHCR the “refugee problem” became an institution of social and 
humanitarian orientation (Malkki 1995, 496). The UNHCR signified a shift in 
international cooperation on refugee issues, one that was humanitarian, more 
explicitly oriented towards the recognition of human rights, and the organisation was 
eventually charged with supervision of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. 
Considering key events prior to the 1951 Convention, I turn finally in this 
section to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).34 The UDHR of 
1948 has proved widely influential, because “it floats above all local and regional 
contingencies and is a statement of more or less abstract moral rights and principles” 
(Morsink 1999, xi). This transcendent quality has allowed the Declaration to aid the 
consolidation and evolution of rights in later instruments such as the 1951 
Convention. The occurrence of human rights discourse in refugee law may in part be 
attributed to its being understood and deployed as “universal, indivisible, 
interdependent, and interrelated” (Haines 2003, 329; see also Eide and Alfredsson 
1992, 6). In order to understand how international refugee law defines refugee status, 
we must take into account the treaties and practices international institutions use to 
                                                 
34 Mazower (2004) presents a compelling account of the origins of the UDHR, and the convergence of 
interests among Jews, Poles, the Allied Powers, and others away from minority and national rights 
(characteristic of the interwar period) towards individual human rights. Perhaps not coincidentally 
there was a parallel shift toward recognising the individual refugee, which also serves to lower the 
cost to States through distinguishing between “targeted” versus “indiscriminate” persecution victims 
(Tuitt 1996, 15). 
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define the categories of and circumstances for being considered a refugee (Goodwin-
Gill and McAdam 2007, 16). Due consideration of the UDHR is necessary because, 
at least prima facie, the Convention is a human rights instrument (Kjærum 1992, 
218–219). This is especially evident in the Preamble of the 1951 Convention, 
referencing a core purpose of the Charter of the UN and the UDHR that “human 
beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination,” and that 
the Convention has sought to secure refugees the “widest possible exercise of these 
rights” (Preamble, see also Article 2; Hathaway 1991, 106–107; Lauterpacht and 
Bethelem 2003, 106–107).  
Among the fundamental rights and freedoms enumerated by the UDHR are 
the “freedom of movement” rights in Articles 13 (movement and residence within a 
state; to leave and return) and 14 (right to seek asylum). Article 14 proved to be 
controversial, and prompted an intense debate during drafting over a proposed 
“right” to asylum (see generally Morsink 1999). The UK Delegation offered an 
amendment to the proposed right to instead read the “right to seek and enjoy 
asylum,” which gained the backing of the United States and others; this amendment 
later passed when supporters of a “substantial” right to asylum conceded to save 
what was left of the principle. The opposing delegations saw that this “gutted the real 
force of the article,” and suggested that the UK Delegation had conflated 
immigration with the right of asylum (Morsink 1999, 79). A Pakistani Delegate 
levelled the criticism that “the right to be granted asylum was implicit in the right to 
freedom of thought and expression” (Morsink 1999, 79). Born out of a fear of mass 
immigration,35 the record appears to suggest the language of the Declaration was 
diluted to calm the political anxiety over a “right” refugees could claim against 
states, that would have to be granted. 
With the passage of the UK amendment, Article 14 of the UDHR reads “to 
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” Morsink (1999, 332) 
observes the adoption of Articles 13 and 14 can “be traced directly to the experience 
of the Holocaust,” where to the victims of Nazi persecution the right to seek and 
                                                 
35 Many states objected to the wording “right to asylum” which would violate state sovereignty, and 
the UK Delegate expressed that a “right” may actually encourage persecution in some states against 
an undesirable minority when it could invite them to claim asylum elsewhere (Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam 2007, 359). In fact, some historians claim Hitler encouraged Jewish emigration, and that 
genocide began when the emigration policy failed (Hilberg 1985; see also Zolberg et al. 1989, 16).  
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enjoy asylum “was a matter of life or death and therefore a question of their human 
rights.” While an extensive consideration of the UDHR is not possible here, the 
rights it declares will be revisited in later chapters of this thesis, especially regarding 
discussions of discrimination, persecution, and general principles of international 
law. It was the unanimous opinion of the delegations that the UDHR exercises only 
“moral force.” On the one hand, it could be argued that although the UDHR is legally 
non-binding, the symbolic power of the Declaration’s philosophical grounding seems 
to have allowed it to “become a moral beacon in the affairs of individuals as well as 
of states,” and the inherent rights it proclaims to “be used as standards against which 
history and circumstance are to be judged” (Morsink 1999, 295–296). On the other 
hand, it could be said that the UDHR is binding in international law, “either because 
[human rights] are part of customary international law, or because they constitute 
general principles of law” (de Schutter 2010, 50).  
At minimum, the Declaration’s achievement has been to establish a broad 
scope of enumerated rights with relatively specific minimum protections, which form 
avowedly universal moral bonds and political obligations (Parekh 2006, 17). The 
process of drafting the UDHR “involved an arduous effort to harmonize different 
cultures of law” (Mazower 2004, 396). The pliability of human rights discourse, as 
opposed to finite constitutional rights, allows its principles “[to be expanded and 
adopted] to changing circumstances by either adding new rights or suitably 
reinterpreting and broadening the scope of the existing ones” (Parekh 2006, 
18).36 Although the UDHR does not grant a “right of asylum,” its authoritative moral 
language can be evoked to support an asylum claim through mandate status of the 
UNHCR or Convention refugee status as recognised by states. In spite of the utility 
of human rights, Benhabib (2006, 52) argues it should be recognised that there are 
inherent contradictions between “universal” human rights and state sovereignty. 
Likewise, the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol can be limited by Signatories 
too, in how these instruments are interpreted and applied (see also Beyani 2006). 
Therefore, I do not wish to overstate the authority of human rights, but rather 
delineate their potential utility in advocating for and understanding inclusive refugee 
law and policy (see generally Hathaway 1991, 109–112). At least it might be said 
                                                 
36 Moravcsik (2000) deploys a theory of republican liberalism and concludes states contract to higher 
ideals in order to confirm domestic legitimacy.  
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that the UDHR is universal in aspiration if not in practice via enforcement 
mechanisms; a similar theme is explored in the next section in relation to the 1951 
Convention. 
1.2 The Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees 
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention) and its 1967 
Protocol (Protocol) are the key instruments of refugee law. The Convention was the 
first human rights treaty adopted by the UN and forms the “second pillar” of the 
refugee regime, preceded by the Statute of the Office of the UNHCR (Einarsen 2011, 
40). The Convention and its Protocol have “legal, political, and ethical significance” 
that extend beyond the specific scope of their texts (Türk and Nicholson 2003, 6); 
their legal and political importance in domestic law, primarily the definition of 
refugee in Article 1A(2), will be considered throughout this thesis. The purpose of 
this section is to outline the key provisions of the Convention and its Protocol and 
their development in order to lay the groundwork for discussion in later chapters.  
The Convention and its Protocol are the cornerstones of international refugee 
law, but interpretation and the determination of refugee status is reliant on 
Contracting States such as the UK (Türk and Nicholson 2003, 6). Therefore, the 
recognition of refugees, policy and practice has varied from state to state and over 
time (Beyani 2006, 271).37 In order to define “refugee” and other concepts, we must 
consider traditional sources of refugee law such as treaties, as well as UNHCR 
guidance on practice and procedures, before looking at UK implementation 
specifically (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 16). This section covers the 
Convention definition of refugee and the analysis will draw upon the travaux 
préparatoires to explore what the drafters and Signatory States may have understood 
to be the meaning and intention of the text.38  
                                                 
37 Neither the 1951 Convention nor its 1967 Protocol prescribe procedures for determining refugee 
status.  
38 The travaux préparatoires, or “preparatory works,” of the Convention consist of official records of 
the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems and Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Status of Refugees. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) states that travaux 
préparatoires may be used as “supplementary means of interpretation” in Article 32 to confirm the 
meaning of Article 31, that a treaty be “interpreted in good faith.” The preparatory works are 
frequently used by adjudicators and commentators in refugee law (Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, 
106; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 9). See also McAdam (2011, 99–103) on the “secondary 
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The Convention’s definition of refugee applied to persons affected “[a]s a 
result of events occurring before 1 January 1951” (Article 1A(2)), either “in Europe” 
or “events occurring in Europe or elsewhere” before the specified date depending on 
which limitation a Signatory State declared to apply (Article 1B). Its 1967 Protocol 
removed the geographic and time limits of the Convention in states which acceded to 
it (see Hathaway 2005, 97, 110–111). States may be party to the Convention, its 
Protocol, or both.39 In Article 1A(2), both the Convention (with geographic and time 
limitations) and its Protocol define “refugee” as applying to any person who  
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” 
The drafting and implementation of the Convention “reflected as liberal a synthesis 
of policies as nation states could agree to” – there was a consensus among signatories 
on the “right to seek asylum,” but territorial sovereignty was often prioritised 
(Gallagher 1989, 580). The Convention was drafted with the view that it was an 
instrument for sharing the burden of refugees, and although it may be outwardly 
humanitarian “the true motives and intentions behind [it] have been subject to debate 
and still influence its interpretation in theory and practice” (Einarsen 2011, 41–42). 
From a critical perspective, the refugee regime was created primarily by the Western 
powers and is sustainable only so long as their interests are reconcilable with human 
rights and humanitarian norms (Loescher 1989, 9; Hathaway 1991, 6–10; Tuitt 1996, 
7). For example, Hathaway (1991, 6) argues that the definition, Article 1A(2), had a 
“strategic dimension” that stems from the “successful efforts of Western states to 
give priority in protection matters to persons whose flight was motivated by pro-
Western values,” which had particular salience in the Cold War. The remainder of 
                                                                                                                                          
means for interpretation” and utility of “all documents that had a formative effect on a treaty’s 
drafting,” which for the 1951 Convention includes the records and documents of the Ad Hoc 
Committee and Conference, such as drafts, written interventions, and summary minutes. 
39 Three states are party to the 1967 alone, while the UK is one of 133 states party to both the 
Convention and its Protocol (Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, 102–103). 
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this section is organised around the themes of international consensus, the 
development of the particular social group category, and the meaning of persecution. 
1.2.1 Perceived importance of consensus between states 
The Convention may have been prompted by, and seen as a solution to, the effects of 
displacement, as well as violations of human rights, but more critically it was a 
means to define categories of people who should receive international protection 
(Gallagher 1989, 594). To support the claim that the Convention was as liberal as 
Contracting States could agree to (Gallagher 1989, 580), the summary records of the 
Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems (hereafter the Ad Hoc 
Committee) and Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons (hereafter the Conference) are examined briefly here to illustrate 
the difficulties of negotiating the terms of the Convention that set out clear 
limitations to state obligations (see Hathaway 1991, 6 on the drafting process).  
The Ad Hoc Committee postponed negotiating a solution for all refugees 
beyond the dateline or events which caused them to become refugees (“events 
occurring before 1 January 1951” in the final agreement), because it was recognised 
states would not accede to a Convention offering a “blank cheque” for obligations to 
an indefinite and uncertain number of future refugees (A/CONF.2/SR.21).40 A 
particular debate in which Mr Hoare (United Kingdom) and Mr Rochefort (France) 
are the main protagonists is a helpful illustration. Over several meetings, stark 
differences of opinion came to light over the geographic limitations of the 
Convention; here, the UK was apparently “universalist” or “generous” and France 
“Europeanist” or “egoist” (A/CONF.2/SR.19; A/CONF.2/SR.35). This debate is 
particularly apt as it centred on the widest possible definition of refugees that 
Contacting States could agree to (A/CONF.2/SR.19).41  
The French Government’s position was that the Convention definition of 
“refugee” should be limited to events in Europe, based on historical facts, and could 
not be universal without making it “Open Sesame” (A/CONF.2/SR.22; see Hathaway 
1991, 7). Mr Rochefort (France) contrasted the international obligations and moral 
                                                 
40 These citations denote separate documents retrieved from RefWorld, a UNHCR database; full 
references for these are listed in Appendix III. 
41 Although I have cited the Nineteenth Meeting generously (A/CONF.2/SR.19), the debate continues 
at other points of the convention too (e.g. A/CONF.2/SR.33; A/CONF.2/SR.34). 
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commitments to refugees against the practical limits of states, especially those on the 
European mainland that refugees could easily reach (A/CONF.2/SR.19). Mr Hoare 
represented that the UK “had always advocated the widest possible definition,” not 
due to the geographic advantage as an island for the control of migration, but “on the 
grounds that the status of refugee should be granted to any person fleeing from 
persecution” (A/CONF.2/SR.19). The UK Government’s stated position was that if 
the purpose of the Convention was to grant certain minimum protections that “those 
guarantees ought not to be limited to refugees from a particular area” 
(A/CONF.2/SR.19). The UK delegation had originally favoured a definition that was 
without the limitations of geography (in Europe) and time (as a result of events 
occurring before 1 January 1951), but eventually accepted these “in a spirit of 
compromise” (A/CONF.2/SR.34). The rest of the Conference was equally divided on 
the issue. 
 The UNHCR had expressed concern for the Convention to cover the greatest 
number of refugees whilst remaining acceptable to as many Contracting States as 
possible (A/CONF.2/SR.21). A solution which suited both sides of the debate was 
eventually found and the compromise is evident in Article 1B(2), discussed above, 
regarding “in Europe” or “in Europe or elsewhere” (see A/CONF.2/80; 
A/CONF.2/SR.21; A/CONF.2/SR.23). The UK Government submitted for inclusion 
in the Conference’s recommendations in the Final Act a paragraph expressing hope 
the Convention would “have value as an example exceeding its contractual scope,” 
and that states would grant refugee status to those not covered by Article 1A where 
possible (Recommendation E of the Final Act; A/CONF.2/107; see Hathaway 1991, 
11).42 The drafting process reveals the competing interests between state sovereignty 
and the control of migration, and the recognition of refugee rights, but the former 
was consistently prioritised in negotiation and often in practice (Tuitt 1996, 38). One 
speaker from the voluntary agencies observed that at the Conference the discussions 
and “decisions had at times given the impression that it was a conference for the 
protection of helpless sovereign states against the wicked refugee” (A/CONF.2/19). 
These themes of a “blank cheque” to refugees or migrant “floodgate,” sovereignty 
                                                 
42 Many states applied this recommendation in refugee crises until the 1967 Protocol removed the 
temporal and geographic limitations of the Convention (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 36). 
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and immigration control, and international consensus are explored in later chapters – 
especially six. 
1.2.2 Particular social group 
Of the five Convention categories that persecution must be based on – race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group (PSG) or political opinion –
SOGI-based asylum claims typically rely on PSG. Despite the significance of PSG 
for this project, it is important to note that commentators and UNHCR Guidance 
suggest that Convention “reasons” or grounds for persecution, may be overlapping. 
Thus sexual minority refugees might also fall within the Convention definition for 
persecution based on, for example, political opinion (UNHCR 2008, 14–15). Tuitt 
(1996, 38–42) observes that states have been reluctant to recognise political opinion 
as a grounds to include additional categories of refugees, such as homosexuals; 
instead many have opted to employ ejusdem generis to interpret the PSG category 
independently of other grounds, but as within the Convention’s scope (see Hathaway 
1991, 160–161).43 Here I will briefly overview the way in which particular social 
group became included in Article 1A(2).  
The travaux préparatoires record that the Swedish Delegate put forward the 
amendment (A/CONF.2/9) because “experience has shown” refugees had been 
persecuted on account of membership of a particular social group 
(A/CONF.2/SR.19). Mr Petren’s (Sweden) recorded comments on the introduction of 
“particular social group” were brief. Regarding the Swedish amendment 
(A/CONF.2/9),44 Mr Petren “suggested the inclusion in sub-paragraph 2 of paragraph 
A of a reference to persons who might be persecuted owing to their membership of a 
particular social group. Such cases existed, and it would be as well to mention them 
explicitly” (A/CONF.2/SR.19).  
However, throughout the Ad Hoc Committee and most of the Conference, the 
draft under consideration did not include PSG, as the amendment was added late in 
the Conference and so was subject of little debate. Therefore, the travaux 
préparatoires and other evidence do not suggest much in the way of an “original 
                                                 
43 See Appendix II on ejusdem generis. 
44 The Swedish amendment (A/CONF.2/9) was adopted by the Conference 14 votes to none, with 8 
abstentions (A/CONF.2/SR.23).  
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intent” of the category, but it has been suggested the drafters presumed it referred to 
former capitalists from the Communist bloc (Hathaway 1991, 7; Aleinikoff 2003, 
265–266; Good 2007, 74–75). As Good (2007, 74) has noted on plausible meanings 
of PSG, it is likely that it was included without objection or discussion in relation to 
concerns for refugees from communist states.45 This seems to be a likely explanation 
considering that the Convention was being drafted at a time when the Cold War 
hostilities were heightening. Indeed, several commentators have argued that the 
recognition of refugees has been used as a foreign policy tool in order to condemn 
the country of origin (Loescher 1989, 12–15; Tuitt 1996, 15–17).46 Another 
interpretation is that PSG was a category intentionally left open to state and judicial 
discretion. I would argue it is unlikely PSG was intended as a remedial clause or 
“safety net” for persons outside the stated categories in Article 1A(2), even if 
perhaps that is how it has been interpreted (see further Hathaway 1991, 157–159. If it 
was the intent, as Harvey (2000, 328) observes, why would “the drafters include a 
list of grounds at all?”  
My interpretation of the records is that a broad application of PSG was not 
intended. In the same statement regarding the introduction of the Swedish 
amendment (A/CONF.2/9), Mr Petren also discusses for “reasons other than personal 
convenience,” a concept introduced by the interwar 1938 Convention discussed 
above. The concept referred to explicitly “[attempts] to exclude the possibility of a 
refugee’s availing himself of asylum for the sake of financial gain,” which Mr Petren 
submitted could be difficult to “gauge,” and the Swedish Government would not 
“accept a text that was not sufficiently limited and precise” (A/CONF.2/SR.19). 
However liberal the Swedish Government may have been in its asylum policy, these 
comments seem to suggest that it too had a preoccupation with limiting the 
                                                 
45 Other observers are critical of this conclusion, such as Einarsen (2011, 63), writing that a “specific 
Cold War motivation cannot be documented, and thus must be based on mere speculation.”  
46 Tuitt (1996, 18) observes that the collapse of the USSR has diminished the extent to which refugees 
are deployed in an “ambassadorial role.” However, there may be a corollary political aim or unwitting 
judicial effect of conferring refugee status on sexual minorities in “pinkwashing,” indicating a similar 
ambassadorial usage today. Here I use pinkwashing as synonymous to what Bhabha (2002, 161) terms 
“gatekeeping” that “keeps migration exclusion morally defensible,” or as Luibhéid (2008, 179–80) 
claims the select few that receive asylum “lend credence to claims of first-world humanitarianism and 
democratic freedom.” This is consistent with a range of literature which posits the determination of 
refugee status is necessarily political, constituting an appraisal of the conditions in the country of 
origin (see e.g. Zolberg et al. 1989, 272–275; Miller 2005, 143, 166). 
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Convention.47 Surveying the minutes of the Conference, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that, like the Convention as a whole, “particular social group” was meant, 
in the words of Mr Petren, to be sufficiently limited and precise.48   
1.2.3 Persecution 
The “well-founded fear of being persecuted” is central to the Convention definition 
and recognition of refugee status. Zolberg et al. (1989, 25) claim that “the selection 
of ‘persecution’ as the key operational criterion was in keeping with the desire of the 
international community to make the status of refugee exceptional,” precluding mass 
influx of refugees fleeing generalised violence. A complementary explanation is that, 
as Hathaway (1991, 7) argues, “[i]t was understood that the concept of ‘fear of 
persecution’ was sufficiently open-ended to allow the West to continue to admit 
ideological dissidents [from the Soviet bloc] to international protection.” However, 
in Article 1A(2) “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted” is ambiguous and 
not clarified elsewhere in the Convention. Neither the 1951 Convention nor its 
travaux préparatoires substantially address the definition of persecution (Goodwin-
Gill and McAdam 2007, 98).   
Therefore, this issue is more adequately addressed in examination of the 
domestic law analysed in the case law analytical chapters (see in particular chapter 
five), because like many terms of the Convention, “well-founded fear of persecution” 
cannot be interpreted and applied independently of other instruments. Rather, it must 
be understood within a broader range of treaties and domestic jurisprudence. A 
number of approaches have been taken to define “persecution.” For example, some 
authorities on refugee law have suggested persecution should be recognised in cases 
of violation of fundamental human rights (Tuitt 1996, 43). Other legal commentators 
have suggested “persecution” has come to be understood as “the severe violation of 
human rights accompanied by the failure of the State to protect the individual” 
(Zimmermann and Mahler 2011, 345). Aside from briefly addressing the minimum 
                                                 
47 However, it should be acknowledged Mr Petren claims Sweden had and hoped to continue a liberal 
asylum policy (A/CONF.2/SR.19). 
48 Because the travaux préparatoires are unhelpful in interpreting PSG due to limited discussion 
(Aleinikoff 2003, 265), I have supplemented the discussion with related opinions; however, the 
limited preparatory work around PSG and therefore lack of evidence for its “original intent” has left 
interpretation open and adds interest in the category as a “space for change” in international refugee 
law. 
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EU standard of persecution later in this chapter, for now I leave these issues to be 
revisited in the context of the case law analysis in chapters four and five, where it is 
possible to situate interpretations of persecution within the contemporary recognition 
of sexual minority refugees.  
1.3 The construct of the refugee 
In summary, part one of this chapter has overviewed key conceptual developments in 
refugee law, the importance of human rights, and the 1951 Convention and its 1967 
Protocol, especially meaning of Article 1A(2). The evolution of human rights 
concepts may in part explain both the expanded scope of the definition of 
Convention refugee (Good 2007, 6),49 and the changes to international legal norms in 
refugee law and UNHCR Guidance and policies considered further in chapters four 
and five. Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007, 70–90) claim that the five recognised 
Convention “reasons for persecution” have “progressively developed” corresponding 
to non-discrimination jurisprudence, including the rights of association (see also 
Hathaway 1991, 136). As this research will demonstrate, the category of PSG has 
expanded protection to a number of groups, including sexual minorities, and 
“[pushed] the boundaries of refugee law” (Aleinikoff 2003, 264). 
Before moving on, it is useful to reflect on the implications of defining 
“refugee” in law in the context of this research.50 Studying, categorising, and 
defining the “refugee experience” is problematic in that “it posits a single, essential, 
transhistorical refugee condition” (Malkki 1995, 511; see also Tuitt 1996). I would 
suggest, similarly to Malkki (1995, 511), that the social complications of defining a 
refugee, as with SOGI (see chapter one), is that to propose a definition or criteria for 
being a refugee in law reifies, to some extent, an essential and transhistorical 
category. The term refugee does not just describe an individual seeking state 
                                                 
49 Zimmerman and Mahler (2011, 299) argue that Article 1A(2) “constitutes, just like similar clauses 
in treaties generally and in human rights instruments in particular, part of a ‘living instrument.’” See 
also Bayefsky (ed., 2006). 
50 The consequences of defining “refugee” and the resulting exclusions are apparent in legal 
terminology. For example, alternative classifications have been developed for asylum seekers to avoid 
their being labeled “refugees” which are protected by international law and entitled certain obligations 
by states; therefore, states have instead labeled many asylum seekers as “‘displaced persons,’ ‘illegal 
immigrants,’ ‘economic migrants,’ ‘quasi-refugees,’ ‘aliens,’ ‘departees,’ ‘boat-people,’ or 
‘stowaways’” to “assert…greater freedom of action” in granting refugee status (Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam 2007, 50).  
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protection but, in fact, often ends up specifying a “kind” of person (Malkki 1995, 
513). Similar to my rejection of specific “gay” categories in favour of the term 
“sexual minority,” the use of “refugee” and its criteria should be clarified, where 
possible, to avoid reducing the person to a “kind” or “type” in the case law analysis 
of this thesis (see generally Luibhéid 2005a, xi on “migrant;” Long 2013). Instead, 
the limits of the term “refugee” should be delineated, noting that it is only 
analytically useful “as a broad legal or descriptive rubric that includes within it a 
world of different socioeconomic statuses, personal histories, and psychological or 
spiritual situations” (Malkki 1995, 496). Where social-scientific, non-legal 
conceptions of “refugeehood” can be broad in scope, the premise of a legal definition 
necessarily reduces this to an artificial identity of those deserving of official 
recognition and creates an “entrenched identity” that is “relatively narrow and 
inflexible” (Tuitt 1996, 14). Part one has attempted to outline the origins of refugee 
law and the centrality of Article 1A(2); moving forward, we will see that the on-
going task of refugee law has been to construct the identity of refugee (Tuitt 1996, 
14).  
A historical inquiry into the category of “refugee,” its administration, 
regulation, and codification in law reveals the 1951 Convention is grounded in the 
European political experience (Hathway 1991, 1), for European refugees, only being 
formally extended to all refugees in 1967. If the Convention’s principles and, 
perhaps, human rights originate in Europe and were adopted in order to address 
European problems, I would suggest analyses remain attentive to the limits of the 
construct “refugee.” As Zolberg et al. (1989, 270) observe, the specification of 
“‘exact definitions’ were necessary to prevent the number of refugees from 
multiplying ad infinitum,” and this has become more self-evident over time, because 
the grant of refugee status “represents a privileged form of migration” which “can 
only be given to a limited number of people.” This (perceived) reality or 
understanding of the refugee requires “discriminating interpretations.” To paraphrase 
Halley (1993, 88) on homosexuality and the construction of heterosexuality, law also 
possesses the authority to designate what and who a “refugee” is – and in doing so 
imposes a notion of refugeehood that, as Malkki (1995) tells us, may not account for 
the whole person. The question to consider here, then, may be to explore the 
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consequences of defining the “refugee,” creating a “kind” of person, and to what 
extent the law simplifies the social world and becomes inflexible. The case law 
analytical chapters will examine the tension between universal conceptions of 
refugee law, sexual and gender identity and their particularistic roots in Western 
ideas and institutions. But first we must consider the institutions of the international 
framework that affect UK law and practice.  
2 International law (and norms) in practice  
Part two of this chapter carries forward the discussion of the 1951 Convention within 
the context of international legal norms and highlights the role of international 
institutions. After briefly considering supporting treaties, the first section considers 
the operation of international refugee law, and the second will outline the 
relationship between the UNHCR and states party to the Convention and its Protocol. 
This discussion will conclude with some of the key features of European asylum law 
that are relevant to this research. Finally, I consider the UK implementation of 
refugee law and its asylum system.  
2.1 The international framework of supporting treaties  
Since the Convention does not specify procedures for the determination of “refugee” 
outwith the definition provided in Article 1A(2), it is important to consider the 
interrelations between human rights and refugee law, and the relationship between 
international and domestic law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) stipulates that States Parties to the 1951 Convention must apply it in good 
faith (Einarsen 2011, 40). Nonetheless, in practice states retain considerable leeway 
in the recognition of international refugee law because it is not enforceable by an 
international body, and so the regime provides an ineffective system of 
accountability. Moreover, it is debateable whether the human rights treaties are 
binding on a state unless that state has ratified the specific instruments (Hamilton 
2006, 237–238). This section briefly outlines relevant treaties of international law, 
and how international law (or norms) may affect domestic refugee law. 
In addition to the 1948 UDHR, “the twin International Covenants of 1966” 
outline crucial rights in international law and further clarify the importance of “non-
discrimination” (Hamilton 2006, 237). These are the International Covenant on Civil 
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and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). As noted above, non-discrimination has contributed to 
the progressive development of PSG (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 70–90). 
Non-discrimination has become a central issue in the application of many 
international human rights and refugee law instruments. As Morsink (1999, 331) 
notes, Articles 2 and 7 of the UDHR are the “textual anchors” of a “non-
discrimination theme that runs throughout” that Declaration, and subsequent 
instruments such as the ICCPR and ICESCR further developed the concept, 
reiterating the importance of non-discrimination.  
In international law generally, non-discrimination cuts through multiple 
instruments and forms a cornerstone of human rights protection. Bodies of human 
rights “law reinforce the non-discriminatory basis of international law…which 
impacts on international refugee law in particular” (Edwards 2003, 47). A select list 
of instruments that espouse non-discrimination include the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, 
the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (Haines 2003, 327–28). 
The 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol are, therefore, part of a broader 
international agreement on the validity of non-discrimination in the enjoyment of 
human rights. Though states retain sovereignty in the application of the codified 
standards of international law, the VCLT affirms that there are common rules 
necessary to protect the international order (Hamilton 2006, 238). As international 
treaties are not “self-applying” and their terms are generally not “self-evident,” the 
meaning of non-discrimination, persecution, and non-refoulement among others must 
instead be understood holistically within international human rights and refugee law 
(Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 7).  
Some commentators have expressed concern over how the 1951 Convention 
has been applied at the state level, according to “national subjective considerations, 
overly political concerns, and prejudices that are at odds with the Convention itself” 
(Beyani 2006, 271). This critical theme will be considered in the case law analytical 
chapters regarding sexual minorities seeking asylum in the UK. But it should be 
highlighted here that there is dispute among decision-makers and commentators as to 
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whether asylum is actually codified in international law (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
2007). Instead, it might be more accurate to say that international law posits common 
standards which are in fact persuasive norms lacking coercive force (Kratochwil 
1989, 179; Steiner 1999, 351). That is, the “international norms” of refugee 
protection more aptly summarise the process of “expansion” or “clarification” of 
existing concepts and definitions, because the Convention and its Protocol lack 
coercive means to ensure state compliance with international obligations.  
As with Morsink’s (1999) assertion that the success of the UDHR has 
partially been credited to the aspirational potential of human rights, I consider the 
“norm” of sexual minority recognition under the 1951 Convention today may be 
attributed to the Convention’s ambiguous definitions of PSG and persecution. I will 
further unpack this idea in the case law analytical chapters as it applies in the UK. 
Using this conceptualisation of international law as normative, I turn now to the 
institutions of the refugee regime.  
2.2 Inter- and supra-national institutions, guidance, and law   
This section considers the role of the UNHCR as the key international institution of 
the refugee regime before moving on to the European response to the “asylum 
crisis,” and the relevant EU law and policy in the UK’s application of refugee law. 
The UN General Assembly (UNGA) established the High Commissioner’s Office for 
Refugees in 1949, and the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (hereafter the Statute) was adopted in 1950 (UNHCR 
2010). The Statute called upon states to cooperate with the UNHCR in performance 
of the Office’s functions, to become parties to subsequent conventions, undertake 
their implementation, and enter into other “special agreements with the High 
Commissioner for the execution of measures calculated to improve the situation of 
refugees and to reduce the number requiring protection” (UNGA Resolution 428(V) 
2(a)). Chapter 1(2) of the Statute declares that the work of the High Commissioner 
should be “entirely non-political” in character, humanitarian and relate to “groups 
and categories of refugees.” The Executive Committee (composed of 79 states 
including the UK) approves the material assistance programmes of the UNHCR and 
advises on the High Commissioner’s role as defined by the Statute (UNHCR 2010).  
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 The UNHCR mandate and 1951 Convention contain similar definitions of 
“refugee,” but it is within the competence of the UNHCR to determine refugee status 
under its mandate and for Contracting States to determine refugee status under the 
1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 51–52). 
Thus, a claimant may be recognised both by the UNHCR as a mandate refugee and 
by the state as a Convention refugee, or as one category exclusively (Goodwin-Gill 
and McAdam 2007, 51–52). Therefore, despite similarities, the UNHCR and states 
may derive different meanings from the respective texts (see further Hathaway 1991, 
11–13). The UNHCR also “has the statutory function of supervising the application 
of international conventions for the protection of refugees, and States parties to the 
Convention and Protocol formally undertake to facilitate this duty” (Goodwin-Gill 
and McAdam 2007, 51–52). This is the primary relevance the UNHCR has in this 
research as an international institution – the guidance it issues, especially the 
UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status (2011b, past editions 1992, 1979), will be referenced in subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. 
 The role of the UNHCR in supervising the 1951 Convention is established in 
Articles 35 and 36. Under Article 35, Contracting States are directed to “undertake to 
co-operate” with the UNHCR “in the exercise of its functions, and in particular 
facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of [the] 
Convention” (see generally Anker 2005). Contracting States are to provide the 
UNHCR “information and statistical data” concerning “the condition of refugees,” 
“implementation of [the] Convention,” and “laws, regulations and decrees which 
are…in force relating to refugees.” As a result, the UNHCR in its capacity to offer 
states guidance on instruments can become an important component of progressive 
readings of refugee law (see e.g. Buxton 2012, 402–403 on HJ and HT [2010]). For 
the first time, in 1996 the UNHCR provided that a claim to refugee status could be 
made on grounds of sexual identity (Walker 2003, 253). 
“It is the policy of the UNHCR that persons facing attack, inhumane 
treatment, or serious discrimination because of their homosexuality, 
and whose governments are unable or unwilling to protect them, 
should be recognized as refugees” (UNHCR 1996, 12). 
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The UNHCR has since issued specific guidance on claims to refugee status based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity (see e.g. UNHCR 2011a; UNHCR 2011b). 
Although the determination of refugee status is a state prerogative, and the UNHCR 
lacks the authority to enforce compliance, the UNHCR “can call attention to the legal 
obligations undertaken” by states to implement the Convention and its Protocol 
(Loescher 1989, 19). In a similar way to international law, UNHCR guidance relies 
on persuasive norms to influence state practice (Anker 2005, 108; Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam 2007, 217). 
 The UK is obliged, however, to implement the law of the European Union 
(EU) in relation to refugee status. While the UK maintains an option to participate in 
EU asylum policy, the Labour Government chose to opt-in to measures adopted 
between 1999 and 2004 (Costello and Hancox 2014, 2, 4). Importantly here, the 
previous Conservative-led and current Conservative Government have not opted-in 
to recent policy, such as the 2011 Qualification Directive (recast),51 and have 
expressed a desire to withdraw from previous instruments (Costello and Hancox 
2014, 4). At the time of writing, however, the 2004 Qualification Directive that is 
discussed below still has effect in the UK (see e.g. API 2015, 6–7).  
Here, I begin by discussing the reasons for European cooperation in asylum, 
before shifting to relevant treaties, and conclude with measures that directly affect 
UK law and policy that are relevant to this thesis. Cooperation in this area was 
initially triggered by an “asylum crisis” in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
“crisis” was characterised by an influx of asylum seekers and populist anti-immigrant 
politics, which, it is argued, led to multinational cooperation through the EU 
(Freeman 1995, 889–893). Many European states adopted restrictive immigration 
policies in response to economic recession in the mid-1970s, and many perceived 
themselves to be “overwhelmed” with asylum claims by the 1980s (Zolberg et al. 
1989, 278; Boswell 2000, 541). European states confronted the increasingly difficult 
task of determining large numbers of asylum claims, and began to “streamline” 
procedures to deal with case backlogs (Boswell 2000, 541–542). For example, the 
UK instituted “fast processing of ‘manifestly unfounded’ asylum claims” which lead 
to an increased refusal rate “from 16 per cent in 1993 to 75 per cent in 1994” (Joppke 
                                                 
51 Council Directive 2011/95/EU of December 13, 2011. 
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1999, 134). The fact that a vast majority of asylum seekers in Western Europe were 
refused led many to conclude they were in fact economic migrants (Hollifield 2004, 
899).  
The first meaningful steps to harmonize asylum policy at the EU level 
occurred in the early 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty (Boswell 2000, 542). Early 
measures were not legally binding on Member States. At the 1999 Tampere summit, 
Member States expressed commitment to develop a comprehensive asylum policy 
(Guiraudon 2003). Effective in 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty expressed a 
commitment to adopt legislation on particular areas of asylum policy. The Directives 
subsequently set out minimum standards for recognising refugee status, but these 
initiatives have been criticised by commentators for encouraging a “lowest common 
denominator” approach (Boswell 2000, 543).52 EU asylum policy has focused on 
accelerated determination procedures, an EU-wide definition of refugee, and “safe 
third country” provisions. The 1990 Dublin Convention sets out which contracting 
state is responsible for an asylum claim (Guiraudon 2003, 266–267). The crux of 
Dublin is that it stipulates refugees must “apply for asylum in the first ‘safe country’ 
where they arrive,” meaning they can be returned to this first state without violating 
the principle of non-refoulement (Hollifield 2004, 898; see also Costello and Hancox 
2014, 4–5).  
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) came into 
force in 2009.53 TFEU Article 78(1) stipulates that “the Union shall develop a 
common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a 
view to offering appropriate status” to those in need of protection and in observance 
of the principle of non-refoulement. Moreover, the common asylum policy must be 
in accordance with the 1951 Convention and other relevant treaties. Article 78 also 
provides that the European Parliament and the Council will adopt measures for the 
standardisation of asylum that will be valid throughout the EU. Following from 
TFEU, Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFREU) grants the right of asylum with “due respect for the rules” of the 1951 
                                                 
52 e.g. Joppke (1999, 85) observes European integration allowed Germany to regain sovereignty over 
refugee policy which had previously been restricted under its Basic Law.  
53 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 
2007, 2008/C 115/01. 
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Convention and its Protocol.54 The position of asylum in the CFREU gives it the 
status of a fundamental right for claimants in the EU.  
Finally, the key EU standards and common criteria of asylum in this research 
can be found in the EU Council Directive 2004/83/EC (see generally Lambert 2006). 
The 2004 Directive instructs Member States, including the UK, to consider through 
their own legislative means minimum standards of refugee protection in defining 
PSG and persecution.55 The European Court of Justice (ECJ), now called the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), oversees the application of the 2004 
Directive and has clarified its meaning in decisions that affected UK practice.56 The 
Directive considers a PSG to “share an innate characteristic, or common background 
that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to 
identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it.”57 Moreover, 
a PSG has a “distinct identity…perceived as being different by the surrounding 
society,” and this common characteristic can be sexual orientation, with the 
limitation that it “cannot be understood to include acts considered to be criminal in 
accordance with national law of the Member States.”58 Thus, the 2004 Directive sets 
out a “two limb” or “cumulative” test for PSG as possessing both an “innate 
characteristic” and that it is “perceived as being different” in the country of origin. 
The CJEU affirmed this approach in X, Y, and Z [2013], but the standard has been 
criticised by the UNHCR and commentators for how it applies in practice, and the 
burden imposed on sexual minority claimants (Chelvan 2013, 3–4; Ferreira 2015, 
425–426; cf. Lambert 2006, 169–170). However, the UK House of Lords (UKHL, 
now Supreme Court) observed in K and Fornah [2006] that “[t]he Directive 
expressly permits member states to apply standards more favourable to the applicant 
than the minimum laid down;” therefore, the UKHL followed the UNHCR’s 
Guidelines that an innate characteristic and social perception “should be treated as 
alternatives,” and recognised PSG as applying “where either criterion is met,” but not 
                                                 
54 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02. 
55 Translated to UK law by Regulation 5 of the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection 
(Qualification) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/2525).   
56 e.g. X, Y, and Z [2013] regarding persecution and the enforcement of anti-homosexual laws; A, B, 
and C [2014] regarding evidence and proof in sexual identity claims.  
57 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of April 29, 2004. Article 10(1)(d).  
58 Ibid. In other words, the Directive incorporates two approaches to interpreting PSG, the “protected 
characteristics” or “immutability” approach and the “social perception” approach (see Appendix II); 
these will be considered in chapters six and seven. 
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requiring both (Lord Bingham, para 16). The 2004 Directive sets out that persecution 
must be committed in respect of an Article 1A(2) ground, and is defined as: 
“(a) sufficiently serious by its nature or repetition as to constitute a 
severe violation of a basic human right, in particular a right from 
which derogation cannot be made under Article 15 of the [ECHR]; or 
(b) an accumulation of various measures, including a violation of a 
human right which is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a 
similar manner as specified in (a).”59 
These are minimum EU standards the UK must apply in determining asylum claims; 
again, Member States may apply more generous standards. The relationship between 
EU law and its application in the UK is considered in several cases considered in this 
thesis, especially the 2004 Directive. 
2.3 UK implementation of refugee law 
Thus far the chapter has set out the relevant background necessary to consider how 
the UK recognises refugees in practice. The cases studied in this thesis cover the 
period 1999 to 2012, and over that time a series of legislative changes reorganised 
the UK asylum system and how claims progressed through the appeals process. This 
section overviews the most relevant statutory changes, the roles and titles of specific 
“adjudicators” – a term I use broadly to describe decision-makers of asylum claims at 
all levels of appeal – as well as the general structure of appeals in the relevant period. 
In conclusion, I revisit the question of the relevance of human rights in the form of 
the 1998 Human Rights Act (HRA). 
Although a signatory to both, the UK has not “expressly” incorporated the 
1951 Convention and its Protocol into domestic law. Instead, “successive legislative 
references and the content of rules adopted” in relation to refugee law has led UK 
“courts to conclude that, to all intents and purposes, [the Convention and its 
Protocol] are indeed part of domestic law” (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 44). 
For the purposes of this study, a rough outline of the judicial and administrative 
structures of refugee status determination (RSD) will provide sufficient background 
for examining the construction of identity and persecution in the case law. The body 
of statutory law set out below concerning immigration and asylum has transformed 
                                                 
59 Ibid. Article 9. 
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the appeals process over time. Following an initial decision from the Secretary of 
State for the Home Department (SSHD),60 if the asylum claim was refused, the 
tribunals to which the appellant first appealed were, in order of creation: Immigration 
Appellate Authority (1971-2005), Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (2005-2010), 
and the First Tier Tribunal (since 2010). Onward challenges from tribunals are 
submitted to the High Court or the Court of Appeal depending on procedure and 
disputed legal questions.61 A final appeal may have been heard previously by the UK 
House of Lords (UKHL) and currently the Supreme Court (UKSC) in difficult 
cases.62  
The first system of immigration appeals was introduced by the Immigration 
Appeals Act 1969 which established a two-tier system (Harvey 2000, 155–156; 
Kotzeva et al. 2008, 210–211). Following this, the Immigration Act of 1971 
replicated many provisions from the previous Act and the two-tier appellant structure 
of Adjudicators and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) under the Immigration 
Appellate Authority (IAA) (Harvey 2000, 156). The rules of the 1971 Act provided 
that the UK’s obligations under the 1951 Convention should be considered for 
someone seeking asylum (Kotzeva et al. 2008, 210–211). Under the IAA, following 
from an initial decision of the SSHD, a refused asylum claim could be appealed to an 
Adjudicator and then the IAT. Further, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 
2002 (NIAA 2002) provided for the dismissal of unfounded claims, added a list of 
“safe countries” to the statutory law (e.g. EU Member States), and limited the scope 
of the Tribunal’s power to review. Regarding the power to review, the Tribunal’s 
remit had previously extended to error of fact (e.g. likelihood of persecution) or point 
of law (e.g. definition of persecution) in hearing appeals, but the NIAA 2002 limited 
grounds of appeal to the IAT to an error of law (Kotzeva et al. 2008, 211; Goodwin-
Gill and McAdam 2007, 536). The IAA tribunal system remained largely intact until 
its dissolution in 2005, at which point it was superseded by the AIT scheme. 
                                                 
60 Under the SSHD, formerly the UK Border Agency (UKBA) and currently UK Visas and 
Immigration (UKVI) staff make initial decisions – I simplify this initial stage and identify the SSHD, 
rather than UKBA Case Owners, Presenting Officers (see e.g. Baillot et al. 2012, 271–272), and 
others under earlier legislation, considering that the sample of case law concerns the appeals process. 
61 The Court of Session is relevant to appeals in Scotland but does not concern the sample of cases 
here. 
62 The UKSC was created by the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 and began hearing cases in 2009 
as the highest appellate court in the UK for civil cases. Formerly, Lords of Appeal in the Ordinary 
(“Law Lords”) were professional judges appointed to the UKHL to perform its judicial functions. 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Refugee law   69 
The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) was created under the Asylum 
and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (AIA 2004) and began 
hearing cases in 2005. The AIA 2004 abolished the two-tier system of Adjudicator 
and IAT under the IAA and replaced this with a single-tier appellate system (Thomas 
2008, 502; Kotzeva et al. 2008, 211–212). In short, asylum seekers first submitted a 
claim with the SSHD and appeals against a negative decision were heard by the AIT 
(Sweeney 2007, 20). Under the AIA 2004, Adjudicators became Immigration Judges 
(IJ) (Sweeney 2007, 20). With the introduction of the single tier, appeals were heard 
by a single IJ or panel of AIT members depending on the circumstances of a 
particular case (Kotzeva et al. 2008, 211–212). The single-tier meant applications for 
reconsideration and review would then go to the High Court or the Court of Appeal 
(see generally Thomas 2008, 495–497). 
The current appeal system is structured according to the Tribunals, Courts 
and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA). This reformed the appeals system and 
introduced the Immigration and Asylum Chamber (IAC) First Tier Tribunal (FTT) 
and Upper Tribunal (UT). Importantly, under the TCEA the UT was vested with 
greater authority to shape FTT practice.63 In chronological order, a refused asylum 
claim on appeal as of 2010 (TCEA in force) proceeds from the SSHD (or UKVI 
decision-maker), to the FTT, UT, High Court or the Court of Appeal, and finally the 
most contentious cases may come before the UKSC. Figure 1, below, roughly 








                                                 
63 Although tribunals “do not have a common law based jurisdiction,” and therefore lack power to set 
precedent, higher courts such as the Court of Appeal have “explicitly encouraged the immigration 
tribunal to give detailed guidance on country conditions to ensure consistency of approach” in asylum 
cases (Elliott and Thomas 2012, 319). 
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FIG 1 Structure of the appeals process64 
 
There are two general points to be distilled from this discussion. Firstly, the UKSC, 
formerly the UKHL, and the Court of Appeal, consider errors of law and establish 
precedents to be followed by the tribunals. Secondly, under the IAA, AIT, and FTT 
                                                 
64 Unlike Figures 2 and 3, I have largely based Figure 1 on another source, an outline by Elliot and 
Thomas (2012, 307). 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Refugee law   71 
and UT today, the specialist adjudicators can generally be said (with variation over 
time and tribunal tier) to deal with both fact and law.  
One final piece of UK legislation requires consideration which links back to 
the previous discussion of human rights. Adjudicators must consider whether the 
UK’s obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) are 
engaged in RSD (Sweeney 2007, 21; Johnson 2011, 72–73). The 1950 ECHR was 
given further effect in domestic UK law by the HRA 1998; for example, section 6(1) 
of that act states “[i]t is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right.” Section 6(3) of the HRA defines a “public 
authority” as including (a) “a court or tribunal,” and (b) “any person certain of whose 
functions are functions of a public nature.” HRA Section 2(1) provides that courts 
and tribunals must also take into account any “judgement, decision, declaration or 
advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights” (ECtHR) in “determining 
a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention Right.” The ECtHR has 
developed jurisprudence in relation to torture,65 private life,66 as well as other 
relevant grounds that affect asylum law in the UK. Therefore, the “European 
dimension” intersects UK asylum law through EU Directives and Regulations and 
the rulings of the CJEU, as well as the rights proscribed by the ECHR and interpreted 
by the ECtHR.  
3 Conclusion 
The contribution of this chapter to the broader project has been to establish the key 
instruments and concepts of international refugee law, and how the UK relates to this 
framework of refugee protection. In addition to outlining what the instruments and 
institutions are and, generally, how refugee law operates, this chapter has considered 
how the international framework may help us to understand how the persecution of 
sexual minorities and their need for protection have been “read-in” under Article 
1A(2). In the interpretation of the 1951 Convention, “particular social group” can be 
understood as an example of an organic element in law. Whether in clarification or 
redefinition of the category, the development of PSG is illustrative of the general 
                                                 
65 e.g. Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR. 
66 e.g. Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149; Bensaid v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 
10. 
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principles of refugee law, and the extension of recognition to unforeseen groups in 
immediate need of protection. As argued by Türk and Nicholson (2003, 42), 
“international refugee law is less an exact science than a regime that needs to be 
responsive to individual circumstances.” Elsewhere, the 1951 Convention has been 
termed a “living instrument” (Zimmerman and Mahler 2011, 299). 
Throughout, I have attempted to structure this chapter and my analysis to 
allude to where there have been and are spaces for change, or pliability in refugee 
law to accommodate sexual minority asylum seekers. To do so in this context I 
outlined the fundamentals of international and domestic refugee protection. Reading 
the travaux préparatoires, PSG was apparently not intended to be an indefinite 
“catch all” category. As we will see in the case law considered in subsequent 
chapters, states have sought to constrain PSG in order to preserve the “integrity” of 
Article 1(A) of the Convention. However, in application, spaces for change in 
domestic law have been created by the continuous interpretation (or as some would 
claim, clarification) of PSG, prima facie allowing the broadest possible application 
of the Convention, while attempting to preserve the integrity of that Convention and 
international principles of universal human rights. In the case law analytical chapters, 
I will consider the evolution of the jurisprudential definition of “particular social 
group,” and how the persecution of sexual minorities has been recognised, part and 
parcel of identifying spaces for change present in legal discourse for the progressive 








  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Socio-legal discourse analysis   73 
Chapter Three – Socio-legal discourse analysis: 
Research design, methodology, and theoretical 
framework 
Chapter one established that sexual and gender identity are culturally relative and 
are, like the construct of refugee discussed in chapter two, historically contingent. 
These background chapters also suggested that a discursive approach is best suited to 
study how the recognition of “refugee” and “persecution” have been progressively 
transformed over time, and how the jurisprudence may obscure sociologically 
problematic assumptions made by adjudicators. Therefore, this chapter proposes an 
approach that is contextual and exploratory. Using socio-legal discourse analysis will 
allow the research to attend to the “performative aspects of [the] texts,” including the 
case law and other documentary evidence, “as sites of definitional creation, violence, 
and rupture in relation to [the] particular institutional circumstances” (Sedgwick 
1991, 3) of refugee status determination (RSD). The approach will be contrasted to 
“traditional” legal analysis and “positivist” social research. In other words, this work 
will be critical in its theoretical approach, and not a “doctrinal” legal analysis. 
Instead, this socio-legal study will utilise a small sample of cases to consider how 
“legitimate” or “genuine” sexual minority refugees have been read-in through the 
case law.  
After setting out the theoretical approach and research questions, this chapter 
outlines the research design and methodology for the analysis undertaken in the case 
law analytical chapters. The subsequent section explains the importance of the 
United Kingdom as a case study and the process of selecting legal cases for analysis. 
The last two sections of this chapter will consider my conceptual framework for 
interpreting the case law as well as the decision-making process. This 
conceptualisation is necessary to link “text to context” as a foundation for the case 
law analysis in chapters four and five, but it will also inform the theoretical critiques 
and further analysis of the research findings in chapters six and seven.  
1 Theoretical approach and research questions 
I am guided by social constructivist and critical theory perspectives on social 
research. This section outlines each in turn and then the research questions. Although 
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there are different traditions of constructivism, constructivist theories in general 
attempt to explain how social processes and interaction constitute shared meanings or 
a knowledge of reality. Constructivism has been applied on a macro level, at which 
an “institution” may be defined as “a relatively stable set or ‘structure’ of identities 
and interests” (Wendt 1992, 399). As such, Wendt attempts to explain conflict 
through the social construction of reality, because “[w]ithout ideas, there are no 
interests, without interests there are no meaningful material conditions, without 
material conditions there is no reality at all” (Wendt 1999, 139). The last two 
sections of this chapter will first consider the roles of “institutions” and actors in 
constructing the refugee, and then how legal decision-making is in effect 
constructivism in practice.  
Constructivism is the most appropriate theoretical approach here because the 
focus is on legal engagements with identity, an essential concept in these theories. A 
constructivist perspective of identity is that it “is a phenomenon that emerges from a 
dialectic between the individual and society” (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 195), and 
these theories emphasise that “a sense of self as a human individual cannot develop 
without social processes” (Jamieson 2002, 509; see also 2012, 4.8). In other words, 
“identities are not something people ‘have’ or ‘are’ but resources that people ‘use’ 
something they ‘do’” (Jamieson 2002, 508). An identity such as “gay” does not “pre-
exist,” but is a construction of, on some level, social interaction. While identity is 
constructed in “fluid” social processes and is therefore not “reified,” it must also be 
acknowledged that identity categories can become notionally fixed rather than being 
experienced as contingent, which allows people to develop a stable sense of self and 
belonging (see further Jamieson 2002).  
The critical perspective in this thesis does not deny that people have stable 
identities and these are significant to living as, for example, LGB or T. However, I 
am concerned that the legal discourse may in fact impose certain forms of identity 
that do not correspond to an individual’s subjectivity, or that adjudicators may fail to 
acknowledge that identity can be a malleable concept. Universal categories of gender 
and sexuality were problematised in chapter one by the accounts of historical 
contingency and global diversity. Adapting Halley’s (1993, 88) insights on the 
construction of heterosexuality, I would similarly observe that in the context of 
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refugee law, adjudicators have the “epistemological authority to know and to 
designate what (and who) a homosexual is” (see also Bourdieu 1987, 838; 
Harrington and Yngvesson 1990, 140–141; Lacey 1998, 125). Therefore, this 
research should remain attentive to how RSD may be ethically violent (Hoad 2000) 
or homonormative (Wilkinson 2014); that is, if discourses of human rights and 
refugee law are based on the assumption of a universal homosexual subject that may 
impose arbitrary and exclusive categories in transnational contexts (Hoad 2000, 153). 
The queer critique of “homonormativity” in this context adds that relying on the 
categories of “LGBT” can be problematic in universal human rights discourse if one 
presupposes who the holder of rights is, and what those rights should be on Western, 
“homonormative” ways to be gay (Wilkinson 2014).  
Drawing upon the critical, queer, postmodern and, to some extent, feminist 
works cited, I will argue that refugee law can and should avoid essential or 
immutable categories (Fuss 1991, 6–7; Duggan 1995, 177; Hart and Bauman 1996, 
1–8), and affirm sexual and gendered differences in opposition to what may be called 
the “logic of identity” (Lacey 1998, 154; see Appendix II and chapter six). This 
perspective is especially drawn from queer thought, but that deconstructive effort 
parallels many socio-legal analyses (see e.g. Bower 1994; Mertz 1994; Merry 1995). 
Finally, I have used “critical theory” broadly to describe that I view this research and 
its findings as a “relative” account, in addition to the politically-minded critiques that 
are developed in Part III. Just as Young (1990, 13) explains in her analysis, the 
present study was undertaken from a particular vantage point: “a specific location in 
a specific society, [and] I can claim in this writing to be neither impartial nor 
comprehensive.” This work does not (or cannot) “separate social facts from social 
values,” or “[claim] to be value-neutral” in its analysis (Young 1990, 5; see also Hart 
and Bauman 1996, 4; Fairclough 1999, 207–208; Blaikie 2009, 17).  
There remain a number of unanswered questions in the transnational context 
of migration regarding gender and sexuality, and particularly how states become 
involved in the construction of identities in the asylum process (see e.g. Grewal and 
Kaplan 2001, 670). This project is not necessarily about the actual sexual or gender 
identities and experiences of refugees from an ethnographic standpoint. Rather, this 
thesis explores how the UK, as a refugee-receiving state, has identified sexual 
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minorities, constructed identity, and recognised the attendant persecutions asylum 
seekers flee. The research interrogates how gay refugees have been recognised as 
eligible or “legitimate” under the Refugee Convention through UK adjudicators’ 
interpretation of law.  
(1) How do UK legal institutions construct “legitimate” or “genuine” 
sexual minority asylum seekers in judicial decision-making?67 This research 
question aims to discover what exclusions are produced in asylum law or how the 
construct “refugee” is kept sufficiently narrow. Although the UK may recognise 
refugee status on the grounds of sexual and gender identity, questions remain as to 
whether (or how) institutional actors impose cultural norms in definitions of asylum 
categories (e.g. LGBT), especially in relation to recent developments. Based on 
concerns raised in the existing literature, this question intends to focus on how 
refugee law may privilege certain groups and individuals such as “LGBT” asylum 
seekers whose identities and behaviours are perceived to be congruent to Western 
labels, potentially undermining individual difference and global diversity that were 
explored in chapter one. 
(a) How does law identify sexual and gender identity in the transnational 
context of asylum? Given that sexual and gender identities and behaviours are 
culturally relative, asylum claims on these grounds are highly challenging in 
transnational judicial decision-making. LGBT categories need to be geographically 
and temporally bracketed as culturally relative and historically contingent. Yet, 
Mertz (1994, 1256) concludes that the nature of legal categorisation necessarily leads 
to “some degree of reification,” and she highlights that the question is not if law 
views particular characteristics of individuals and groups rigidly, “but how, and to 
what degree, and with what consequences.” The implications for sexual minorities 
claiming asylum may be that non-Western, non-conforming identities and behaviours 
are not cognisable to adjudicators, or that particular “forms” of identity are imposed 
                                                 
67 I use “legitimate” and “genuine” somewhat interchangeably but intend a different connotation in the 
use of each term. “Legitimate” pertains to the accepted claim to refugee status; “genuine” is slightly 
broader and means to imply the asylum seeker’s sexual or gender identity is cognisable and “true,” not 
an “unsettled” desire or fantasy, but deeply felt and constitutive of human dignity (purportedly 
“immutable”). Regarding persecution, “legitimate” refers to the objective and established well-
founded fear of persecution but, again, “genuine” may be broader and refer to both the objective and 
subjective well-founded fear in the assessment of credibility. In other words, an asylum seeker may 
have a genuine, subjective fear of persecution, but an adjudicator may find that is not an objective fear 
sufficient to make a legitimate claim to refugee status. 
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on or expected of asylum seekers in legal decision-making. 
(b) How is the persecution of sexual minorities understood in legal and 
political discourse? Establishing persecution is essential in an asylum claim, thus 
attention to this as a separate sub-question is warranted. Understanding the 
construction of legitimate asylum seekers also involves the problematic issue of 
delineating “when discrimination shades into persecution,” which is particularly 
difficult in cases “where [minority groups] are systematically treated less favourably 
than others” (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 86). Prior studies have examined 
practical consequences of how persecution is recognised, for example, the 
expectation that asylum seekers can return to the country of origin on the basis they 
will exercise “discretion” to avoid persecution (e.g. Millbank 2009a). But additional 
work into how the persecution of sexual minorities is constituted in the legal and 
political discourse of UK asylum recognition contributes to the literature in this field, 
and enhances extant explanations of what constitutes a “legitimate” sexual minority 
asylum claim. 
(c) What are the implications of this research for theories of sexual and 
gender identity and, in particular, for sexual autonomy? Adapting a problem 
posed by Plummer (1992, 18) to the context of sexual minority asylum, we might 
ask: Is it possible to agree on what we can really “know” about sexual and gender 
identity in order to accommodate (global) diversity, and deploy Western “gay” 
identities in rights claims while still remaining sensitive to (local) difference? 
Drawing on conclusions from this research, this thesis proposes a relational 
autonomy framework for understanding, adjudicating, and advocating transnational 
sexual minority asylum claims.  
2 Research design and methodology 
To answer the research questions, the methodological approach adopted consisted in 
a qualitative, exploratory inquiry attuned to the broader context of refugee law. The 
study followed multiple units of analysis, such as emergent identity categories, and 
recognised forms of persecution (Yin 2009, 18, 53–54). For example, the research 
actively resisted pre-defining a sexual minority refugee, but certain categories were 
identified in the case law early in the research (e.g. “open” versus “discreet” 
homosexuals). Utilising archival sources, this case study research design allowed for 
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an in-depth investigation into the socio-legal construction of sexual minorities and 
recognised persecution. 
As a small-n research design without a testable hypothesis or a predefined 
data set, the research strategy compensated with rich description of empirical and 
publicly available data to persuasively argue the validity of the findings (Bryman 
2004, 273; Yin 2009, 40–45, 102). The case selection, which will be discussed in the 
next section, is especially pertinent because this project faces many of the limitations 
of other qualitative projects, especially relating to generalisability (see e.g. Jaworski 
and Coupland 1999, 36–38; Gomm et al. 2000, 17–98). Generalisability in the 
present context refers to a matter of “fit” between the chosen case – the UK – and 
other jurisdictions to which it may be possible to apply this study’s concepts and 
conclusions (Scholfield 1993, 200). The hope is that the thick descriptions of the 
socio-political context of legal decisions and the construction of legitimate or 
genuine asylum claims allow the research conclusions to be judged to “fit” or inform 
studies of other refugee receiving states (Scholfield 1993, 200; Bechhofer and 
Paterson 2000, 42).  
Framing the study as socio-legal is especially apposite considering that the 
research questions focus on law’s construction of identities, and the relationship 
between law and the social world (Lacey 1998, 221–223; Banakar and Travers 
2005b, 135–136). A socio-legal approach is ideal in this study of tensions between 
fluid sociological images of gender and sexuality, and the more rigid, and, therefore, 
conflicting perspective that law derives from individual cases, formal practice, and 
state imperatives (Banakar and Travers 2005a, 12–13; 2005b, 133). The socio-legal 
approach applied in this thesis can be distinguished from a doctrinal study of the law, 
because the former takes the latter as the object of study. In doing so the aim is to 
free the study of legal discourse from the jurisprudential debate on law between 
“formalism” that conceptually separates law from the “social world,” and the 
competing notion of “instrumentalism” that sees “law as a reflection” of power or 
“tool in the service of dominant groups” (Bourdieu 1987, 814). The socio-legal 
approach here seeks to look at asylum law from the outside, rather than on its own 
terms, to deconstruct the discourses of its operation, in order to assess the impact of 
the jurisprudential debate on sexual minority asylum seekers (Lacey 1998, 222–223). 
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Lacey (1998, 230–231) argues that socio-legal studies should be concerned with the 
source and understanding of values, and recognise the exclusions in legal practices. 
Further, this means not only “generating insights…about the deep meaning of legal 
practices but also about how such practices might be reconstructed” (Lacey 1998, 
231). 
A flexible socio-legal research framework supports a transdisciplinary 
approach open to multiple methods and sources of data. Framing the study as 
transdisciplinary allows the thesis to strategically draw upon the fields of sociology, 
political and legal studies. It is trans-disciplinary or across disciplines because legal 
studies does not have an independent methodology relevant to answering the 
research questions. Instead, law “borrows” knowledge from other fields such as 
social research (Good 2007), instrumentally to accomplish its purposes; for example, 
how evidence is deployed in legal discourse to determine the truth of a sexual 
minority asylum claim (see Cotterrell 1998, 174). Therefore, this research cannot, 
strictly speaking, be inter-disciplinary in the sense of combining different approaches 
to address the problem (Cotterrell 1995; 1998).  
Within a socio-legal framework, I employed discourse analysis to research 
how asylum law understands “genuine” identity and constructs the “legitimate” 
claims of sexual minority refugees (see Appendix II on “legitimate”). In this sense, 
socio-legal discourse analysis “aims at discovering how social identities…(power) 
relations and systems of knowledge are signified, constituted, and constructed” 
(Banakar and Travers 2005b, 136). Drawing on a broad range of texts, discourse 
analysis was used to explore how sexual minority identities are constituted in legal 
discourse, and how the asylum system(s) govern the recognition of genuine sexual 
minority refugees (Jaworski and Coupland 1999b, 135–136; Banakar and Travers 
2005b, 136). Applying discourse analysis in legal contexts can be used to understand 
how “judgments about intention” are created by participants (Wood and Kroger 
2000, 14–15), to “reveal” the way the texts represent concepts of gender, sexuality, 
and persecution and, more generally, the “ideological functions of language in 
producing, reproducing or changing social structures, relations, identities” (Mayr 
2003, 5 cited in Benwell and Stokoe 2006, 105; see also Fairclough 1999, 202). The 
analysis seeks to uncover the constructs of identity and persecution, especially in 
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finding how “cultural meaning,” for example, is infused into the legal discourse. 
Through “interrogating the cultural meanings” of the case law and legal frameworks 
of RSD, we may “uncover the unconscious bias inherent in…judicial decisions” on 
sexual minority refugee status (Morgan 2006, 147).  
Applying discourse-analytic methods, broadly, to interpret “texts,” including 
archived written, visual and audio data, allowed for a wide array of evidence to be 
drawn on for the case study (Jupp and Norris 1993, 46–49; Wood and Kroger 2000). 
But the principle sources of data in the case law analytical chapters are decisions of 
UK courts. The analysis identifies intertextuality
 
between UK decisions and other 
countries’ case law (or “international refugee law”) in the creation of LGBT asylum 
precedents in order to answer the research questions (Bakhtin 1999, 130–131; 
Fairclough 1999, 184–185).68 The analysis in chapters four and five links the 
discussion of UK cases to other authorities in the “transnational” or “transjudicial” 
conversation where possible (discussed in the next section), such as where this lends 
legitimacy to a particular UK interpretation of the Convention. Similarly, the analysis 
attempts to show the dense interconnections of UK case law at various levels – 
conceptualising judges as institutional authors – noting how adjudicators cite other 
determinations, and the purpose and intention of intertextuality, for example, 
implicitly or explicitly invoking a case such as Amare [2005] that developed a 
consequentialist line of reasoning that prioritised immigration control and a narrow 
vision of human rights. The work also attempts to draw in other institutional texts 
where relevant, such as UK Asylum Policy Instructions (APIs) and other policy 
guidelines like UNHCR Guidance, as these texts may influence judicial decision-
making and vice versa.  
More specifically, the discursive approach of this thesis is most akin to 
critical discourse analysis, “notably [in] its questioning of objectivity and its interest 
in the practices which produce apparent objectivity, normality and factuality” 
(Jaworski and Coupland 1999a, 33, see also 1999b, 497). Discourse analysis may be 
                                                 
68 The “intertextual perspective [sees] discourse as the recontextualising of already existing forms and 
meanings, one text echoing and partially replaying the forms, meanings and values of another” 
(Jaworski and Coupland 1999b, 53, see also 139). Therefore, the intertextual approach sets out “to 
track how various forms of discourses, and their associated values and assumptions, are incorporated 
into a particular text, why, and with what effects” (Jaworski and Coupland 1999a, 9). By 
intertextuality I mean how the case is cited and deployed, e.g. by other judgments, government 
policies, and in decision-making (see Barnes et al. 1996, 57–59; Benwell and Stokoe 2006, 107). 
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resisted as a research “method” (i.e. used theoretically) and may always be on some 
level “critical” (see e.g. Jaworski and Coupland 1999a). It seems to me that discourse 
analysis can only be done from an interpretive, subjective perspective, and the 
findings will have critical or politically reconstructive implications whether or not 
this is made explicit in the research (Finch 1986, 3). Parts II, the case law analytical 
chapters, and III, the theoretical contribution, of this thesis contrast the case law 
against social research and theory, and critique the apparent political imperatives 
behind supposedly objective legal decision-making (Lacey 1998, 145–146). For 
example, the case law analytical chapters highlight how case law often constructs 
“genuine” identities as immutable, innate or unchangeable (see in particular chapter 
four). Politically, this study also critiques adjudicators’ invocations of the UK’s so-
called “legitimate aim of firm but fair immigration control” (Amare [2005], para 4) 
and the impact this perception has had on sexual minority refugee recognition (see in 
particular chapter five). In sum, the discourse analysis involves a variety of “texts” to 
elaborate the practical and symbolic importance of these events in answering the 
research questions. 
3 Case selection and primary data 
The UK case is a good example of a country where sexual and gender identity-based 
asylum claims have been increasingly recognised. As such it provides an interesting 
site for elucidating the considerations underpinning legal decisions on sexual 
minorities seeking asylum. This section explores why the UK is an important case 
study in more depth, and argues that the research findings may be generalisable or 
widely applicable to refugee law and other Signatory States, before considering the 
method(s) of selection of the legal cases for analysis.  
The UK House of Lords, now the Supreme Court, and Court of Appeal are 
authoritative in the “transnational judicial conversation” of refugee law (Hathaway 
and Pobjoy 2012, 338), or what Slaughter (1994) calls “transjudicial 
communication.” Transjudicial communication is “communication among courts – 
whether national or supranational – across borders” (Slaughter 1994, 101). This 
conceptualisation is particularly apt to explain how refugee law could be described as 
quasi-international and is applied by Signatory States, such as the UK where there is 
apparently “a reliance on persuasive authority” and “a sense of common judicial 
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identity and enterprise” (Slaughter 1994, 102; see also Kratochwil 1989; Tobin 2012, 
especially 454 on “interpretive communities”). Chapter four will consider the 
importance of persuasive, transnational case law in the evolution of PSG; chapter 
five considers the constraint of so-called “international consensus” on the 
interpretation of persecution in particular.  
UK law is internationally significant to the construction of the notion of 
refugee. In addition to the influence it enjoys in the “transjudicial conversations” 
between common law countries, UK judgments are also important in Europe. For 
example, following the key case of HJ and HT [2010], Sweden adopted the Supreme 
Court’s approach to determination of sexual identity-based asylum claims (Jansen 
2013, 4), and courts in Norway and Finland have also endorsed the decision 
(Chelvan 2013, 8). If the argument that the UK’s stature in the “transnational judicial 
conversation” of refugee law fails, at minimum we can establish that HJ and HT 
[2010] is in itself significant and worthy of additional academic attention. Decided 
by “one of the world’s most influential courts” (Tobin 2012, 482), HJ and HT is one 
of “the two highest-level judicial determinations in the world to address gay refugee 
claims to date” (Millbank 2012, 500).69 Therefore, it is important to understand the 
relevant history, social and theoretical contexts of identity, and the case law which 
was integral to the Supreme Court’s decision. This thesis will elaborate how the UK 
came to occupy one of the most facially “progressive” stances on sexual minority 
asylum claims and human rights (i.e. at least in terms of case law). 
As an exploratory case study this research did not begin with a particular set 
of legal cases for analyses. Instead, it employed “theoretical sampling,” a sub-type of 
purposive sampling, to collect data from judicial decisions, guidance, as well as 
legislation to contextualise the cases (Glaser and Strauss 1968, 45–77; Layder 1998, 
47). Data generation was guided by the emerging concepts, identifying legitimate 
identities and fears of persecution recognised by legal institutions (Corbin and 
Strauss 2008, 195; Blaikie 2009, 143–144, 178, 179). Through “purposive sampling” 
a substantial roster of key cases were collated. Cases were selected for this work 
                                                 
69 The other national-level decision being S395 [2003] of the High Court of Australia, which is 
considered extensively in the UK case law and discussed where relevant in this thesis; two judgments 
of the CJEU, X, Y, and Z [2013] and A, B, and C [2014], clarified aspects of EU standards in relation 
to sexual orientation and might also be highly classed, but these necessarily considered the 
interpretation of the Directives and not the Refugee Convention per se.   
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drawing first from key House of Lords/Supreme Court and Court of Appeal 
judgments relating to sexual identity-based asylum claims (see Appendices IV 
“Select table of cases” and V “Case summaries”). The first decision to recognise 
homosexuals as a PSG, Islam and Shah [1999], and K and Fornah [2006], which 
further clarified the parameters of PSG, are the key House of Lords decisions prior to 
the creation of the Supreme Court and its judgment in HJ and HT [2010]. I then 
turned to legal database tools such as Westlaw UK, which allow the searcher to find 
key cases that have cited or relied on, for example, Islam and Shah [1999], and a 
number of cases were marked as relevant from mining the academic literature. 
Ultimately, a sample of thirteen Court of Appeal cases from 1999 to 2010 was 
generated, including appeals cited in HJ and HT [2010].  
House of Lords and Supreme Court judgments are binding on the Court of 
Appeal, and the decisions of all of these courts are binding on Tribunals and 
Adjudicators. Emphasis on these key cases in this thesis is justified because they are 
authoritative and therefore crucial to the UK recognition of sexual minority refugees. 
However, the sample also includes several Tribunal-level determinations and second-
hand accounts of these decisions in order to contextualise the jurisprudence in 
practice, and to further elaborate the development of particular lines of judicial 
thought. One notable IAT determination, RM and BB [2005], flagged as a Country 
Guidance (CG) case, is cited throughout this thesis, because of the reliance 
subsequent precedent-setting judgments placed on the Tribunal’s factual findings on 
Iran (see Thomas 2008, especially 494 on CG). Two AIT determinations are also in 
the main sample given they were appealed in other cases cited. Finally, two UT 
(IAC) determinations are considered to illustrate how HJ and HT [2010] has been 
applied. In total, the main sample consists of 22 cases, including: 3 House of Lords 
and Supreme Court, 13 Court of Appeal, 2 Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber), 3 Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, 
and 1 High Court decisions. These are summarised in Appendix V, which also 
contains some additional context and explanation as to why these cases are crucial to 
answering the research questions. A range of other domestic and international legal 
cases particular to refugee law, and also human rights, are considered, where they are 
relevant to understanding the development of cases in the main sample.  
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4 Interpreting and analysing the data 
Having set out the research strategy, it is now necessary to conceptualise a 
theoretical framework, or approach to the data, and analysis (Crotty 1998, 7–9; 
Punch 2006, 48–49; Blaikie 2009, 128). As set out in the methodology section, 
discourse analysis will be used to explore how sexual minority identities are 
constituted in the legal discourse, and how the asylum system governs the 
recognition of legitimate sexual minority refugees (Banakar and Travers 2005b, 
136). The analysis of legal discourse includes the available evidence in treaties, 
statutes, cases, and guidance notes. In addition to the establishment of precedent, the 
research is concerned with the ways in which adjudicators represent, construct, and 
reify identity and persecution, because the question may not be if law does this, but 
how and the possible consequences (Mertz 1994, 1256; see also Lacey 1998, 144–
145). To make sense of the legal texts, a theoretical bridge is required between the 
methodology described above and the analysis of the process of RSD (see e.g. 
Blaikie 2009, 20–21, 124–129), or “linking text to contexts,” because “[h]ow texts 
are produced and interpreted…depends on the nature of the social context” 
(Fairclough 1999, 206). 
  It is first necessary to state that the research analysis will cite and discuss the 
written determinations of Adjudicators, Immigration Judges, Lords Justice, Lords 
and Baroness Hale70 as authors. These authors are writing in particular 
circumstances (or contexts) with a specific purpose and audience to be addressed. In 
moving beyond a “doctrinal” approach to the law, the documents are where possible 
acknowledged to be works of “authors” that construct meaning, creating or 
interpreting law in relation to the social world (see Bourdieu 1987; Lacey 1998, 232–
233; Fairclough 1999, 204).71 For example, these authors define the scope of 
particular legal concepts such as persecution and “find” facts in asylum claims which 
                                                 
70 The only woman appointed as a Law Lord; no other woman has been appointed to the Supreme 
Court (as of 2015). To my knowledge, no Lady Justice on the Court of Appeal heard an appeal in the 
sample here. 
71 In a sense, this approach to asylum law recognises that it is a “quintessential form of symbolic 
power of naming that creates things named, and creates social groups in particular” (Bourdieu 1986, 
838). Symbolic power “is a power of consecration or revelation, the power to consecrate or reveal 
things that are already there” (Bourdieu 1989, 23). This perspective is taken in tandem with that 
presented in chapter one, that adjudicators possess the epistemological authority to know what and 
who homosexuals are (Halley 1993, 88), and by extension here whether or not they have a well-
founded fear of persecution (see also Mehan 1999). 
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together may or may not constitute persecution. The analysis of the case law should 
be attuned to the role of adjudicators in construction of legal facts (Sweeney 2007). 
Jurists are authors that draw upon a diverse range of narratives to reach conclusions 
in a process that reshapes refugee status in the case law. In citing all adjudicators as 
authors, it is also acknowledged that decisions should be attributed to the tribunals 
and courts on which they sit as well, in order to assess the “collective judgements” 
(Barnes et al. 1996, 56), and the standing of particular decisions in the jurisprudence 
and recognition of LGBT-based claims in the UK. 
Labelling adjudicators as “authors” could also be extended to other “jurists” 
who write and practice in this field such as legal practitioners and scholars who have 
contributed to the process of reading-in sexual minority refugees under Article 1A(2) 
of the Refugee Convention (see Lacey 1998, 141–143 on “legal community”).72 
Adjudicators, practitioners, and academics are “gatekeepers” in refugee law (Bhabha 
2002). In addition to decision-makers, solicitors, barristers, and academics possess 
authority as practitioners, experts in the field, writers on law, and so participate in the 
interpretation of texts and, therefore, the construction of refugee (Bourdieu 1999, 
505). Bhabha (2002) suggests that human rights and refugee advocates actively 
participate in the sorting of genuine and non-genuine claims, facilitating 
“gatekeeping” and legitimating state practice (see also Lacey 1998, 142–143 on 
“non-legal…communities”). Zimmerman and Mahler (2011, 420) observe that 
academic research has contributed to the acceptance and progressive recognition of 
LGBT claims (see also Anker 2005, 107, 119).73 Non-governmental institutional 
authors have contributed to the on-going process of interpretation through reports on 
sexual minority asylum (e.g. UKLGIG, Stonewall, and ORAM) and general country 
guidance reports often used as supplements to official state reports (e.g. ILGA, 
Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International) – often identified as “corporate 
partners” – though I also use “stakeholders” interchangeably.  
Even if non-juridical actors have a less explicit role in constructing the 
legitimate or genuine refugee, many are implicated in gatekeeping and crucial to 
                                                 
72 The ordinary meaning of “jurists” includes judges but also solicitors, barristers, legal researchers, 
and students of law.  
73 For example, consider frequent references to Hathaway (1991) in many cases discussed in chapters 
four and five of this thesis; other examples include Dauvergne and Millbank (2003) in SW [2011], 
para 76, as well as Millbank (2009a) in HJ and HT [2010], para 92-93, 112. 
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RSD. From a Foucauldian perspective of discourse analysis, “expert status” is 
significant in the production of discourse. Discourse “relies on the idea that there will 
be limitations on who will be considered to speak authoritatively,” and “whether 
statements will be judged as ‘true’ rather than ‘false’” (Lange 2005, 178). Experts 
provide adjudicators with indispensable “objective” evidence and “facts” about an 
asylum seeker, including medical doctors who may verify previous physical trauma, 
psychiatric professionals who diagnose conditions such as PTSD, and country 
experts such as anthropologists who have studied that society (see e.g. Thomas 2008, 
505, 527–528). Other “gay” refugees from the country can be implicated too. John 
Bosco, whose claim was discussed in the introduction, has testified before 
adjudicators on the claims of other asylum seekers, and been asked questions which 
included: whether he knew his friends’ boyfriends, how many relationships the 
asylum seeker had, if he believed the asylum seeker or if he was misleading John and 
pretending to be gay, and even if John had sex with him (Thiam 2012).  
However, most importantly, the analysis will consider UK policy and how 
adjudicators act in the process of granting refugee protection, and the interpretation 
of refugee and human rights law. Other “jurists” and “authors” will not be 
disregarded in the analysis because they are critical to the process of forming, 
interpreting, and implementing law. But the opinions submitted by extrajudicial 
jurists are more often evidentiary in proceedings, such as NGO human rights reports, 
or supplementary to interpretation of the law, such as the widely cited work of 
Hathaway (especially 1991). Despite the importance of commentary from other 
jurists, to state the obvious, these authors do not write on behalf of Signatory States 
in an official capacity. On the other hand, adjudicators acting on behalf of the UK 
hold a monopoly on symbolic violence, and physical constraints on life, liberty, and 
property (Bourdieu 1987, 837–838; Lacey 1998, 125–127, 157–158; Mehan 1999, 
572–573). In the case of RSD, the rejection of a genuine claim may result in serious 
harm and/or deprivation of individual liberty. The written positions of judges 
“transcend” individual perspectives to represent the view of the state on sexual 
minorities’ claims to refugee status (see Bourdieu 1987, 837–838). However, the 
process of exercising this authority is not linear but patchwork. 
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Adjudicators often tend to prefer one of the approaches to the law and 
evidence put forward by the appellant or respondent that in turn draw upon a range of 
texts from the broader juridical field and expert evidence from, for example, social 
researchers or medical practitioners (see Cotterrell 1998, 174).74 The position here 
contends that adjudicators do not find legal “facts” in RSD, but that the “meaning 
and significance” of facts are “actively constructed by [adjudicators] from the 
competing narratives presented to them” (Sweeney 2007, 31).75 The arguments 
proposed by appellants and respondents in briefs and hearings draw from a variety of 
texts to establish facts (e.g. from expert witnesses, state or NGO Reports) and to 
offer persuasive reasoning (e.g. domestic jurisprudence, international precedent, or 
academic works) for consideration in RSD. That is to say that the case before 
adjudicators proposes a means of interpreting and applying the law that is drawn 
from a variety of other texts such as case law and research to support or argue the 
dismissal of a claim to refugee status. Borrowing from Sweeney (2007), I argue that 
the determination of “legal facts,” especially in claims on sexual and gender identity 
which are shown to be indeterminate in chapter one of this thesis, should be 
understood as “constructivism in practice.” The adjudicators draw from the evidence 
and arguments submitted, and bring the case together under one systematic summary 
or “narrative,” and often issue a decision derived from the approaches proposed by 
the appellant and respondent.  
Given the complexity of these processes, I do not seek to fully detail RSD, to 
construct a generalisable framework or, for that matter, to profile jurists as individual 
authors. The immediate limitation of the approach presented in this chapter is that 
“RSD is a multistage process in which identities are experienced, framed and 
translated,” so it may not be possible to achieve a complete understanding of this in 
the written decisions (Berg and Millbank 2013, 121; see also 2009). However, 
                                                 
74 See e.g. Kotzeva et al. (2008, 36–39) for suggested types of evaluation (e.g. questioning) and 
evidence (e.g. NGO and state COI reports) advocates or practitioners should use in their own 
assessments of claims and the presentation of the asylum seeker’s narrative. This note considers topics 
of assessing a claimant’s credibility, accounting of events, and evidence. 
75 While this is evident in many of the cases to be discussed, perhaps the most obvious and relevant 
example is HJ [2008]. In that case Hodge J (para 1-2, 26-27) sets out the appellant’s lengthy appeal 
history spanning six years at that time and, therefore, that the Tribunal had at its disposal a range of 
narrative evidence from the appellant. The AIT explicitly chose to ignore HJ’s most recent testimony 
in favour of a previous statement which purportedly showed his life in Iran was safely discreet, and 
that he had not suffered unreasonably as a result (Hodge J, para 41). 
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acknowledging the context of adjudicators’ positions in the field and the complexity 
of RSD is important to understanding the construction of sexual and gender identity, 
and recognition of persecution in the legal discourse. In sum, adjudicators hold 
power over the acceptance or dismissal of “facts” (e.g. objective risk of persecution), 
the scope of the law (e.g. obligations under the 1951 Convention or the ECHR), and 
whether they believe the claim (e.g. subjective fear of harm, credibility, and so on). 
This perspective acknowledges the “position” of adjudicators not only as the authors 
of case law, facts and credibility of claims, but also their status as agents of the state 
and shaping of social reality – namely, in shaping “genuine” refugee identities and 
well-founded fears of persecution.  
5 The decision-making process 
Even though it may offer an incomplete picture, examination of the case law in this 
research sheds light on how identity is constructed by the authors in order to answer 
the research questions. Sexual and gender identity must be framed in the terms of the 
Refugee Convention and within the adjudicators’ own understandings of identity, 
behaviour, and persecutory harm (see Berg and Millbank 2009; 2013, 121).  
By taking case law as the primary source of data, I turn now to explain the 
way in which I will conceptualise the process by which adjudicators (and other 
jurists) reach decisions on refugee status.76 Again, this is intended as a general 
conceptual outline, and the concepts will not, for example, be measured as variables 
or used to draw conclusions in the analysis. However, these assumptions are 
important to understanding the data and its creation, which is therefore significant 
background to the analysis, because “there often remains a considerable role for the 
decision maker’s own personal judgment” (Thomas 2008, 491; see also 2006, 84–
85). I created Figure 2, below, in order to help us visualise my conceptualisation of 
the process of judicial interpretation of facts and law in the RSD. 
  
                                                 
76 This section theorizes decision-making of the actors; the UK’s asylum system was outlined in 
chapter two. For a more practical overview, see e.g. Kotzeva et al. (2008, 279, 311–312) on the 
constitution of the Tribunal and procedures in the UK.  
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FIG 2 Interpretation of Facts and Law 
 
Needless to say, the process of factual and legal interpretation has been simplified for 
representation here, whereas more systematic research on decision-making may 
outline a complex, iterative, multistage process. The centrepieces of RSD are the 
facts or evidence and the law and legal principles. This simplified model of the 
interpretation of facts and law is, arguably, not exclusive to RSD, but a general 
observation of the legal decision-making process (see generally Holland and Webb 
2010, 125–133). However, the particular significance here is the fluidity and 
intangibility of the “facts.” Any test applied by adjudicator to determine an asylum 
seeker’s identity is potentially deficient, because there is no concrete, knowable 
“truth” or, therefore, possible systematic approach to the determination of gender or 
sexuality and whether they are, for example, intrinsic, immutable, or genuine (see 
further chapter six). But ultimately adjudicators focus intently on finding “facts” to 
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the detriment of jurisprudential issues in many determinations (see e.g. Thomas  
2006, 79; Sweeney 2007, 19). Put simply, the task of adjudicators is to interpret the 
law of refugee status in light of the evidence and to accept or deny the claim before 
them. However, there is often an intense focus on the facts and their credibility 
(Thomas 2008, 491–492), leading to common-sense thinking rather than reasoned 
decision-making based on the jurisprudence (Sweeney 2007, 19) and decisions based 
on pre-understandings of sexual and gender identity (Berg and Millbank 2009).  
 In an asylum claim, the facts may be drawn from country of origin information 
(COI), and include dates of arrival, age, occupation, and so on (see e.g. Thomas 
2006; 2008; see further case law analytical chapters). Supporting evidence could 
include accounts of past persecution, prosecution, or other well-founded fear of 
future harm if returned, such as a court summons (see e.g. Miles 2009; Vine 2014). 
Generally, the claimant holds the “burden of proof” and submits facts and evidence 
of the case, but in many asylum claims the Secretary of State or even the adjudicator 
contests this evidence, such as the credibility of identity or the well-foundedness of 
the fear of persecution (see e.g. Sweeney 2007; Millbank 2009b). Sweeney (2007, 
30) observes that “the power games” between adjudicators and solicitors in labelling 
evidence as “not credible” versus legal “findings of fact” contributes to the myth of a 
privileged access to “truth.” RSD may tend toward adversarial or, perhaps, “fact-
fighting” (Bazelon 2015), rather than inquisitorial procedures but, like the legal 
principles, how the asylum process should be conducted seems to be rarely addressed 
in the case law (see Thomas 2008, 509–510).77 However, in AK [2008] Sedley LJ 
(para 24) clarified, obiter, that proceedings should be “a collaborative endeavour to 
get at the truth by the best available means.”    
Alongside “facts,” the law stands as a lens through which jurists see the case 
and its merits (see Figure 2). Taking the view of Sweeney (2007, 21), however, 
suggests that “[t]he reality of the RSD process is that these legal definitional 
questions” in translating “abstract (legal) norms to actual practice” are hardly 
                                                 
77 Of course, the UK is an “adversarial appellate jurisdiction” where “the appellant bears the burden of 
proof; it is for the parties to present the evidence that they wish to rely upon;” and the independent 
tribunal “should refrain from descending into the arena” (Thomas 2008, 509). This is a brief, critical 
reflection on the process of asylum adjudication, drawing upon the literature, to consider how legal 
facts are constructed in the asylum context, as opposed to a comparison between adversarial and 
inquisitorial legal systems. 
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addressed. As we will see in some of the determinations analysed in the case law 
analytical chapters, adjudicators, especially in Tribunals, focus almost exclusively on 
findings of fact – e.g. credibility of sexual identity, COI, and objective risk of 
persecution – whereas the application of law in asylum cases is often downplayed 
(Sweeney 2007). Though determinations often appear to rely on common-sense 
approaches, the claimant and respondent generally set out for the adjudicator 
opposing views of the legal principles or differing precedent that should be applied. 
The contested space could include the meaning of the Convention and its scope, the 
meaning and application of previous precedents in the case law, or the persuasive 
reasoning of international jurisprudence. The facts and law are seen as independent, 
and treated as mutually exclusive, whereas the beliefs, biases, or pre-understandings 
of the adjudicator are formed independently, are independent of a particular case at 
play, but influence perceptions of fact and law. 78 
While this project does not attempt to discover personal beliefs of individual 
jurists, the apparent importance of judicial subjectivity must be acknowledged.79 The 
assumption in the analysis is that adjudicators (and all actors in the field) have sets of 
beliefs, biases, or pre-understandings that impact decision-making (see e.g. Jubany 
2011; Souter 2011). Belief and bias are difficult or impossible to attribute, and may 
in fact be unnecessary to account for in a strict analysis of the case law. A major 
study of the US asylum system, Refugee Roulette (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007; 2009), 
Failing the Grade (UKLGIG 2010) in the UK, and other statistical studies have 
suggested that RSD is often subjective, and to some extent dependent on the 
adjudicator and the claim submitted.80 It would be an oversimplification to claim that 
adjudicators are not aware of their own subjectivity; for example, in AK [2008] 
Sedley LJ (para 4) explained that the two previous determinations, which accepted 
and refused the same asylum claim, “illustrate how two conscientious fact finders 
                                                 
78 Here I must thank Mor Sobol for drawing my attention to the independent versus dependent factors 
and outcomes at play in outlining the process. 
79 This is loosely derived from Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, that are dispositions which incline 
agents to act and react in certain ways (Bourdieu 1991; Thompson 1991). This also applies to “field” 
(or social context) that is assumed to be both real and metaphorical; “agents” or “actors,” importantly, 
must believe in the game they are playing. 
80 Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007; 2009) suggest there are marked disparities in the rates of refusal of 
different categories of refugee claims across the US and connections between adjudicators’ personal 
profiles and the acceptance of certain asylum claims. The UKLGIG (2010) report claims that in the 
UK lesbians and gay men were refused 98-99% at the initial stage compared to 73% of other claims 
submitted. See generally Thomas (2008; 2009).  
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can reach opposite conclusions on the same evidence.” However, while the findings 
of jurists and the language they use to express them are often made to seem obvious 
and objective, determinations are often made in a “common-sense” way, influenced 
by the subjective views of the adjudicator (Sweeney 2007, 26).  
Successful asylum claims are likely to have set out a persuasive story. 
Arguably, public and legal advocates make strategic decisions using prevailing 
norms to frame arguments for asylum which often play on the presumed stereotypes 
of adjudicators. Skeleton arguments81 provide a narrative that will “resonate” with an 
adjudicator’s “values, beliefs, and assumptions of” the gay refugee and persecution, 
and effective asylum claims often “draw upon prevailing norms and beliefs, no 
matter how problematic they may be” (Ahmad 2002, 122; see also Miller 2005, 164–
166; Morgan 2006, 147). Other examples can be found in the literature and case law 
on sexual and gender identity-based asylum claims that suggest rigid, Western 
notions of identity and behaviour may influence decision-making (see e.g. Berg and 
Millbank 2009; Bennett and Thomas 2013; further chapter four). 
The interpretation of facts and law is a contested space (whether or not formal 
proceedings are adversarial or inquisitorial) in the process of reaching a particular 
outcome in the adjudicator’s decision.82 While the facts and law are to some extent 
independent from each other, as are the particular beliefs of an adjudicator, the 
outcome (or decision) is dependent on all of the above. The adjudicator might be 
predisposed to act on a case in a certain way, forced by judicial constraints or other 
factors, but the merits of the decision are previously indeterminate.83 The facts and 
law may be mutually exclusive, and determined separately, but in the narrative of a 
legal decision these concepts are often fitted together like the pieces of a jigsaw 
puzzle (see Thomas 2008, 520; Holland and Webb 2010, 129–130). The case law 
presents a template from which to determine refugee status. Like a puzzle, where the 
box may provide a reference, legal concepts such as persecution must resemble the 
template provided by the jurisprudence. An adjudicator may start with the case law 
                                                 
81 See Appendix II on “skeleton.” 
82 Even if RSD is inquisitorial, the position articulated here suggests that the adjudicator is still in the 
position of constructing or finding the facts of the case and understanding the law; e.g. knowing what, 
and who, a homosexual is and the risk of future persecution in the country of origin. 
83 An exception here could be made to an appellate court, where adjudicators and judges in lower 
courts determine facts, but the contention here is that the general argument still applies if in a 
modified sense. 
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(template) and find the factual elements (pieces of the puzzle) that lead to a particular 
result – or even begin with the result based on findings of fact and justify the 
conclusion in retrospect (see Mehan 1999, 563 on “unconscious bias,” 573 on 
“oracular reasoning”; Souter 2011, 53, 55–56 on denial). The analysis in the case law 
analytical chapters suggests this facts/law dichotomy may be somewhat artificial, 
because “their dependence works both ways” (Holland and Webb 2010, 129). In 
refugee law, persecution is a concept which illustrates the difficulty of this 
distinction, because there is no agreed upon legal test or standard. Instead, jurists 
draw on a range of sources, often broad definitions, that are dependent upon the 
subjective interpretation of the actor and the presentation of facts in a particular case 
to create meaning of, especially, a well-founded fear of persecution (see chapter 
five). The jigsaw exercise fits together the pieces of fact and law into a cohesive 
narrative with a justified and legal outcome on the claimant’s refugee status. 
As Bourdieu (1987, 826) has noted, the “rules” outlined in the case law, 
generally, “can never be purely and simply applied to a new case” (see also Barnes et 
al. 1996, ix, 54–73 on finitism). This may be especially difficult to negotiate under 
PSG in Article 1A(2), where “legal opinion sometimes implies that the phrase’s very 
indeterminacy is its most desirable feature, allowing courts to cope with the almost 
limitless range of situations that may arise [emphasis added]” (Good 2007, 74). In 
seeking to answer the research questions, the analysis of the case law must consider 
the subjective elements of RSD, such as the credibility of sexual identity. The 
standing and outcome of particular asylum claims is difficult to predict because the 
legal norms in precedent are used as tools to justify the determination, but “the same 
precedent [can be] understood in different ways, [and] can be called upon to justify 
quite different results” (Bourdieu 1987, 832–833). The established precedent cannot 
be viewed entirely as a rational framework that guarantees “consistency and 
predictability as well as the objectivity of the legal decisions” acting to limit arbitrary 
and subjective decision-making (Bourdieu 1987, 832–833). The interpretation and 
application of precedents illustrates textual elasticity where the social world, such as 
the nature of identity, can be perceived and expressed in different ways and are 
indeterminate (see Bourdieu 1989, 20). 
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6 Conclusion 
The constructivist perspective detailed in this chapter drew upon critical theory. The 
theoretical approach to the research acknowledged that its findings are relative, and it 
was conducted with a political concern for individual difference – in opposition to 
homonormativity – and ethical violence in RSD. I argued for a flexible and 
exploratory research design, and that the UK is a good case for study in light of 
recent developments and the international significance of the country’s case law. The 
case law examined has been purposefully sampled, and the discursive analysis of the 
texts will give a broad, contextual account that problematises the judicial constructs 
of a “gay” refugee. 
This research design could be said to reflect the tension between an 
“inherently probabilistic” social research perspective compared to legal reasoning, 
which is “nonprobablistic” and “associated with a large tolerance for low-accuracy 
results” (Driessen 1983, 479 cited in Good 2007, 32) given the imperative in RSD to 
grant or reject a claim for protection (Thomas 2006, 86). The approach outlined for 
the interpretation and analysis of the data and the conceptualisation of decision-
making highlights the role of adjudicators as authors of the social world. I have 
drawn attention to the quasi-independent capacity of adjudicators to shape social 
reality in their written decisions, and their power to impose form in the determination 
of legitimate categories and concepts in refugee law (Bourdieu 1987, 839; Jamieson 
2002, 511–512). Using the theoretical and methodological framework in this chapter, 
Part II of this thesis will detail the historical development of the UK’s recognition of 
sexual minority refugees, but also challenge the assumptions made in legal discourse 
by drawing on sociological understandings of identity. 
 
 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
  95 
Part II – Case law analytical 
chapters 
Introduction 
Part I reviewed the literatures on sexual orientation and gender identity, international 
refugee law, and the relevant background of the United Kingdom’s asylum system, 
which are essential to the analysis of the case law in Part II. Chapters four and five 
examine the interpretation of particular social group (PSG) and persecution 
respectively, and assess how the UK has “read-in” sexual minority refugees in its 
case law and policy. This preface briefly overviews the evolution of UK 
jurisprudence to provide context for the following case law analytical chapters. 
The UK Supreme Court decision HJ and HT [2010]84 was couched in strong 
language affirming LGBT asylum seekers’ right to live openly and to qualify for 
refugee status if they had a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of 
origin. However, the UK was comparatively late among liberal democracies to 
recognise LGBT asylum, and its law and practice in the area had long been criticised 
(see e.g. Millbank 2005; Johnson 2007, 105). Well-founded fear on the basis of 
sexual orientation was recognised as a PSG by many Western states in the late 1980s, 
1990s, and by the UNHCR in 1995 and 1996 (Millbank 2002, 149; Walker 2003, 
253). The Court of Appeal first considered whether sexual orientation was a PSG in 
Binbasi in 1989, and rejected the contention that anti-sodomy laws were persecutory 
(McGhee 2001b; Millbank 2004, 208; 2005, 6–7). Binbasi [1989] suggested that 
asylum seekers should “refrain” from homosexual acts, because anti-sodomy laws 
targeted “practising” homosexuals, even if the discrimination suffered amounted to 
persecution (Tuitt 1996, 91).  
A decade later, the UK House of Lords challenged the traditionally narrow, 
status quo understanding of PSG in Islam and Shah [1999], and unanimously agreed 
that “homosexuals” could constitute a PSG under the Convention (McGhee 2001a; 
Millbank 2005). Islam and Shah arguably shifted the focus onto the discriminatory 
basis of persecution, creating opportunities for the recognition of other non-
                                                 
84 The key cases discussed are summarised in Appendix V; abbreviations for cases cited regularly can 
be found in IV; and acronyms are listed in I.  
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traditional Convention refugees (see Anker 2005). The Court of Appeal subsequently 
implemented the new PSG category of homosexuals in Jain [1999], where they 
developed a “conduct driven approach” for RSD that focused on the nexus between 
homosexuals and sexual acts, and neglected the expression of identity (Chelvan 
2011, 57). The decision emphasised that the mere existence of anti-sodomy laws did 
not amount to persecution, but that an asylum seeker from a state prohibiting and 
enforcing criminal law against the engagement in private activity may be able to 
qualify under the Convention (Schiemann LJ, 77). However, the majority of cases 
following Jain held that incarceration of periods from forty days to ten years did not 
amount to persecution under the Convention or breach the ECHR (Millbank 2004, 
222).85  
After the passing of the HRA 1998, which gave the ECHR further effect in 
UK law, asylum claims began to be argued both on grounds under the 1951 
Convention and grounds under the ECHR.86 Cases such as the conjoined appeals of Z 
and M and A [2002] considered Article 3 (prohibition of torture) and 8 (right to 
private and family life). While the 1951 Convention was not at the forefront of this 
case, many commentators have argued that the broader human rights framework has 
become central to the protection of sexual minorities in refugee law (e.g. Hathaway 
1991; Anker 2002; Millbank 2004). Nonetheless, early claims under the ECHR did 
not “translate into any real consideration of…the rights of lesbians and gay men in 
the vast majority of cases,” and determinations on human rights were more 
“formulaic” and often “superficial” (Millbank 2004, 209). UK adjudicators 
consistently rejected framing RSD in the language and reasoning of the human 
rights-based arguments put to them.87  
Following the High Court of Australia’s (HCA) decision in S395 [2003], a 
second Court of Appeal case considered Z’s claim to refugee status in the UK.88 
International jurisprudence is persuasive and not binding, but UK courts repeatedly 
cited this particular Australian determination, and it has also received a significant 
                                                 
85 See e.g. Z and M and A [2002], para 36. 
86 For example, the House of Lords held in Ullah [2004] that non-refoulement applied where there 
were denials or violations of rights under the ECHR.  
87 See e.g. Z [2004]; Amare [2005]. 
88 Z [2004]. On the remitted case prior to the 2004 appeal, the Tribunal had concluded that Z did not 
demonstrate a serious risk of harm under the Refugee Convention or ECHR Article 3 (prohibition of 
torture) for the same reasons. 
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amount of academic attention (e.g. Goodman 2012; Hathaway and Pobjoy 2012; 
Schutzer 2012). In S395 the HCA rejected the “discretion approach,” holding that 
asylum seekers could not be expected to take steps to hide or modify their belief or 
identity to avoid persecutory harm if they were returned (see Millbank 2004, 215; 
2009a). Z’s primary contention in the appeal, elucidated by S395, was that 
“persecution” is a “discriminatory denial…of a core human right,” in this case the 
right to a private life, and that the appellant was unable to live openly with his 
“(homosexual) partner” in the country of origin (Buxton LJ, para 10). The Court of 
Appeal rejected this, holding that the core of the HCA decision was already a part of 
UK law; that the Convention did not protect all interferences with human rights; and 
that the threat of serious harm was necessary to constitute persecution.89    
From 1999 to 2010, UK adjudicators repeatedly rejected the notion that anti-
sodomy laws were persecutory (Millbank 2005; Miles 2009), and expected 
claimants’ discretion – i.e. the self-repression and concealment of identity and 
behaviour in order to avoid persecution (Millbank 2005; 2009a; Schutzer 2012, 685–
693).90 Dismissing a right to live openly, the courts instead fabricated the concept of 
“reasonable” discretion, which in some ways facilitated the invisibility of sexual 
minorities, in expecting them to “pass” as heterosexuals (see McGhee 2000; 
2001b).91 While the extent of the change prompted by HJ and HT [2010] is debatable 
(i.e. whether too far or not far enough – cf. Hathaway and Pobjoy 2012; Weßels 
2013), the decision was profound in that it comprehensively dismissed the logic of 
discretion, and referred to the right of association and the immutability of identity. 
The Supreme Court asserted that if an asylum seeker were to live openly and had a 
well-founded fear of persecution on that basis if returned, they would qualify for 
refugee status, even if that harm might otherwise be avoided by concealment.92  
Chapter five considers the juridical construction of sexual minority refugee 
status, including what is “reasonably tolerable” to conceal, and the shift towards 
protection of expression and association. Chapter six elaborates on the assessment of 
                                                 
89 The Court of Appeal had granted permission to appeal with the express emphasis that this was to 
consider the impact, if any, of S395 upon English law based on the appellant’s claim that case shed 
new light on his appeal (Buxton LJ, para 8). 
90 See e.g. Z [2004]; Amare [2005]; RG [2006]; HJ and HT [2009]. 
91 See e.g. J [2006]; HJ [2008]; XY [2008]. 
92 See also RT and KM [2012], applying HJ and HT to political opinion. 
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persecution and the evolving “threshold” of serious harm, well-founded likelihood of 
its occurrence, and eventual recognition that it is not the burden of refugees to protect 
themselves. Both of these chapters consider the judicial development of the concept 
of discretion, because even if discretion can no longer be “required,” these 
determinations are historically significant and may help us to understand where the 
legal discourse “went wrong.” Yet, as we will see, there may still be scope for 
discretion reasoning in decision-making if an asylum seeker is understood to be 
“naturally discreet” about their identity. Finally, the case law that came before HJ 
and HT [2010] is still instructive for understanding the judicial construction of sexual 
and gender identity, as well as what it means to be persecuted on these grounds, and 
for explaining the context of the recognition of “gay” refugees today.  
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Chapter Four – The inclusive guise of “gay” 
asylum 
Between 1999-2010, UK House of Lords/Supreme Court and Court of Appeal 
decisions incrementally recognised a wider scope of private behaviour, public 
identities, and types of persecution suffered by LGBT claimants as qualifying for 
refugee status. However, consideration of the jurisprudence on how sexual 
orientation has been “read-in” as a “particular social group” (PSG) also demonstrates 
the limitations of that inclusion. The analysis in this chapter suggests that the courts 
repeatedly sought to prevent what, in their view, would have been an opening of the 
floodgates – whilst in the same breath suggesting that the UK was a place of refuge 
for persecuted sexual minorities. The protracted process of establishing LGBT 
persons as a PSG reveals a judicial reluctance to accept a right to privacy against the 
threat or imposition of anti-sodomy laws. The courts further expected “discretion” or 
“concealment” of identity, rejecting a right to live openly without fear of persecution, 
in many asylum cases until 2010.  
This chapter outlines the progressive recognition of sexual minority refugees, 
but also critiques how explicit and implicit exclusions are constructed in the judicial 
discourse. The analysis of PSG undertaken in part one primarily considers the 
implications of adjudicators’ constructions of gender and sexuality as potentially 
“legitimate” PSG-based asylum claims. Part two critically considers a select group of 
cases in depth on the construction of “genuine” claims by sexual minorities as it is 
conceived in the case law.93 Distinct themes emerged from the determinations, such 
as defining private and public spheres and what may be “reasonably” concealed. The 
analysis considers some of the emergent concepts thematically, and offers some 
insights on the process of the construction of sexual orientation and gender identities 
in refugee status determination (RSD). The conclusion drawn is that if “disbelief” is 
a barrier to sexual minority refugee status, the challenge is to reconcile the 
requirement for credibility with the possibility that an adjudicator cannot know 
surely or definitely who is “gay.” 
                                                 
93 See Appendix II and chapter three on my uses of “legitimate” and “genuine.” 
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1 Reading in sexual orientation and gender identity as 
a particular social group 
Part one outlines the development of the jurisprudence of the House of 
Lords/Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, as well as some applications at the 
Tribunal level, which (re)defined PSG. It should be noted that, particularly in part 
one, the definition of what constitutes “persecution” is closely entangled within the 
definition of PSG/identity and vice versa (see chapter five), because the concepts are 
not mutually exclusive.94  
1.1 Analysis of “particular social group” 
It is first necessary to contextualise the judicial interpretation of PSG in order to 
address the construction of “legitimate” or “genuine” sexual minority asylum seekers 
in judicial decision-making. Here I will provide an overview of how sexual 
minorities were accepted under the Convention category, PSG, in UK jurisprudence. 
Importantly, the UK drew substantially on evolving international case law on PSG 
assessment to expand the application of Article 1A(2).  
Islam and Shah [1999] detailed how broad categories of women subject to 
discriminatory persecution could qualify for refugee status. For the first time the 
House of Lord’s interpretation also “compelled the Home Office to recognise the 
possibility” of a sexual orientation-based PSG (Good 2007, 95). UK law and practice 
had previously required some cohesive attribute and group interdependence as 
criteria for PSG.95 The House of Lords (UKHL) relied strongly on the 1985 US 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) In re Acosta’s construction of PSG.96 In re 
Acosta held that persecution in relation to the five Convention refugee categories 
must be aimed at a common, “immutable characteristic” that cannot be changed or is 
one which an asylum seeker should not be required to change, because the 
characteristic is fundamental to an individual’s identity or conscience. 97  
                                                 
94 See e.g. McHugh and Kirby JJ in S395 [2003], para 43, who explain this problematic dichotomy 
with particular clarity; Weßels (2013, 55) on the discretion requirement. 
95 Lord Steyn writes in Islam and Shah that the Court of Appeal had previously held that the claimants 
did not qualify as a PSG, because the term “implies a collection of people closely affiliated with each 
other” citing Sanchez-Trujillo, et al., v Immigration and Naturalization Service, 801 F.2d 1571, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 15 October 1986.  
96 According to Lord Bingham in K and Fornah [2006], para 14. See In re Acosta [1985].  
97 The In re Acosta approach was also endorsed in Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, US BIA, 12 March 
1990, regarding a gay man. 
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Lord Steyn (Islam and Shah, 154) observed that “homosexuals are, of course, 
not a cohesive group.” Citing Hathaway (1991, 159), Lord Steyn suggested the 
drafters had contemplated a limited meaning to PSG, and that it was not intended to 
be a remedial clause or “catchall.” While acknowledging certain limitations to the 
Convention definition of a refugee, the UKHL rejected that it was necessary to 
further restrict the PSG category with requirements of homogeneity, cohesiveness, 
interdependence, or co-operative organisation. Drawing upon international 
jurisprudence,98 the UKHL concluded that “depending on the evidence homosexuals 
may in some countries qualify as members of a [PSG]” (Lord Steyn, 155). Crucially, 
if an individual is able to evade the persecution feared, perhaps because of a 
privileged status or circumstances, that “does not mean the social group of 
homosexuals cannot exist” (Lord Steyn, 155). Lord Millet dissented on the 
appellants’ appeals, but he agreed with the majority that the PSG category should not 
be confined to its “original meaning,” and invoked the non-discrimination clause in 
the UDHR to support this interpretation. Lord Millet asserted a PSG of domestic 
violence victims could not exist because of the “circular constitution” principle, but 
accepted that homosexuals were a social group independent of persecution.99 
“In a society which subjected practising homosexuals but not non-
practising homosexuals to persecution the relevant social group would 
still consist of homosexuals, not a subset of practising homosexuals. 
A non-practising homosexual would have no difficulty in establishing 
that he was a member of a persecuted social group. His only difficulty 
would be in establishing that his fear of persecution was well 
founded…This would be a matter of evidence, but given the hostility 
encountered by all homosexuals in such a society and the obvious 
problems the applicant would have in satisfying his tormenters of his 
own sexual abstinence, I doubt that the difficulty would be a real 
one.”100  
                                                 
98 Particular attention was paid to the New Zealand case, Re GJ [1995], which drew upon case law and 
practice from Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, Canada, and the US to 
conclude that homosexuals can constitute a PSG within the meaning of Article 1A(2). Millbank 
(2004, 197–199) traces the New Zealand decision to Ward [1993]; furthermore, considering cases that 
drew upon Ward, Millbank argues Australia, New Zealand, and the US purportedly took a “less 
categorical” or immutable approach, whereas the UK did not as convincingly reject this position on 
sexual orientation.  
99 See Appendix II on “circular constitution.” 
100 Lord Millet, 173. 
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The early creation of a legal distinction between “practising” and “non-practising” 
was succeeded by the distinctions between “open” and “discreet” homosexuals or, as 
Weßels (2013) proposes, the shift in assessment to “is” versus “does” after HJ and 
HT was decided by the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) in 2010. Lord Millet’s dissent in 
Islam and Shah is an insightful prelude to later debates over whether “practising” 
homosexual conduct in the private sphere has anything to do with a public identity, 
and how to assess the likelihood of persecution if “private” sexual practices were to 
become known to the public in RSD.  
Within a year of Islam and Shah the Court of Appeal would carry the 
distinction of sexual “practice” forward in Jain. In Jain [1999], the conduct based 
approach carefully outlined the types of “permissible sex” that might bring a 
claimant under the Convention.101 Schiemann LJ (77) set out that there are 
“permissible grounds” upon which states may interfere with persons’ sexual 
behaviours, including the expression of sexual desires, paedophilia, and 
exhibitionism. Evans LJ (79) agreed with Schiemann LJ’s opinion, but was “anxious 
to emphasise” that the appellant sought “an adult male partner whose homosexual 
practices would be conducted in private and with that partner.” This strongly 
parallels Millbank’s (2002, 164) observation that public sex has often been used to 
isolate gay men as promiscuous and predatory, citing Backer (1996, 531) in 
suggesting that challenging anti-sodomy statutes in the UK resulted in gay men being 
inscribed as “mythological figures of disgust” in judicial discourse (see also Bersani 
1987, 531). The court’s acceptance here of the possibility of a homosexual refugee is 
made conditional upon the refugee’s perceived “normality,” and is underlined with a 
sense of disgust, and conflation of homosexuality with criminality.102 Evans LJ (79) 
further clarified that if there were “any suggestion” that the Indian Penal Code 
“discriminates…against homosexual men who engage in homosexual practices with 
                                                 
101 The SSHD accepted that the appellant was a member of a PSG of “practising homosexuals,” 
according to Islam and Shah; Schiemann LJ (73) speculates that this may not be the proper 
categorisation, but that it could “be regarded ‘those perceived to be homosexuals,’ or some other 
grouping.” But the issue of categorisation was deferred to future cases because the material issue in 
Jain was whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution.  
102 “Homosexuality, as with many other forms of sexual misconduct, is a criminal offence in Pakistan 
[emphasis added]” – R v Special Immigration Adjudicator, ex parte T, High Court, 11 May 2000 
(Unreported), para 2, cited in Millbank (2004, 218–219). UK adjudicators were reluctant to accept 
prosecution could be persecutory and, instead, viewed it as a proper enforcement of social mores. 
“Permissible persecution” and cultural difference is discussed further in chapter five.  
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minors or in public” (i.e. the predatory or promiscuous) it would raise “entirely 
different considerations” that would “militate strongly against the applicant.”103 In 
outlining the conduct-based approach in Jain, the court was careful to accept private 
homosexual “practices.” Obiter dicta,104 “permissible” sex was contrasted to other 
sexual behaviours the judges deemed perverse, and which a state might justifiably 
disapprove of, prohibit, and sanction (see Backer 1996, 530–538, 554–590). 
Homosexuals could bring themselves within the Convention definition of PSG, but 
the UK would only accept “good gays” as refugees and not “bad queers” (see Miller 
2005, 146–147; Wilkinson 2014). The phrase “good gays” is also used more broadly 
in this analysis to include being “discreet” upon return, having a demonstrably fixed 
sexuality (e.g. never married with an opposite sex partner), among other ideals that 
have been expected of “genuine” sexual minority asylum seekers. 
The specification of, put bluntly, “no perverts” evident in Jain is perhaps 
more muted yet still present in other adjudications considered in this thesis. For 
example, in HC [2005] it had been found credible that HC, who had owned a video 
shop, had been “falsely” accused of having “adult pornographic videos” (Keene LJ, 
para 9). Although clarifying that HC’s conduct was not provocative or criminal, the 
court went beyond a mere statement of fact. Covertly, the court seemed to suggest 
that the possession and distribution of videos which offended social mores, such as 
same-sex pornography and, especially, child pornography would likely have 
“militated strongly” against HC. “Obscene” materials may have provoked 
adjudicators’ own anxieties of the perverted, promiscuous, and predatory asylum 
seeker so clearly expressed by the Lords Justice in Jain. In Hathaway and Pobjoy’s 
(2012) critique of HJ and HT, they argue there is a duty on the courts to exclude 
“trivial” behaviours or, as Goodman (2012, 425–426) writes in response, to “curb 
some forms of provocative conduct.” Further analysis will suggest what an asylum 
seeker “is” or “does” is still a contested issue. 
                                                 
103 This is, of course, a critique of the judicial discourse and why the judges found it was necessary to 
juxtapose another state’s regulation of homosexuality with, for example, the protection of children 
from homosexual paedophiles, and does not mean to suggest that being the latter should entitle one to 
refugee protection. However, it is curious that later cases, such as RM and BB [2005], would use 
evidence of cruising areas to indicate a tolerance for homosexuality rather than potential evidence of 
intolerance and oppression, where cruising in public places may be the only outlet for a prohibited 
sexual desire.      
104 See Appendix II on obiter dicta. 
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However, the legal issue of whether homosexuals could constitute a PSG 
under the Convention (generally) faded over time in UK case law following Islam 
and Shah [1999]. Adjudicators stepped back from questioning the necessary “form” 
of a PSG, such as questions of organisation, and continued by accepting that 
appellants were, in fact, homosexual and therefore members of a PSG for the 
purposes of the Convention. The 2004 EU Qualification Directive (Council Directive 
2004/83/EC) provided that sexual orientation could constitute a common 
characteristic of a PSG, but gender identity was only added to Article 10 of the EU 
Qualification Directive in 2011 (Jansen 2013; Tsourdi 2013).105 Generally, the 
contested space shifted from the meaning of PSG per se towards the possibility of 
discretion or concealment, the perceived reasonableness of an asylum seeker’s 
behaviour, and the availability and credibility of the evidence such as whether an 
asylum seeker sought to access “gay spaces” or experienced persecution.  
The UK established that sexual minorities could constitute a PSG in 1999, but 
I would argue the debate did not end there, with the inclusion of homosexuals under 
PSG. Before HJ and HT [2010], adjudicators developed a tendency toward outright 
disbelief of evidence of the likelihood of persecution, and then following the 
landmark 2010 decision were increasingly suspicious of the authenticity of the 
identities claimed, for example, with respect to who is subjected to the kind of harm 
that maintains a “nexus” to the Convention category (and their credibility),106 or what 
acts can form the basis of the “high threshold” of persecution (or its likelihood). 
Arguably, the turn towards a discursive examination of credibility and subjective 
assessment of persecution refocused the debate over the PSG upon issues that had 
previously been peripheral, and suggests that the interpretation of PSG is ongoing 
and thus remains relevant in RSD.  
  
1.2 “Reasonable” concealment: More than sex? 
UK case law evidences that its adjudicators were for some time keen to demarcate 
the “limits” of sexual minority inclusion under the Convention, primarily built upon 
the discretion requirement. This section details how judgments based on strictly 
                                                 
105 The UK has not opted-in to the 2011 EU Qualification Directive (Council Directive 2011/95/EU; 
see also Costello and Hancox 2014, 4), but does issue Asylum Policy Instructions on gender identity 
(API 2011b). 
106 See chapter two and Appendix II on the nexus requirement. 
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private conceptions of identity and concealment were rationalised. By the mid-2000s, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the US had all acknowledged that “requiring 
behaviour modification as a means to avoid persecution constitutes an unacceptable 
limit on the expression of an individual’s identity” (Johnson 2007, 105). In a 
particularly vivid illustration, a German decision-maker first compared discretion to 
changing the colour of one’s skin to avoid persecution in 1983 (Weßels 2013, 55). 
Until the UKSC decision in 2010, adjudicators imposed the discretion requirement in 
spite of the fact that other Signatory States had recognised that it “[placed] an unfair 
demand on lesbian and gay applicants that [did] not exist for other cognate groups” 
(Goodman 2012, 427–428). By focusing RSD on discretion, privacy, or a “norm of 
invisibility,” the UK “[employed] the violence of the law to force applicants back 
into their…closets” (Millbank 2005, 120).  
But the operation of discretion reasoning was ambiguous. For example, 
Buxton LJ (RG [2006], para 19) wrote that the courts in Z [2004] and Amare [2005] 
recognised that a “forced change of sexuality” would perhaps breach the ECHR, that 
is, if it amounted to being “forced” on consideration of the evidence. The Secretary 
of State (SSHD) also accepted that an “illicit requirement” for an asylum seeker to 
conceal their identity to avoid persecution, as the Tribunal had posited in Amare’s 
appeal, was an error of law (Laws LJ in Amare [2005], para 10). However, UK 
adjudicators consistently found that discretion as to sexual orientation or gender 
identity did not in itself amount to persecution within the meaning of the Refugee 
Convention or otherwise place asylum seekers in a situation of persecution. The sub-
sections below consider some of the many rationalisations that sustained the 
discretion approach, including the avoidance of identity altogether with a focus on 
conduct, ignoring the obvious connections between past discretion and the fear of 
persecution, and the possibility of internal relocation in the country of origin. 
1.2.1 Discrete, discreet conduct: Narrowly classified and concealable 
categories 
In Jain [1999], the Court of Appeal’s conduct-driven approach affirmed the 
distinction between “practising” and “non-practising” homosexuals, and built a 
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closet out of privacy.107 The conduct based approach centred on the practising/non-
practising homosexual and a similar open/discreet distinction soon emerged in the 
case law (Millbank 2012, 505–506). These distinctions proved to be major evidential 
hurdles and sources of adjudicator speculation of, for example, why homosexuals had 
acted discreetly, which was used in turn as justification for suggesting asylum 
seekers could continue to do so as a grounds for rejecting claims to refugee status. In 
other words, evidence of a past concealment of identity legitimised the requirement 
of future discretion in RSD. The implicit rationale of discretion was that the sexual 
identities of asylum seekers were constituted by nothing more than deviant sex and 
that transgression of norms needed to be concealed.  
The conduct driven approach in Jain invited adjudicators to forensically 
examine asylum seekers’ “private” sexual practices as well as the moral acceptability 
of their desires (i.e. privacy to do what). Adjudicators were essentially given 
permission to seek and form perspectives on the claimants’ sexual lives. The 
spectacle of their being sexual and the practice thereof, such as where it took place, 
who did what and to whom, became the way of defining a legitimate gay refugee 
(see e.g. Miles 2009). The UK’s broader depiction of the “good gay” refugee was 
one who was private, silent, discreet, and for a decade determinations did not 
properly engage the public implications of the ways in which sexual identity is linked 
to sexual practice (see Johnson 2007, 109).108 Focusing assessment on sexual 
conduct often forgoes examination of the psychological implications of the persistent 
anxiety of hiding, and fear of spill over from the asylum seeker’s “private” sexual 
life into the public sphere (see e.g. B [2007], para 18 on a doctor’s testimony). 
                                                 
107 I discuss Jain at length in this chapter, and chapter five to some extent, because of the formative 
importance Schiemann LJ’s conduct driven approach had for later case law; e.g. Amare [2005], para 
22, where Laws LJ cited Jain at length in addressing the relation between human rights and refugee 
status; Hodge J also relied heavily on Jain in HJ [2008], para 15, and quoted a substantial excerpt 
which evidences the precedent’s continued importance at least until HJ and HT [2010]; see also King 
IJ in JM [2008], para 152. 
108 For example, see Dawkins [2003], para 35, citing the Adjudicator’s determination: 
“Insofar as there may be some interference, by virtue of the imposition of criminal 
sanctions causing the appellant to be secretive in the conduct of his homosexual 
relationships in Jamaica, I have had regard to the background evidence as to the lack 
of societal discrimination against homosexuals and the specific evidence of the 
appellant regarding his own [discreet] homosexual activity…” 
Limiting the scope of identity to privacy and sexual conduct, it was found that Dawkins could go 
clubbing and be sexually promiscuous, discreetly. On the other hand, Binbasi [1989] had suggested 
that the gay claimant might exercise “self restraint,” which Millbank (2004, 214) presumes could be 
construed to mean “complete and life-long sexual abstinence” to avoid persecution. 
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Finally, the conduct-focused framework for adjudication apparently prioritised 
“practicising” homosexuals with the added emphasis on “being out” in the country of 
origin in order to claim refugee status (Johnson 2007, 106–107).109  
Regarding the precedent in Jain for the protection of (legitimate) private 
conduct, the obvious exclusions to refugee status are identities and expressive 
practices which are public and could have otherwise been accommodated by their 
“reasonable” concealment. According to Millbank (2004, 209) the reasoning in 
Binbasi [1989] was that “abstinence would protect the applicant from prosecution as 
it was gay sex, rather than being gay, which was the subject of criminal sanctions.” 
Jain edged forward, slightly, in stating homosexual asylum seekers may be able to 
bring themselves within the Convention definition, but through persecution based on 
homosexual sex and not being gay, per se. Ironically, this reflects the 2013 decision 
of the Supreme Court of India to uphold the law which contributed in part to Jain’s 
feared persecution: “Section 377…does not criminalize a particular…identity or 
orientation. It merely identifies certain acts which if committed would constitute an 
offence.”110 Claiming rights to privacy can be a successful legal strategy in domestic 
contexts to challenge anti-sodomy laws.111 However, privacy is not a comprehensive 
solution, especially where anti-sodomy laws do not explicitly discriminate between 
hetero- and homo-sexual acts.112 Privacy was further limited in the asylum context 
where it was interpreted to exclude the protection of public identities. A broader 
rights-based approach was repeatedly rejected by adjudicators.113 
Essentially, determination relied on distinguishing what were unacceptable 
                                                 
109 See e.g. Amare [2005], para 4, citing the Adjudicator’s determination, para 19; HJ [2008], para 42-
44, regarding past concealment not adversely impacting the claimant, how HJ’s life in the UK did not 
involve “highly extroverted forms of homosexual activity,” and so return was reasonable; see also B 
[2007], para 23, and how the SSHD construed the claimant’s increasingly public homosexuality as an 
attempt to further the asylum claim. 
110 Suresh Kumar Koushal and another v NAZ Foundation and others, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 
2013, para 38. Nevertheless, some UK adjudicators did acknowledge that anti-sodomy laws were 
patently discriminatory, e.g. HS [2005], para 147, 150. 
111 See e.g. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v. Minister of Justice and 
Others, Case CCT 11/98. 
112 cf. the Supreme Court of India decision, National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and 
others, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 400 of 2012, para 21-22, 47, 63, and 66 which potentially put this 
decision at odds with the court’s view in the S377 case. The present decision was a major victory for 
trans/hijra activists who sought equal rights and protections, as well as a legal “third gender” option 
(see chapter one regarding hijra). The court strongly framed self-determination/personal autonomy in 
terms of dignity (para 74) and equality as the “basic essentials designed to flower the citizen’s 
personality to its fullest” (para 98).  
113 e.g. Z [2004]; Amare [2005]; JM [2008]. 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum  108 
violations of privacy from acceptable discrimination or “permissible persecution” of 
non-conforming practices of sex and expression (Johnson 2007). Adjudicators’ 
subjective assessments of the boundaries of privacy and what was acceptable sexual 
conduct within that limited space allowed concealment to be deemed “reasonable.” 
By imposing discretion the UK was “indirectly colluding with the persecutory state” 
in the subsequent limits placed on failed asylum seekers’ lives in their countries of 
origin (Tuitt 1996, 93; see also Johnson 2007, 109; 2011, 58, 61; Jansen 2013, 6).114 
Specifically in sexual orientation-based claims, the pretence of discretion contributes 
to the “production of ‘invisible’ homosexuality [and] perpetuates the continued 
social eradication of the expression, public visibility, and even the practice of 
homosexuality in the countries concerned” (McGhee 2001b, 25; see also Dauvergne 
and Millbank 2003; Millbank 2004, 214; Johnson 2007, 108).  
Post-Jain the UK adapted its position on the concealment of sexual behaviour 
and identity. As is the nature of case law, principled legal rules require interpretation 
and adaptation in application, but RSD was often skewed toward exclusion rather 
than protection. The narrowly classified and concealable categories of potential 
refugees were sieved through often contradictory discourses of discretion, silence, 
and conformity versus openness, political activism, and flaunting to be rejected and 
returned to a surrogate closet. 
1.2.2 Nascent discretion reasoning 
Conduct-based adjudication, discretion and concealment took hold after Jain and 
remained the status quo for a decade. Adjudicators carefully avoided affirming any 
rights to sexual identity and expression in RSD. This sub-section analyses early 
discretion reasoning and Z [2004], in particular, because the discussion in that appeal 
revolves around the landmark Australian decision, S395 [2003]. 
First, it is beneficial to foreground some sociological implications of the 
assumptions of the discretion requirement for the construction of sexuality. Millbank 
(2004, 217) provides an example of the effects of discretion requirements, citing at 
length an appeal of a gay Pakistani before the High Court in 2001. The appeal 
concerned the claimant’s fear of persecution if he were to be returned and live 
                                                 
114 See also Haines QC (para 114) in Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004] on the potential complicity 
with persecutors in RSD. 
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openly, as he had been living in the UK. The facts of his homosexuality and the lack 
of a gay community in Pakistan had been accepted. However, the Adjudicator 
concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution 
so long as he were to be discreet about his lifestyle as he had in the past. To “attract” 
persecution “he would have to flaunt his homosexuality.”115 Millbank (2004, 216, 
217) argues that the adjudicators trivialised the public expression of homosexuality 
as a “right to go clubbing,” and demonstrated “a dogged determination not to 
conceptualise the life experience…of a gay man in terms of human rights concepts 
such as self-expression or freedom of association.”116 The observation of this kind of 
early discretion reasoning remained relevant until at least 2010. 
For example, in the AIT hearing that would eventually wind its way to the 
Supreme Court as HJ and HT [2010], HJ’s claim that discretion would not be 
reasonably tolerable was dismissed. Hodge J (HJ [2008], para 43) trivialised rights to 
association in public when recounting HJ’s testimony that he had enjoyed going “to 
pubs, clubs, parks and friends’ homes,” and being “able to hold hands and put his 
arms around gay friends.” Hodge J (para 45) acknowledged that “[i]n Iran, he could 
not go to gay clubs,” because “[h]omosexuals may wish to, but cannot, live openly in 
Iran.” The Tribunal found that because he could convene discreetly with a few 
confidants in Iran, HJ could “express his sexuality albeit in a more limited way than 
he could do elsewhere” (Hodge J, para 45). The discretion requirement was 
repeatedly challenged in appeals for refugee status. But the Home Office and 
adjudicators were adept at framing the reasoning in adjudications so as to maintain 
appearances that the refusal of refugee status based on the possibility of the 
claimant’s discretion could not adequately be described as a “requirement,” which 
would contravene domestic and international jurisprudence.117 The first decision to 
employ this cynical tactic in the main sample analysed here was handed down in 
2004. 
                                                 
115 Quoted by the High Court (para 10) in R v Special Immigration Adjudicator ex parte T [2001] 
Imm. A.R. 187. The Tribunal declined to overturn the Adjudicator’s decision, as did the Court of 
Appeal (Millbank 2004, 217). 
116 See e.g. Dawkins [2003], where the Adjudicator’s findings of fact, para 27, are set out by Wall J: 
the asylum seeker, Dawkins, had frequented gay nightclubs in Jamaica (Wall J, para 13-14), 
purportedly evidence that he was not a risk of ill-treatment, and Dawkins was able to maintain sexual 
relations “by meeting his various partners either at a hotel or a guest house” (Wall J, para 13). 
117 Notably, in domestic law, Ahmed [1999]. 
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Following the publication of the HCA decision in S395 [2003], Appellant Z 
complained in the application for permission to appeal that the SSHD and IAT had 
failed to consider “why the appellant had conducted his personal relations discreetly” 
(cited in Buxton LJ in Z [2004], para 20).118 The Court of Appeal supported the 
Tribunal’s decision and concluded that the appellant had not substantiated his own 
question in the appeal with evidence demonstrating why he had been discreet about 
his sexuality in Zimbabwe. In fact, reflecting on his judgment in Z [2004], former 
Lord Justice Buxton (2012, 397) writes that “[i]n terms of its evidence and argument, 
Z was a very unsatisfactory case.” However, the decision the court reached leads to a 
paradoxical conclusion or suggestion of what may lead to a successful claim: a 
premium is placed on “being out” in the country of origin and, yet, that expression of 
sexuality may actually provoke the persecution feared. Below, I have included an 
excerpt from Z [2004] for discussion of three conceptual themes that emerged during 
this period (see Fairclough 1999, 196 on method). Crucially, adjudicators had 
reasoned that self-repression was the asylum seeker’s own preference, and so 
constructed a legal artifice in which discretion was not, in the court’s view, required.  
“[1] He said that they did not visit gay places…He said they 
conducted their relationship ‘secretly, so it was not known.’ This 
history is relevant because it demonstrates in our view that [2] the 
appellant’s chosen form of homosexual conduct did not involve overt 
expression or the frequenting of gay bars or other collective 
homosexual settings, [3] activities which may well increase the risk an 
appellant would run of hostile reaction from the police or public 
[numbering my own].”119  
At the centre of the discursive legal construction or, perhaps, omission of identity is a 
distinction between “open” and “discreet” homosexuals, which produced a 
seemingly impossible double bind for achieving refugee status. The case law has 
both suggested that asylum seekers demonstrate having taken the risk of being out, 
open, perhaps even politically active,120 or experienced persecution in the past,121 and 
                                                 
118 Z [2004]. See also S395 [2003]: McHugh and Kirby JJ, para 18, decided that the tribunal had erred 
in dividing homosexuals into “discreet” and “non-discreet” categories, especially where there may 
have been a “need to act discreetly” to avoid persecution, and noted the tribunal failed to consider 
what would happen if the appellants were discovered by the community to be homosexuals. 
119 IAT cited in Buxton LJ, para 6. 
120 e.g. Amare [2005], especially para 6; B [2007], para 12. 
121 e.g. the case of “E” in RM and BB [2005]; RG [2006]; HJ [2008]. 
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coupled these with the expectation that claimants be “good gays” in their discretion, 
conscious of the social mores in their country of origin.122 Any combination of these 
contradictory constraints may leave no clear path to refugee status for persecuted 
sexual minorities.  
I would argue the excerpt is indicative that [1] evidence that a claimant had 
been closeted in the country of origin, regardless of reasons for this concealment, 
allowed adjudicators to infer that sexuality had not previously put the asylum seeker 
at risk, and would not do so in the future. This “expectation of silence and 
conformity” leads the adjudicator to “privilege an imagined (discreet)” lifestyle, even 
over and above past experience of persecution as well as present and future conduct 
such as living openly, which may expose them to persecution (Millbank 2004, 214–
215). On the second point [2], adjudicators often went so far as to conclude 
appellants really wanted to live a private life, regardless, and therefore discretion was 
not “imposed” in the rejection of the claim and their prospective removal.123 In 
relation to Z’s claim, the IAT found that “in reality the appellant and his partner had 
been able to conduct their gay relationship without serious difficulties” (Buxton LJ, 
para 6). By interpreting previous concealment to infer “choice” of lifestyle, 
adjudicators used evidence to suggest homosexual conduct would remain private 
without having to seriously consider the reasonable likelihood or implications of the 
associated identity becoming public. That is to say, UK adjudicators did not address 
how a claimant’s sexual life, conduct or, by extension, identity could potentially 
become public and the possibility of persecution in those circumstances (see Weßels 
2013, 66). At [3], the adjudicators acknowledged the danger the claimant might be 
put in upon return if he acted “openly,” but the court decided that expecting Z to 
conduct his relationship discreetly was not unreasonable – after all, that was his 
choice (see also Millbank 2004, 214, 216; HJ and HT [2010], para 97). Even if the 
finding that Z’s “chosen form of homosexual conduct” was inherently discreet is 
taken at face value, as correct, adjudicators either failed to grapple with or 
                                                 
122 e.g. JM [2008], especially para 149; HJ and HT [2009], para 34-36. 
123 Similar reasoning is also applied in Amare [2005], discussed below, and in RG [2006], para 11. See 
also Millbank (2004, 214), citing an Australian case where the court referred to the applicant’s 
“‘preferred lifestyle of discreet homosexuality’ in Iran.” 
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intentionally neglected how the “choice” can be constrained by the imperative to 
avoid persecution as well as the tenuous safety a closet has to offer.124   
The conclusion reached by the court in Z [2004] is especially problematic 
given that permission to appeal had been granted in order to consider the relevance 
of the HCA decision, S395 [2003]. The UKSC later found the application of S395 in 
UK Court of Appeal decisions to be based on a “misunderstanding” of the Australian 
case (HJ and HT [2010], para 25-29, 47-51, 102-103, 124-127). S395 would have 
implied an entirely different legal outcome for Z if it had been applied correctly. In 
S395, a gay couple had been determined to exercise discretion because they feared 
serious harm if they were to live openly. McHugh and Kirby JJ (para 34-35), in the 
majority in that case, submitted that the Minister (respondent) was correct, that the 
appellants would indeed exercise discretion if returned to Bangladesh as they had in 
the past. However, the Tribunal did consider the possibility that the choice to be 
discreet was influenced by the fear of persecution if they were not to be so (see 
McHugh and Kirby JJ, para 40, 44, 53, 55, 56; Gummow and Hayne JJ, para 80, 82). 
Contrary to the court’s conclusion in Z [2004], “the judgment [in S395] conceives of 
sexuality as fully rounded identity and in doing so implicitly posits self expression as 
a protected aspect of that identity” (Millbank 2004, 207). While the SSHD, Tribunal, 
and Court of Appeal may have been right to decide that there was “no specific 
evidence” for why Z had concealed his relationship in Zimbabwe, the decision seems 
to evade, or even contort, the reasoning of the majority in S395.  
If the UK court had properly considered and applied the HCA’s decision, the 
Lords Justice would have granted Z’s appeal. The court would have directed the 
Tribunal upon remitting the case to consider whether the evidence showed Z had to 
be discreet or if he could live openly upon return, and scrutinised the real question of 
whether Z had a well-founded fear of persecution in either scenario. Finally, the 
decision would have emphasised the importance of not relegating sexual minority 
                                                 
124 Others have referred to this as “reasonable tolerability,” suggesting that choice discourses have 
surfaced in the wake of HJ and HT. Weßels (2013, 64), for example, argues “the emphasis seems to 
have moved from ‘reasonably tolerable discretion’ to a presumption of ‘discretion by 
choice’…because the [HJ and HT] test continues to focus on the applicant’s behaviour and separates 
this from the protected identity.” Based on the cases considered in this thesis, I would observe this is a 
continuation, if evolution, of the legal discourse in the new paradigm. Perhaps this is also merely a 
conflict of terms, and the recent legal reasoning has moved past referring to the “choice” as 
“reasonable,” per HJ and HT. 
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asylum seekers to a “false dichotomy” of “discreet” and “non-discreet” groups 
(McHugh and Kirby, para 38-39; Gummow and Hayne JJ, para 88).  
Asylum seekers’ professed sexual orientations were generally accepted as 
fact until HJ and HT [2010].125 In retrospect the credibility assessment of the sexual 
identities of Z and others seems to be inconsistent with current practice, which raises 
a speculative and yet troubling question of whether this change has allowed 
adjudicators additional discretion to refuse claims in light of HJ and HT (see further 
chapters six and seven). Currently the Asylum Policy Instructions suggests 
adjudicators infer a claim is unfounded where the asylum seeker’s evidence 
presented an irrational degree of risk-taking, because it would be unbelievable that 
she had placed herself in a position of possible harm (Vine 2014; API 2015). Perhaps 
in the case of Z, not being discreet would be incredible.  
It is reasonable to find that Z’s “discreet” lifestyle in the country of origin 
may have been adopted to avoid harm or could result in harm in spite of a desire for 
a quiet life, which the court so whimsically dismissed as voluntary concealment.126 
As presented in the written decision, Z’s contention that previous discretion 
evidenced the possibility of persecution seems sensible, grounded in international 
refugee and human rights discourses and, if anything, adds to the appellant’s credible 
well-founded fear and the identity claimed. 
1.2.3 Conduct in the closet 
This sub-section considers more thoroughly the operation of the discretion 
requirement upon private sexual conduct, based on an “understanding that closeting 
of sexuality is a permissible limit on the expression of identity” (Johnson 2007, 108). 
Over time discretion reasoning evolved with case precedent, but the basic concept 
that it relied on, in various forms, was always the closet. 
According to Buxton LJ (para 11) in RG [2006], Z [2004] proposed two 
questions: first, “is he being required…to modify his behaviour” and, secondly, “will 
that modification of behaviour put him in a situation of persecution.” Like Jain, the 
revised framework centred on private homosexual conduct, and required a very high 
                                                 
125 Based on the sample of cases in this study; see e.g. Amare [2005], HJ [2008], Apata [2015], and 
the literature, e.g. Millbank (2009a), Lewis (2014). 
126 See HJ and HT [2010], Lord Rodger, para 65 on previous discretion as “an indication that there is 
indeed a threat of persecution;” Sir John Dyson, para 123 on “no real choice.” 
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likelihood of persecution, such as the enforcement of anti-sodomy laws in the 
country of origin.127 Given that anti-sodomy laws often only target men who have 
sex with men (MSM), a literal reading of then-UK precedent might have reached a 
misinformed conclusion that other gender and sexually non-conforming persons 
would not also be at risk from authorities, non-state agents, and the broad 
discriminatory effects of the very existence of such prohibitions (Jansen 2013, 7–
8).128  
In Amare [2005] the claimant was a lesbian from Ethiopia which, unlike 
many states that criminalise sodomy, also criminalises female same-sex acts 
(Itaborahy and Zhu 2013, 48). Lesbian claims to asylum may be impacted by the 
double discrimination of gender and sexual orientation as argued in Amare (Laws LJ, 
para 23, 26; see UNHCR 2002, para 16–17). The UNHCR Guidelines (2011b, 80–
83), for example, provide that even where gender is not a central ground of a claim, 
gender-related aspects are important to understanding the context and evidence in 
RSD. General issues of the social control of women, restricted access to public 
spaces, and lower social and geographic mobility have apparently contributed to 
fewer lesbian claimants and their invisibility in refugee law (McGhee 2001b, 25–26; 
Miller 2005, 141; Jordan 2009, 171; Cragnolini 2013, 101). Amare submitted as 
evidence that Ethiopian society placed a premium on marriage to the extent that 
where a single woman did not live with her family, she was, in effect, considered a 
prostitute (see Laws LJ, para 11). Problematically, women’s rights have also been 
viewed through a lens of cultural difference in asylum claims, which obscured the 
fear of persecution (see chapter five).129 The court applied discretion in Amare but, 
additionally, failed to appreciate the ways in which women are too often deprived of 
the social and material resources to, at minimum, have their own discreet “closet,” let 
alone the additional barriers they may face in trying to access the public sphere.  
In the sample of cases, the first recognition of the right to expression and 
association was tenuously made in J [2006], but with the explicit limitation that the 
                                                 
127 See e.g. OO and JM [2009], para 9, 13, 22; Johnson (2011, 61); Tobin (2012, 453–454). 
128 Consider, for example, National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v. Minister 
of Justice and Others, Case CCT 11/98, para 108-109; in this decision the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa struck down the country’s anti-sodomy law. 
129 See e.g. Islam and Shah [1999], especially 163 on the majority of women conforming to 
subordination; K and Fornah [2006], para 28, 109.   
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repression of aspects of sexual identity was acceptable. To a certain extent, Kay LJ 
cited and applied S395 [2003] in the spirit of the law, both of the HCA decision and 
the growing international consensus which it represented – sexual identity was about 
more than private sex. In remitting the case to the Tribunal, the Court of Appeal 
instructed the Tribunal to consider if “discretion” is something reasonably tolerable 
for J in Iran, “not only in the context of random sexual activity but in relation to 
‘matters following from, and relevant to, sexual identity’ in the wider sense 
recognised by the [HCA]” (Kay LJ, para 16; citing Gummow and Hayne, para 83). 
Buxton LJ (para 20) agreed with the judgment of Kay LJ, but qualified that inquiry 
into what may be reasonably tolerable with more obviously limited terms. Buxton LJ 
(para 20) wrote that J “may have to abandon part of his sexual identity” where not 
being discreet could lead to “extreme danger.” This approach is generally consistent 
with the pre-2010 cases in this study, with the possible exception of Collins J’s 
critique in B [2007].130  
In B the respondent relied on the absence of prosecutions in Algeria to argue 
that the claimant was not at risk of persecution. The Adjudicator agreed in finding 
that homosexuality was tolerated to some extent in Algeria so long as it was not 
“expressed very explicitly in public,” which B had argued would provoke social 
hostility, police harassment, or possibly even death threats from Muslim 
fundamentalists (Collins J, para 11). At the High Court, Collins J (para 24, 31) noted 
the repeated references to “discreetly” in previous determinations, and that the whole 
basis for refusing B’s claim was that he would act discreetly if returned. Collins J 
(para 15) further questioned what the Tribunal meant by “expressing very explicitly 
in public through behaviour or clothes” and, therefore, whether the risk of 
persecution was “limited to those who flaunt their homosexuality,” or perhaps LGBT 
rights activism (see further part two, below).  
In HJ [2008], the AIT considered the questions set out by Kay and Buxton 
LJJ in J [2006], principally with a remit to determine why HJ had been discreet in the 
past, would be so if returned to Iran, and whether the need for discretion would itself 
constitute persecution (Hodge J, para 5-6, 9, 39; see also Appendix V). Rather than a 
“subjective” test, which is described as how it is thought HJ “should behave” or, 
                                                 
130 See further Appendix V; discretion was important in this decision, but not the error of law. 
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perhaps, should be able to be a homosexual, the Tribunal interpreted their assigned 
task as an objective test on the “facts” of how HJ “will behave” (Hodge J, para 39). 
According to the Tribunal, these facts were to be deduced from how and why he had 
conducted himself before: “we have to examine whether that will entail for him 
having to live a life which he cannot reasonably be expected to tolerate” and if it 
required him to suppress “many aspects of his sexual identity” (Hodge J, para 39).  
HJ’s counsel forwarded that the fear of being discovered, convicted, 
sentenced, and punished for homosexuality in Iran was the causative factor of 
discretion, and that HJ could not reasonably be expected to tolerate this discretion. 
The SSHD simply concluded that, because HJ had lived discreetly to avoid 
authorities, he reasonably tolerated life in Iran (Hodge J, para 10-11). The Tribunal 
reviewed the CG case,131 RM and BB [2005], and considered up-to-date evidence 
(see Thomas 2008 on CG). Iranian punishments for homosexuality were 
acknowledged to amount to persecution, and it was noted that there had been an 
increase in surveillance since 2005 (Hodge J, para 20-24). But the evidence of 
increased surveillance was insufficient, because Iran defines homosexual offences 
under a broad category as a moral crime. Thus, there was no evidence homosexuals 
were a particular target of authorities (Hodge J, para 25). Like RM and BB [2005], 
the Tribunal in HJ found the likelihood of discovery and persecution for private 
conduct was slim. Noting that the situation of Iranian homosexuals was relatively 
unchanged, Hodge J (para 25) included an excerpt of RM and BB that observed “it 
can be expected that they would be likely to conduct themselves discreetly for the 
obvious repercussions that will follow” (Allen VP, para 124). 
The Tribunal found that, because HJ had been discreet in the past 
(“objectively”), he could reasonably tolerate a closeted life in Iran without significant 
detriment to his private life or, purportedly, significant risk of harm: 
“On the evidence he was able to conduct his homosexual activities in 
Iran without serious detriment to his private life and without that 
causing him to suppress many aspects of his sexual identity. Whilst he 
has conducted his homosexual activities in the UK less discreetly, we 
are not persuaded that his adaptation back to life in Iran would be 
                                                 
131 See Appendices II, on country assessments and CG cases, and V, on RM and BB [2005].  
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something he could not reasonably be expected to tolerate.”132 
Hodge J (para 45) continued, HJ “may well live in fear on return to Iran now he is 
aware of the penalties which might be arbitrarily imposed were he to be discovered.” 
Nevertheless, the dismissal of the appeal was not overturned on the basis of the 
Tribunal’s finding that, in spite of the level of seriousness, the actual probability of 
discovery was insufficient for international protection.  
The requirement to suppress sexual identity to avoid persecution was 
particularly apparent in XY [2008]. The Court of Appeal here decided that it was not 
unreasonable that the Iranian appellant and his “friend,” A, with whom he had a 
“seven-year relationship” had been restricted to sex in bathhouses and A’s home 
when his family were away (Stanley Burnton LJ, para 2).133 XY’s homosexuality and 
relationship with A were accepted as facts by adjudicators. However, what 
authorities knew, whether A had been arrested, and if XY had been summoned were 
not accepted by adjudicators as having been established (Stanley Burnton LJ, para 3). 
XY’s counsel argued the Immigration Judge (IJ) had failed to consider J [2006], and 
whether XY could reasonably be expected to tolerate having to “conduct his sexual 
life clandestinely” (Stanley Burnton LJ, para 5). Counsel also stressed XY’s 
circumstances of living in a family home and having to go to public baths (Stanley 
Burnton LJ, para 14). The court accepted that the consequences of living openly in 
Iran amounted to persecution according to the CG case, RM and BB [2005] (para 
123-124). But Stanley Burnton LJ (para 7) in XY stated that if homosexual claimants 
are discreet “there is no real risk of their being apprehended and punished” unless 
“they have previously been arrested or are wanted…on account of their homosexual 
activities.” 
Like the Tribunal in the remitted case of J [2006], i.e. HJ [2008], in XY 
[2008] Stanley Burnton LJ (para 9) found it opportune to underline Buxton LJ’s (J, 
para 20) emphasis on HJ possibly having to “abandon part of his sexual identity,” 
                                                 
132 Hodge J, para 44. 
133 A is referred to once as “friend” and once as “partner.” Similar to gender and pronouns in AK 
[2008], a case discussed below, we cannot know how XY identified A from the decision. However, 
the use of “friend” is highlighted because, depending on how XY actually identified A, it is a peculiar, 
possibly culturally rooted description for a long-term partner, and/or could be a homophobic 
characterisation of that relationship by the court akin to a racist reference to a black man as “boy.” 
The court in HJ and HT [2009] also refers to XY’s “7 year homosexual relationship with a friend” 
(Pill LJ, para 24). 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum  118 
which helped to justify the decisions in HJ [2008] and XY [2008]. Yet, these 
determinations appear at odds with Kay LJ’s (para 16) affirmation in J [2006] of a 
protected identity “not only in the context of random sexual activity,” say, sex in a 
bathhouse shower cubicle, but also in “matters following from, and relevant to, 
sexual identity” (and here Kay LJ was drawing upon Gummow and Hayne JJ in 
S395, para 83). In XY, Stanley Burnton LJ (para 10-13) excerpted HJ [2008] at 
length: this included the rationale that HJ could clearly tolerate living in Iran as a gay 
man because he had done so previously, that there was no evidence the appellant was 
of interest to authorities, and that while the UK might be preferable to him, he would 
act discreetly in Iran without serious detriment to his private life (Hodge J, para 41-
42, 44-45, 61-62). “It was for [XY] to establish that he could not reasonably be 
expected to tolerate his condition if he were returned,” which, according to the court, 
he did not, and the appeal was dismissed (Stanley Burnton LJ, para 14). What, in the 
court’s view, may have been unreasonable and intolerable remained undefined. 
While continuing to examine Iranian asylum appeals in the UK, the next case 
considered gender identity and the fear of being perceived to be gay and persecuted 
in that state. Berg and Millbank (2013, 135) argue that gender identity should be 
conceived and developed in jurisprudence as a PSG distinct from sexual orientation, 
and by that measure AK [2008] failed to properly identify and articulate that PSG. It 
should be noted, however, that the decision suggested adjudicators found that AK 
belonged to a PSG and that credibility was not disputed but whether there was a 
well-founded fear of persecution was not clear (Sedley LJ, para 2, 19, 28). Instead, 
the concern is that a failure to develop the PSG could impact future gender identity 
claims that would have less case law from which to draw support.  
Berg and Millbank (2013, 123–124) found only 37 publicly available 
decisions concerning trans asylum seekers in their study of 5 states and 17 years of 
case law, including 3 UK decisions. AK [2008] is included in this sample as it 
elaborates, if briefly, some key trans asylum issues. Importantly, this illustrates how 
little developed UK case law is on trans claimants and that, despite recent 
innovations to the Asylum Policy Instructions (API 2011b; Berg and Millbank 2013, 
122–123, 132, 143–144), gender identity has effectively only been implied with the 
inclusion of gender and sexual orientation. 
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Problematically, AK is identified as “he” and described as “a transsexual in 
need of gender reassignment” (Sedley LJ, para 1). While AK was male to female 
(MTF), it is not clear in the decision whether AK had “actually presented their 
chosen sex or preferred mode of address,” so we cannot infer whether the 
construction of trans in the case is a reflection of the adjudicators’ or appellant’s 
view (Berg and Millbank 2013, 126, 144–145). With that cautionary note, I also use 
male pronouns in reference to AK.  
Sedley LJ (para 1) expresssed that, “[s]urprisingly – at least to the outside 
world – gender reassignment is not only accepted but widely practised in Iran.”134 
But AK feared “he will be perceived and persecuted” as a homosexual (Sedley LJ, 
para 1). While AK’s appeal was granted by Atkinson IJ, the SSHD’s application for 
reconsideration succeeded before Mather IJ (see Appendix IV). Mather IJ found the 
previous decision had wrongly “equated the risks to the appellant as a transsexual,  
with those of a homosexual,” but the Court of Appeal disagreed with this analysis 
(Sedley LJ, para 2, 4). Sedley LJ (para 4) asserted that Atkinson IJ’s opinion had 
distinguished the two groups, but he also accepted AK’s argument that “there was a 
real risk that others in Iran would not do so.” Sedley LJ (para 6) agreed, only briefly 
adding that it was an “evidential fact” that the risk of persecution facing “a pre-
operative transsexual living in Iran” could not simply be equated “to that faced by 
overt homosexuals.” Like pronoun preference, the decision does not offer substantial 
details of AK’s personal circumstances. For example, if in Iran a “post-operative 
transsexual” would not face persecution, I wonder if perhaps AK did not wish for 
(certain) medical intervention(s) to affirm their gender identity (see Sedley LJ, para 
28). The majority of the decision concerned the appeal’s process, so I consign the 
analytical consideration of gender identity to these few short paragraphs which is a 
fitting reflection of the jurisprudence.  
1.2.4 Principle of internal relocation 
The discretion requirement has also been coupled with assumptions that asylum 
seekers could be refused because of an internal relocation alternative.135 Internal 
                                                 
134 See also HS [2005], para 49, 86; Jansen (2013, 13); Eshaghian (2008).  
135 The UNHCR Guidelines (2011b, 105–113) refer to “internal relocation alternative” or “internal 
flight alternative” but adjudicators do not necessarily refer to the principle of relocation as an option 
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relocation is a fundamental consideration in RSD, that an asylum seeker could be 
removed and relocated in the country of nationality (see generally Hathaway 1991, 
133–134). For example, in Atkinson [2003], part of the claimant’s grounds was of his 
perceived homosexuality in his community due to his association with his gay boss 
(Supperstone QC, para 7). Supperstone QC (sitting as Deputy Judge) found that if 
Atkinson were to relocate to a new area, “there [was] no reason why he should be 
perceived as being homosexual” (Supperstone QC, para 27). 
A common inquiry is whether a sexual minority can instead seek refuge in a 
cosmopolitan city (Jansen 2013, 13–14). Evidence of cruising areas in Tehran was 
cited from CG RM and BB [2005] several times in the sample. In B [2007] the 
findings of the Adjudicator set out “in the cities,” “big cities, especially in Algiers,” 
there are various meeting places for homosexuals, as long as their behaviour is not 
overt (cited in Collins J, para 11).136 So, in reality, internal relocation has the 
potential to be deployed as “discretion plus” – displacement and relocation of 
identity within the individual, plus relocation of the individual within the country.137  
In HC [2005], the Court of Appeal agreed with points of law in favour of HC, 
but the appellate history details a problematic application of an internal relocation 
alternative. The Adjudicator and the Tribunal failed to consider the cumulative effect 
of being both a Palestinian and gay in suggesting internal relocation (Keene LJ, para 
21). According to the Adjudicator, HC was not safe in his refugee camp due to 
criminal actions, but he was safe in other areas of Lebanon, such as Beirut (Keene 
LJ, para 18-19). The Tribunal agreed and articulated that while living openly is not 
tolerated and homosexual acts are punishable, the evidence did not show a 
“reasonable likelihood” of persecution from state or non-state actors “if he were to 
conduct himself with discretion” (cited in Keene LJ, para 23). Supported by a range 
of documents and expert evidence, HC had testified that “[a]s a Palestinian I could 
not live in a Christian area and as a gay I could not live in a Muslim area” (Keene LJ, 
para 11, 21). Keene LJ was persuaded by the appellant’s argument, and concluded 
                                                                                                                                          
for an asylum seeker other than international protection as internal relocation or flight. See also 
UKLGIG (2010, 5-6).   
136 See also LZ [2011], para 66-74 on the disputed “gay scene” in Zimbabwe. 
137 See also Millbank (2012, 505) on “re-concealment;” Zaccour (2015) on Lebanon; HJ and HT 
[2010], para 19-21, 84. 
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that the evidence had been misconstrued and did not consider de facto discrimination 
(Keene LJ, para 28-31).     
Of the approach taken by the Court of Appeal generally, three principles are 
more widely applicable. First, the possibility of internal relocation was questionable 
in HC’s circumstances, because of the accumulation of factors impeding the 
“tolerability” of return. The accumulation of factors of discrimination and possible 
ill-treatment were the result of the various intersections of his being gay (PSG), 
Muslim (religion), and Palestinian (race/nationality) which made the prospect of his 
relocation and inclusion in any community and opportunity for a normal life 
extremely difficult, perhaps unreasonable (Keene LJ, para 29).138 This brings us to 
the second problem with the internal relocation alternative, liveability. While the 
Adjudicator had found he “could reasonably (and safely) relocate” to Beirut, where 
“he had lived without difficulty,” the Court of Appeal found this did not consider the 
long-term viability of “his prospects of living safely in Beirut on a long-term basis,” 
including owning property and employment (Keene LJ, para 30). Finally, as with the 
discretion requirement and the implications of conforming to a society’s norms by 
acquiescing to marriage, masquerading as heterosexual, or living a celibate life, an 
issue within internal relocation alternatives is the forcible production of an “outsider” 
who is regarded with suspicion. The Adjudicator’s finding that Palestinians were 
granted free movement between camps “ignored the [expert evidence] about the 
difficulties a young gay man would have in doing so and the suspicion which would 
attach to him if he sought to do so” (Keene LJ, para 31). Discretion itself is 
suspicious, often because it affirms an inescapable expression of one’s sexuality 
through discourses of silence and non-conformity to social mores.  
In JM [2008], the appellant was not out to his family, but this would 
“inevitably be revealed on the issue of marriage” (King IJ, para 17). In Uganda this 
would also be an issue for relocating within the country. Local counsellors would 
need to give permission to resettle in a new area, and “[a]s a 32 year old man who is 
                                                 
138 Keene LJ does not, as I have, highlight that the various factors are in fact, possibly, parallel 
Convention grounds under Article 1A(2). I highlight them here as I seek to develop a narrative that the 
categories are distinct but not mutually exclusive (see e.g. MM [2009], especially para 35; further 
chapter seven). Moreover, relevant factors may not in themselves be standalone Convention grounds 
but include, for example, gender (e.g. LaViolette 2007), or other status or stigma such as HIV (e.g. 
Johnson 2007). 
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not married, it would not take many questions to elicit the fact of his homosexuality” 
(King IJ, para 17, 20). Unfortunately, the case of HC [2005] somewhat stands out in 
the jurisprudence in that it recognises that an internal relocation alternative is not 
always as straightforward as it may at first seem. Relocation must be scrutinised for 
whether it actually provides sufficient protection if, as I have argued, it is closely 
linked to, or a subset of, discretion reasoning.139  
1.3 HJ and HT: Gay rights are human rights? 
The Supreme Court’s judgment in HJ and HT [2010] affirmed that LGB(T)140 
asylum seekers should be able live openly without the fear of persecution or the 
requirement for discretion. As gay men, the appellants, HJ and HT “are to be as free 
as their straight equivalents in the society concerned to live their lives in the way that 
is natural to them as gay men, without the fear of persecution” (Lord Rodger, para 
78). The UKSC dismissed the reasoning of discretion, and quite firmly grounded its 
decision in the immutability of sexual identity.141  
Importantly, homosexuals “are as much entitled to freedom of association 
[and] self-expression in matters that affect their sexuality, as people who are straight” 
(Lord Hope, para 14). While the slight differences in the opinions of Lords Rodger 
and Hope can be reconciled,142 their contrasting frames of the scope of a relevant 
“gay life” seem to strike a discordant note. Lord Hope (para 35; see also 14-15) 
seemed pointedly more reserved than Lord Rodger in terms of the construct of 
refugee: “it would be wrong to approach the issue [of persecution] on the basis that 
the purpose of the Convention is to guarantee…that he can live as freely and as 
openly as a gay person as he would be able to do if he were not returned” (cf. Buxton 
2012, 405–406). Or, at least, Lord Rodger did not offer a similar qualification. On 
                                                 
139 i.e. HC does not seem to have had a significant impact in the development of jurisprudence relating 
to gay refugees. See also Hysi v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 711 on internal relocation, concealment, 
and mixed ethnicity, cited in HJ and HT [2009] and [2010]. 
140 The UKSC did not, strictly speaking, engage gender identity or trans issues in seeking asylum. But 
there was a hidden reference, perhaps inadvertently, in an anecdotal account of persecution of a 
couple who had been “married,” and one of the parties was actually gender non-conforming (Lord 
Hope, para 2; Gevisser 2014). Moreover, it is arguably inconceivable the principles of the case would 
not equally apply to gender identity; e.g. consider the application of HJ and HT [2010] in MT [2011] 
regarding religion and RT and KM [2012] regarding political opinion; see also API (2011b). 
141 Recall “natural to them;” see also Lord Hope, para 11; Lord Rodger, para 76; Hathaway and 
Pobjoy (2012, 386). 
142 See e.g. LZ [2011], para 99-100; SW [2011], para 10-11. It should be noted, however, that Lord 
Hope’s judgment was not adopted by other members of the Supreme Court (Buxton 2012, 406).  
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the contrary, beginning from a position of immutability Lord Rodger (para 76) wrote 
that Convention protection extends to gays and lesbians, but also “bisexuals and 
everyone else on a broad spectrum of sexual behaviour,” and they “are entitled to 
have the same freedom from fear of persecution as their straight counterparts.”  
With the exception of “naturally discreet” persons, the UKSC outlined that if 
an asylum seeker were to live openly and had a well-founded fear of persecution on 
that basis if returned, they would qualify for refugee status even if that harm might 
otherwise be avoided by concealment. Previous discretion reasoning undermined the 
very purpose of the Convention; as Lord Rodger (para 82) explained, to refuse an 
asylum seeker because “he could avoid the persecution by living discreetly would be 
to defeat the very right which the Convention exists to protect – his right to live 
freely and openly as a gay man without fear of persecution.” Lord Rodger (para 82) 
set out a new test to be followed by adjudicators (see also Lord Hope, para 35). The 
Tribunal in SW [2011] interprets this task and helpfully summarises the questions 
which need to be answered in light of HJ and HT: 
“(a) whether [the Tribunal] was satisfied on the evidence that 
the claimant was gay, or that he or she would be treated as gay 
by potential persecutors in the country of nationality; and if so  
(b) whether it was satisfied on the available evidence that gay 
people who lived openly would be liable to persecution in the 
applicant’s country of nationality; and if so    
(c) what the individual claimant would do if he or she were 
returned to that country.”143    
Lord Rodger’s (para 82) judgment was that if an asylum seeker “would choose to 
live discreetly simply because that was how he himself would wish to live, or 
because of social pressures, e.g. not wanting to distress his parents or embarrass his 
friends, then his application should be rejected” – i.e. “naturally discreet” (cf. Lord 
Hope, para 22). However, if the asylum seeker would live discreetly because of a 
fear of persecution, they should be granted refugee status.  
 So HJ and HT still left ample discretion for adjudicators to reject an asylum 
claim. Firstly, as the excerpt from SW [2011] above indicates, adjudicators must be 
                                                 
143 SW [2011] para 10-11, see also 119; Lord Rodger’s test is also summarised in Appendix V. 
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satisfied the asylum seeker is gay. This is often a matter of credibility. Secondly, 
discretion is still applicable in cases of “social pressures,” which seems to be quite a 
subjective test for showing how “well-founded” a fear of being persecuted is; the 
application of HJ and HT in SW [2011] followed that “naturally discreet” sexual 
minorities are not refugees (Gleeson IJ, para 85, 106). Counsel for SW, Chelvan 
urged the Tribunal to “go further than the Supreme Court” and find that “naturally 
discreet” lesbian and bisexual women in Jamaica were refugees because they did not 
live a “heterosexual narrative” (Gleeson IJ, para 85). Chelvan argued that the 
implication of not conforming to the heterosexual narrative, such as not marrying or 
having children by a certain age, was that even if an asylum seeker was naturally 
discreet and did not “go shouting about [their sexuality, they] are going to be 
identified” (Roberts 2013b). Although SW’s appeal succeeded, the Tribunal rejected 
“that all lesbians” were at risk, because that would be “very close to finding a generic 
risk to all single women throughout the country” including “naturally discreet” 
lesbians who lived a heterosexual narrative (Gleeson IJ, para 106). 
 Finally, there is a more speculative issue of what exactly falls under the 
UKSC umbrella of behaviour that is “natural to them as gay men” in the construct of 
refugee (see further chapter six). A critique of HJ and HT is that refugee status 
should not be awarded for “trivial” behaviours which are deemed not to be 
fundamental to the “immutable” gay identity (e.g. Buxton 2012; Hathaway and 
Pobjoy 2012; cf. Goodman 2012, 425–426). For instance, Lord Rodger (para 78) 
uses illustrative, “trivial stereotypical examples from British society” to say: 
“[J]ust as male heterosexuals are free to enjoy themselves playing 
rugby, drinking beer and talking about girls with their mates, so male 
homosexuals are to be free to enjoy themselves going to Kylie 
concerts, drinking exotically coloured cocktails and talking about 
boys with their straight female mates.”  
Hathaway and Pobjoy (2012, 335) argue that the UKSC failed to “grapple with the 
scope of activities properly understood to be inherent in, and an integral part of” the 
status of being a gay refugee. In other words, to exclude from refugee status what is 
“trivial” to sexual minority identities or, as Goodman (2012, 425–426) summarises 
their argument in his response, to “curb some forms of provocative conduct” (see 
also Millbank 2012; Weẞels 2013). Tobin (2012, 457) is critical of Hathaway and 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum  125 
Pobjoy’s approach, but agrees that “[i]f persecution is to be considered a serious 
human rights violation…then there was a need for the members of the Supreme 
Court to ground their finding of persecution in an internationally recognised human 
right.” Chelvan (2013, 9) identifies that the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) rejected reasoning that attempted, like Hathaway and Pobjoy, to draw a 
distinction between so-called “core” and “peripheral” conduct. The CJEU found in X, 
Y, and Z [2013] that the fact a homosexual “could avoid the risk by exercising 
greater restraint than a heterosexual in expressing his sexual orientation is not to be 
taken into account” (para 75); moreover, “it is unnecessary to distinguish acts that 
interfere with core areas of the expression of sexual orientation, even assuming it 
were possible to identify them, from acts which do not affect those purported core 
areas” (para 78).  
The obvious impact of HJ and HT was to clarify that it was not “reasonable” 
to expect discretion to avoid persecution. The decision also appears to have moved 
the UK, at least in law, to the forefront of efforts to secure sexual minorities’ human 
rights, even if those were not clearly specified, in RSD. In spite of the UKSC’s 
landmark ruling on the recognition of sexual minorities’ routes to refugee status, the 
contentious problem of establishing “facts” such as of a “genuine” identity remains 
as a potentially irresolvable conflict in RSD, as we shall now explore. 
2 “Genuine” sexual minority refugees 
Part two interrogates the judicial construction of sexual orientation and gender 
identity and possible methods for the identification of asylum seekers’ identities in 
RSD. Building on part one, the analysis here critiques the assessment of sexual and 
gender identity in the determination of “genuine” as well as “unfounded” claims to 
refugee status. In particular, medical, psychological, and country information 
discourses have affected the constitution of a “genuine” sexual minority refugee. The 
issues considered have emerged from the case law, not always chronologically, and 
are significant to RSD pre- and post-HJ and HT. Though credibility issues pervade 
all aspects of all asylum claims and may be a particular barrier to SOGI-based 
claims, this analysis is not concerned with the assessment of credibility per se. 
Instead, this is a discussion of the possibility that an adjudicator cannot know surely 
or definitely someone’s gender or sexuality. The analysis is organised thematically 
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into sections on the body, the perception of gender and sexuality, and finally the 
dichotomy of (dis)belief in credibility assessment. 
2.1 Bodies of evidence 
Generally, forensic medical evidence left by sexual practices on the bodies of asylum 
seekers never really seemed legitimate in the UK as a means to establish the “truth” 
of identity. But the possible utility of types of corporeal evidence were occasionally 
entertained in asylum proceedings to establish the credibility of sexuality before 
being exceeded again by psychological, personal narrative, and country 
assessments.144 This section explores the possibility of testing arousal to “prove” the 
sexuality claimed, submitting to medical examination for signs left on the body by 
sexual acts, and the filming or photographing of sexual acts to overcome 
adjudicators’ “culture of disbelief” (O’Leary 2008; Souter 2011).  
International authorities have denounced the use of tests designed to measure 
erotic response in RSD.145 Pallometry or penile plethysmography (PPG) and, the 
rough equivalent but less common, vaginal photoplethysmography (VPG) are 
instrumental forms for measuring blood flow to genitals. PPG and VPG tests usually 
expose the subject to different levels and types of sexually explicit material to 
measure response, and purport to indicate the presence of sexual arousal and object 
preference (see ORAM 2011). The reliability of both tests is questionable and courts 
have found PPG results inadmissible in criminal cases, but the test is still widely 
used as a “therapeutic” tool and indicator of the likelihood of reoffending in certain 
states (Wilcox 2000, 139–140; Odeshoo 2004). The Czech Republic used VPG and 
PPG to assess asylum seekers until 2009, which provoked international 
condemnation and, though the practice was stopped, PPG was used as late as 2012 in 
a Slovakian case (Jansen and Spijkerboer 2011, 52; Śledzińska-Simon and Śmiszek 
2013, 17; Jansen 2014, 23–24;). While I found no documented case of the UK using 
PPG or VPG, I discuss them in the broader international and European context to 
                                                 
144 See Appendix II on “psychological assessments,” “personal narrative,” and “country assessments” 
or COI.   
145 See Toomey v United Kingdom, App. No. 37231/97 (1999) regarding PPG monitoring. See also 
Jansen and Spijkerboer (2011, 49–50) applying Toomey in the asylum context.  
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum  127 
underscore the problem sexual identity poses to definitive testing.146 Moreover, there 
is an obvious attraction for UK adjudicators to locate a defensible measure of sexual 
identity in RSD (Sweeney 2007; O’Leary 2008, 89),147 as seen in the next technique 
for corroborating one’s sexuality with bodily evidence. 
The possible use of forensic medicine to assess homosexuality in RSD was 
explored by the UK in 1995. Ioan Vraciu failed to produce convincing proof of his 
homosexuality through other evidence and a consistent personal narrative. The 
solicitor for the Home Office requested that doctors medically examine Vraciu’s 
anus for scar tissue which was accepted by the IAT until the appellant’s solicitor 
successfully argued homosexuality is properly understood to be psychological in its 
manifestation (McGhee 2000, 39–42).148 Of course, if medical examination of an 
alleged homosexual’s anus was applied broadly, it would falsely assume that all 
MSM engage in anal sex and as “passive” participants too (Schutzer 2012, 695), and 
it is doubtful such a test could produce conclusive results (Long 2004, 136–137).  
Perhaps “rectal examination reports” have failed to gain traction in the UK 
because of the obvious limitations. However, in an unreported 2007 case, the 
representative for the SSHD questioned why there was no medical evidence to 
support the gay claimant’s self-professed “passive” sexual role, and the IJ accepted 
the argument was admissible (Miles 2009, 24; Chelvan 2010, 60–61). Even as 
outliers, the consideration of scant medical evidence of an asylum seeker having 
been anally penetrated brings into stark contrast the construction of male 
homosexuality in RSD. There are also significant issues of medical and legal ethics 
involved in such an approach, including dignity, bodily integrity, and ECHR Article 
3 ill-treatment standards. An examination may require consent, but the catch-22 
could be that not to consent would shed doubt on credibility. Based on the evidence 
presented in this case study, the more unsettling problem is that it is a symptom of 
something more systemic – the precariously thin line tread by UK techniques of 
                                                 
146 Given the small-n design of this study, I wonder if UK adjudicators really never tried to push PPG 
or VPG into RSD, if I have missed an instance in the literature and, more speculatively, why 
adjudicators passed over this method of testing the veracity of claims given the documented references 
to “rectal examination reports.” 
147 e.g. in 2006 an IJ asked counsel: “What medical evidence is there that your client is gay?” 
(O’Leary 2008, 89). 
148 R v SSHD ex parte Vraciu 1995, Special Adjudicator’s report, Appeal no. HX/70517/94, 28 April 
1995.   
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discovering the “truth” of sexual identity running parallel to those of the persecutory 
states refugees are fleeing. Consider, for example, the forced examinations of suspect 
homosexuals in Egypt, Lebanon, and Kenya (Long 2004; Agutu 2015; Zaccour 
2015).149 
In the CG case on Iran, RM and BB [2005], an expert gave the example of the 
case of a student in a dormitory, whose suspicious liaisons with another man were 
reported to the authorities. After being placed under surveillance, they were arrested 
and prosecuted, and the body of the passive partner became a key piece of evidence.  
“The [Iranian] student had been sentenced to death because he had 
confessed. They had found sperm in his body. There was no way for 
him but to confess… He did not, however, confess until the [medical 
expert’s] report arrived, and even if he had not confessed, the crime 
would be proved by the personal knowledge of the judge…”150  
RM and BB [2005] underscores the transnational dynamic of “knowing” a sexual 
minority in RSD. UK adjudicators are predicting the likelihood of what the 
persecutory state could “know,” and what it would do about the knowledge, real or 
perceived, of the claimant’s gender or sexuality. So the inherent difficulties in gender 
and sexuality not only limit what UK adjudicators can know for themselves, but is 
additionally compounded by the persecutors’ power to know in their own judgment, 
which may restrict the rights of, or otherwise harm, sexual minorities.  
In RM and BB [2005], the IAT delved significantly into the “reasonable 
likelihood” a “practising homosexual” would come to the attention of Iranian 
authorities. The IAT found a death sentence on conviction of sodomy was unlikely 
given that the burden of proof theoretically included, for example, “the witness of 
four just men” (Allen VP, para 15, see also 18, 21, especially 117 on its infrequent 
use). But it was also suggested that the most important element of the Iranian legal 
framework is the “knowledge of the judge,” which means that, in practice, the 
prosecution of homosexuality could be secretive and censored, with judges 
exercising great discretion over the severity of punishment (Allen VP, para 30-33, 
                                                 
149 Millbank (2004, 214) makes a similar argument in relating persecution to the discretion 
requirement as “decisions [which] come perilously close to the same ideology as discriminatory 
criminal laws.” Here, however, I build upon this to suggest that transnational decision-making can 
come “perilously close to the same ideology” of knowing a sexual minority, or who is not (see also 
McGhee 2001b, 25; Tuitt 1996, 93).  
150 Allen VP, para 54. 
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46).151 Official Iranian statistics later released recorded 2,148 arrests for the crime of 
sodomy in just nine months of 2006 (HJ [2008], para 19). But for a decade, UK 
adjudicators continued to speculate whether homosexuals were likely to come to the 
attention of authorities on reports from family, state-sponsored neighbourhood 
surveillance, raids on known cruising areas, and even entrapment via internet 
chartrooms (see HJ [2008], para 17-25). Adjudicators remained unconvinced that 
Iranian sexual minorities may be subjected to imprisonment, lashings, even an 
exceptional death sentence, which would purportedly only then qualify as a well-
founded fear of being persecuted.152 
As discussed above, HJ and HT [2010] ushered in stronger protections for 
LGBT refugees in the UK, who no longer had to show discretion was intolerable, 
and so the point of contestation moved to proving the identity claimed (see Millbank 
2009a; Lewis 2014). Numerous reports have documented gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
asylum seekers submitting sexually explicit pictures and videos to prove the identity 
claimed (e.g. BBC 2014; Dugan 2014; 2015; Duffy 2015). Public scrutiny triggered a 
review of Home Office practice. The new Asylum Policy Instructions do not permit 
explicit lines of questioning and allegedly avoid soliciting graphic responses, and 
acceptance of the media has also been discredited by the CJEU (Chelvan 2014; 
Smith 2014; API 2015).153 The scrutiny of refugee bodies, from the forensic traces of 
sex acts to measuring erotic responses, has failed to prove immutable identity, “but 
God knows we keep trying” (Sant 2009).  
Psychological assessment is often used as evidence in asylum applications, 
but does not seem particularly reliable. Psychological assessments of conditions such 
as PTSD can often produce competing results that are open to interpretation rather 
than provide definitive “proof.”154 Moreover, while RSD demands a consistent 
personal narrative, “a person’s survival of persecution sometimes necessitates 
amnesia and denial of the impact and severity of traumatic events” (Shidlo and Ahola 
2013, 9). Successful asylum claims generally demonstrate a “chronologically 
                                                 
151 See also Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004], para 24; Re GJ [1995]. 
152 e.g. RM and BB [2005]; J [2006]; HJ [2008]; and HJ and HT [2009], especially para 13-21, 31.  
153 See further A, B, and C [2014]. 
154 e.g. RG [2006], para 17-20; Apata [2015], para 47-56; see also B [2007], para 21 on depression and 
para 18-19 regarding the mental health assessment which suggested B would be unable to conceal his 
homosexual identity without experience of the necessary “life skills” to “mask” his “distinctly 
feminine” characteristics. 
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accurate, ‘factual’ and realistic linear narrative of persecutory behaviour,” but the 
chances of success are increased the more this “evidence can be endorsed by the 
scars of torture and…medical reports” (Johnson 2011, 69; see also Millbank 2009b, 
5–6, 11–16). The conclusion I draw from scientific measures of the body, especially 
relating to sexual and gender identity, is that even “hard” evidence can only be made 
true by the belief or knowledge of the judge. The key to transnational decision-
making is fundamentally discursive or constructivist in practice (Sweeney 2007, 31), 
and so the problem of establishing “proof” of gender or sexual orientation is likely 
irresolvable. Instead RSD has often relied on finding the “truth” through such things 
as stereotypes, societal prejudices, narrative consistency, and other shaky measures 
of a “genuine” gay.  
2.2 Visually arresting: Perceiving “genuine” sexual and 
gender identities  
The mere fact of being effeminate or butch can militate against an asylum claim in 
perplexing ways. “Flamboyance” is a particularly problematic expression in the legal 
discourse which has been used to trivialise sexual minority identities when they 
could otherwise be concealed to “pass” as “normal.” On the other hand, if asylum 
seekers were not “flaunting” their gender or sexuality, that could be cited for the 
claim’s dismissal and justified discretion as reasonable. This section discusses how 
visibility is an issue before an adjudicator, as well as what could be done by the 
asylum seeker to remain invisible to avoid persecution. 
To paraphrase an iconic judicial confession,155 “knowing a gay when you see 
one” is perhaps the most tempting consideration in adjudicating something, such as 
identity, which cannot be precisely defined or evidenced (see Gewirtz 1995). 
Observing that the presentation and perception of gender and sexuality has 
influenced RSD can be deduced from the case law and is supported by the literature 
(Hanna 2005; LaViolette 2007, 191–192, 196–197; Bennett and Thomas 2013; 
Lewis 2014). Research has suggested that where an adjudicator considers that it is 
                                                 
155 Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184 (1964) was a US Supreme Court decision on obscenity and 
pornography. After stating that he would not venture to offer further definitions of types of obscenity, 
and perhaps the impossibility of ever “intelligibly doing so,” Justice Stewart concludes his concurring 
opinion: “But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that [emphasis 
added]” (Stewart J, 197).  
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possible to know a “genuine” gay asylum seeker, this has often been applied through 
a lens of a stereotype, and therefore has influenced outcomes (e.g. Miles 2009, 27; 
Bennett and Thomas 2013, 26; UKLGIG 2013, 16–21).156 Judging the sexuality of 
the asylum seeker by their visual presentation and similar evidence on gut instinct 
resorts to limiting stereotypes that are culturally relative (Bilefsky 2011; Gray and 
McDowall 2013, 22–23; see also chapters one and six). In sexual minority claims, 
many adjudicators have relied on the “when I see it” mantra to judge whether an 
asylum seeker “looks” like the identity or not, in addition to assessing whether their 
narrative “rings” true or false (e.g. Millbank 2009b; Schutzer 2012; Mathysse 2013, 
29; Murray 2014). The visual perception of identity strongly parallels the recurrent 
dichotomy of discretion or “passing” versus open expression or “visibility” in the 
case law. Instead of seeing multiple routes to intelligibility in how identity may 
become known, the baseline assumption in RSD is an “inadequate dichotomy of 
visibility and invisibility” (Robinson 1994, 716). Within that dichotomy, assessing 
the truth of identity has often relied on “the false promise of the visible as an 
epistemological guarantee” (Robinson 1994, 716, see also 716–719), such as 
demeanour confirming “gayness” or finding one’s stereotypical mannerisms could be 
made invisible through discretion. For example, consider an Adjudicator’s 
assessment of appearance or mannerisms as indicative of the identity claimed: 
“The appellant’s demeanour in court supported his claim to be a 
homosexual desireous of living openly as a homosexual but only in the 
gay community… His fear is of persecution should he return to 
Pakistan and behave there as an open and outed homosexual and in a 
promiscuous manner.” 157 
While the sample of this thesis only includes one determination on grounds of gender 
identity, AK [2008], a large scale study of EU LGBTI asylum recognition only 
reported a single instance in which an asylum seeker’s gender identity was not 
believed (Jansen and Spijkerboer 2011, 51; see also Jansen 2013, 15–16). At least in 
the binary man/woman distinction, perhaps gender identity is a visible 
                                                 
156 This could be legally problematic per R. (on the application of European Roma Rights Centre) v 
Immigration Officer, Prague Airport [2004] UKHL 55 which established that stereotyping qualifies as 
direct discrimination, e.g. if some sexual minority asylum seekers are treated less favourably than 
others.  
157 Quoted by the High Court (para 9) in R v Special Immigration Adjudicator ex parte T [2001] Imm. 
A.R. 187. 
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epistemological guarantee (Berg and Millbank 2013, 127–129; see also Morgan 
2006, 156). But there has been an agonising inconsistency in adjudicators’ 
assessments of “visible” credibility between the “genuine” gay presentation and 
demeanour being made true and, on the other hand, effeminacy and flamboyance 
adding credence to the dismissal of unfounded claims.  
In B [2007] a major question before adjudicators was whether B could act 
discreetly given his “innate characteristics” (Collins J, para 32). Given B’s “distinctly 
feminine behaviour” and lack of experience concealing those characteristics, a 
psychologist had determined B did not have the “life skills” to survive as a 
homosexual in a repressive society (Collins J, para 18). The Adjudicator had found 
that B had lived discreetly in the UK and could do so in Algeria (Collins J, para 14). 
B’s fresh claim (see Appendix V) was supported by a range of evidence that he had 
“not acted in what could be described as a discreet fashion” in the UK, including 
photographs of his participation in pride as well as his involvement in a number of 
gay organisations (Collins J, para 16). Collins J (para 23) excerpts the following from 
the Home Office refusal letter: 
“It is considered that your client has gone out of his way to express 
his homosexuality in public in an attempt to further his asylum and 
human rights claim in light of the adjudicator’s findings and your 
client’s activities are purely intended to frustrate his removal from the 
[UK].” 
Similarly, in a 2015 appeal of a lesbian asylum seeker, the FTT concluded that her 
“change of image is entirely due to a false claim of lesbian sexuality,” and because 
she is not a lesbian, on return to her country of origin “she will not be motivated [to] 
act in such a manner as to be perceived to be a lesbian.”158  
The theme of perception in UK jurisprudence, however, more often focused 
on how visibility affected the well-founded fear. In Amare [2005], the IAT and Court 
of Appeal cited the Adjudicator as stating that there was no evidence to indicate that 
it was “essential to her identity as a homosexual woman that she adopt an overt style 
                                                 
158 Cited in Apata [2015], para 13 (see further chapter six). While the appellant in MM [2009] had 
apparently not “exaggerated” his identity publicly to “bolster” his claim, it is interesting to draw 
comparison here to Rix LJ (MM, para 21), quoting the Tribunal: “We have come to the decision that 
the Appellant’s religion, like his homosexual leanings have been exaggerated to enhance his asylum 
claim. We consider that his religious conversion was tactical” (see further Appendix V). 
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of homosexual behaviour in public” in a way that could result in state or non-state 
persecution (Laws LJ, para 4). Laws LJ (para 6) quotes the IAT (para 36): 
“The appellant is not a political activist nor feels compelled to make 
outspoken criticism of societal discrimination against homosexuals... 
Such relationships are no more “flamboyant” than most heterosexual 
relationships… If such a relationship can be classified as “being 
discreet,” it does not seem to us to be very different from the 
conventional married lives of many other couples who neither flaunt 
their sexuality nor adopt an overtly heterosexual lifestyle.”159 
Of the cases considered in this thesis, the excerpt above is perhaps the clearest 
example of a judicial failure to empathise, a complete lack of understanding of the 
differences that define the lived experiences of sexual minorities – people whose 
lives have been violently shaped by the banal assumption that everyone is or should 
be heterosexual and, at minimum, visibly indistinguishable. In XY [2008], Stanley 
Burton LJ (para 13) excerpts the IJ’s determination (para 61-62) in which it is noted 
XY did not come to the attention of Iranian authorities on account of political or 
religious dissidence, and evidence he would be of interest to the state was 
disbelieved. The IJ rejected the claim that XY would have to abandon part of his 
sexuality:  
“The Appellant does not simply abandon his sexual identity if he is 
required to carry on his sexual activities with a same-sex partner with 
some care or discretion. All persons, of whatever sex, involved in 
intimate relationships conduct themselves with such care and 
discretion.”160 
At least in Amare [2005] the Tribunal directly acknowledged that it was “clear that 
the nature of [Amare’s past] relationship was secretive in a way that would not have 
                                                 
159 See also B [2007], where the Adjudicator found that social hostility and police harassment in 
Algeria for explicit homosexual behaviour was not too different from the situation in the UK (Collins 
J, para 11), and also drew comparison to a French case where the gay Algerian had been granted 
asylum; unlike B, that individual was a “political activist,” organising AIDS and human rights work, 
and “had a particularly high profile” (cited in Collins J, para 12). Likewise, in the dissenting opinion 
of Callinan and Heydon JJ (S395 [2003], para 107-108), the Justices suggest the appellants’ sexual 
identity required no public or overt expression, as they had not engaged in “sexual politics.”  
160 IJ’s determination, para 61, cited in XY [2008], para 13; see also HJ and HT [2009], para 24, 35. 
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occurred had the relationship been heterosexual” (para 34, cited in Laws LJ, para 
6).161  
Simply put, the evidence in Amare’s claim did not indicate that she 
“flaunted” her sexuality any more than heterosexuals. The dangerous and 
contradictory implication is that evidence of “being out” in the country of origin, 
while inviting persecution, may have been beneficial to Amare’s claim. Instead, she 
had previously been able to “‘pass off’ as friends” with a former partner in Ethiopia 
to avoid the persecution from which she was seeking asylum (Laws LJ, para 6). 
Forced marriage, marital rape, and severe criminal penalties were presented as 
evidence of systematic discrimination against women in Ethiopia and the possible 
persecution Amare could face if returned, but the discrimination the court accepted 
she was likely to suffer was held not to amount to persecution (see Laws LJ, para 6). 
The fact Amare had been able to avoid persecution on account of discretion was not, 
as the adjudicators had made it, incidental but based wholly on her ability to remain 
invisible.  
Consider another case, RG [2006], regarding how mannerisms may identify 
an asylum seeker. Part of RG’s claim was that since living in the UK he had become 
more overt in the expression of his sexuality. It was argued that it would be 
psychologically traumatic for RG to be returned to Colombia and have to conceal his 
mannerisms. While other circumstances militated against RG’s asylum claim, 
notably his serostatus, the Adjudicator addressed the aspect of expression with 
reassurances that RG “would regulate his behaviour accordingly so as not to draw 
unwelcome attention to himself no matter where he is if by failure to to [sic] so he 
would place himself in danger” (cited in Buxton LJ, para 6). This view of refugee 
status disregarded the expression of sexuality, and asserted that the fact that the UK 
is more accepting of sexual minorities is insufficient where modifications and 
concealment would, purportedly, prevent persecution (see e.g. Buxton LJ in RG 
[2006], para 19). 
                                                 
161 The Court of Appeal upheld the Adjudicator’s determination, but although the SSHD accepted the 
IAT had made an error of law, Laws LJ (para 5) considered their determination “very well reasoned, 
balanced, and sensitive.”  
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Flamboyant character was alternatively used to demonstrate that the asylum 
seekers’ “innate characteristics” would surely have provoked persecution in the past 
if there was indeed a well-founded fear. In JM [2008], King IJ (para 13) noted: 
“The appellant in his written statements described himself as 
‘feminine and softly spoken.’ From our observations of him this 
would be an accurate description. Recognising as we do the dangers 
inherent in subjective approaches to demeanour, it is right that we 
acknowledge that there will be a perception in certain quarters that the 
appellant is effeminate in manner and speech.” 
Absent the context, one could assume the qualification of dangers in subjective 
approaches to demeanour would be judicious, but in fact the Tribunal authenticated 
his sexual identity by using his demeanour in order to justify the refusal of JM’s 
claim. King IJ (para 20, 23) was clearly vexed that JM’s demeanour and 
stereotypically gay profession as a hairdresser would not have already raised 
suspicions of his sexuality and, therefore, did not believe that he would be persecuted 
on return (see Hanna 2005). The Tribunal went on to “find that any limited restraint 
or discretion exercised by the appellant so as not to give rise to offence in public” 
which required JM to conceal his sexuality and mannerisms did not compromise “his 
integrity or sexual identity” (King IJ, para 159; see also Millbank 2012, 519–520).  
  These appellants could “pass” without being visually arrested by the 
persecutors and so did not require refugee status.  “When I see it” then is not only a 
reference to immediate visibility of demeanour, mannerisms, or flamboyance in 
asylum proceedings.162 The assessment of discretion/openness or passing/visibility is 
based on an assemblage of personal narrative and country assessments that make the 
asylum seeker likely to be perceived as a sexual minority if removed from the UK, in 
addition to how the adjudicator perceives the genuineness of the person seeking 
asylum. It is this “knowledge of the judge” which makes the visibility of an asylum 
seeker a transnational affair, neither situated wholly in the perceptions of asylum 
proceedings nor in the country of nationality.  
                                                 
162 See e.g. SW [2011]: “The appellant is educated, sophisticated and articulate” (para 27), and “we 
were able to see that her style of dress was feminine rather than ‘manly,’ and her skin is fairly dark” 
(para 28). 
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2.3 Dichotomy of (dis)belief: Situational and fluid sexualities  
The legal discourse has consistently undermined the very possibility of bisexuality, 
as well as situational sexuality where, for example, a sexual minority may be or feel 
obliged to marry and live a “heterosexual” lifestyle. In RSD an asylum seeker is 
either believed to be gay or dismissed as unfounded, with little grey area or benefit of 
the doubt. Although I do not purport to test the veracity of claims or legal strategies 
for claiming asylum, in the framing of claims to asylum it is little wonder that 
asylum seekers often posit an absolute “immutable” identity, even if in reality SOGI 
can be more nuanced. This section considers how RSD tends toward a hetero/homo 
distinction which omits the possibility of fluid sexuality, and how it may be in some 
circumstances situational.  
The evidence of the appellant, M, in Z and M and A [2002] was discredited 
by the Home Office, and ultimately the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s 
case. Schiemann LJ (para 46, 47) excerpted the Adjudicator’s determination at length 
which details that the applicant’s case is weakened by the fact that M did not claim 
asylum immediately on arrival, first claimed asylum on the basis of political opinion, 
and only later added persecution on the basis of homosexuality. But the Adjudicator 
also expressed that in “view of the fact that the appellant is married and has two 
children, it seems strange that he now claims to be a homosexual” (cited in 
Schiemann LJ para 46). Of course, I am not arguing that the Adjudicator should be 
discouraged from inquiring as to the inconsistencies in the narrative and development 
of a claim, per se, such as testing issues of M’s credibility. However, the view that 
M’s family status somehow excludes him from the broader category of homosexuals 
is problematic if, as argued in chapter one, sexuality is understood to be fluid and 
mutable.  
In Dawkins [2003] Wall J (para 10-12, 15, 18) clearly expressed his 
scepticism that the claimant was a gay man. According to Wall J, the Adjudicator’s 
determination was not impacted by the fact that Dawkins had a relationship with a 
woman, Maxine. “It was argued on Dawkin’s behalf that homosexuality was capable 
of falling within the definition of a ‘social group’ and that the applicant, despite his 
relationship with Maxine, was gay [emphasis added]” (Wall J, para 18). Dawkins 
alleged to have fabricated the relationship with the woman after he was outed to his 
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brother by a third party, and he felt obliged to demonstrate to his brother that he was 
not gay (Wall J, para 10). 
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in NR [2009], and the claim was 
remitted back to the Tribunal for a new determination. However, the Tribunal’s 
reasons for finding she was not a lesbian are especially troublesome. Goldring LJ 
(para 1) summarised that the AIT found NR’s “past lesbianism was in the nature of 
teenage experimentation rather than a settled sexual orientation,” and current same-
sex “relationship was motivated by a desire to strengthen her claim for asylum.” NR 
had “experimented with different types of sexual identity” while “imprisoned in all-
female institutions,” because “there was no alternative except celibacy” (AIT cited in 
Goldring LJ, para 22). The SSHD told the court that the AIT’s conclusions about 
NR’s sexual identity seemed to based on “its rejection that she was raped and 
consequently that could not explain her becoming a lesbian,” among other findings 
(Goldring LJ, para 23). It does not appear to me in the context of the decision that 
NR had argued she was a lesbian because she had been raped, but that the Tribunal 
had made that connection in order to undermine the credibility of her claim.  
If NR’s sexual history was “experimentation and not settled,” it was, in other 
words, not “immutable.” Citing NR [2009], the current Asylum Policy Instructions 
(API 2015, 16) provide that “what is relevant is ‘current’ identity” but, of course, 
adds that self-identification “should not however be accepted as an established fact 
on the basis solely of the declarations of the claimant.” Instead, self-identification of 
a current identity is just the starting point for an assessment of the asylum claim.  
A recent case is particularly relevant to issues of evidence and the 
gay/straight dichotomy. An asylum seeker from Jamaica who claimed to be bisexual 
and was in a same-sex relationship in the UK was disbelieved by the Home Office, 
discredited on the grounds that the Tribunal had rejected the credibility of a past 
relationship with a man on details such as the partner’s date of birth, and that the 
claimant had been married, and had a child. Explicit photographs were also 
dismissed as evidence, because they were not also of the man he was in a 
relationship with (Mattocks 2014a; 2014b; Duffy 2015; Fenton 2015). These 
examples underline not only how the current framework of adjudication moves to 
invisibilise bisexuality, but also how it forces other sexual minority asylum seekers 
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into pigeonholes. The inconsistency makes claimants question what, if anything, 
could “prove” their sexuality: letters from friends and family, media including of an 
explicit variety, past marital status and other evidence is easily bent in favour or 
against an asylum claim dependent on the subjective belief of adjudicators. Perhaps 
all HJ and HT [2010] accomplished was moving the goalposts, as Millbank (2009a) 
has coined, from “discretion to disbelief.”   
3 Conclusion 
UK case law produced exclusions to refugee status through requiring discretion, 
anxiously sought to define acceptable sexual behaviour against criminality and 
perversion, and finally accepted the right to live openly. While the UK no longer 
formally requires the concealment of identity and behaviour to avoid persecution, the 
new frontier in RSD appears to be a continuing negotiation of where discrimination 
shades to persecution under HJ and HT [2010]. The “new” challenges also involve 
the interrogation of the “truth” of identity. HJ and HT has raised new 
epistemological questions of how to know a homosexual after an apparent shift 
towards disbelief, as well as additional questions of what behaviours should be 
protected from persecution in refugee law. 
 
.
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Chapter Five – When persecution is 
persecution worthy of protection 
A common thread running through RSD is the second hurdle an asylum seeker must 
overcome after “proving” they are member of a sexual minority – what would 
amount to persecution, and how to persuade the adjudicator of the likelihood of their 
being persecuted. In considering the various principles of persecution, the most 
important element is that the “subjective” fear of the claimant must also be shown to 
be “objective” or “well-founded” to engage the Refugee Convention. Until HJ and 
HT [2010], adjudicators often found that an asylum seeker’s fear was not well 
founded if it was possible for them to avoid being persecuted by being discreet in 
their country of origin. In other words, it was “reasonable” to expect a claimant to be 
discreet about their private life and identity, even if discretion was the result of a 
threat of harm; Johnson (2007) aptly terms this “permissible persecution.”  
This chapter considers the definition of persecution, and how the difficulties 
of “well-foundedness” and the threshold of persecution have been navigated in the 
case law in relation to sexual minorities. The legal separation of what constitutes a 
PSG and, then, what amounts to a well-founded fear of persecution is central to 
refugee law (Türk and Nicholson 2003, 18).163 This is reflected in the separation of 
the case law analytical chapters, but I would emphasise that the distinction in the 
legal discourse is somewhat contrived. Sexual minorities’ identities and behaviours 
may be directly shaped and defined by discrimination, and the threat of persecution 
(see Eribon 2004; Good 2007, 71–84).164 Where possible the chapter considers the 
case law chronologically to allow the analysis to emerge from the data, but this is at 
times impractical because the concept of persecution as it applies to sexual minorities 
was not articulated here as linearly as PSG. So, instead, this chapter contains a more 
thematic analysis of the cases. 
Part one first considers how discretion was applied by courts as a means of 
defeating the claim to an objective fear of persecution. Secondly, the chapter sets out 
how HJ and HT [2010] recognised that, in a sense, discretion is persecution. Several 
issues have been central to the judicial construction of the “threshold” of persecution, 
                                                 
163 See e.g. Haines QC in Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004], para 48. 
164 See Appendix II on “circular constitution;” chapter four in relation to PSG. 
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and the separation of well-founded fear from acceptable discrimination. These 
include the likelihood of prohibitions being enforced in the country of origin, 
whether discretion was a “requirement,” and the reasonableness of restrictions on 
expression and association. However, I will argue that following HJ and HT [2010], 
the focus of persecution in the legal discourse moves from what may be “reasonably 
tolerable” persecution to debates on the “reasonable likelihood” of harm. Part two 
critically reflects on the instrument of discretion, the closet. The final sections of this 
chapter analyse the role of culture in the assessment of persecution, and the extent to 
which the politics of immigration control and international consensus have 
influenced what the UK has recognised as the persecution of sexual minorities.  
1 Developments in the assessment of persecution 
“There is no single decision…which answers this straightforward 
question does it amount to persecution according to these broad tests 
if the clandestine character of the homosexual activity which there has 
been in the past and will be on return in the future is itself the product 
of fear engendered by discriminatory legislation or policing which 
itself violates the individual’s human rights?”165  
Some authors suggest “persecution” was intentionally undefined in the 1951 
Convention (e.g. Hathaway 1991, 102). Central to the problematic is that 
understanding well-founded fear, and creating a threshold of “when discrimination 
shades into persecution” is particularly difficult because sexual minorities “are 
systematically treated less favourably than others” around the world (Goodwin-Gill 
and McAdam 2007, 86). In the excerpt, above, Sedley LJ (J [2006], para 1) 
confronted these dilemmas: what amounts to the persecution of sexual minorities, 
how to separate persecution from commonplace discrimination on grounds of gender 
and sexuality, and whether discretion is an appropriate consideration in RSD. The 
first section below considers developments in UK approaches to assessing the 
persecution of sexual minorities between 1999 and 2010, and the second considers 
HJ and HT [2010] and the effects of that decision.  
                                                 
165 Sedley LJ granting J permission to appeal, cited in J [2006], para 1.  
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1.1 Discretion and persecution before HJ and HT 
In considering the selected case law in this study, five shifts are identifiable in UK 
adjudicators’ approaches or tests to assess the persecution of sexual minorities, the 
first four of which occurred prior to HJ and HT [2010]. Firstly, in defining 
persecution, Islam and Shah [1999] crucially demonstrated that the Convention is not 
concerned with all cases of persecution, but with those cases arising from 
discrimination or, in other words, discriminatory persecution. Secondly, the Court of 
Appeal’s quick intervention in Jain [1999] set out a conduct driven approach that 
applied to the persecution of sexual minorities as well as the PSG. Thirdly, the cases 
of Z [2004] and Amare [2005] carefully dismissed human rights-based approaches 
(HRBA) which supported the expression of identity, and refined the conduct 
approach with affirmations that not all rights violations are persecutory (e.g. forced 
repression of sexuality is not necessarily persecutory). Fourthly, J [2006] explicitly 
constructed a “reasonable tolerability” test for considering when discretion was 
appropriate, and instructed adjudicators to consider whether the modification of 
behaviour on return would place an individual at risk of persecution. Finally, HJ and 
HT [2010] concluded that asylum seekers should not be expected to conceal their 
identity to avoid persecution, and outlined that adjudicators must consider whether 
previous discretion was actually caused by a well-founded fear. The sub-sections 
below set out the first four developments in judicial assessments of persecution 
before HJ and HT. 
1.1.1 Discriminatory persecution 
The UKHL decision, Islam and Shah [1999] is a cornerstone case which set out the 
relationship between discrimination and persecution. Lord Hoffman (161) wrote in 
his judgment that discrimination is key to interpreting the Convention, because it is 
not concerned with all cases of persecution but with “persecution which is based on 
discrimination” (i.e. discriminatory persecution). Lord Hoffman (158-159) explained 
in the context of those appeals that domestic violence is “regrettably by no means 
unknown” in the UK; however, that does not amount to being persecuted or 
constitute a PSG for the purposes of refugee law, “because the victims of violence 
would be entitled to state protection” (see also Anker 2005, 116–118). The concept 
of discriminatory persecution thus helped to define the scope of the PSG category, 
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demonstrating how closely interconnected these two aspects of RSD are.166  
Although persecution is not defined in the Convention, Lord Hoffman (Islam 
and Shah, 164) cited a formulaic definition of persecution, that “Persecution = 
Serious Harm + The Failure of State Protection” (Refugee Women’s Legal Group 
1988, 5; see also Anker 2005, 107). “Being persecuted,” according to Haines QC 
(Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004], para 53), “is the construct of [these] two separate 
but essential elements” that are necessary to engage what Hathaway (1991, 135) 
identifies as the “surrogate or substitute protection” of refugee status. Until 2010, the 
decisions in this study suggest that, in relation to sexual minorities, the UK approach 
could be summarised as “Prior Discretion + Continuity of Discretion on Return = No 
Well-Founded Fear of Persecution.” While crude, I would submit this description 
highlights that the UK systematically undermined the purpose of the Convention by 
shifting the burden onto asylum seekers to protect themselves by being discreet about 
their sexuality. For example, while the Court of Appeal in J [2006] went on to allow 
J’s appeal, Kay LJ (para 8) summarised the AIT’s finding on the appellant’s well-
founded fear of persecution as follows:  
“The finding…that this appellant does not have such a fear is 
constructed on the fact that he was not persecuted during his earlier 
homosexual relationships in Iran prior to his departure because they 
were ‘conducted discreetly’ and that it is not reasonably likely that he 
will be the subject of adverse attention from the authorities following 
return to Iran, by implication because any future homosexual 
relationship there would also be ‘conducted discreetly.’”167  
In rejected claims, adjudicators have often discussed or implied what was 
permissible treatment that did not amount to persecution. For example, when the 
Court of Appeal revisited J’s case in HJ and HT [2009], Pill LJ (para 34-36) 
discussed how the Tribunal would have to decide whether social standards that 
limited private sexual practices violated an asylum seeker’s human rights, or were 
permissible violations for the purpose of refugee status. Regardless of how serious or 
discriminatory the threat of harm was in a state that did not offer protection, sexual 
                                                 
166 See further chapter four; Appendix II on “circular constitution” for related aspects of this 
discussion. 
167 See also B [2007], para 14. 
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minority asylum seekers could, supposedly, act discreetly to evade persecution.168 
This chapter demonstrates that not all cases of discriminatory persecution have been 
found to be cases of persecution, even when asylum seekers were recognised as 
members of a PSG, and had well-founded fears of “being persecuted” if “being 
discreet” had not been considered as a reasonable alternative to refugee status. 
1.1.2 Conduct driven approach: Conduct, privacy, and persecution 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in Jain [1999] the Court of Appeal instructed 
that homosexuals could qualify as refugees for being persecuted on grounds of 
private sexual practices, but not because they were openly gay. Schiemann LJ (77-
78) also detailed a continuum where at one end a state enforces anti-sodomy laws 
against private homosexual conduct and at the other a state does not prohibit 
homosexuality and sexual minorities are free of “social disapprobation.” He (78) 
stated that the occasional interference with privacy was not in itself persecution, and 
“[t]he problem which increasingly faces decision-makers is when to ascribe the word 
‘persecution’ to those pressures on the continuum” (see also JM [2008], para 152). I 
will argue that the challenge of “when to ascribe” persecution is still a contentious 
factor in RSD. 
The Tribunal had found in the case of Jain that on the evidence, the 
criminalisation of sodomy (or “carnal intercourse,” Section 377 of the Indian Penal 
Code)169 was not in itself persecutory on several counts. Firstly, although the 
maximum prison sentence was 10 years, there were no known “recent charges” for 
sodomy. Secondly, the law does not criminalise homosexual identity per se even if 
society views it as “deviant.” Thirdly, Indian society’s attitudes are progressively 
changing. Fourthly, there is no evidence the appellant would be forced into an 
arranged marriage. Finally, even though a known homosexual may not receive 
“sympathetic treatment” from Indian authorities, in that the police have a reputation 
for brutality, and the conditions in detention or jails are “at best most 
                                                 
168 Consider for instance the discussion in chapter four of how likely Iranian asylum seekers were to 
come to the attention of authorities (e.g. HJ [2008], para 17-25). Perhaps the death penalty was 
unlikely in Iran but, if exposed, an offender of sexual morals might be subject to a significant prison 
sentence and/or lashings (persecution and ECHR Article 3 violations). And, yet, these were 
entertained on grounds of “likelihood” despite adjudicators’ acceptance of the asylum seekers’ sexual 
orientation. See e.g. RM and BB [2005], J [2006], HJ [2008], XY [2008], and HJ and HT [2009]. 
169 This law had been struck down by the High Court of Delhi in 2009, but was reinstated by the 
Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013. 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
When persecution is persecution worthy of protection 144 
uncomfortable,” Jain was said to be unlikely to be subjected to this treatment (IAT, 
page 24, cited in Schiemann LJ, 75). Of course, it is questionable to suggest that the 
prison conditions are not persecutory or a violation of ECHR Article 3 ill-treatment 
standards.170  
However, the Lords Justice in Jain accepted the Tribunal’s assessment of the 
possibility of future harm. It was “not reasonably likely” that the appellant would 
experience discrimination or even harassment, which is to say the fear of persecution 
was not well-founded. As the approach only acknowledged the legitimacy of private 
sexual practices, laws that criminalised the public expression of gay and lesbian 
identities which were vaguely defined and arbitrarily enforced were not accepted as 
amounting to persecution (Millbank 2004, 215–216).171 Schiemann LJ (76) wrote 
that if it were shown that there was a reasonable likelihood the appellant would “be 
imprisoned or treated brutally by police, with the State being indifferent, for 
indulging in homosexual acts in private [emphasis added],” it should be accepted as 
constituting a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Moreover, the test was 
explicitly linked to the assumption of discretion. “If [Jain] does not openly show 
himself to be a homosexual the risks of anything occurring outside his family must 
be down to a chance encounter,” and that again, therefore, the fear of persecution 
was not well-founded (IAT, page 24, cited in Schiemann LJ, 75).  
Schiemann LJ claimed to appreciate that the existence of legal prohibition 
can affect a person’s private life. He (78) stated that “in some not greatly dissimilar 
circumstances” from Jain’s appeal, a claimant might show “facts” that allow an 
adjudicator to “infer” that they have a “justified fear of persecution.” Evans LJ (79) 
also rejected the appellant’s approach to defining persecution, which cited 
Hathaway’s (1991, 108–112) four protected categories of human rights or “core 
entitlements” (see iii, below). Rather, the “relevant form of persecution” was said to 
centre on “the individual [enjoying] the right not to be persecuted for his private 
legitimate behaviour” (Evans LJ, 79). The focus on conduct subsequently obscured 
the effects of the very existence of anti-sodomy laws, and how other discriminatory 
prohibitions affect sexual minorities (Gray and McDowall 2013, 22). Unenforced 
anti-sodomy laws may, for example, discourage sexual minorities from associating 
                                                 
170 See e.g. Soering [1989]; Ullah [2004]. 
171 R v SSHD ex parte Lepeov, High Court, 15 February 2000 (Unreported).  
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and developing relationships, regardless of the nature of one’s “private” sexual 
conduct or the “likelihood” sanctions would be enforced. Discriminatory persecution 
may result either from insufficient state protection by non-state actors even in the 
absence of criminalisation, or where formal protections and equality provisions are 
not applied in practice (Millbank 2004, 210–211). As we will see, future 
determinations interpreted Jain in ways that applied a nearly impossible threshold of 
the likelihood of prosecution and therefore persecution, especially because of the 
discretion requirement. 
In spite of Jain, the UK practice of RSD stubbornly resisted the idea that 
prosecution was persecution, and even contemplated that sentences of ten years 
imprisonment did not amount to persecution (Millbank 2004, 222).  For example, in 
Z and M and A [2002], the Court of Appeal and Schiemann LJ reconsidered when 
the threat of prosecution might be persecutory. On the evidence, the Adjudicator 
accepted that Z was a homosexual and had been in a same-sex relationship in 
Zimbabwe, but determined that the fear of persecution was not well-founded because 
the country’s anti-sodomy law was not actively enforced (Schiemann LJ, para 25). 
Considering Z’s appeal, the Tribunal applied the ECtHR decision in Modinos [1993], 
and determined that anti-sodomy laws amount to a breach of the right to a private life 
(Schiemann LJ, para 25). The Court of Appeal remitted the case of Z. According to 
the court, an unenforced law was not persecutory, and the Tribunal was instructed to 
assess the actual risk of prosecution.172  
Moreover, Appellant A’s appeal presents a conspicuous example of decision-
making based on the idea that a homosexual should be discreet in order to avoid 
being prosecuted, which, according to the court, may under certain circumstances 
amount to persecution. A was in a relationship in Zimbabwe and was identified as a 
homosexual after a domestic dispute. The incident was reported to the police, “who 
arrived to investigate it as a case of common assault,” but it was because the 
appellant and his partner “volunteered the carnal nature of their relationship that the 
police came to treat it as sodomy” (IAT, para 2, cited in Schiemann LJ, para 36). A 
and his partner were sentenced to imprisonment but this was suspended, and they 
                                                 
172 See also Laws LJ in Amare [2005], para 6, citing that the IAT, para 36, found that Amare was able 
to develop covert “homosexual relationships in Ethiopia without the serious possibility of being 
prosecuted or convicted of offences arising from her homosexuality.”  
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were issued with a fine. The fine was treated as diminutive (and downplayed by the 
IAT, para 2, cited in Schiemann LJ, para 36), but so too was the prospect of a harsher 
sentence: 
“Even if there were such a risk, there has been no suggestion that the 
conditions of imprisonment there carry any risk of ill treatment over 
and above the fact of incarceration. Though this point was not argued 
for us, we should not regard 40 days’ imprisonment as itself 
amounting to Refugee Convention persecution or Art. 3 ill 
treatment.”173  
The Court of Appeal did not clarify in its judgment whether the Tribunal’s view on 
40 days’ imprisonment was persecutory, apparently leaving this to adjudicators to 
determine on the circumstances of an individual claim. But after A’s arrest, he had 
also been attacked by a group of men who recognised him from a newspaper report. 
By focusing on sexual conduct and prosecution, the UK approach obviously failed to 
examine how “criminal sanctions [established] a climate where further human rights 
breaches are allowed to flourish unchecked” (Millbank 2004, 223; see also Ferreira 
2015, 425).  
Instead, in its assessment of the risk of A being persecuted upon return, the 
IAT relied on the evidence that A had been discreet – only engaging in “consensual 
sodomy in private,” had “not claimed to have indulged in any other kind,” and would 
thus remain an “undetected” homosexual (para 5, cited in Schiemann LJ, para 36). If 
Jain [1999] established the threat of actual imprisonment could constitute 
persecution, the IAT remarks cited by Schiemann LJ (para 36) in Z and M and A 
[2002] seem to tell a different story of the construct of the gay refugee. The “good 
gay” would have lived discreetly but also never admitted, under any circumstances, 
the carnal sin of their homosexuality to the state. The Tribunal stressed in A’s 
circumstances the “harm was self inflicted” (Millbank 2004, 223), and the appeal 
illustrates how discretion reasoning can be “a particularly invidious form of victim 
blaming because it affirms the perspective, if not the conduct, of the persecutor” 
(Millbank 2012, 504; 2013, 37). The expectation of discretion minimised the risk of 
persecution, and hence such a fear would not be well-founded. Because A had 
wittingly broken the rule of silence, the implication of the adjudicators’ conclusion 
                                                 
173 IAT, para 5, cited in Schiemann LJ, para 36. 
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was that the country of origin was entitled to jail or threaten punishment upon the 
homosexual, with impunity, in order to maintain adherence to the social mores of the 
country – and this was just not persecutory. In other words, the persecution was 
permissible and there was no legitimate claim to refugee status. 
On the international stage, in 2002 the UNHCR Guidelines noted the criminal 
prohibition of homosexual conduct could amount to persecution.174 Yet, the judicial 
construction of the threshold of persecution established in Jain (i.e. whether or not 
anti-sodomy laws were enforced) remained contentious in two ways: firstly, whether 
punishments were persecutory or “mere” discrimination; and, secondly, how to 
objectively assess the likelihood of the enforcement of prohibitions. 
1.1.3 Not all rights violations are persecutory 
It has been argued that imposing a limit on the expression of gender or sexual 
identity, including “elementary” modifications, actually achieves the ends of 
persecutors – the maintenance of the political community’s norms of gender and 
sexuality. In other words, “[m]anaging that violence through repression of one’s 
identity perpetuates persecution, and jurisprudential affirmation of such a finding 
validates the persecution” (Johnson 2007, 107; see also chapter six). The sample of 
decisions discussed here openly affirmed broad circumstances under which 
persecution and deprivation of human rights were permissible.  
Revisiting Z’s case, Z [2004], in light of S395 [2003], the Court of Appeal 
addressed several aspects of UK jurisprudence on the right to privacy, the ability to 
live openly in the country of origin and whether the need to be discreet was 
persecutory. Z’s counsel argued that in light of S395, persecution was understood to 
be the discriminatory denial of a core human right such as private life, and that 
persecution expressed through the inability to live openly was protected by the 
Refugee Convention and ECHR Article 8 (Buxton LJ, para 10). Z’s counsel drew 
upon the definition of persecution set out by the UKHL in Ullah [2004], where Lord 
Steyn (para 32) quotes Hathaway (1991, 112): “persecution is most appropriately 
defined as the sustained or systemic failure of state protection in relation to one of 
                                                 
174 UNHCR (2002, para 17); Millbank (2004, 224) criticises the UK’s failed application of this 
standard; see also Türk and Nicholson (2003, 21).  
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the core entitlements which has been recognized by the international community 
[emphasis added].”175 
According to Buxton LJ (Z [2004], para 11-12), however, Lord Steyn was 
actually setting out conduct which might be persecutory in Ullah, and did not 
establish conduct which definitely breaches the threshold of persecution. Instead, 
Buxton LJ referred to Lord Bingham in Sepet [2003], where he defined persecution 
as a strong word suggesting death, torture, or other severe penalty. Lord Bingham’s 
(Sepet, para 7) construction of persecution has become “the standard definition” 
(Johnson 2011, 61), and has been widely cited as guidance in many 
determinations:176   
“[Persecution] is a strong word. Its dictionary definitions…accord 
with popular usage: ‘the infliction of death, torture, or penalties for 
adherence to a religious belief or opinion as such, with a view to the 
repression or extirpation of it;’ ‘A particular course or period of 
systemic infliction of punishment directed against the professors of 
a…belief.’” 
Following this definition Buxton LJ (para 12, see also 14-19) asserted in Z [2004] 
that not all interferences with “core human rights” are protected under the Refugee 
Convention (see further Buxton 2012, 394). 
On the other hand, appellant Z relied on McHugh and Kirby JJ (para 43) in 
S395, which set out that “[i]t is the threat of serious harm with its menacing 
implications that constitutes the persecutory conduct.”177 Z’s permission to appeal 
was granted in order to assess the implications of S395 but, according to the UK 
Court of Appeal, the HCA had relied on a principle already established in UK law by 
Ahmed [1999].178 In Ahmed, Simon Brown LJ (8) posited that the single, critical 
question was whether the asylum seeker would behave as she says she will, however 
                                                 
175 Hathaway’s (1991, 108–112) classified four tiers of human rights as “core entitlements,” see 
further Appendix II. The “core entitlements” approach was advanced in, for example, Z [2004], para 
11, Amare [2005], para 17. The efficacy of the definition was challenged by Evans LJ in Jain [1999] 
and Laws LJ in Amare [2005].  
176 For example, Sepet was referenced in Z [2004], para 12; RG [2006], para 14; J [2006], para 11 
which was then applied in HJ [2008], para 8 as well as XY [2008], para 8, 10; HJ and HT [2010], para 
12. 
177 Asylum seekers continued to refer back to S395 until HJ and HT [2010]; e.g. HJ particularly relied 
on McHugh and Kirby JJ (para 43) to argue for a HRBA to assessing persecution (Hodge J in HJ 
[2008], para 14). 
178 Buxton LJ in Z [2004], para 16, referring to McHugh and Kirby JJ in S395, para 41. 
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“unreasonable,” and risk persecution in the country of nationality; if so, she is 
entitled to asylum. Abridged, Simon Brown LJ’s judgment in Ahmed [1999] stated:  
“[I]n all asylum cases there is ultimately but a single question to be 
asked: is there a serious risk that on return the applicant would be 
persecuted for a Convention reason? If there is, then he is entitled to 
asylum. It matters not whether the risk arises from his own conduct in 
this country, however unreasonable… [T]he critical question: if 
returned, would the asylum seeker in fact act in the way he says he 
would and thereby suffer persecution? If he would, then, however 
unreasonable he might be thought for refusing to accept the necessary 
restraint on his liberties, in my judgment he would be entitled to 
asylum.”179  
If the IAT had refused Z’s application by requiring him to avoid persecution, they 
would have failed to respect the jurisprudence in Ahmed; but, according the Court of 
Appeal, they did not make the error of requiring behaviour modification (Buxton LJ, 
para 16-17). Instead the Tribunal had proposed the closet as voluntary discretion or 
concealment based on its finding of how Z had previously acted and would act in the 
future to avoid persecution (Buxton LJ, para 17).  
In the remitted case of Z, the Tribunal had admitted a report by an expert 
witness, Dr Oliver Phillips, to give evidence on attitudes to homosexuality in 
Zimbabwe (Buxton LJ, para 5). In the Court of Appeal, Buxton LJ (para 22) claimed 
that neither the COI nor Dr Philips’ report indicated that there was widespread social 
hostility towards homosexuals, and therefore it was not possible to form a view of 
what might happen if Z and his partner were to live together “but otherwise not 
[emphasise] their homosexuality.” Without having access to the specific evidence 
provided to support the appeal, Phillips (1997) had previously written on the 
vilification of gays and lesbians in Zimbabwe, but also that the vitriolic discourse of 
President Mugabe and others did not appear to have prompted an increase in arrests 
or prosecutions for sodomy.180  
                                                 
179 Simon Brown LJ Ahmed [1999], 8. This influential statement has been cited widely in domestic 
and international jurisprudence, including many cases discussed here, such as: S395 [2003], para 41; Z 
[2004], para 16; RG [2006], para 10; HJ and HT [2010], para 18; see also Amare [2005], para 10; J 
[2006], para 10. 
180 See also Phillips (2000) and his evidence in LZ [2011], which is considered throughout the 
determination. 
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Requiring an explicit discretion requirement would be an error of law; 
therefore UK adjudicators created loopholes. If an adjudicator decided on evidence 
that an asylum seeker had been discreet in the past, whatever the reasons, the UK 
was not in fact enforcing concealment in the eyes of the law. Ultimately, Z [2004] 
did not answer the question of what adjudicators should see as appropriate evidence, 
either for concluding that discretion had been employed to avoid persecution, or for 
the gravity or likelihood of the harm feared to require international protection. 
Buxton LJ (para 24) concluded that the “appeal comes down to the issues of fact,” 
and there was not “sufficient evidence” of why Z had been discreet. Or, as Buxton LJ 
(para 14) would later apply in RG [2006], “it was not established that he behaved in 
the way that he did only to avoid persecution or that his conduct denying his 
sexuality was so serious in its effect upon him as to put him in a situation of 
persecution.”  
With reference to Z [2004] and Ahmed [1999], the SSHD and Court of 
Appeal accepted in Amare [2005] that the IAT had erred in law in stating “[a] person 
can properly be expected to take some steps to ensure the risk he faces is reduced” 
(Laws LJ, para 11, 10). But like Buxton LJ (para 16-17) in Z [2004], Laws LJ (para 
11) in Amare found that the relevant determination of the present appeal, the 
Adjudicator’s, did not find “that the appellant should act secretly or discreetly…so as 
to avoid persecution, but that as a matter of fact that is how she would conduct 
herself, having done so previously.”  
However, the judgment in Amare [2005] went further, and minimised 
arguments for a connection between human rights and persecution in RSD. Amare’s 
counsel advanced a HRBA with two relevant points to the development of 
jurisprudence (see Laws LJ, para 17). First, persecution is the sustained or systemic 
violation of internationally recognised human rights and the core values of privacy, 
dignity, and equality with a failure of state protection (Hathaway 1991, 104–105). 
Second, discrimination based on gender is a source of persecution that is “structural,” 
“endemic,” or “institutionalised” in societies such as Ethiopia; combined gender and 
homosexual grounds are especially pernicious. The judgment of Laws LJ (para 17-
33) considered the appellant’s proposed HRBA at length. The wisdom of Haines 
QC’s purported reliance on Hathaway (1991) in the New Zealand decision, Refugee 
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Appeal No. 74665 [2004] was criticised by Laws LJ (para 20, 30-31). Particular 
attention was paid to Haines QC’s (para 66, 82) discussion in favour of a HRBA, and 
explanation of why discretion is contrary to fundamental rights. Laws LJ (para 27) 
recalled two Convention principles as though Haines QC and Hathaway were at odds 
with the 1951 definition: the nexus clause in Article 1A(2),181 and that persecution 
must be of a “substantial level of seriousness.” Haines QC was alleged to have 
underplayed the importance of a nexus to the Convention as well as the seriousness 
of harm in deference to the deprivation of a human right. Laws LJ (para 31) 
suggested, on the other hand, that Hathaway’s (1991, 112) definition should “be 
treated with a degree of caution.” Curiously, Hathaway’s definition had been cited by 
a number of international authorities, including the UKHL (e.g. Ullah [2004], para 
32). Yet, Laws LJ (para 31) insisted the definition “[gives] no very clear place to the 
requirement of gravity or seriousness,” and “[contains] no recognition of the 
condition that protection is only to be afforded” in cases of violations arising from 
1951 Convention grounds.  
Amare’s counsel argued that criminalisation was an affront to human rights, 
and cited the UK case of Dudgeon and the landmark South African constitutional 
case which denounced anti-sodomy laws as contrary to private life.182 But Laws LJ 
(para 19-20, 30) dismissed the appellant’s referral to non-asylum cases as unhelpful 
to interpreting the 1951 Convention (see also Laws LJ, para 22, 28, 32 on 
international consensus).  
The second pillar of Amare’s argument was that discrimination was 
cumulative and endemic (see Laws LJ, para 23, 26-27). The persecution of sexual 
minority women in particular often appears structural and rooted in the accumulation 
of discrimination on grounds of sexuality and gender, as outlined by the appellant’s 
counsel in Amare.183 The HRBA advanced by the appellant sought to clarify the 
“grey area” between discrimination and persecution. For example, the lack of 
reported prosecutions in a particular country of origin does not mean that state 
protection is sufficient where in fact sustained, systemic discrimination may subject 
                                                 
181 See Appendix II on the “nexus clause.” 
182 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
and Another v. Minister of Justice and Others, Case CCT 11/98. 
183 Set out by Laws LJ, para 23-24, 26; see also Baroness Hale in Hoxha [2005], para 35-36. 
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sexual minorities to treatment amounting to persecution. In Hoxha [2005], Baroness 
Hale cited UNHCR Guidance that discrimination in itself is not persecutory.184 Yet, 
“a pattern of discrimination or less favourable treatment could, on cumulative 
grounds, amount to persecution” warranting refugee status (Baroness Hale, para 
35).185 But just as Laws LJ (para 21) had narrowly applied S395 [2003] to focus on 
the question of substantial levels of harm (see McHugh and Kirby JJ, para 40, 43), he 
(para 27) similarly relied on Baroness Hale’s (para 36) statement in Hoxha that “the 
treatment feared has to be sufficiently severe” to justify the restricted application of 
human rights to assess persecution in Amare.186  
According to Buxton LJ (para 16) in RG [2006], the consensus of UK 
jurisprudence and international authorities was that a “high level of distress…must 
be reached before a denial of freedom can be said to be persecutory.” Of course, 
whose freedoms or exercise of core human rights or what, on the facts of a case, 
“counts” as persecution is unresolved in such constructions. What Buxton LJ (para 
19) does make clear, however, is that the “teaching” of Laws LJ in Amare [2005] and 
his own decision in Z [2004] “is that a breach of Convention rights,” such as the 
“forced change of sexuality,” “cannot in itself amount to persecution” (see also 
Johnson 2011, 73). Problematically, proving that the “level of distress” experienced 
from having to repress identity is sufficient to reach Buxton LJ’s threshold rested on 
highly subjective factors.187 
1.1.4 Reasonable tolerability  
In J [2006], Kay and Buxton LJJ set out a “reasonable tolerability” test for 
adjudicating sexual minority asylum claims. The Court of Appeal found discretion 
was not appropriate if the concealment of sexuality was sufficiently significant in 
itself to place an individual at risk of persecution, defined by serious harm, intensity 
and duration (Kay LJ, para 8, 10-11; Buxton LJ, para 20). Kay LJ (para 11) 
suggested that reasonable tolerability was set out in previous UK decisions.188 
However, reasonable tolerability does not appear to have been the explicit test or 
                                                 
184 See further OO and JM [2009], para 11-14, 17-21; UNHCR (2002, para 14). 
185 See also Keene LJ in HC [2005], para 29-31; chapter four of this thesis. 
186 See also Buxton LJ’s interpretation of S395 [2003] in Z [2004], para 15, on “the level of 
interference.” 
187 See Sir John Dyson in HJ and HT [2010], para 122. 
188 Specifically Z [2004], para 12, Amare [2005], para 27, and RG [2006], para 16. 
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principle until J [2006]. The version of reasonable tolerability in J was less of an 
iteration of the case law than it seems to have been retrospective sense-making for 
jurisprudential clarity and/or legitimacy.189 Instead, the preceding case law appears to 
have been more concerned with the “high threshold” of persecution, especially 
regarding repeated emphasis upon part of the opinion of McHugh and Kirby JJ (para 
40) in S395 [2003], which mitigated the broader implications of that international 
authority.190 But perhaps J [2006] was emphasising the underlying “reasonable 
tolerability” requirement in earlier UK jurisprudence.  
In part, J [2006] seemed to recognise discretion was an unfair burden to 
impose on an asylum seeker. However, the court also constructed the reasonable 
tolerability test in its decision, and Buxton LJ’s short intervention significantly 
shaped the test to the detriment of sexual identity in refugee status. Kay LJ (para 3) 
cited the finding in RM and BB [2005] (para 123) that the death penalty for sodomy 
in Iran was rare, but that the Tribunal was satisfied that if homosexuals did come to 
the attention of authorities there was a real risk of “significant prison sentences 
and/or lashing.” Kay LJ (para 4) continued, the CG case “paints a much grimmer 
picture” than countries with mere societal discrimination and that, “[p]lainly, there 
are particular problems for practising homosexuals in Iran.” He (para 8) continued 
that the Tribunal’s determination that J would not be persecuted was based “on the 
fact that he was not persecuted previously,” “because [his relationships] were 
‘conducted discreetly,’” nor would J come to the attention of authorities on return 
because his conduct “would also be ‘conducted discreetly.’”191 Kay LJ (para 8) 
scrutinised this point from the perspective of S395 [2003]. The HCA suggested the 
intensity and duration of harm was relevant such that “the person persecuted cannot 
reasonably be expected to tolerate” it; but the majority decision also emphasised that 
the Convention would give no protection under religion or political opinion if the 
claimant must “take steps – reasonable or otherwise – to avoid offending the wishes 
                                                 
189 In 2012, then-former LJ Buxton wrote a response to the UKSC judgment in HJ and HT [2010]. In 
order to defend his previous commitment to discretion reasoning, which he still found tenable, Buxton 
(2012, 397–398) added yet more terms to the debate in order to lend credibility to his view, including: 
“limited range of persecution” regarding tolerating a threat, and “behavioural avoidance” instead of 
discretion; he further argues that the Court of Appeal had previously drawn upon Hathaway and 
Pobjoy’s (2012) distinction between “endogenous” and “exogenous” harm “without realising that it 
[and he] was doing so” in J [2006] and Z [2004].  
190 See HJ and HT [2010], para 25-29, 66-69. 
191 See also Z [2004], para 16-17; Amare [2005], para 11 on voluntary, not tolerable discretion. 
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of the persecutors” (McHugh and Kirby JJ, para 40; see also Goodman 2012, 427–
428). The HCA continued: “The notion that it is reasonable for a person to take 
action that will avoid persecutory harm” fails to properly consider if the claimant’s 
discretion was influenced by the fear of persecution (McHugh and Kirby JJ, para 43).  
Considering J’s appeal in HJ and HT [2010], the UKSC would later conclude 
that the Court of Appeal had interpreted the observations in S395 [2003] to imply a 
reasonable tolerability test in spite of the fact the HCA “was plainly” referring to 
“the context of what amounts to persecution and not [avoiding persecution]” (Lord 
Collins, para 103; see also 81, 125). As such, the Court of Appeal wrongly 
constructed a reasonable tolerability test in J [2006] based on a “misunderstanding” 
of Ahmed [1999] and S395. The Court of Appeal, through their reasonable 
tolerability test, instructed the Tribunal to consider whether discretion could be 
expected of asylum seekers to avoid being persecuted if the modification of their 
behaviour was not “sufficiently significant in itself to place [them] in a situation of 
persecution” (Kay LJ, para 10-11). Persecution is thus, according to Kay LJ (para 
11), a synthesis of a “strong word” according to Sepet [2003] and of a significant 
“intensity or duration” that a claimant “cannot reasonably be expected to tolerate” 
per S395. 192   
Further, Buxton LJ (para 20) added to the judgment’s test of what may be 
reasonably tolerable by instructing that the Tribunal should take account that J may 
have to “abandon part of his sexual identity…in circumstances where the failure to 
do so exposes him to the extreme danger that is set out in [RM and BB [2005]].” 
Refuting that asylum seekers had been required to be discreet, former Lord Justice 
Buxton (2012, 398) writes that – if it was not reasonable to expect any “adjustment 
of behaviour” – “the alternative seemed to be to grant asylum automatically in any 
case where any adjustment of behaviour would be required in order to 
avoid…persecution.” I turn now to consider the remitted case of J, HJ [2008], 
together with XY [2008], because they raise similar issues of applying reasonable 
tolerability that benefit from comparison.193 
                                                 
192 Also applied in Z [2004], para 12, Amare [2005], para 27, RG [2006], para 16, and JM [2008], para 
154, 156 via J [2006]. 
193 See also JM [2008], para 153-155. 
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Following the approach in J [2006], Hodge J (HJ [2008], para 9) summarised 
that since living openly could expose J/HJ (hereafter HJ) to extreme danger, the 
Tribunal needed to determine whether the need to be discreet “would itself constitute 
persecution” under the Convention. What is supposedly unreasonable and intolerable 
discretion was vaguely defined. Arguably, Stanley Burnton LJ (para 8) in XY [2008] 
somewhat clarified the test: “[a] persecutory situation is capable of existing by 
reason of the fear and stress engendered by [the] risk” of having “to carry 
out…sexual activities clandestinely” (i.e. discreetly). Hodge J (HJ, para 7) cited the 
text of the 2006 Protection Regulations – 194 which emphasised that the harm feared 
must be sufficiently serious – which is remarkable given that adjudicators had 
accepted the fact that if Iranian homosexuals were not discreet or were discovered, 
that would expose them to extreme danger (see also Stanley Burnton LJ, para 6). 
New evidence was even presented to the AIT in HJ that included official Iranian 
arrest statistics, and further corroborated the prospective punishments for sodomy 
(Hodge J, para 19-20). The SSHD argued that in the case of HJ, with which the 
Tribunal in effect agreed in its determination, “[w]here a person does in fact live 
discreetly to avoid coming to the attention of the authorities he is reasonably 
tolerating that position” (Hodge J, para 10, 45; see Millbank 2012, 520 on how this 
creates a catch-22). The Tribunal concluded that the “[e]nforcement of the law 
against homosexuality is arbitrary but the evidence does not show a real risk of 
discovery of…homosexuals in Iran who conduct their homosexual activities 
discreetly” (Hodge J, para 46; see further part two, below). The Court of Appeal 
essentially came to the same conclusion in XY, and it was suggested the appellant 
may have to abandon part of his sexual identity, but there is nothing to say he could 
not continue his sexual life discreetly (Stanley Burnton LJ, para 13-14).  
In HJ and HT [2009] the Court of Appeal found that the application of S395 
[2003] in J [2006] constructed an “appropriate and workable test” that complied with 
the standards of refugee law, which the Tribunal in HJ [2008] “plainly understood” 
(Pill LJ, para 31; see also para 24-25 on XY). Additionally, Pill LJ (para 31) added 
that adjudicators should determine what was reasonably tolerable for an asylum 
seeker with reference to the religious “beliefs” and societal “views about 
                                                 
194 Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection Regulations 2006 [SI 2006 No. 2170], 
implementing EU Council Directive 2004/83/EC, Article 9; see also B [2007], para 29. 
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homosexuality and its practice” in the country of origin: “A judgement as to what is 
reasonably tolerable is made in the context of the particular society” (Pill LJ, para 31, 
see also 36; see further part two, below). These discussions are a far cry from the 
notion of gay men “drinking exotically coloured cocktails” and being “as free as their 
straight equivalents in the society concerned,” which Lord Rodger (para 78) would 
affirm when HJ and HT reached the UKSC in 2010. 
1.2 Discriminatory persecution post-HJ and HT: Discretion is 
persecution 
As we have seen, “discretion” was a central theme throughout the case law from 
1999-2010. In 2010 the UKSC clearly set out in HJ and HT (para 102-103, 124-127) 
that the Court of Appeal constructed the reasonable tolerability test for persecution 
based on a “misunderstanding” of the HCA judgment, S395, which the Lords Justice 
had taken out of context.195 
Firstly, Lord Rodger (para 58) commented on whether discretion was 
required; for years, adjudicators did not claim to require discretion but “[purported] 
to decide the case on the assumption the applicant would do so.” But “this 
distinction,” in Lord Rodger’s words (para 59), “is pretty unrealistic,” because “when 
faced with a real threat of persecution, the applicant would have no real choice: he 
would be compelled to act discreetly.” In fact, it was an “obvious point” that the 
effect of discretion reasoning was “to establish a form of secondary persecution 
brought on by his own actions in response to the primary persecution” – i.e. 
discretion is persecution (Lord Rodger, para 75; see also Lord Collins, para 106-107; 
cf. Buxton 2012, 402). 
Secondly, aside from the need to be discreet being persecutory, the UKSC did 
not fully engage what amounts to “being persecuted.” On the one hand, Lord Hope 
(para 35) stated in no uncertain terms: “There will be little difficulty in holding that 
in countries such as Iran and Cameroon gays or persons who are believed to be gay 
are persecuted and that persecution is something that may be reasonably feared.” 
But, on the other hand, the UKSC did not set out a specific test for persecution as it 
had for determining whether the claimant was a refugee based on being or being 
                                                 
195 Former LJ Buxton (2012) argues, on the other hand, that the UKSC disregarded the basic 
principles of refugee law and, in fact, inverted the established means of interpreting Article 1A(2). 
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perceived as gay, if they could be openly gay and what they would do if returned.196 
In an abstract sense, Lord Walker (para 89-91) discussed the “threshold of concern” 
(Hathaway 1991, 75–80) in RSD, which is a reasonable degree of likelihood of a 
subjective and, critically, objective fear or, his preferred term incorporating both 
elements, “risk” of the asylum seeker being persecuted. He (para 91) adds: 
“I suppose that it may be debateable whether a gay man 
would be at real risk of persecution (in the Convention sense) 
if, on returning to his own country, he would face a one in ten 
risk of being persecuted and made to pay a fine, or sent to 
prison for a month. But if he would face a one in ten risk of 
being prosecuted and sentenced to death by public hanging 
from a crane there should be only one answer.”  
This is important for context of what may be persecutory post-HJ and HT. Other 
engagements in the decision with the concept of persecution seem to have been built 
on the assumption that there is an established (objective) measure of what amounts to 
persecution. For instance, reference was made to Hathaway’s (1991, 108) definition, 
“sustained or systemic failure of state protection” in relation to international “core 
entitlements,” as adopted by several key authorities (see HJ and HT, para 13, 101, 
113-115). In fact, former Lord Justice Buxton (2012, 393–394) argues that the UKSC 
incorrectly used Hathaway’s definition of persecution as a complete one, and should 
have considered Sepet [2003] on whether the treatment was sufficiently severe. 
In the two initial applications of HJ and HT considered in the sample of this 
thesis, the SSHD argued before the Tribunals that the evidence of each country did 
not show treatment amounting to “being persecuted.” Regardless of how “natural” 
they found being openly gay or discreet, an asylum seeker must show that being so 
would result in persecution. In the case of SW [2011], the SSHD argued on evidence 
that there were no lesbians living openly in Jamaica; the only risk of discreet lesbians 
being persecuted was from “isolated and infrequent incidents which fall short of the 
threshold for persecution,” which required “a ‘consistent pattern’ of ill-treatment” 
(Gleeson IJ, para 70).197 Applying HJ and HT, SW’s counsel argued this fact was 
                                                 
196 See HJ and HT, para 35, 82. 
197 The SSHD declined to make further submissions in light of the new test, HJ and HT [2010], which 
negated much the respondent’s argument put to the Tribunal in SW [2011], see e.g. para 50-51, 54-55, 
116. 
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irrelevant “since the need to return to discretion for safety’s sake was itself 
persecutory” (Gleeson IJ, para 81). SW’s appeal was successful.  
In the other case, LZ [2011], the SSHD contented that there was “societal 
disapproval” of homosexuality in Zimbabwe but not persecution (Macleman and 
Holmes IJJ, para 6, 24). LZ’s appeal succeeded because of the particular risk-factor 
that her family had connections to members of the elite, but the Tribunal found no 
“general risk” to homosexuals in the country (Macleman and Holmes IJJ, para 113-
116). Notably, in LZ, the Tribunal directly addressed the perennial question of 
whether anti-sodomy laws are persecutory, and Macleman and Holmes IJJ (para 27) 
observe that it is “legally uncontentious” that the existence of anti-sodomy laws is 
not persecutory unless they are “routinely enforced, and penalties imposed.” 
 To summarise the findings in part one of this chapter, persecution can be 
targeted, physical violence and acted out by the state or with its complicity. Often in 
the absence of sufficient state protection, persecution also consists of subtler forms 
of oppressive power in which a whole range of actors, institutions, and social norms 
contribute to discrimination and collude to deprive sexual minorities of rights. If 
persecution is to be understood, as authorities such as Ward [1993], Horvath [2001], 
Ullah [2004], Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004], and HJ and HT [2010] have recited, 
as the “sustained or systemic failure of state protection” of rights (Hathaway 1991, 
112), I would argue that oppression (or “dispossession”) is integral to the assessment 
of refugee status, not as a substitute for but as the facilitator of persecution and the 
circumstances of well-founded fear (see further chapter six). A principled definition 
or approach to (discriminatory) persecution accounts for the common scenario of 
oppression which leads, in the case of sexual minority claims, to discretion or the 
closet: “But for” the asylum seekers’ modification of behaviour, might they have 
suffered more? Per HJ and HT (para 75, 106-107), threats of harm that necessitate 
discretion and a closeted existence can amount to persecution. To persecute sexual 
minorities is to oppress with the view of making them invisible and eliminate the 
perceived threat to society and the state; this is not always (or only) achieved by the 
persistent and ominous threat of torture or death, but also the threat or deprivation of 
the rights a full member of the political community would enjoy (Hathaway 1991, 
108–112). 
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 Arguably, reasonable concealment has not been entirely eliminated as a result 
of HJ and HT (see Weβels 2013) and, as discussed in chapter four, some 
commentators have argued for the exclusion of so-called “trivial” behaviours which 
are not integral to the status of being gay (Anker and Ardalan 2012; Hathaway and 
Pobjoy 2012). Moreover, while HJ and HT makes a strong emotive case for sexual 
minorities to be as free as heterosexuals, and has established that the need to be 
discreet can be persecutory, it is still the case that the treatment or harm feared on 
grounds of sexual or gender identity must both be reasonably likely to occur and 
sufficiently severe to amount to persecution. 
2 Constraining what amounts to persecution 
International consensus on human rights and refugee law has been used selectively in 
the UK, often to justify immigration restriction. Early international law on sexual 
orientation challenged anti-sodomy laws on grounds of human rights claims to 
private life.198 However, the existence and enforcement of such laws was slow to 
develop as grounds of persecution within refugee law.199 In theory, the UK 
recognised homosexual refugees who were persecuted for “legitimate” private acts, 
but in practice discretion was applied in a way that undermined the necessary well-
founded aspect of persecution.200 Discretion reached its nadir in the so-called 
reasonable tolerability test, which was based on a “misunderstanding” of 
international case law, and continued to limit the recognition of gay refugees.201 
Today, the need to be discreet is seen as potentially persecutory.202  
 The first section here critically reflects on why discretion is problematic in 
the assessment of persecution. I start by arguing that adjudicators did not 
“misunderstand” the international case law and that discretion was contrary to the 
Convention – the question is why did they ignore axiomatics of the closet (Sedgwick 
2007, 3–4)? If discretion is now seen to be contrary to the Convention, there must be 
other hurdles that explain why the processes of securing contested rights for sexual 
minority refugees were so lengthy. The remainder of the chapter offers an analysis 
                                                 
198e.g. Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149; Toonen v Australia, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (4 Apr 1994); see also Millbank (2004, 218). 
199 e.g. Jain [1999]; Z and M and A [2002]. 
200 e.g. Z [2004]; Amare [2005]; RG [2006].  
201 J [2006]; see also XY [2008]; HJ and HT [2009]. 
202 HJ and HT [2010]; see also SW [2011]; LZ [2011]. 
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and some explanations for the narrow recognition of the “gay” refugee. I firstly 
assess how aspects of the local context in countries of origin, including their cultural 
norms and evidence of systemic violence, has influenced the assessment of 
persecution. Giving too much weight to culturally specific norms or explanations for 
what appears to be persecution, or undermining the discriminatory effects of 
persecution as generalised violence prevents an adjudicator from properly assessing 
whether there is a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Finally, I will summarise 
the impact of immigration control and international consensus, and how these could 
affect spaces for change going forward. 
2.1 Glass closets, discovery and persecution: There was no 
“misunderstanding” 
Basing protection from persecution on the discretion of a claimant undermined the 
very purpose of refugee status. Regarding state prohibitions, the UK failed to 
recognise that even unenforced anti-sodomy laws can foster widespread 
homophobia, fear of reporting abuse to authorities, and extortion at the hands of law 
enforcement. Likewise formal equalities do not always translate to freedom from 
persecution (Millbank 2004, 210–211, 215–216, 226; Johnson 2007, 103). This 
section considers the courts’ application of discretion, and suggests there was no 
“misunderstanding” of international law in discretion reasoning. Rather, discretion is 
used as a way of denying or avoiding responsibilities under the Convention. 
UK adjudicators had in many cases a range of evidence that would suggest 
that regardless of whether an asylum seeker wanted to be discreet, or would modify 
their behaviour as a matter of self-preservation, where their sexual indiscretions 
came to the knowledge of society or the state they could be persecuted. Yet, this 
knowledge was often downplayed. For example, a Tribunal found that it was “far too 
speculative to suppose that those around [Amare would] identify her as a lesbian and 
demonstrate their disapproval of her activities by acts of sexual or other violence 
upon her” (IAT, para 36, cited by Laws in Amare [2005], para 6). Even on the 
limited evidence and accepted facts which featured in the Court of Appeal’s decision 
in Amare [2005], it is plain to see that a single woman in Ethiopia would be living in 
an incredibly transparent closet.  
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I use the terms “glass” or “transparent” closet similarly to what has been 
called the “heteronormative panopticon,” including the “constant fear of being 
“disclosed,” of being victim of violence, to self-violence accompanied by 
internalised homophobia” (Kuhar and Švab 2008, 268).203 Johnson (2007, 103) 
suggests that the terminology used by the judges in RG [2006] “evidences a failure 
on their part to understand the threats of violence and blackmail” that were presented 
in RG’s case. Even where there was “some level of formal protection,” the COI and 
human rights organisations had suggested that there was a real risk the persecutors 
may be non-state actors and that local authorities and communities in Colombia may 
be complicit (Johnson 2007, 103).  
Similarly, in HC [2005] the formal legal position contrasted with the actual 
threat of persecution in Lebanon for the claimant, a gay Palestinian. There was a 
range of background information presented in the appeal, including COI which stated 
prosecution was unlikely but open homosexuality was not tolerated, that Lebanese 
police do not interfere in Palestinian camps, as well as two reports which discussed 
the legal and factual position of sexual minority rights in Lebanon, respectively 
(Keene LJ, para 12, 14-15, 21, 28-30). The previous decisions had emphasised the 
legal position, but the Court of Appeal stressed the broader evidence. An expert 
attested that “while [it was] not literally impossible for a gay man to live in a Muslim 
area of Lebanon, it would be extremely difficult for him to do so,” and nor would he 
be safe in Beirut (Keene LJ, para 13). An acquaintance who had visited HC in 
Lebanon provided a witness statement that noted the “risks of blackmail and arrest if 
gay men spent the night together or met openly” (Keene LJ, para 14). The 
assumption of discretion held by many adjudicators failed to consider the many ways 
societies can identify sexual minorities, and what they could do about it (see further 
chapter four). 
A further example of this is the CG case, RM and BB [2005], because it was 
accepted by UK adjudicators that if homosexuality was discovered by the Iranian 
authorities, they would investigate and prosecute, and the punishment would at 
                                                 
203 Švab and Kuhar (2014, 19) use “transparent closet” differently, specific to the family and a refusal 
to acknowledge coming out, but I mean it as something specific to the fact of being discovered by 
family, society, state and the risks more like the panopticon. See also Kuhar (2012, 151–152, 162) 
applying “transparent closet” to the public/private dichotomy, Tebble (2011), and chapter six.  
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minimum violate ECHR Article 3 and likely amount to persecution.204 This CG was 
used in several other appeals considered,205 and discretion in Iran was accepted as a 
matter of survival, where there was no public gay community (see Allen VP in RM 
and BB [2005], para 28).206 Expert evidence suggested that homosexuality may be 
discovered in large part because of private complaints which can be made in the 
Iranian legal system, though their source is often questionable (Allen VP, para 65). 
Private complaints are “a large source of insecurity for a practicing homosexual,” as 
they can “be laid against him by a neighbour, servant, a spouse or any other person in 
his orbit, either out of a sense of moral rectitude or for revenge” (Allen VP, para 
117). Allen VP (para 124) curiously suggested that allegations that a complaint had 
been or could be made by a asylum seeker’s family should be viewed with 
“scepticism,” but in the context of a conservative society where homosexuality 
brings incredible shame to the family too, I find this is misguided (see e.g. Morgan 
2006, 144–145; McFarland 2014; Ferreira 2015, 423–424).207 In fact, Haines QC 
(para 26-27) emphasised that Iranian “homosexuals are repressed by their family and 
relatives” in Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004]. 
While there were known cruising grounds, evidence suggested that there were 
“raids on homosexuals in parks in Tehran” (Allen VP, para 43). In HJ [2008] it is 
noted that Iranian authorities sought to entrap homosexuals in Internet chatrooms in 
2004-2005 (Hodge J, para 21). For discretion to really guarantee safety in Iran, the 
evidence seems to suggest the only certainty would be non-disclosure plus 
celibacy.208 The Tribunal was also told that two men living together would “arouse 
neighbourhood suspicions as being very unusual” (Allen VP in RM and BB, para 43), 
and since 2004 “a sort of state-run neighbourhood watch” has policed all manner of 
moral crimes (Hodge J in HJ [2008], para 22).  
While Iran is a state at the more extreme end of the spectrum, these points 
trouble the logic of discretion generally (see Millbank 2012, especially 506). As 
                                                 
204 See also HJ [2008], para 20; XY [2008], para 6-7; cf. HS [2005]. 
205 Including HS [2005], J [2006], HJ [2008], XY [2008], HJ and HT [2009], MM [2009], and HJ and 
HT [2010].  
206 See also Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004], in which Haines QC (para 28) found that the evidence 
suggests “that to avoid harm, homosexuals in Iran must live ‘in the closet.’” 
207 Other appellants have raised concerns their families could report them to authorities, e.g. B from 
Algeria who had been “disowned” (B [2007], para 16). 
208 See Lord Rodger in HJ and HT [2010], para 63. 
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discussed in the last chapter, the appellant in JM [2008] relied heavily on the 
argument that questions asked of his marital status would inevitably reveal his true 
sexual identity regardless of modification to behaviour (King J, para 17, 20, 81, 143). 
And in Amare [2005], adjudicators speculated on what could happen if she were to 
live with a partner in a “conventional” but not “flamboyant” relationship (Laws LJ, 
para 6). Decision-makers failed to acknowledge an axiomatic truth – peculiarity 
alone raises suspicions, heightens surveillance, pierces the closet and increases the 
risk of persecution.  
The UKSC (HJ and HT [2010], para 102-103, 124-127) would later explain 
that many decisions on discretion were based on a “misunderstanding” of S395 
(especially McHugh and Kirby JJ, para 40). As Lord Hope (HJ and HT, para 20) 
explained his use of concealment over discretion, I would prefer not to call this a 
misunderstanding because “this euphemistic expression does not tell the whole 
truth.” Whatever the reasons, the Court of Appeal had all of the tools at its disposal 
to correctly apply S395 or, at minimum, might not have engaged with persuasive and 
non-binding international case law. I have tried to expose some of the many false 
assumptions that discretion prevented persecution and negated a well-founded fear, 
but these wilful oversights were especially pernicious. 
2.2 “Tradition,” generalised violence, and international 
consensus 
Normalising violent social contexts in decision-making gets in the way of an 
evaluation of persecution. In the first subsection, I suggest that whether a state may 
enforce “traditional” values, even if its laws or social mores may result in 
persecution as defined by international refugee law, is a contested issue. Relatedly, 
culturally specific notions of harm and justice may conflict with international human 
rights norms and be persecutory. Finally, this section will consider COI that 
indicated the persecution feared was systemic and not discriminatory, and, therefore, 
the asylum seeker is determined not to be a Convention refugee. The second sub-
section further considers the role of cultural divergence in the context of restricted 
interpretations of persecution, as well as “international consensus” and keeping the 
“floodgate” sufficiently closed.   
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2.2.1 Local context: Normalised violence and the perceived need to 
“respect” local cultural norms 
The perceived need to balance international human rights standards and local cultural 
norms has troubled adjudicators (see e.g. Anker 2005, 113–116). For example, 
adjudicators have struggled over how to classify the systemic, subordinate position 
of women in Pakistani society measured against “universal” rights and UK 
liberalism. Islam and Shah [1999] illustrated an underlying anxiety of some 
adjudicators to assure “respect” for the local laws and customs in countries of origin. 
On the other hand, it has been observed that awarding refugee status is an implicit 
criticism and political reprimand of the country of origin (see e.g. Hathaway 1991, 
82–83, 100–101; Tuitt 1996, 93; Anker 2002, 152; 2005, 120; Millbank 2004, 203). 
Assessing persecution whilst attempting to respect a society’s cultural norms can 
adversely impact asylum claims. As the IAT had determined in the case of Islam: 
“We do not think the purpose of the Convention is to award refugee status because of 
a disapproval of social mores or conventions in non-western societies” (cited in Lord 
Hoffman, 165).  
The UKHL rejected that respect for local cultural norms was a determinative 
factor in RSD.209 In any case, the right to be free from discrimination is not only a 
Western value but also shared, at least in law, with Pakistan’s constitution and the 
human rights instruments it too ratified.210 But Islam and Shah suffered 
discriminatory persecution as a result of the failure of the state in practice to protect 
them from ill-treatment because of their subordination in that society (Lord Hoffman, 
165-166). Instead, Lord Hoffman (165-166) employed universal rights over the 
Tribunal’s culturally centred approach.  
Court of Appeal and Tribunal decisions have since found it necessary to 
continue engaging cultural difference in the assessment of persecution. Adjudicators 
have found that it is necessary to separate the question of discriminatory persecution 
from whether there are local cultural norms that may be legitimately enforced.211 
                                                 
209 Islam and Shah [1999], 165-166. 
210 See also Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004] where Haines QC (para 38) rejected domestic human 
rights standards in favour of international measures, because the former “allows too easily the 
intrusion of ideology and also the implication of censure of the state of origin,” and he (para 112) 
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human rights norms in RSD.  
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This includes whether a state can legitimately regulate social mores, by customary 
norms or domestic law, and determining when these can be persecutory. To decide 
these questions, adjudicators have had to weigh competing values of international 
human rights and “traditional values” (Wilkinson 2014).  
In HJ [2008] the Tribunal emphasised that in Iran homosexual acts are 
classified as “crimes against the public virtue,” including adultery and other crimes 
in a “wide sense” (Hodge J, para 19). “But there is no evidence that [the authorities 
have] focused particularly on homosexual conduct” (Hodge J, para 25). So 
accordingly it was merely incidental that “homosexuality is one of the moral crimes 
which is subject to increased surveillance,” and that failed to show HJ would be 
discovered and persecuted for private homosexual conduct (Hodge J, para 25). Pill 
LJ (para 32) gave additional weight to social morality in assessing persecution in the 
conjoined appeal of HJ and HT [2009]: 
“The need to protect fundamental human rights transcends national 
boundaries but, in assessing whether there as been a breach of such 
rights, a degree of respect for social norms and religious beliefs in 
other states is…appropriate. Both in Muslim Iran and Roman Catholic 
Cameroon, strong views are genuinely held about homosexual 
practices… Analysis of in-country evidence is necessary in deciding 
what an applicant can [reasonably tolerate] on return…”  
Pill LJ (para 36) concluded that Tribunals must determine “[w]hether a requirement 
to respect social standards has the effect of violating a fundamental human right.”212 
In effect, adjudicators not only endorsed the enforcement of traditional values in 
Iran, Cameroon, and other states, but also the regulation of public morality with the 
threat of persecution.  
In the majority of appeals considered in this thesis, asylum claims were 
rejected on grounds that prosecution and therefore persecution was unlikely. 
However, several examples in the literature and case law suggest that refugee status 
had been refused not only because states may regulate public morality by threatening 
persecution, but also that the persecution was not really persecution in the context of 
that society. In one case, an Adjudicator had reasoned that an asylum seeker “would 
                                                 
212 In HJ and HT [2010], para 128-130, Sir John Dyson rejects this approach with reference to 
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not face persecution if he were returned to the Yemen…only prosecution and any 
punishment [100 lashes or 1 year in prison], within the context of the Yemeni culture 
would not be harsh and unconscionable.”213 Another Adjudicator accepted that an 
asylum seeker had suffered ill-treatment and six months imprisonment, but in the 
context of Iran “[h]is sentence of six months for homosexuality and sodomy was not 
disproportionate and relatively lenient.”214 These cases illustrate the notion of 
“permissible persecution,” which can be broadened, especially since discretion is 
now properly recognised as persecutory. Asylum claims rejected on grounds of 
discretion show that adjudicators appreciated that the closet was, in the context of 
those cultures, “not disproportionate and relatively lenient.”215 
Finally, the formulation of “discriminatory” persecution that merits refugee 
protection as distinct from “systemic” persecution that does not, though neat in 
theory, can become messy in RSD. Widespread, generalised violence in countries of 
origin has led to the rejection of asylum claims despite the addition of evidence that 
suggested the likelihood that sexual minorities may be harmed was higher. In an 
unreported appeal to the IAT in 2001, the Brazilian claimant’s evidence noted that 
more than 1,600 gay, lesbian, and trans people had been murdered from 1980-1999. 
The homicide rate was determined to indicate a systemic rather than discriminatory 
threat of persecution. The IAT found that the figure must be viewed in the context of 
Brazil and its “unbelievable record of violence,” 6,000 murders in Rio de Janeiro in 
1999 alone, and given domestic activists claim there are 15 million homosexuals in 
the country, “it is difficult to see” the community “is a particular target of 
violence.”216 A similar finding of systemic violence was made in Dawkins [2003], 
which undermined the asylum claim. The Adjudicator determined: 
“Against the context of the background and high levels of violence in 
Jamaica, whilst noting that he was attacked outside a gay night club… 
                                                 
213 Saeed v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 01465; the Adjudicator’s determination was overturned on appeal to 
the IAT; cited in Millbank (2004, 218–221).  
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I do not regard it as established to a reasonable degree of likelihood 
that he was attacked on account of his homosexuality.”217 
In JM [2008], King IJ (para 105) discredited the claimant’s evidence of mob violence 
in Uganda on the basis it was systemic too. The Tribunal found there was a culture of 
violence and vigilantism in the country. The violence feared by JM was found not to 
be discriminatory, because the report submitted had “very little to say” about 
homosexuality as a provocation (King IJ, para 105). Therefore, according to the 
Tribunal, JM was unlikely to be at risk of the persecution feared any more than the 
next Ugandan, so he was not a Convention refugee.  
If adjudicators allow a broad cultural view to influence the assessment of the 
state, society, and persecution feared, they may fail to engage the question of 
whether the circumstances are in fact persecutory. While the circumstances of 
generalised violence may, strictly speaking, be a separate consideration from cultural 
difference, what they share in common is the local context of countries of origin. 
And both have obscured whether there is a particular risk to a gay asylum seeker. 
“Gay” asylum seekers can easily be determined to be aberrations to “traditional” 
culture and “statistics,” that may be underreported, rather than as refugees threatened 
by local cultural norms and as vulnerable targets in circumstances of generalised 
violence. 
2.2.2 An invisible hand: Restricting the meaning of persecution 
“The appellant’s sexuality comes at a price but it is not so high as to 
require the international community to provide surrogate 
protection.”218 
The case law considered suggests that political imaginings of the perceived effects of 
asylum decisions were a primary driver of legal reasoning, rather than a principled 
jurisprudential application of human rights and refugee law. Jain [1999] justified a 
limited interpretation and application of the concept of persecution, allegedly 
grounded in an “international consensus” which attempts to be observant of cultural 
                                                 
217 Adjudicator’s determination cited in Dawkins [2003], para 31; see also SSHD’s argument in SW 
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difference. Schiemann LJ (74) at the appeal quoted the Tribunal (page 22) on the 
divergence of standards in the international community:  
“…to deny a country its right to adhere to mores, to cultural attitudes 
and to laws different from one’s own and which make up its inherent 
being cannot be acceptable if the Convention is to have any truly 
international acceptability… [W]e can see that the punishment for 
behaviour which is unacceptable can be judged by one standard, for 
example international norms, whilst in the same case the cultural 
attitude or mores is judged by another, for example that of the country 
to which the asylum seeker may be returned.” 
Underlying the evolution of the “threshold” of persecution is a preoccupation with 
maintaining an international consensus (see also chapter two), which continues to be 
deployed to justify a narrow construct of the refugee. Of course, it could be argued 
that adjudicators had a benign intention to recognise difference, and avoid false 
universals. But Jain and successive cases apparently engaged cultural difference and 
international consensus on the definition and assessment of persecution as a means to 
justify immigration restriction. 
 Another excerpt from Jain [1999] is coded below (see Fairclough 1999, 196 
on method). This reasoning has appeared varyingly in the jurisprudence, including 
[1] finding international consensus, [2] fear of opening the floodgates, and [3] the 
move to cloak restrictionist intentions with positive humanitarian objectives.  
“[1] It is clearly desirable that the international community moves 
with a degree of consensus in relation to what it regards as 
persecution, [2] for otherwise burdens will be imposed upon those 
States who are most liberal in their interpretations and whose social 
conditions are most attractive. [3] If intolerable burdens are imposed 
there is a risk that such States will resile from their observance of the 
Convention standards, which would be a disaster [numbering my 
own].”219  
The excerpts above, especially at [1], illustrate an on-going preoccupation with 
limiting the Convention by clearly demarcating those eligible for refugee status with 
a focus on “burden sharing” between Signatory States.220 At [2], the Court of Appeal 
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apparently sought to move the UK towards the lowest common denominator, with 
added emphasis at [3] on the importance of states distributing the costs of refugees.  
 Jain declared there was an international consensus that states should not 
interfere in private homosexual conduct. However, an unenforced penal code that 
maintains the “privacy of the closet” was said not to be persecutory (see Millbank 
2004, 215 on Jain). The restriction placed on expression and association limited the 
number of prospective refugees even before there was a consideration of whether the 
fear of prosecution was well-founded, and what punishments would breach the 
court’s threshold of persecution. At [2], above, by referring to the “social conditions” 
that may be desirable to masses of the world’s homosexuals, perhaps the Lords 
Justice were assuming the UK is less homophobic than other Signatory States, or 
maybe that it has a more generous welfare state which was relevant in, for example, 
the rejected asylum claim of HIV-positive RG in 2006 (Johnson 2007, 109).221 Other 
researchers have observed the “floodgates argument,” as it is termed by Millbank 
(2004, 222), who quotes Walls J (para 49) in Dawkins [2003]:222 
“It simply cannot be the law, in my judgement, that merely because 
the law of Jamaica has a criminal statute which criminalises 
homosexual behaviour, that mere fact cannot, of itself, be sufficient to 
require this country to grant immigration status to all practising 
homosexuals in Jamaica. On that basis, anybody who was a 
homosexual could come to this country and claim asylum [emphasis 
added].” 
In HJ [2008], Hodge J (para 12) suggested that the appellant’s counsel offered 
submissions in a skeleton argument that came “very close to a claim that, given the 
discrimination against homosexuals in Iran, on a proper application of the law any 
homosexual person from Iran is entitled to international protection.”223 The 
appellants’ appeals in SW [2011] and LZ [2011], which applied HJ and HT [2010], 
were allowed explicitly in the particular circumstances of those asylum seekers. The 
floodgate was clearly a key concern in both determinations as the Tribunals stressed 
upfront in their introductions that it did not follow that granting refugee status to one 
claimant meant that all nationals of the same sexual or gender identity had a 
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legitimate claim to UK protection. On the other hand, if the adjudicator’s role is to 
apply legal principles and if, hypothetically, applying those rules granted every 
homosexual of a particular nationality refugee status, it is questionable why the, 
arguably political, “floodgate” is the primary judicial concern. Or as Grahl-Madsen 
(1966, 163) argues: “Once a person is subjected to a measure of such gravity that we 
consider it ‘persecution,’ that person is ‘persecuted’ in the sense of the Convention, 
irrespective of how many others are subjected to the same or similar measures” (cited 
in Hathaway 1991, 85).  
2.3 Critical reflections: Politics, immigration control, and 
international consensus 
“The answer in each case is so blindingly obvious that it must be a 
mystery to some why either of them had to reach this House.”224  
The remainder of this chapter will revisit and summarise the argument that the 
judicial discourse evidences a political preoccupation with limiting immigration, and 
that UK adjudicators had repeatedly rejected broader recognition of sexual minority 
asylum seekers on these grounds. This study has observed that “consensus” was 
often used in the determination of sexual minority claims when adjudicators were in 
effect hiding behind international norms instead of rising to meet the UK’s 
obligations of protection. 
On the one hand, international consensus can be beneficial in creating spaces 
for change, exploiting the open texture of refugee law for the purposes of expanding 
the scope of Convention protection. However, it may also be that application of the 
Convention relies on interpreting human rights, not universally, but to the point that 
humanitarian and political interests are reconcilable (see Zolberg et al. 1989, 272; 
Loescher 1993, 51; Einarsen 2011, 46; see also chapter two). So-called “international 
consensus” has been used in arguments for the restriction as well as the expansion of 
Convention protection, and “winning” arguments on either side are tenuous at best 
and are open to reinterpretation in subsequent applications of the law (see Bourdieu 
1987, 832–833; Goodman 2012, 441–442).225   
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Consider, for instance, K and Fornah [2006] and their Lordships’ apparent 
dismay that adjudicators had refused the appellants refugee status on the grounds that 
women did not constitute a PSG and a reluctance to acknowledge that FGM was 
persecutory. Lord Brown (para 121) wrote, “It would be most unfortunate if the 
jurisprudence of the United Kingdom (out of step with that of most enlightened 
countries) were available to support a narrow view of the Convention’s protective 
reach.” The House of Lords emphasised the UK as an outlier in an imagined league 
of exceptional countries to expand the scope of the Convention in terms of 
“international” acceptability (see Anker 2005). Their Lordships framed the scope of 
protection in problematic terms of “enlightened” and “civilised” countries, which 
construct UK (and Western) exceptionalism against “backward” states (see Puar 
2006, 68–69, 85–86; Mepschen et al. 2010; see also Waites 2013, 145, 147–149 on 
colonial guilt). In the words of Baroness Hale (para 108), “The United Kingdom is 
apparently alone in the civilised world in rejecting such a claim.”  
While the decision in K and Fornah seems to suggest a common-sense 
solution, the concept of persecution has evaded definition and proved an effective 
barrier to refugee status. Dawson J (160) of the HCA recalled in Appellant A [1997]: 
“By including in its operative provisions the requirement that a refugee fear 
persecution, the Convention limits its humanitarian scope and does not afford 
universal protection to asylum seekers.” It may be that this fact of persecution is so 
obvious as to be banal. But I would argue that the uses of persecution to limit or 
restrict the construct of refugee are often covert and ambiguous. Persecution has 
occasionally created spaces for change and widened the scope of refugee protection, 
for example, in the assessment of threats, likelihood, or types of harm that may be 
recognised. However, interpreting what amounts to persecution has usually 
forestalled the recognition of otherwise genuine claims to refugee status.  
Sexual minorities have been excluded from refugee status for lack of 
adjudicators’ “empathy and imagination” in understanding persecution (Millbank 
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2002), but also by the perceived need in their political imaginations to balance 
refugee protection with immigration control and international consensus, imperatives 
which appear to transcend case-by-case decision-making (see further Ivarsflaten 
2005). For example, in Z and M and A [2002] the SSHD argued that appellant A’s 
current relationship in the UK was outwith the scope of ECHR Article 8, and that 
any interference with his private life resulting from deportation was in the public 
interest for “the maintenance in itself of immigration control” (Schiemann LJ, para 
38).226 For whatever reasons, adjudicators are apparently preoccupied with limiting 
the scope of Convention protection. Consider Lord Hope (para 9) agreeing with Lord 
Brown (para 85) in Hoxha [2005]:227  
“[I]t is generally to be assumed that the parties included the terms that 
they wished to include and on which they were able to agree, omitting 
other terms which they did not wish to include or on which they were 
unable to agree… It is not open to a court…to expand the limits which 
the language of the treaty itself has set for it.”  
I would argue the view of historical permanency is problematic when juxtaposed to 
the competing jurisprudential narrative that the Convention is a “living instrument.” 
The literature and cases studied in this thesis would suggest that expanding on the 
language of the Convention is exactly what courts have done. Whether through 
lenses of human rights, supplementary interpretation or because of the necessities of 
changing socio-political realities, reading-in new categories of identity and 
persecution pushed at the limits of the Convention text. It seems to be a source of 
judicial anxiety that the principles of interpreting the Convention rely on terms that 
are not fixed or clearly demarcated. UK legal decisions have been apparently 
influenced by the political imperative of keeping the categories of refugees and 
persecution narrow for fear of opening the floodgates (Berg and Millbank 2013, 
131). Interpretations based on the lowest common denominator were justified by 
claims that not to do so would undermine the Convention, especially because not to 
                                                 
226 The Court of Appeal specifically asked the AIT to consider whether this was proportional upon 
remittal; Z and M and A [2002], para 39.  
227 Hoxha primarily dealt with the cessation clause, Article 1C(5). 
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do so would burden states with more generous or liberal interpretations, as well as 
those with attractive social conditions.228  
Despite the pace of change in international law relating to sexual minority 
refugee status, UK adjudicators continued to be reticent in recognising that the 
discretion requirement was incompatible with the Convention. The true watermark of 
an “international consensus” began submerging UK case law and practice even as its 
courts continued to hark back to the threat of “being out front” if the UK were to be 
too liberal in its interpretation versus other Signatory States.229 In other words, it was 
clear that the “consensus” of many authorities had moved beyond requiring 
discretion, but the UK continued to hide behind the imputed international norm (i.e. 
the old standard). In Z [2004], two foreign cases took centre stage: S395 from the 
HCA and Refugee Status Appeals Authority of New Zealand (hereafter “Authority”) 
in Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004]. Buxton LJ (para 13) did “not presume to 
determine what is the law of New Zealand in light of the Authority’s decision, but 
[he had] no hesitation in saying that the decision gives no support to [the appellant’s 
argument].” Buxton LJ (para 13) quoted the Authority’s decision (para 114) in order 
to highlight that “serious harm is threatened,” and concluded that the deprivation of 
rights alone does not constitute persecution “in its international meaning.”  
While Buxton LJ disclaimed knowledge and authority over New Zealand’s 
law, the judge and Court of Appeal explicitly purported to exercise authority over the 
“international meaning” of persecution and other Convention definitions. Buxton LJ 
(para 13) highlighted that “serious harm is threatened” (literally and figuratively), but 
he did not discuss the last part of his own excerpt of the Authority’s decision. Haines 
QC (para 114) of the Authority stated that if the asylum seeker would be deprived of 
a core human right “and serious harm is threatened,” that “it would be contrary to 
the…purpose of the Refugee Convention to require the refugee to forfeit or forgo 
that right and to be denied refugee status on that basis that he or she could engage in 
self-denial or discretion…”230 On the other hand, Buxton LJ concluded his 
discussion of the excerpt from the Authority’s decision by finding that the 
                                                 
228 See e.g. Jain [1999], 77; Amare [2005], para 22, 31; RG [2006], para 6; OO and JM [2009], para 
24. See also Hathaway and Pobjoy (2012, 335). 
229 See especially Laws LJ in Amare [2005], para 32. 
230 See further Tobin (2012, 479–480) for a discussion and critique of the Authority’s distinction 
between “core” and “marginal” rights.  
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requirement of serious harm was consistent with the UK case law, namely Sepet 
[2003]. Similarly, on the decision in S395 that discretion itself may be persecutory 
(McHugh and Kirby JJ, para 43), the Court of Appeal found that this too relies on a 
substantial level of interference, threat and menace, to qualify for refugee status 
(Buxton LJ, para 15).  
In Z [2004], as in other cases, adjudicators drew from international 
jurisprudence when it suited their argument, imposed meaning with their 
interpretations, but otherwise claimed to have bounded limitations in their authority, 
for example, where it would have opened the “floodgate.” The contradictory readings 
of international jurisprudence involved disclaiming authority over another 
jurisdiction, while at the same time appropriating, interpreting, and representing it in 
the context of the domestic case to legitimise the domestic limitations to refugee 
status. The reasoning is similar to UK adjudicators’ expressed desire to maintain 
parity in the international system of refugee law, where courts claim they cannot go 
beyond what the Signatory States had contractually bound themselves to recognise. 
The duplicitous justification is humanitarian, that the Convention is a living 
instrument and humanitarian text of enormous value that requires consensus to 
ensure its integrity and continued application – this was especially apparent in Amare 
[2005].231 
In that case the Court of Appeal decided that the interference with the 
claimant’s private life in returning her to Ethiopia “would not be disproportionate 
given the legitimate aim of firm but fair immigration control” (Laws LJ, para 4).232 
In Amare, Laws LJ (para 22) cited Schiemann LJ (77) in Jain [1999], most notably 
that the evolution of refugee law must be based on an international consensus, 
“otherwise burdens will be imposed upon States who are most liberal in their 
interpretations and whose social conditions are most attractive.” While the 
Convention may be a “living instrument,” Laws LJ (para 28) expressed that “this is 
no license for the courts, in the cause of protecting or enlarging human rights, in 
effect to impose on the State obligations which in truth they have not undertaken.”233  
                                                 
231 Amare [2005], especially para 32; see also Jain [1999], 77.  
232 See also B [2007], para 35; JM [2008], para 168. 
233 cf. Hoxha [2005], para 9, 85. 
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As discussed in part one, the court in Amare was highly critical of a HRBA in 
RSD. Part of the effect of downplaying rights was the conclusion that homosexuals 
cannot migrate to the UK under the Convention as a matter of “personal 
convenience” where they might find and develop relations more freely than in their 
countries of origin: “The Convention is not there to safeguard or protect potentially 
affected persons from having to live in regimes where pluralist liberal values are less 
respected, even much less respected, than they are here” (Laws LJ, para 31).234 The 
court emphasised that “refugee” is a limited category with a narrower scope of 
protection than Amare had argued from a human rights perspective – purportedly for 
the preservation of the Convention, because states would no longer adhere to the 
Convention under the “burden” of too liberal an approach. 
A recurring theme in the sample of cases is that the asylum seeker cannot be 
assumed to want to be “more free” in the UK; and that merely because they may be 
less free in their country of origin, that is not persecutory. For instance, in 2006 the 
SSHD sent B a refusal letter which specifically cited this excerpt from the claimant’s 
evidence: “I am not a discreet gay Muslim man. In summer, I enjoy sunbathing 
topless in Soho Square…and [the] relaxed gay pavement lifestyle that exists in 
London.”235 Similarly, an adjudicator in the appeal of a gay Pakistani noted: “It is of 
course not a Convention reason that an asylum seeker returning to his own country is 
unable to enjoy there the peripheral benefits of westernised and so called liberalised 
behaviour.”236 Perhaps, according to the UKSC in HJ and HT (e.g. para 11, 78), the 
Convention does in effect guarantee asylum seekers more freedom if their so-called 
“liberalised behaviour” would result in a well-founded fear of being persecuted. 
As discussed in chapter two, the drafting and implementation of the 
Convention “reflected as liberal a synthesis of policies as nation states could agree 
to” (Gallagher 1989, 580). It has been argued that states viewed specifications of 
particular individuals and groups deserving of international protection as preventing 
the number of refugees from multiplying ad infinitum (Zolberg et al. 1989, 270). The 
Convention was, as mentioned repeatedly in the preparatory works, an instrument for 
                                                 
234 Cited in HJ [2008], para 16. 
235 Cited in B [2007], para 23; see also HJ [2008], para 36-37, 43. 
236 Quoted by the High Court (para 10) in R v Special Immigration Adjudicator ex parte T [2001] Imm 
AR 187. 
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“burden sharing” with the explicit goal of securing the widest possible definition of 
“refugee” that Contracting States could agree to.237 Or as Laws LJ (para 28) imagines 
politically in Amare, the “courts must keep a weather eye on the fact that they are 
dealing with the product of negotiation between contracting states.” Without an 
international consensus the burden of refugees would be imposed upon states with 
the most liberal interpretations and most attractive social conditions; “to apply the 
Convention without marked respect for the edge or reach of what the contracting 
States agreed,” in Laws LJ’s assessment, “would carry great risks” (Laws LJ, para 
32).  
HJ and HT [2010] “fundamentally undermines Laws LJ’s rejection” of a 
progressive human rights and international consensus approach.238 However, this 
chapter has demonstrated that the perceived consensus of the Convention deployed 
by UK adjudicators was restrictionist. This complicated the received wisdom of the 
utility of international human rights and refugee law in domestic practice to further 
broader protection. Advocates and researchers had proposed the “international 
consensus” was tilted towards greater recognition of sexual minority refugees prior 
to HJ and HT,239 and possibly a human rights-based understanding of persecution, as 
demonstrated by Canada in Ward [1993], Australia in S395 [2003], and New Zealand 
in Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004]. If spaces for change are seen in the Convention 
as a “living instrument,” this analysis suggests that diligence should be paid to 
“international consensus” as subject to an interpretive process which could just as 
easily swing away from broader protection of refugees and their human rights.  
3 Conclusion 
The minimum accepted persecution in the jurisprudence and policy guidance for the 
purposes of refugee status has changed over time, mirroring the extent to which 
rights to engage in private sexual acts and the public expression of sexual orientation 
and gender identity have been incrementally acknowledged in UK jurisprudence. UK 
adjudicators have repeatedly rejected rights to expression and association in RSD. 
Regardless of the discrimination, ill-treatment, and persecution faced by sexual 
                                                 
237 See A/CONF.2/SR.19; A/CONF.2/SR.21; A/CONF.2/SR.23; chapter two of this thesis. 
238 S Chelvan, Twitter correspondence, 29 May 2013, available at: 
https://twitter.com/S_Chelvan/status/339839817753956353 [Last accessed 14 April 2015]. 
239 See e.g. OO and JM [2009], para 15-16, 24. 
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minorities, if the conditions of their concealment were found to be “reasonably 
tolerable” the asylum claim could be rejected. As I have set out, the forced repression 
of gender or sexual identity resulting from the persistent threat of discriminatory ill-
treatment or harm posed by discovery or visibility can be in itself a well-founded fear 
of persecution. 
UK legal discourse on refugee status and sexual minorities has included 
broad and often sweeping statements of the international meaning and significance of 
the Convention. Relative interpretations of “consensus” have been used to justify 
immigration control and the restrictionist tendencies of adjudicators. The case law 
suggests courts often treated possibilities of persecution lightly, as well as any 
subsequent limits on sexual minorities’ rights. HJ and HT [2010] has opened new 
doors in determining that sexual identity should not have to be concealed, even based 
on previous discretion, because of a well-founded fear of persecution. While proving 
sexual and gender identity presents new challenges, especially if there has been an 
increase in the instances of adjudicators disbelieving the identities claimed, the 
concept of persecution remains even less clear. If the social group has been 
recognised in the case law and the identity claimed can be proven, refugee status 
hinges on subjective and perhaps even more imprecise tests than those used for 
proving identity to judge what would amount to persecution, and, furthermore, the 
likelihood of being persecuted. Regardless of how broad or narrow the test for 
persecution may be, it is the adjudicator’s discretion in the assessment of well-
founded fear that plays the most significant role in the outcome of an asylum claim. 
In Part III, I will propose a different way to assess persecution based on the concept 
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Part III – Theoretical contributions 
Introduction 
The conclusions drawn in Part II suggested, firstly, as to whether if “disbelief” that 
an asylum seeker is in fact “gay” is increasingly an obstacle to refugee status, the 
challenge may be to reconcile issues of proving the identity claimed with the 
possibility that an adjudicator cannot know surely or definitely who is “gay.” 
Furthermore, HJ and HT [2010] framed sexual identity as “immutable,” but did not 
make clear what behaviours should be protected from persecution. Finally, HJ and 
HT set out that discretion can no longer be required to avoid persecution, and 
affirmed sexual minorities’ rights of expression and association when seeking 
asylum. The decision paved the way for greater recognition of sexual minority 
refugees, yet there are still gaps in protection in the legal discourse and practice of 
RSD. Part III will address these deficiencies by offering an alternative to the 
determination of “immutable” identity, and clarifying the role of rights in the 
assessment of persecution.     
Part III contributes an alternative approach to the protection of sexual 
minorities which is grounded on the case law analysis and critique in Part II. The 
approach is based on three original contributions: norm deviance, relational 
autonomy, and compassionate creativity. Chapter six argues that in order to decide 
on sexual minority claims to refugee status, determination should focus on the 
persecutory intent to suppress non-conforming acts and identities (or norm 
deviance). Norm deviance does not focus on determining what “protected 
characteristics” are “immutable,” but instead on what distinguishes the asylum seeker 
from society and puts them at risk of being persecuted, such as gender non-
conformity.  
Chapter seven offers an alternative approach to the assessment of a well-
founded fear of being persecuted in relation to sexual minorities by applying existing 
theories of autonomy in the context of refugee law. I argue that a framework of 
relational autonomy develops a better understanding of the conditions necessary to 
realise a life free of persecution; the loss of relational autonomy, including 
relationships and equal rights, could constitute a well-founded fear of persecution. 
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Part III will conclude by exploring how the original concepts developed build upon 
the existing case law, and offer an analysis of how the interpretive standpoint of 
creative compassion uses these concepts in the determination of refugee status. 
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Chapter Six – Norm deviance and the social 
group 
Drawing upon the analytical conclusions of the case law in the previous two 
chapters, this chapter proposes a conception of norm deviance for determining the 
refugee status of sexual minorities. As I have previously argued, gender identity and 
sexual orientation have been established as culturally relative and historically 
contingent categories, therefore compounding the difficulties of knowing the “truth” 
of an asylum claim. Even in the most detailed medico-psychological evaluations, 
sexual and gender identity are inaccessible and subjects of speculation. Evidence 
presented to substantiate the claimed identity and fear of being persecuted is always 
reliant on subjective belief of its credibility and reliability. I develop the concept of 
norm deviance as a means to identify sexual minority claims, and argue that the 
persecutory intent to suppress non-conforming acts and identities can found a 
“genuine” well-founded fear of persecution. This new approach to the PSG category 
overcomes several epistemological difficulties posed by gender and sexuality in 
transnational decision-making. Most importantly, the norm deviance approach avoids 
essentialised categories. 
Part one of this chapter considers alternative ways of interpreting PSG, 
including the approaches of immutability or protected characteristics and social 
perception, and it explores how the epistemological problems of sexual and gender 
identity may be better accounted for in RSD. Part two reconsiders the findings of this 
research, and explains why norm deviance is better suited as an alternative 
conceptual framework. I conclude that RSD can avoid essential categories while 
remaining consistent with Convention principles, and norm deviance is a workable 
and less prescriptive way of defining and identifying the social group(s) of sexual 
minority refugees. 
1 Re-reading the PSG as norm deviance 
While norm deviance broadly may be attributed to a number of groups, here I am 
concerned with norm deviance on the grounds of sex, gender, and sexuality. 
Although I draw upon common sociological definitions of “norm” and “deviance,” 
and there are notional similarities in their usage here, I have not used the terms with 
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reference to the theories of other disciplines such as criminology (see e.g. 
Abercrombie et al. 2006, 106–107, 272). Instead, I use these terms as empirical 
descriptors. Norms are standards and “rules that govern social behaviour and are 
enforced by positive or negative sanctions” (Bruce 2006, 216, 69). “Norms” will be 
used broadly to refer to informal, social expectations, or de facto rules as well as 
formal, legally codified, or de jure rules. Deviance “is the breaking of social rules” 
and is, therefore, different from the norm and may be sanctioned (Bruce 2006, 216, 
69). Importantly, this definition of “norms” captures a broad spectrum of social 
power relations, thus determining whether the sanction for deviance amounts to 
persecution must also consider the grey area between de jure and de facto norms, 
such as with some applications of Sharia law, where the “source” of a persecutory 
sanction, whether state or non-state, may be obscure:  
“[A]n act or characteristic is only deviant because the social 
group has created the rules which define what is acceptable 
and what is deviant… [W]hat makes homosexuality 
‘abnormal’ is a set of norms that accept only 
heterosexuality. Another society could decide otherwise; in 
that sense deviance was always situational” (Bruce 2006, 69). 
Deviance from the norms of heterosexuality or compulsory heterosexuality is 
situational and may be relevant in a number of societies.240 With respect to the PSG, 
assessing norm deviance involves examining the negative sanction applied to the 
asylum seeker whose particular figuration of sex, gender, and/or sexuality may place 
that person at risk of discriminatory persecution in the country of origin. The asylum 
seeker’s norm deviance may transgress a number of social conventions, even 
simultaneously, such as defined sex/gender roles, socio-legal rules, or being 
attributed an identity viewed by wider society as perverse. And while the idea of 
persecutory intent may be relevant to other refugee categories,241 what is important 
                                                 
240 Others have referred to “compulsory heterosexuality,” coined by Rich (1980; see also Butler 1991; 
Sedgwick 1991, 81), generally as “institutionalized heterosexuality” (e.g. Weeks 2007, 12) and 
“heteronormativity” (e.g. Warner 1993; McGhee 2001a, 3; Luibhéid 2005b, 74) among other terms. I 
have chosen compulsory, in a more literal sense, because I mean to argue and emphasise that it is the 
absence of a meaningful choice, or indeed outright prohibition, which can be persecutory. See also 
Young (1990, 58–61) on cultural imperialism and oppression. 
241 See also Aleinikoff (2003, 267–268) on a UNHCR brief regarding “values and standards at odds 
with…social mores,” and UNHCR guidance referring to “harsh or inhuman treatment due to their 
having transgressed…social mores.” In Hoxha [2005], para 32, Baroness Hale discussed sexual 
violence against women as a means of political oppression that can result in “pain, hardship and [the] 
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here is the intent to suppress and eliminate the “deviant” sex, gender, and/or 
sexuality.242 
According to this conceptualisation of norm deviance, a genuine refugee is 
one who is persecuted by the country of origin or society because of who or what 
that person is, or has chosen to be. A sexual minority asylum seeker is often unable 
to fully develop and express identity, lacking the means to actualise normatively 
deviant desires because of the dispossession, ostracism, or fear of persecution in the 
country of origin. Rather than defaulting to the immutable, essential, or categorical 
frameworks in PSG claims, which reify identity and produce future exclusions, I will 
argue that the primary inquiry of RSD should be norm deviance. Deviance from 
compulsory heterosexuality places an individual at risk of discriminatory 
persecution.  
First, part one reconsiders identity in the transnational arena of asylum 
seeking to assert the relevance of norm deviance. The second section considers how 
the social perception approach to determining PSG-based claims is better suited to 
accommodating identity in transnational contexts, and with greater inclusivity. 
Strategic essentialism may be a feasible alternative to the anti-essentialist rejection of 
fixed identity categories, but I argue that the recognition of subjectivity and identity 
is better accommodated by a constructive assessment of the persecutory intent to 
suppress deviance.  
1.1 The problems of identity in transnational decision-making 
In chapter one, I argued that the use of LGBT identities in non-Western states may 
be liberating in some contexts, for example as categories with global visibility and 
utility in claiming rights attached to them (Katyal 2002, 119–123). However, in some 
states “LGBT” labels can lead to accusations of the adoption of non-traditional, 
imported practices, and can result in persecution (Katyal 2002, 122, 125–132). It 
should also be noted that the use of “LGBT” locally does not necessarily involve the 
                                                                                                                                          
indignity of rejection and ostracism,” and noted: “The UNHCR Guidelines recognise that punishment 
for transgression of unacceptable social norms imposed upon women is capable of amounting to 
persecution” (see UNHCR 2002, 3, 12, 23, 31). 
242 Persecutory intent should not be seen to imply that an adjudicator must establish what was in the 
mind of the persecutor. I will suggest in this chapter and chapter seven that “intent” can be interpreted 
by external factors in the available COI evidence, such as a hostile regime or the prevalence of 
religious extremism. This is because, unlike, for example, criminal law, RSD requires a lower 
standard of proof – that of “reasonable likelihood.” 
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adoption of the Western culture associated with these categories (see e.g. Philips 
2000, 34; Spruill 2000, 14). Non-Western sexual minority communities have 
developed and inevitably will continue to develop new articulations of identity by 
drawing on local cultures and traditions, but continue to lay claim to the protection of 
international norms and the rights associated with “normalised” LGBT identities (see 
e.g. Altman 1996; Philips 2000, 34; Walker 2000, 61–62; Weeks 2007, 216–223). 
Therefore, the need to avoid presupposing meaning and values and reification of 
identities is a pressing issue in the transnational decision-making arena. An 
additional layer of complexity is introduced when individual fluidity within cultures 
or social groups is considered. So, here we return to the question of whether it is 
possible to agree on what we can really “know” about sexual and gender identity in 
order to accommodate (global) diversity, and deploy Western “gay” identities in 
rights claims while still remaining sensitive to (local) difference (Plummer 1992, 18; 
see also Miller 1999, 290–291). 
Developing a legal framework for that purpose here requires consideration of 
the roles of gatekeepers in shaping the construct of refugee, including adjudicators, 
advocates, academics, and activists (Bhabha 2002; see also Miller 1999, 291).243 The 
background literature and case law analytical chapters of this thesis suggested that 
claiming refugee status as a sexual minority has resulted in the reification of types of 
people or categories of asylum seekers who are deemed worthy of protection. 
Similarly, Sheill (2009, 56) observes that human rights discourse “requires stable 
categories,” eschews “special rights,” and stresses the “normality” of LGBT 
people.244 Though case law and policy guidance have taken note of cultural diversity 
(e.g. API 2015), gatekeepers persistently default to assumptions of stable, immutable 
identities. The case law analytical chapters have shown that adjudicators in particular 
have been unable to see beyond kinds or types of people that may form a PSG in the 
literal sense. Reliance on a “gay” category may lead to the protection of certain 
                                                 
243 The concept of gatekeeping and gatekeepers is drawn from Bhabha (2002), to set out that all actors 
in the field are implicated in the inclusion and exclusion of refugees. Gatekeeping in practice is, in 
short, the subjective process of determining of who is a genuine refugee (see further Appendix II). See 
also McGhee (2001b, 38) on “specific intellectuals” and the “suspension of the system” in the 
inclusion of sexual minorities as a PSG.    
244 See also D’Emilio’s (1998, 244-245) critique that homosexuality rhetorically becomes a “poor 
second choice” when identity is essentialised, and “[w]e must not slip into the opportunistic defence 
that only homosexuals become homosexuals.”  
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claimants, rightly, but the ends do not justify the means, especially in the sense of 
creating a new “kind” or “type” into which new claimants must “fit” (see Walker 
2000, 68; Morgan 2006). The assumption of a stable category also contributes to the 
myth of a knowable “truth” in a claim, forsaking the empathy and imagination for 
understanding the very unknowability of gender and sexuality.  
If the narrative of an exemplary well-founded fear of persecution is that of an 
“out,” gay male political activist fleeing the oppression of a state and its anti-sodomy 
laws, many sexual minority asylum seekers could be excluded from refugee status 
(see Lewis 2014, 967). The case law suggests many adjudicators know no conception 
of identity besides the “possession” of one and, in fact, seem possessed by identity as 
an object. Adjudicators’ imaginations fail to understand the ways in which refugees 
have been dispossessed of their identities and freedoms,245 that is, dispossessed of the 
ability to realise a different sexual or gendered life for fear of persecution. The 
essentialist perspectives held by adjudicators further contribute to the reification of 
categories and exclusion of other sexual minorities from seeking asylum. Identity, as 
I argue in this chapter, is not an object that can be possessed, and casting identity as 
immutable can be oppressive even in a case where the immediate result is refugee 
status. The newsworthy case of Aderonke Apata aptly illustrates these intrinsic 
troubles of identity.246 
Aderonke Apata is not a lesbian, at least according to the UK authorities. 
Viewed through an immutable lens that imagines permanence of identity, several 
points of Apata’s claim trouble rigid legal classifications. From Nigeria, Apata first 
claimed asylum in 2004 on the grounds of religion, which failed. Raised Christian, 
she married a Muslim man. Since having been discovered working illegally in 2012, 
she has claimed the marriage was a cover for a long-term lesbian relationship (Dugan 
                                                 
245 Butler (2004, 19) observes on identity that “when we speak about my sexuality or my gender, as we 
do (and as we must) we mean something complicated by it. Neither of these is precisely a possession, 
but both are to be understood as modes of being dispossessed, ways of being for another or, indeed, by 
virtue of another.”  
246 I have chosen this case in particular for the fact it is, literally, newsworthy. Several mainstream 
outlets, LGBT news sites, and activist groups have taken up the banner of Apata’s cause (see e.g. 
Blair 2015; Filar 2015). So the facts of the case are not only topical, the “public outrage” shows 
another aspect of gatekeeping and the assumptions of identity rooted in political discourses. In fact, I 
was first made aware of Apata’s case by an email requesting support for her petition to the 
government (various online petitions garnered tens of thousands of signatures), and later happened 
upon various social media posts by her supporters, e.g. the Asylum for Aderonke Facebook page 
(since removed). 
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2014). When her husband’s family suspected the affair, Apata was taken to a sharia 
court where she was sentenced to death. She managed to escape, though her brother 
and three-year-old child “were killed in related vigilante incidents” (Dugan 2014). 
Her ex-girlfriend was also killed some years later, but the 2012 claim was refused as 
was her 2015 appeal. Moreover, Apata tells The Independent that she submitted 
personal pictures and videos as a last resort to “prove” her sexual orientation (Dugan 
2014; 2015). As discussed in chapter five, reports of asylum seekers going so far as 
to submit sexually explicit evidence in desperation to prove their sexuality 
contributed to a review of Home Office procedures relating to LGB-based claims 
(BBC 2014; Chelvan 2014; Vine 2014); this is no longer permitted (A, B and C 
[2014]; API 2015). 
I revisit Apata’s case later in this chapter. Neither you nor I know if she is a 
lesbian. In fact not even her friends, family, or sexual partners can know her “true” 
sexual orientation. Put simply, an adjudicator might be persuaded to see “truth” in 
either argument (see Sedgwick 2007, xv on “perspectivism”). In spite of the fact that 
she might not be a lesbian, the conclusion I draw below is that she is deserving of 
refugee status on the grounds of norm deviance.  
1.2 Social perception of the PSG: Moving beyond 
immutability 
It appears that the coherence of “LGBT” at a national level within the UK is tenuous 
and fictitious, let alone the notion of a global homogeny of LGBT people.247 
Thinking “strategically,” though, about what we can know about sexual minorities 
globally and what makes “sexual minorities” a distinguishable PSG, the most 
important commonalities are deviance from heterosexual or cisgender hegemonic 
norms and the resulting discrimination or persecution.248 While sexual and gender-
                                                 
247 Discussing the fluidity of identity can be as elucidating as it is obscuring; the purpose of this thesis 
is not to attempt a comprehensive mapping of the noted contingencies. However, the existence of a 
“messy” world of subjective, personal, and interpersonal identities at multiple levels of analysis must 
be acknowledged. Importantly, though, I am not intending to conflate culturally relative categories 
with individual subjectivity, or fluid identities, within particular cultures. 
248 Cisgender (also cissexual and gender normals) is a term connoting one’s gender aligning to the sex 
one was assigned at birth (Schilt and Westbrook 2009). NB people with alternative sexualities (e.g. 
LGB people) can be non-cisgender where applicable (i.e. a trans person could also be LGB). The 
addition of this term intends to highlight the divergent experiences of norm deviance in gender and 
sexuality. I have argued in chapter one that gender identity and sexual orientation are not discrete, but 
also cannot be conflated; the concepts are intricately connected (see e.g. Katyal 2002, 133–136).  
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variant acts and identity are relative, what is shared in common amongst sexual 
minorities is subjection to various levels of discrimination and persecution. What can 
be “known” is the violence against a minority; not only violence against someone 
self-identified as a sexual minority, but also against those who are “perceived” to be 
a sexual minority, or are “unknowable” and discreet in everyday life. To consider 
norm deviance as a more appropriate construct of refugee, I first situate the concept 
in existing debates on interpreting PSG and the problems with the dominant, 
immutable approach to the category, before going on to unpack persecutory intent or 
what is intended by (the threat of) persecution.  
1.2.1 Interpreting PSG: Immutability and social perception 
There is an international consensus in refugee law that prohibits the “circular 
constitution” of a PSG (see chapter four; Appendix II; Aleinikoff 2003, 292–294; 
Türk and Nicholson 2003, 17). This means that Signatories and the UNHCR have 
insisted that “a social group must exist independently of the persecution imposed on 
members of the group” as a limiting principle (Aleinikoff 2003, 286). However it has 
also been widely acknowledged that “while persecutory conduct cannot define the 
social group, the actions of the persecutors may serve to identify or even cause the 
creation of a particular social group in society” (Appellant A [1997], 173) – i.e. it is 
still the perception created of an attribute and not being persecuted that identifies the 
PSG (Aleinikoff 2003, 288; UNHCR 2011b, 94). The social group must not be 
defined by the persecution, because that could “render the other four Convention 
grounds superfluous” (UNHCR 2011b, 92).  
Generally, approaches to the interpretation of PSG have taken two forms: the 
“protected characteristics” or “immutable” approach and the “social perception” 
approach. The “protected characteristics” approach considers whether a group shares 
an immutable characteristic which is so fundamental to their human dignity that they 
cannot change or should not be required to change it (Türk and Nicholson 2003, 17). 
The “social perception” approach considers whether the group shares a common 
characteristic that sets it apart from society as different and makes those individuals 
vulnerable to persecution (Türk and Nicholson 2003, 17). As observed by Baroness 
Hale (para 99) in K and Fornah [2006], “homosexuals can qualify as [a PSG] under 
either approach; but the social perception approach might identify ‘set apart’ groups 
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based on a common characteristic which is neither immutable nor fundamental.” The 
key distinction between social perception and immutability is that social perception 
also protects those asylum seekers who associate for so-called “non-fundamental” 
reasons.   
In 2003 Aleinikoff (2003, 274) suggested the UKHL offered a mix of both 
the immutability and social perception tests, but more often relied on immutability. 
The UKHL further attempted to reconcile these approaches in K and Fornah 
[2006].249 However, as I have argued, HJ and HT [2010] tends toward the 
immutability approach in its language, but also in how it has been applied (see 
chapter four; Hathaway and Pobjoy 2012, 386). I would argue this approach 
contributes to the maintenance of an apparent hierarchy of what (or who) should be 
protected as definitive sets of “protected characteristics.” The analysis in chapters 
four and five suggested UK adjudicators have a tendency to fit claims neatly in the 
Western concepts of the “normal” LGBT rights holder (Weber 2015), which, 
perhaps, maintains a “Charmed Circle” of good refugees to the exclusion of 
perceived sexual and gendered chaos (see Rubin 1993; Wilkinson 2014, 365, 373–
374). Immutability also seems to privilege an overly historical construct of the 
Convention refugee that claimants must fit: the archetypal and still most generally 
accepted “genuine” sexual minority refugee is the gay male activist fleeing political 
oppression (see McGhee 2001b; Lewis 2014, 967).  
However, regardless of identity’s evident contingency, identity claims are 
made in our everyday lives, political struggles, and in legal claims for rights. 
Categories can be liberating as they are debilitating (Young 1990, 47–48; Seidman 
1993, 136). Bearing in mind this disconnect between theories of gender and sexuality 
and the requirements of proof in RSD, one alternative may be “strategic 
essentialism” (Spivak 1988, 205; see also Duggan 1995, 185–186).250 Identity is 
fluid, and yet legal categories entail some degree of reification (Mertz 1994, 1256); 
this incompatibility might be partially rectified by the observation that “[a] strategy 
suits a situation; a strategy is not a theory” (Spivak 1994, 154). That is to say, what is 
                                                 
249 See discussion in K and Fornah [2006], para 11-16, 57-58, 97-101, 113, 118. 
250 Spivak (1994) criticises non-reflexive uses of strategic essentialism, and I do not intend for it to go 
unchecked here. On the contrary, I hope my preference for an anti-essentialist stance (where possible) 
and suggestion of difference or norm deviance in adjudication ideally avoids the ascription of 
categories altogether.  
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true of the social “theory” of identity may not be wholly transferrable to a “strategy” 
for advocacy and decision-making in RSD.  
Still, relying on essentialism as a legal strategy is incompatible with 
constructivist theories of identity, and the analytical findings of this thesis suggest it 
is both detrimental for the individual seeking asylum and that it reifies identity in the 
case law. It is is both possible and necessary to avoid essentialism in the construct of 
refugee (Fuss 1991, 6–7; Duggan 1995, 177). In acknowledging that identity claims 
exist (in the sense of people claiming to “have” identities), it is important to avoid 
adopting the terminology and reasoning that assumes immutability. Norm deviance 
moves the assessment away from immutability and towards a social perception 
approach. 
In the particular context of refugee law, I argue for a social perception 
approach to interpret PSG-based asylum claims. This is crucial, for example, in 
circumstances such as those of many sexual minority asylum seekers from Iran. It 
may be particularly difficult to prove these claimants constitute an “immutable” 
PSG, because sexual minorities are so marginalised and made invisible by the threat 
of persecution in Iranian society that even their very existence has been officially 
denied (Reeves 2009, 219–220). I would argue that the social perception approach 
acknowledges the fact that a social group is often, per Lord Millet’s (174) dissenting 
opinion in Islam and Shah [1999], “an artificial construct called into being to meet 
the exigencies of the case” – even if PSG cannot be a “catch all” (UNHCR 2011b, 
92). The social perception approach is also discussed further in the next chapter in 
relation to persecution and relational autonomy. 
1.2.2 Social perception and persecutory intent 
I turn now to explain how persecutory intent is a key concept of the social perception 
approach being outlined, and argue that the animus of the persecutor should be a 
central focus in the determination of social groups and refugee status. Building on 
Aleinikoff’s (2003) “social perception” approach, the concept of norm deviance 
suggests that gatekeepers need to more thoroughly consider the persecutory intent or 
conduct in RSD. As early as 1966, Grahl-Madsen (1966, 175) argued for persecutory 
conduct to be the benchmark for refugee status, writing, “it is the behaviour of the 
persecutors that determines what persons shall be considered refugees in the legal 
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sense” (cited in McGhee 2001b, 27; see also 26–28). As we will see, emphasising the 
persecutory intent against the PSG unsettles the paradigm case of the “gay” asylum 
seeker. Alternatively, norm deviance allows us to “know” sexual minorities seeking 
asylum, while avoiding the ascription of hierarchical “protected characteristics” in 
RSD. 
Adjudication of the persecutory intent to suppress norm deviance is 
practically achievable within RSD. It allows gatekeepers to affirm diversity of 
gender and sexuality in transnational decision-making on what constitutes a PSG, as 
well as to positively assert the social conditions that would contraindicate 
persecution (see further chapter seven). Persecutory intent and norm deviance must 
be actively assessed through constructive decision-making by those who are 
determining refugee status. And as with all rights claims, we must begin with the 
acknowledgement that RSD requires “social negotiations” that are “situational, 
provisional, or temporary and involve ad hoc discursive strategies” (Seidman 1997, 
41–42).251 
The fundamental problem of a purely identity-based claim to refugee status 
can be likened to Butler’s oft-quoted observation that “[s]ocial categories signify 
subordination and existence at once. In other words, within subjection the price of 
existence is subordination” (Butler 1997, 20; see also Golder 2013, 13–14 on rights 
and subjection). Butler (2004, 31–32) argues that “norms of recognition function to 
produce and deproduce the notion of the human,” and applies this to transnational 
identity and persecution:  
“This is made true in a specific way when we consider how 
international norms work in the context of lesbian and gay human 
rights, especially as they insist that certain kinds of violences are 
impermissible, [and] that certain lives are vulnerable and worthy of 
protection...” (Butler 2004, 31–32; see also 2009, 41–42). 
The very existence of categories of sexual minorities is dependent on international, 
national, and interpersonal norms of recognition at multiple intersections. We must 
                                                 
251 I believe Miller (1999) is rightly critical of ad hoc claims, and suggests that identity-based 
groupings focused on discrimination and privacy are dangerous; however, here I mean to recognise 
that claims in the end must often be framed pragmatically, and in the language of the UK in an asylum 
claim. Possibly, for example, positing that claimants like Apata are lesbians. Nevertheless, I hope that 
the conception of norm deviance, where possible, avoids identity as the basis for inclusion in Article 
1A(2).  
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“first be imagined from somewhere else” before we can consider to imagine 
ourselves or, rather, “I cannot be who I am without drawing upon the sociality of 
norms that precede and exceed me” (Butler 2004, 32; see also Weeks 1995, 102–108; 
Eribon 2004, 56–59; Downie and Llewellyn 2011, 4–6).  
I am not arguing that identity is entirely irrelevant to RSD, but that it should 
be understood differently and defined at least in part by the behaviour of the 
persecutors – the persecutory intent and conduct.252 Generally, though not 
exclusively, what is intended by the persecution of sexual minorities is to sanction 
the deviant norm, because it is perceived as a threat to the normative bounds of 
compulsory heterosexuality in the state or society (see Wilkinson 2014, especially 
365 on “moral sovereignty”). The current gap in protection is that genuine refugees 
may fail to evidence they do indeed “possess” a cognisable identity, and that the 
violence of their dispossession warrants international protection.  
It would be ill-advised to engage in reductivism that makes asylum seekers’ 
identities and rights as individuals the sole focus, because self-definition of identities 
and freedoms is in large part collective (Miller 1999, 291). Yet, at the other extreme, 
to stake a claim to community entails some degree of reification (Sedgwick 1991, 85 
on “incoherence”; Weeks 1995, 104). The challenge is to find a middle way for the 
purposes of RSD (see Aleinikoff 2003, especially 287). This requires locating what 
can be known of the dispossessed in their countries of origin, including the 
deprivation of full personhood and discriminatory rejection from the polity (e.g. 
exclusion from social, political, or economic life) on the grounds of their norm 
deviance.  
1.3 A theory of norm deviance 
The previous section set out the use of norm deviance as a strategy in the context of 
refugee law; here I will outline a theory of the concept and how asylum seekers’ lives 
may have been shaped by discrimination and persecution. This provisional theorising 
of sexual and gender identities and behaviours in persecutory contexts is necessary to 
                                                 
252 Two commenters posed related questions on this point. Briefly, why not simply focus on 
unacceptable practices of persecution rather than social norms at all. A focus on social norms may 
leave out instances of persecution. I agree. Unfortunately, as discussed above, refugee law insists the 
PSG cannot be defined by the persecution. So like the attribute of being left-handed in the example in 
Appellant A [1997], deviance from the norm may be necessary to maintain a nexus under the 
Convention. Thank you to Antony Duff and Luís Duarte d’Almeida for these comments (Olsen 2015).   
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operationalise the legal approach of norm deviance. “Difference,” “stigma,” and 
“taboo” all may be used interchangeably in different contexts to refer descriptively to 
what I mean by “norm deviance” and “norm deviants” in RSD. Difference seems to 
denote the quality of being “other,” stigma often refers to the social status of an 
individual and its effects, and taboo has been used to describe the political dimension 
of social non-conformity. But I also mean something conceptual by norm deviance: 
norm deviance attempts to bridge the gap between sociological and legal 
understandings of sexual minority refugees, so we might better understand an asylum 
claim without impressing LGBT assumptions upon the claimant.253 First, I revisit the 
closet, before considering stigma, and visibility, and conclude that what can be 
known is persecution for the transgression of norms of heterosexuality. 
1.3.1 Closetedness: Norm deviance, visibility, and harm 
For sexual minorities, to “come out of the closet,” to make sexual preferences and 
gender identifications public is necessarily a political act (Weeks 1990; Altman 
1993). I would argue that the term “closet” does not solely apply to sexuality and 
gender identity (e.g. Arendt 1967, 66–67). We all have closets, regardless of gender 
identity or sexual orientation, social status, or geography; “all a closet is, is a hard 
conversation” (Beckham 2013; see also Sedgwick 1991, 68; Katyal 2002, 129–130). 
Stated more analytically: the closet is not gay, but also affects those assumed to be 
members of a sexual minority by their appearance, lifestyle, or other stigma that 
might wrongfully identify them. Sedgwick (1991) and Foucault (1990) affirm that 
there are many silences; closetedness itself is not binary, but is instead a “speech act 
of…silence” which occurs in “fits and starts, in relation to the discourse that 
surrounds and differently constitutes it” (Sedgwick 1991, 3).  
For a sexual minority, the consequences of disclosure or their previously 
unacknowledged status becoming public, can vary significantly depending on 
various intersections of sex (as assigned), age, race, class among other statuses and, 
particular for our purpose here, country of origin. Of course the consequences of 
“coming out” can also lead to harm. The link between the “closet” or “discretion” 
and persecution is described by the HCA (para 43) in S395 as “the threat of serious 
                                                 
253 See generally Davies and Harré (1990, 51) on typification; Duggan (1995, 192–193) on dissent; 
Eribon (2004, 15–17) on insult.   
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harm with its menacing implications that constitutes the persecutory conduct” (see 
also Sedgwick 1991, 68; Gray and McDowall 2013, 22). Here, I examine the 
discriminatory effects on the everyday lives of sexual minorities to contextually 
develop the theory of norm deviance. 
Goffman (1968) famously analysed stigma, and some of this work might 
provide some initial groundwork from a symbolic interaction standpoint for 
conceptualising norm deviance. Charting the etymology of stigma, Goffman (1968, 
11) tells us the term originated in reference “to bodily signs to expose something 
unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier.” It was designed to expose 
people in public as slaves, criminals, and traitors; medicine later used the term to 
describe physical disorders; and today stigma “is applied more to the disgrace itself 
than to the bodily evidence of it” (Goffman 1968, 11; see also Sedgwick 1991, 75; 
Urla and Terry 1995, 1–3). Importantly, the definition of stigma suggests society 
considers that the individual “with a stigma is not quite human” (Goffman 1968, 15; 
see also Cowan 2009, 114 on gender and personhood; Sheill 2009, 55). Stigma 
describes the status of a person that might provoke persecutory intent, but further 
consideration is needed of how an asylum seeker’s life is complicated by it and 
results in their being persecuted. 
Tebble (2011) elaborates how the “ethic of unacknowledgeability” 
complicates and transcends public and private distinctions around sexuality (see also 
Sedgwick 1991, 69–71 on judicial formulations of “public” and “private”). The 
“closet,” specifically, in Tebble’s theory is understood to be a notion within 
unacknowledgeability that is a “more general operation of norms of physical 
disappearance and discursive silence which together constitute homosexuality’s 
governing taboo ethic” (Tebble 2011, 922). Tebble’s definition of taboo, like stigma, 
contributes to an understanding of norm deviance in the present context: “taboo [is] 
the status of social practices that are considered not only to be unacceptable, 
forbidden, and hidden from view, but also…undiscussable in the vast majority of 
circumstances” (Tebble 2011, 921; see also Millbank 2005, 120; 2009a). These 
taboos are brought to the fore in the asylum process (e.g. Johnson 2011, 70–71). 
Research has shown particular difficulties in disclosing sexual orientation in the first 
instance of claiming asylum, and later in discussing personal histories. It is suggested 
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that all of these difficulties are compounded by cultural and linguistic barriers (see 
e.g. Johnson 2011 on silence; Baillot et al. 2012 on sexual violence, especially 281–
288; Bennett and Thomas 2013, 26; Ferreira 2015, 419). I turn now to apply these 
insights to a theory of norm deviance. 
1.3.2 Transgressing norms and uncertain risks of being persecuted 
In countries that are anxious of non-conformity and where sexual minorities are 
persecuted, the taboo can itself make norm deviance invisible or even inhibit its very 
possibility. The effect is that the threat of persecution can actually limit the available 
evidence of a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Consider RM and BB [2005] 
where expert evidence was given that “[h]omosexuality is a taboo subject in Iran and 
the family and friends of persons convicted of homosexual offences are extremely 
unlikely to campaign or publicise a conviction owing to the social stigma” (para 36). 
Moreover, although the country of origin information (COI) in that appeal suggests 
that it is reasonably likely Appellant E would have been at risk, adjudicators became 
preoccupied with whether E had committed an offence by participating in an explicit 
sex education video. But the real question of persecution here, as elsewhere, has less 
to do with the letter of the law than the indeterminate scope of harm and arbitrary 
violence that may be inflicted by state and non-state persecutors – the menacing risk 
of harm which silences – closets – the norm deviance.      
As a result of a taboo, the dominant position of “normals” may be expressed 
through quiet disapproval, verbal and physical harassment and violence as means to 
ensure conformity to expectations of behaviour and appearance in the (symbolic and 
literal) policing of public spaces (Eribon 2004, 16, 46–47; Tebble 2011, 926; O’Neill 
and Bliss 2014).254 The norm deviance of sexual minorities is engendered by public 
stigma and private shame in everyday life that teaches moderation, that is, when to 
be unknowable in situations of unacknowledgeablility (Tebble 2011, 931). Both 
cisgender heterosexuals and norm deviants often cooperate to keep “the Love that 
                                                 
254 This “normal” person is a simplification: it may be in certain circumstances, for instance, that 
widely shared norms in a society are not in fact persecutory but that a sexual minority is subjected to 
persecution by a minority, perhaps to which the asylum seeker also belongs, for breaking the social 
norms of that community. But regardless of whether the persecutory intent to suppress deviance is 
widely shared in that society, the relevant question still concerns the insufficiency or failure of state 
protection in relation to the asylum seeker being persecuted for their behaviour or identity, i.e. norm 
deviance. Thanks to Luís Duarte d’Almeida for his insight in a discussion of the draft (Olsen 2015). 
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dare not speak its name” (Douglas 1894/1984) hidden from view (Sedgwick 1991, 
67–69). While it is often already an open secret, accepting the existence of the stigma 
or taboo is dependent on the context, in addition to the great range of consequences 
that could result from the norm deviance being acknowledged (see Goffman 1968, 
155; Sedgwick 1991, 77–78 on unknowing; Eribon 2004, 53–55). 
Sexual and gender identities are in some ways shaped by the insults, trans- 
and homo-phobia confronted in the process of self-making (see Sedgwick 1991, 80, 
89–90; Eribon 2004, xviii). The ethics of taboo, difference, stigma, or norm deviance 
may be found in common with both domestic and foreign groups of sexual 
minorities. The deviance from social norms may result in everyday “low level” 
discrimination to discriminatory persecution at the other extreme (see Butler 2004, 
34).255 However, in states such as the UK there are meaningful opportunities 
available not to be discreet about one’s non-conforming gender or sexuality, and the 
state is willing and able to protect sexual minorities from discrimination and 
violence.  
 Persecutory states perpetrate or are complicit in, through lack of criminal 
prosecution and legal protections, the discriminatory persecution of sexual minority 
refugees. Persecution of sexual minorities is directly linked to their transgression of 
social norms, and usually those norms that relate to gender and the prescribed 
lifestyle of a given culture (see Katyal 2002, 142–145; LaViolette 2007; Millbank 
2009b, 25–26 on UNHCR Guidance). Deviance, transgressing those gender norms, 
invites violence ranging from casual insults to harassment and death. So the 
psychology of the persecutor – persecutory intent – is necessarily implicated in the 
well-founded fear of an asylum seeker and the PSG (see Aleinikoff 2003, 272, 279–
280, 293–294; see also Sedgwick 1991, 18–21 on “homosexual panic;” Eribon 2004, 
15 on “insult”). Sexual minority refugees are disciplined by state or non-state actors, 
“[preceding] from the anxious and rigid belief that a sense of the world and a sense 
of the self will be radically undermined” by the norm deviance (Butler 2004, 34; see 
also 2006, 208; Arendt 1967, 300–301; Terry 1995, 159; Wilets 1997, 1006, 1049).  
                                                 
255 However, I do not mean to suggest this could be assessed along a continuum, but is linked to 
complex circumstances of a particular case. 
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2 The knowability of norm deviance 
Having defined norm deviance and situated the concept in refugee law, I turn now to 
consider how the concept decentres the assumption of a knowable identity. One’s 
“immutable” identity or “inner truth” cannot be known, but necessarily manifests 
itself in behaviour – both of the persecutor and persecuted – that can be observed. 
Norm deviance shows that what is knowable is that sexual and gender identity is 
linked to behaviour, and that refugees are persecuted by an inability to be themselves 
and/or because they have been (made) visible. In both instances the threat of being 
persecuted deprives sexual minorities of the ability to actualise non-conforming 
gender or sexuality.  
An approach that focuses on understanding the persecutory intent to suppress 
the norm deviance of the asylum seeker is more appropriate and sensitive to the 
challenges faced by sexual minorities claiming asylum. The evidence of a well-
founded fear, including social ostracism, vigilante justice, and criminal prohibitions 
(e.g. laws proscribing acts, identities, expression, and association) substantiates a 
claim to refugee status. The question should not be “is an individual ‘gay enough?’” 
but, rather, “is a sexual minority at risk of persecutory treatment?” Determination 
should consider how deviance from social norms, namely compulsory 
heterosexuality, may result in discriminatory persecution rather than focus on the 
protection of particular identities. The final part of this chapter, then, considers 
contradictory constraints in the definition of PSG, examples of how norm deviance is 
more appropriate, and concludes with thoughts on the way forward. 
2.1 Immutability and double binds 
An analysis of previous applications of case law has shown that even subtle 
assumptions of essential, immutable, or inborn identity-based categories are 
damaging (see chapter four). Before considering a series of double binds that have 
led to the refusal of sexual minority claims, we must first consider the dominant 
approach to RSD – immutability – in this context, because I argue it has led to these 
exclusions. As proponents of protected characteristics, Hathaway and Pobjoy (2012) 
argue that the protection of gay refugees should be limited to behaviour that is 
supposedly integral to their “immutable” identity. Responding to Aleinikoff’s paper 
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that identifies the immutability and social perception approaches, and favours the 
latter, Hathaway had previously proposed a hypothetical “social group” of persecuted 
roller-bladers, and argued that it would be more “reasonable” for them to “take off 
their skates” than to be granted refugee status for “non-fundamental” behaviour (see 
Aleinikoff 2003, 299). Aleinikoff refuted Hathaway’s immutability critique from a 
social perception standpoint: is the asylum seeker at risk of persecution, however 
“unreasonable” the asylum seeker’s actions? These approaches will be further 
considered in the next chapter in relation to persecution, and I will argue the social 
perception standpoint is the correct one. The relevance of the distinction between the 
two approaches here is that by adopting Hathaway’s approach to defining the scope 
of conduct relevant to an identity arbitrarily limits Convention protection. The notion 
of “immutable” identities and basing refugee protection on fixed sets of so-called 
“reasonable” characteristics and behaviours has excluded sexual minorities. In 
refugee law, the immutability approach inevitably “codifies an excruciating system 
of double binds, systematically oppressing gay people, identities, and acts by 
undermining through contradictory constraints on discourse the grounds of their very 
being” (Sedgwick 1991, 70; see also Johnson 2011, 62–63).  
A number of double binds have constrained sexual minority asylum claims 
from 1999 to the present. It was necessary at one time to be “out” in the country of 
origin to form a successful claim, which was often coupled with the discretion 
requirement and/or an internal relocation alternative to avoid persecution.256 Further 
to being “out,” a claimant might have been expected to express a desire to live a 
political life versus a quiet private life and to show a willingness to transgress the 
taboo regardless of the possible consequences (see chapters four and five). Yet, other 
claimants that had not been discreet but “out” or taken “risks” were found not to be 
credible (see Millbank 2009b, 20–21; UKLGIG 2010, 9). Chief Inspector Vine’s 
(2014, 21–22) review of Home Office practice includes a case study and partial 
excerpt from a transcript in which the applicant’s evidence was “tested” and 
disbelieved on the basis of the context of past sexual activity. According to the report 
it remains “important to test the credibility of the applicant’s evidence of what 
appeared to have been behaviour that risked discovery, knowing the impact in his 
                                                 
256 See further chapters four and five.  
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country of being discovered” (Vine 2014, 22; see also Schutzer 2012, 696 on how 
this creates a catch-22). In other words, the current credibility test asserts that a 
credible asylum seeker would have avoided any risk of discovery, and been 
invariably discreet to avoid the persecution from which they are seeking asylum.  
Adjudicators have favoured claimants from countries that enforce anti-
sodomy laws to establish an “objective” well-founded fear, which has compounded 
the invisibility of women who are not subjected to as many formal legal prohibitions 
globally (see further HDT 2016). Yet, at the same time asylum seekers may have 
been pressed in questioning as to why they were gay if it was illegal in the country of 
origin (see Bennett and Thomas 2013, 26). Asylum seekers have been required to 
support their self-identification with tangible evidence like pictures or love letters 
that, when available, could be disbelieved as implausible and fabricated (Millbank 
2009b, 17). Finally, there is a contradiction in the most recent controversy of asylum 
seekers feeling compelled, like Apata, to submit evidence containing graphic, 
intimate, private materials to “prove” their claimed public identities (Chelvan 2014; 
Dugan 2014); as we have seen, one does not necessarily follow from the other. These 
double binds, the systemic lag between law and social theory of gender/sexuality, 
and the failure of practice to constructively adapt to the changing realities of refugee 
protection call for a more radical, de-essentialised framework. 
UK practice is evolving, most recently with Chief Inspector Vine’s (2014) 
report and subsequent updates to UKVI Asylum Policy Instructions (2015), both 
produced in cooperation with stakeholders (see also Gray and McDowall 2013, 23–
24). For example, Chelvan (2014) has advocated for a framework of difference, 
stigma, shame, and harm (DSSH), rather than identity as such, to assess LGBTI 
asylum claims, and Vine (2014) cites this formulation. There are parallels between 
what I have outlined and Chelvan’s framework, and DSSH is undoubtedly a valuable 
tool for gatekeepers, and a strong critique of the failings of UK adjudication (see also 
LaViolette 2007). However, neither DSSH nor the updated UKVI Asylum Policy 
Instructions (2015) depart radically enough from the assumptions of universal “gay” 
identities or casts a broad enough net for the protection of potentially vulnerable 
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persons.257 Stressing the immutability of identity claims to any degree may incur 
future limits to the PSG. 
2.2 Norm deviance in context 
This section uses several “real world” examples to explore the application of norm 
deviance, and illustrate how it can help identify a knowable yet still fluid social 
group, thus allowing for the reality of many people’s experiences to be recognised 
within RSD. The first example, asexuality, attempts to expose the conflict between 
individual and community-focused notions of sexual orientation, and how we are 
dispossessed of our “own” identities. The expression of gender is the second example 
that problematises definitive, set limits to an asylum seeker’s conduct when 
considering whether they should be protected by PSG. Finally, I argue that RSD 
must accommodate how acts and identities are imagined and practiced.  
2.2.1 Reading in omissions: Asexuality, celibacy, and situational 
sexuality 
Not unlike other sexual minorities, asexuals and celibates subvert compulsory 
heterosexuality, and so deviance from heterosexual norms may result in persecution 
in an asexual case too. Discretion or concealment on return has often been coupled 
with an assumption that celibacy would prevent persecution, from Binbasi in 1989 
until HJ and HT (para 63, 92) in 2010 (Tuitt 1996, 37; Millbank 2012, 503–504).258 
However, if a cisgender person with a norm-deviant sexual orientation (or non-
orientation) was to return and practice life-long abstinence (willingly or unwillingly), 
the difficulties in conforming to norms of marriage and spousal cohabitation may 
result in discriminatory persecution. It is highly problematic if RSD dismisses as 
                                                 
257 My criticism here is more directed at a general legal perspective that apparently requires 
consequentialist reasoning, whereas I have situated this research outside this system and can thus be 
more critical. However, for example, when Chelvan (2014) speaks as a gay barrister of wanting a 
more feminine birthday cake when he was a child, and Millbank (2012) writes that behaviour reveals 
an identity, it seems to me these positions play into the hand of current judicial thinking on “finding” 
something that is and has always been there, or at least they do not seem to question the myth of 
essentialism (see further chapter seven). That is, those arguments seem to parallel Vine’s (2014, 19–
20) analysis of RSD, finding an “inner truth” and how that has been “realised,” as opposed to my own 
argument for the process of becoming a sexual minority, and the factors that affect the choice to so 
become.  
258 While asexuality is distinct from celibacy, for the “functional” purposes of refugee law this 
comparison still seems advantageous as part of a “pragmatic discursive strategy.” The blurring of the 
distinction seems useful to draw attention to often invisible, but very real, asexual people who are 
likely suffering in silence.    
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relevant the absence of a choice to deviate from the norms of compulsory 
heterosexuality without fear of persecution, or for that matter, if it assumes that the 
burdens of acquiescing to those norms in order to avoid persecution are merely an 
inconvenience.  
 The observation that “[i]t takes two women, not one, to make a lesbian” (de 
Lauretis 1991, 232 cited in Weeks 1995, 103) also extends to asexuality as an 
identity that cannot be constituted individually. Butler (2004, 33) observes that “we 
are outside ourselves as sexual beings, given over from the start, crafted in primary 
relations of dependency and attachment” which are “coextensive with our existence” 
(see also Sedgwick 1991, 81; Eribon 2004, xvii). Identities are mutable, situational, 
and characterised by discourses of relations that define or constitute their very 
existence. One’s identity can be influenced by the context such as the particular time 
and place, knowledge or unknowing of the identity, and subjection to power such as 
in the fear of violence (see McGhee 2001b, 21 on “discourse”). The absence of 
sexual desire must also be valid as part of the normative aspiration for full sexual 
minority inclusion within the PSG category. To be asexual requires socially defining 
oneself against others with sexual orientations, and possibly learning from other 
asexuals in self-definition.259 Even as a hypothetical, the circumstances and 
implications of asexuality are relevant to RSD.260 
In particular, here the notion of choice allows us to contrast the desire to be 
asexual with being forced by one’s circumstances into a celibate or heterosexual life. 
In the case of Aderonke Apata, evidence of a previous marriage as well as the 
existence of her child, were used to discredit the claim that she was a lesbian. On 
appeal to the High Court, the barrister for the Home Office explained Apata had 
“indulged in same-sex activity,” but “[y]ou can’t be a heterosexual one day and a 
lesbian the next day” (Dugan 2015). Even post-HJ and HT, RSD has failed to 
                                                 
259 Social media and communication technologies underline the organic nature of many sexual 
minority “communities.” A prominent example of the asexual community is the organisation and web 
resource AVEN <www.asexuality.org> (Tucker 2011; Carrigan and Falconer 2015). Anecdotally it 
seems that many asylum seekers are looking for a freedom to love – to be given over to others fully, 
romantically. However, that observation is not meant to assert an ideal (see also Miller 1999, 295–296 
on “good sexuality”). 
260 i.e. I am not aware of a reported or unreported case regarding the asylum claim of a self-identified 
asexual. Chelvan (2014) briefly defends his position from an asexuality critique, and Vine’s (2014, 
26) report mentions asexuality in passing and notes the case of a Jamaican woman who was “not 
straight enough,” but the case itself does not directly address asexuality. See also SW [2011].   
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grapple with situational heterosexuality, whereas the spectacle of situational 
homosexuality, for example in prisons and pornography, has been given ample 
consideration in academic and popular discourses (see Halley 1988, 941–946; 
McIntosh 1992; Duggan 1995, 156). While the latter can be said to exist, the former 
has been made into a serious issue of credibility in RSD. Moreover, the invisibility of 
bisexuality is compounded by the entrenchment of the hetero/homo binary as an 
issue of credibility (Rehaag 2009; Duffy 2015; chapter four of this thesis).  
As discussed in chapter one, in particular, sexual identities cannot be inferred 
exclusively from an instance or instances of stereotypically associated sexual acts 
(Halperin 1990; Padgug 1992, 58; Whitehead 1993; Naqvi 2014). Situational 
sexuality sheds doubt on what exactly sexual images and other explicit evidence – 
the presentation of which constitutes a gross violation of human dignity – can 
prove.261 Failing to fully consider the implications of compulsory and situational 
heterosexuality can be particularly damaging to women because of their dependent 
status in certain countries (see also Sheill 2009, 62–65 on women and privacy; 
UKLGIG 2010, especially 6; HDT 2016).  
2.2.2 Gender and other expressions of identity 
There are many more figurations of sex, gender, and sexuality than can be condensed 
into the male/female and gay/straight binaries. That includes variations within 
heterosexuality and homosexuality that are manifested in the expression of what we 
feel about our bodies, sexualities, and how we relate to one another. A majority of 
people are cisgender and still many others identify within the established sex/gender 
binary, but a more ethical and comprehensive approach is possible in order to 
account for others that claim not to have or seek to challenge gender norms.262 The 
predominant binary notions of male/female as either/or in gender identity needs to 
accommodate the both/neither lived realities of many gender-variant individuals 
(Cowan 2009, 100–104). Everyone should have a right to self-determination of 
gender; this means an opportunity to resist binary categories, even if it is not possible 
                                                 
261 See e.g. A, B, and C [2014]. 
262 Consider “freedom not to hold and not to have to express opinions” (Lord Dyson in RT and KM 
[2012], para 32) as a principle of freedom of thought, opinion, and expression enumerated in the 
UDHR (Articles 18 and 19), ICCPR (Article 18), and ECHR (Articles 9-10). See also RT and KM, 
para 32-36, and Aleinikoff (2003, 269–271) on thought and association. See further chapter seven. 
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to escape them (Butler 2006; 2014; Cowan 2009, 111–112), and the choice to 
identify as non-binary or genderqueer among others, such as the increasingly 
recognised third gender options as equally valid to assigned or self-identified “man” 
or “woman” labels (Halley 1993, 99; Katyal 2002, 136–142). The urgency of reading 
gender diversity into PSG determinations is evidenced in a global trend toward 
gender-inclusion; for example, the Supreme Court of India decided the “third 
gender” option was a human rights issue (Feder 2014),263 and there have also been 
legislative changes such as Germany’s controversial “indeterminate” birth certificate 
option (Agius 2013; Viloria 2013).  
Like sexuality, gender expression may result in persecution through the intent 
to eliminate the norm deviance. Such norms are constituted at least in part through 
compulsory heterosexuality and the “complementary” binaries discussed above. For 
example, what if a transgender individual in Iran did not wish for medical 
intervention against their body? Iran represents a somewhat peculiar, and uniquely 
violent, form of compulsory heterosexuality for someone to fit the cisgender, 
morphological ideal of the state and, purportedly, Islam, in that it requires trans 
people and other sexual minorities to undergo surgery or face prosecution for 
homosexuality; that is, to refuse the state’s demand that trans people undergo surgery 
is to deviate from the prescribed masculine and feminine norms, possibly resulting in 
persecution or even death. Needless to say, this has resulted in the coercion of some 
individuals into sex reassignment rather than what we might call gender confirmation 
surgery (Eshaghian 2008; Bach 2013, 35–36; Jansen 2013, 19; McFarland 2014).264  
In this example we can see that self-determination of one’s gender or 
sexuality can be enabled or constrained by the state and society, and so it may not 
have been possible for an asylum seeker to reject a norm in the country of origin (see 
further chapter seven). There are critical “historical, social, political, and economic 
conditions under which particular actions and identities become available, thinkable, 
                                                 
263 See National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) v Union of India and others [Writ Petition (Civil) 
No. 400 of 2012], para 62: “[A]ll citizens shall have the right to expression of his self-identified 
gender. Self-identified gender can be expressed through dress, words, action or behaviour or any other 
form. No restriction can be placed on one’s personal appearance or choice of dressing.” 
264 Sex reassignment is used here to denote the violation of an individual’s bodily autonomy or 
integrity against their felt gender or without their consent such as, for example, the case of intersex 
children before they are able to consent. Gender confirmation, on the other hand, refers to a medical 
process of configuring the body with gender identity (i.e. an affirmative term, unlike the former).  
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liveable, and desirable – and, conversely, unthinkable, unliveable, and undesirable” 
(Luibhéid 2005b, 70). In other words, the possibility of being and existing as a sexual 
minority is in some ways dependent on the absence of a fear of persecution, and the 
persecutor’s intention to eliminate deviance in that society or make it invisible (see 
Shidlo and Ahola 2013, 10).  
Control over one’s body must include presentation as much as morphology 
and sexual pleasure. Dress and other presentations in the physical spaces people 
share are critical to an individual’s internal, psychic existence (Bach 2013, 35). Our 
appearances are not only “private” matters of choice. Public expression of gender 
and sexuality is equally important to rights of privacy in the attainment of full 
citizenship (Stychin 1995; 1998; Katyal 2002, 145–148), to count as human without 
fear of discriminatory persecution. For example, clothing can be crucial to 
expressions of individuality, community, gender, sexuality, religion, and other social 
symbolisms (see e.g. Millbank 2012, 513–514). More than an expression of one’s 
self, clothes are speech, “can be a political statement, and can evoke a political 
response” (Weeks 1995, 150). Clothes “are a form of self-expression” which can 
bring us into conflict with others (Hall 1928/2008, 76) because they “change our 
view of the world and the world’s view of us” (Woolf 1928/2008, 120).265 
Restrictions on the public expression of identity are always political and may 
constitute a well-founded fear of persecution.  
2.2.3 Individual subjectivity and the implications for RSD 
RSD must be flexible and attentive to the axiom that “[p]eople are different from 
each other” (Sedgwick 2007, 22). Except in keeping with the requirement of Article 
1A(2) that the risk of persecution must be on the grounds of a Convention category 
such as PSG, approaching determination from the perspective of norm deviance does 
not impose forms of identity to the legal construct of a “gay” refugee and thus better 
accounts for individual subjectivity. By subjectivity I mean an individual’s 
“particular perspective, feelings, beliefs, and desires” (Solomon 2005) pertaining to 
their gender or sexuality (see also Jamieson and Simpson 2013, 12–15). Challenging 
the boundaries of who should be protected by refugee law, what is cognisable to 
adjudicators, indeed, what it is possible to know, requires the de-essentialisation of 
                                                 
265 See e.g. B [2007], para 11 on behaviour and clothes. 
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categories to imagine and empathise with the multifaceted, legitimate desires of 
asylum seekers whose deviance from established sets of norms may result in 
persecution (Miller 1999, 299). It should be insufficient to say “this asylum seeker is 
a lesbian” if that category does not reflect the person’s own needs, thoughts, feelings, 
and fear of persecution. Instead, a decision-making framework must account for the 
infinite possibilities of gender, sexuality, and asylum seekers’ subjectivity.  
A problematic assumption of adjudicators is that sexual categorisation can 
determine fixed, empirical facts about a person’s identity based on a natural given. 
Alternatively, I argue that RSD must account for figments of gender and sexuality 
that are (or can become) acts and identities with a diverse array of meanings (and 
legitimacy) in an asylum seeker’s “immutable” life (see Sedgwick 2007, xvi).266 The 
process of determination can be conceptualised differently to account for this by 
acknowledging fantasy, the imaginary domain, and recognising that subjectivity is 
inaccessible to avoid the present fixation upon an LGBT PSG. 
An individual’s subjectivity, identity and behaviour, is bound to fantasy – 
“fantasy is part of the articulation of the possible; it moves us beyond what is merely 
actual and present into a realm of possibility, the not yet actualized or the not 
actualisable” (Butler 2004, 28). Cornell’s (1995; 2003) “imaginary domain” 
stipulates that people require access to imagine themselves as whole persons as an 
aspect of human integrity (bodily, sexual, and so on). Lacey (1998, 120) argues that 
the imaginary domain is impossible to achieve fully in practice, yet crucial to the 
“on-going project of personhood.” As Lacey (1998, 120) writes, “[t]here is an 
asymmetry in the imaginary domain: it cannot be captured or realized by institutions, 
but it can be killed or closed off by them.” In this case, the persecutory intent to 
impose compulsory heterosexuality inhibits one’s ability to deviate from the 
prescribed norms, to imagine and embody a life as a sexual minority; and the 
determination of “protected characteristics” can kill or close off the refugee’s 
subjectivity too. 
                                                 
266 As argued in the next chapter, “figments” of gender and sexuality, beliefs about one’s self, 
behaviour, and the PSG, whether real or imaginary, may gain legitimacy from a juxtaposition with 
“immutable” religious beliefs and practice protections in international, European, and UK refugee law 
(see Miller 1999, 301). 
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Predetermined “protected characteristics” are not only difficult (or 
impossible) to prove as “immutable,” but are also out of touch with the epistemology 
of identity (see Aleinikoff 2003, 297–298 on “external factors;” Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam 2007, 80). To conceptualise which protected characteristics are 
“fundamental,” the adjudicator must impose a particular form or stereotypical ideal 
in order to define who is deserving of protection, which is ethically problematic; and 
this approach does not address how one is to determine the distinction between the 
protected “identity” and the relevant “conduct.” Take for example a sexual sub-
culture. Are individuals that identify with dom, sub, SM, BDSM or other “kink 
labels” among others not deserving of protection from persecution? (see Walker 
2000, 65–66). Should these norm deviants be required to change their behaviour 
even if they find it integral to their full sexual and life fulfilment? This particular 
“kink” in sexual behaviour and communities of norm deviants also blurs the 
heterosexual-homosexual binary that predominates activist and legal discourse (see 
Miller 1999, 290 on heterosexual nonconformity).  
An immutable approach constructs hierarchies of sexual identity and 
behaviour, presupposing that one act or orientation is more important than others 
deemed “trivial” (see Sedgwick 1991, 8–9 on “gender of object choice”). I would, 
perhaps too idealistically, hope that such a hierarchy of (consensual) desires is 
untenable even in the legal context of refugee status.267 Yet, in practice, a legal 
strategy may require some “consensus on what constitutes acceptable behaviour” 
(Weeks 1995, 64). So, if sexual minorities are to be as free as heterosexuals (Lord 
Rodger in HJ and HT, para 78), and if some asylum claims may require taking 
“national legislation as a yardstick” (UNHCR 2011b, 14), the consensus may be that 
only kinks or sexualised behaviours that do not result in bodily harm are permissible, 
which is consistent with UK case law.268 However, the distinctions between harm 
and eroticism in UK jurisprudence are problematic and ambiguous (Cowan 2010). 
UK refugee law seems equally ambiguous on this issue between so-called “core” and 
                                                 
267 See e.g. Millbank (2012, especially 515) on integral/marginal conduct; Hathaway (in Aleinikoff 
2003, 299) on “roller-bladers;” Rubin (1993) on the “Charmed Circle.” 
268 This approach appears to be consistent with the 2004 Qualification Directive according to the 
CJEU: “only homosexual acts which are criminal in accordance with the national law of the Member 
States are excluded from its scope” (X, Y, and Z [2013], para 76). See further the UKHL decision in R 
v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 on consent and bodily harm. 
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“marginal” breaches of human rights. This ambiguity likely stems from the 
contradiction highlighted by Tobin (2012, 472), that drawing upon human rights law 
can be problematic in that its discourse “makes no distinction between serious and 
non-serious human rights violations.” On the other hand, the consensus in refugee 
law is that not all rights violations are persecutory. However, if we reframe 
persecution as regards to its intent, to suppress or eliminate norm deviance, perhaps 
there is scope for inclusion.269  
Discriminatory persecution must be “sustained and systemic” according to 
widely accepted standards, and a useful illustration of the effect is that “the ‘normal’ 
relationship between state and citizen” is “ruptured” (Anker 2005, 118). That 
breakdown leaves the refugee “fundamentally marginalized, unable to enjoy basic 
rights, or vindicate them through change or restructuring from within her society” 
(Anker 2005, 118; see also Hathaway 1991, 135–136). It is in this sense that fantasy 
and the ideal of the imaginary domain have implications for good judgment, in 
allowing decision makers to understand the relationships between the asylum 
seeker’s self, identities, or norm deviance and the resulting persecution; in short, how 
ruptures may result in their dispossession (see Nedelsky 2001a, 114; 2001b, 241). 
Similarly to Young’s (1990, 40) definition of the oppressed, the dispossessed “suffer 
some inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their capacities and express 
their needs, thoughts, and feelings.” To adjudicate asylum claims of the dispossessed 
is to understand that the process of becoming one’s self is intangible and indefinite, 
but is one that profoundly affects the embodiment of autonomy, belonging, dignity, 
and integrity. In line with this body of social theory, I conclude that gender and 
sexuality are psychic, inaccessible, and conditional “truths,” only knowable through 
self-determination and yet reliant on the affirmation of others. The challenge is to 
“[map] out different values” of “autonomy, relationships, of belonging, of difference 
and diversity” in a process, such as RSD, so that “change can happen” (Weeks 1995, 
100). I revisit this in the next chapter. 
                                                 
269 See Lord Dyson in RT and KM [2012], para 51; see also para 47-52, especially 49 on “sado-
masochistic acts.” 
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3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, norm deviance that results in persecution should be protected by 
refugee status, and a PSG for the purposes of refugee status could be constituted 
from well-founded fear of persecution as a result of norm deviance. The importance 
of advocating the choice and mutability of norm deviance is not an esoteric 
consideration, but a pressing concern for the protection of genuine refugees. An 
adequate framework cannot rely on the “born this way” liberal mantra, using “gay-
positive” biology which implicitly links sexual orientation and gender identity to a 
determinative feature of the body or psyche (Terry 1995, 160–161). A successful 
claim on immutable grounds requires having to justify the permanence of the asylum 
seeker’s identity (Millbank 2009b, 15–16),270 entertain the coherence of the social 
group (see Davies and Harré 1990, 58–59),271 and/or pretend to the ideals of the 
nearest-dominant subject position (e.g. L, G, B or T) relative to their norm deviance 
to form a successful claim (see Davies and Harré 1990, 46).272 Finally, I would stress 
again the grey area between norm deviance and the persecution where they may be 
mutually constitutive, and that one informs the other (Young 1990, 47; Eribon 2004, 
18–19).  
What is “true” of Aderonke Apata’s claim is not that she is a lesbian – though 
she may be. Like all identities, the meaning of lesbianism is fluid, contingent, and 
subject to the personal experience of the claimant, including discourses that define 
and differently constitute the identity such as the persecutory intent to enforce 
conformity. Apata is a norm deviant who has avowed non-normative same-sex 
relationships and, at least situationally, has evidenced same-sex relations that would 
                                                 
270 Such as in the case of Apata, whose life is riddled with so-determined evidence of heterosexuality 
and, therefore, her present self-identification was disbelieved (Dugan 2015). Apata could not be a real 
lesbian. 
271 In spite of the apparently settled fact that the coherence of the social group is no longer an explicit 
pre-requisite to a PSG-based claim (see Islam and Shah), I would note that the implicit reasoning of 
coherence arises in the justification that “I” am one of “them” (see Sedgwick 1991, 79). How do you 
know you are a lesbian? What gay bars have you frequented? The questioning of evidence necessarily 
invokes coherence, even if to a lesser extent than more traditional interpretations of PSG. 
272 Again, while I acknowledge that the imperative of gatekeepers to ensure the acceptance of a 
genuine claim may require strategic essentialism, and that such an outcome is just, I mean here to 
critique the framing of the issue to find a more constructive way forward through norm deviance. But 
gatekeepers should consider the “epistemological authority to know what (and who)” (Halley 1993, 
88) as “constructivism in practice” (Sweeney 2007), viewing strategic essentialism with a focus on 
how a person, not what (or who), is a genuine refugee. In other words, establishing identity and 
persecution should focus on how the evidence or facts are made true by gatekeepers, rather than what 
is simply true or false.   
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place her at risk of persecution in Nigeria. Apata was dispossessed in Nigeria, unable 
to actualise needs, thoughts, feelings, and desires without transgressing compulsory 
heterosexuality and risking persecution. Who or what asylum seekers are or do that 
sets them apart as a PSG is a necessary nexus to the Convention. However, the 
inquiry must also consider how they have been deprived of the very opportunities to 
deviate from compulsory heterosexuality due to the threat of persecution. The next 
chapter considers how relational autonomy enables us to imagine ourselves 
otherwise – to identify and practice different ways of being sexual and performing 
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Chapter Seven – Relational autonomy, 
embodied rights, and the judgment of 
persecution 
While the previous chapter considered norm deviance as a way of identifying sexual 
minority refugee claims under “PSG,” this chapter develops a framework for 
defining the conditions to realise a life free of persecution. It does so by developing 
the theory of relational autonomy in the context of RSD: a relational autonomy 
approach requires consideration of the positive conditions for human flourishing, and 
the assessment of persecution resulting from norm deviance and dispossession.  The 
infringement of relational autonomy constitutes a threat to life and liberty, and is 
persecutory. In this chapter, I argue that it is the persecutory intent to deprive a 
person of rights to relate which may constitute a well-founded fear of persecution. I 
offer both a conceptual explanation of relational autonomy and consider how it may 
be applied in the judgment of persecution. 
Part one considers how relational autonomy is necessary for the concept of 
norm deviance to be meaningfully operationalised. To illustrate the theory in 
practice, this chapter argues that assessing the autonomy of a claimant – whether 
there is a well-founded fear of persecution – requires consideration of both the legal 
status of sexual minorities and the relational, social conditions in the country of 
origin that would contraindicate persecution. In addition, a “social perception” 
approach requires gatekeepers to focus on the persecutory intent. Part two then 
argues that RSD requires imagination, empathy, and giving claimants the “benefit of 
the doubt” where there may be no immediate or formal “facts” in the active 
assessment of how truth, such as credibility, is constructed. I conclude by suggesting 
that assessing the deprivation of relational autonomy, including equal rights and 
social inclusion, is a sociologically and legally grounded approach to judging 
persecution that is attuned to sexual and gendered difference. 
1 Applying relational autonomy to refugee status 
It is relational autonomy that ensures the conditions of human flourishing, which 
make autonomous expression of gender and sexuality possible. The word 
“autonomy” comes from Greek and is derived from the roots “self” and “law” to 
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mean – having one’s own laws (see Lindley 1986, 5; Hepburn 2005). In an important 
sense, deviating from prescribed norms involves giving oneself new rules and 
definitions, both sexual and gendered. Yet, just as the concept of norm deviance 
cannot exist independently of normativity, neither can autonomy exist outside of 
society. Having one’s own laws or norms is dependent on relations with others. Part 
one of this chapter now considers how relational autonomy enables sexual minorities 
to thrive, and how the deprivation of rights that empower relational autonomy are 
persecutory. Sexual minorities require equal treatment of their rights, including 
privacy, as well as access to the public sphere, to achieve autonomy.  
The first section below situates relational autonomy in refugee law as a 
“social perception” approach, before considering opposing theories of autonomy and 
how they may be reconciled. Relational autonomy requires reconceptualising rights, 
and focusing on how they foster individual agency. I use “rights to relate,” 
“relational rights,” and “embodied rights” somewhat interchangeably to show the 
conceptual problem from different angles. The phrase “rights to relate” builds on 
Waaldjik’s (2013) term “right to relate,” which aptly summarises the international 
legal struggle for sexual minorities more broadly in the recognition of relationships. 
“Relational rights” asserts that rights are relationships (see e.g. Young 1990; 
Nedelsky 1990; 1996b), and the phrase “embodied rights” emphasises how rights are 
or should be enacted in practice, through embodiment, to be meaningful. Part one 
concludes with sections on how relational autonomy applies to individual self-
determination and, finally, the essential value of community.  
1.1 The social perception approach and persecution 
The concept of norm deviance moves the determination of PSG towards a social 
perception approach of how the asylum seeker is discriminated against, threatened, 
and dispossessed by the persecutory intent. As mentioned in the previous three 
chapters, one critique of HJ and HT [2010] is that the court’s judgment failed to 
acknowledge that refugee status should not be awarded for “trivial” behaviours, 
which are deemed not to be fundamental to the “immutable” gay identity (e.g. 
Hathaway and Pobjoy 2012; cf. Goodman 2012, 425–426).273 A “social perception” 
                                                 
273 See also Hathaway’s analogy of the persecution of roller-bladers and argument that it would be 
more reasonable for them “to take off their skates,” and Aleinikoff’s response discussed in chapter six 
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analysis, on the other hand, focuses not on determining what “protected 
characteristics” are immutable, or what characteristics an individual should or should 
not be required to change,274 but asks: is the asylum seeker at risk because they are or 
will be perceived as deviant and persecuted, however “unreasonable” (or “trivial”) 
their actions may be?  
In chapter six, I showed how using a framework of norm deviance means that 
a plethora of acts and behaviour are not, and should not be construed as trivial (e.g. 
BDSM, genderqueer). In contrast, Hathaway and Pobjoy (2012, 335) argue the 
Supreme Court failed to “grapple with the scope of activities properly understood to 
be inherent in, and an integral part of” the status of being a gay refugee of in HJ and 
HT, implying that there is a duty to adjudicate and exclude from refugee status what 
is “trivial” to sexual minority identities (cf. Goodman 2012; Millbank 2012; Weẞels 
2013). To fail to exclude the “trivial” could open the proverbial floodgates and 
undermine the “consensus” on which the Convention is built (cf. Aleinikoff 2003; 
Hathaway and Pobjoy 2012). However, chapter five suggested that “consensus” is a 
problematic aim in refugee law, and can undermine the purpose of refugee 
protection. In order to apply a more appropriate interpretation of the Convention, 
these arguments for “consensus,” which restrict the recognition of refugees by 
delineating characteristics and conduct that are protected (in contrast to those that are 
“trivial”), must be refuted. 
Anker and Ardalan (2012, 533–534, see also 538–539) suggest that instead of 
clarifying the scope of protected grounds in sexual identity claims, we should look at 
“the context of persecutory harm;” it would be “analytically clearer to re-frame what 
activities should be protected under the Convention in terms of violations of core 
rights.” While I do not support Anker and Ardalan’s apparent desire for specified 
limits to the construct of refugee, their human-rights based approach seems pointedly 
less discriminating than, as Hathaway and Pobjoy (2012) have advocated, denoting a 
scope of (immutable) activities integral to the status of being gay.275 Alternatively, 
                                                                                                                                          
(Aleinikoff 2003, 299). This chapter argues for a position similar to Aleinikoff’s analysis: is the 
asylum seeker at risk of persecution, however “unreasonable” the asylum seeker’s actions?  
274 See e.g. K and Fornah [2006], para 11-16, 57-58, 97-101, 113, 118 on immutability or protected 
characteristics and the social perception approach. 
275 For example, Hathaway and Pobjoy (2012) would exclude a right to go to Kylie concerts; while 
perhaps Lord Rodger’s (HJ and HT, para 78) “trivial stereotypical examples” are problematically 
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Millbank (2012, 510–512) refutes the protected/trivial distinction because the activity 
does not cause the persecution or form the basis of protection, but in fact reveals the 
identity protected by refugee status (see also Weẞels 2013, 56). Still, this approach 
seems too wedded to the assumption of an immutable identity. Instead, the social 
perception approach shows that “to adopt a ‘non-triviality’ requirement [for refugee 
status] would be to give the persecutor carte blanche for groups that associate for 
‘non-fundamental’ reasons, that is, to permit the persecutor to accomplish precisely 
what he or she wants” (Aleinikoff 2003, 300), namely the suppression of norm 
deviance (see Inlender 2009, 359).276 
Relational autonomy, as set out in this chapter shows that in establishing the 
“truth” in an asylum claim, RSD should be focused on the persecutory intent, rather 
than the identity of the asylum claimant. RSD has inappropriately focused on 
establishing identity through the sexual acts of the claimants, probing evidence for 
credibility through “confessions of the flesh” and incitement to discourse of their 
sexuality (Foucault 1980, 215–216; 1990; Salter 2007, 58–60; Golder 2013, 12–14). 
I have argued that focusing on “essential” identities may result in the distortion of 
credibility, reinforcing assumptions of monolithic narratives of sexual and gender 
identity. Problematic assumptions of identity and credibility are especially evident in 
Chief Inspector Vine’s (2014, e.g. 21) report.277 Vine’s (2014) report into the Home 
Office’s handling of sexual orientation-based claims recommends that adjudicators 
should focus on open questions which “[enable] the applicant to provide a narrative 
about realisation of their sexuality” (Vine 2014, 19), and quotes a First Tier Tribunal 
                                                                                                                                          
culturally relative, he was actually referring to expression and association not to particular activities, 
and those are certainly not “trivial” rights. See also Tobin (2012, 473–474); Millbank (2012, 514–
515).   
276 See also Haines QC in Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004], para 114: “By requiring the refugee 
applicant to abandon a core right the refugee decision-maker is requiring of the refugee claimant the 
same submissive and compliant behaviour, the same denial of a fundamental human right, which the 
agent of persecution in the country of origin seeks to achieve by persecutory conduct;” however, see 
also para 120-121, 124 on the Authority’s view of “core” rights and avoiding “absurd results.” 
277 One particular Observer article, “Home Office wouldn’t believe I was gay: how do you prove it?” 
(Townsend and Taylor 2014), quoted sexually explicit lines of questioning by adjudicators (see also 
Taylor and Townsend 2014). This prompted changes in the handling of the claims and commissioning 
of Vine’s report (see also API 2015). The reason for including a number of actors in the definition of 
“gatekeepers” is illustrated by the apparent, immediate impact the article had according to senior 
managers who acknowledge the spotlight “applied extra pressure…to improve [Home Office] 
handling of sexual orientation cases” (Vine 2014, 41). The media, as in this example, activist groups 
or “stakeholders,” and a myriad of others are implicated in the determination of “genuine” refugees 
(see Lacey 1998, 9; Nedelsky 2001a, 114–115; 2001b, 242–243). The report is notably silent on issues 
of well-founded fear of persecution, focusing instead on the assessment of sexual orientation. 
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judge who has stated that questioning sexual orientation “should focus on an 
‘individual’s inner life’” (Vine 2014, 20). However, one cannot know a claimant’s 
“true” inner identity, whether it is immutable or not.  
The self-identification of an asylum seeker as, for instance, gay may need  to 
remain a centrepiece of PSG-based claims as a strategic imperative. But the 
observable social circumstances such as those documented in country of origin 
information (COI), which suggest persecutory intent against that claimant’s norm 
deviance, are a clearer indicator of a genuine asylum claim than merely establishing 
the status of the claimant as “gay.” For example, the Adjudicator accepted the facts 
that RG was a homosexual and HIV positive. In Colombia, these were at-risk groups 
targeted by paramilitaries, and “prostitutes, drug users, vagrants and people with 
mental disabilities [were also] often murdered by extremist elements in what is 
described as a social cleansing [emphasis added]” (cited in RG [2006], para 3).278 
That RG was or would be perceived to be gay in this circumstance may be important 
to his being identified as part of the PSG, but which of his “activities” should be 
protected is not relevant to the consideration of the level of risk that is indicated by 
the broader evidence of the persecutory intent, in this instance, for “social cleansing.”  
By refocusing the assessment of persecution upon whether or not the asylum 
seeker was able to exercise relational autonomy, refugee protection can affirm sexual 
and gender non-conformity, and diversity, by determining if the COI and other 
evidence indicates a persecutory intent to suppress or eliminate the deviance. Having 
defined the terms of relational autonomy and having put it in the context of refugee 
law, I turn now to consider theories of autonomy in greater detail.  
1.2 Seeking reconciliation between perspectives on 
autonomy 
Debates between the proponents and critics of liberal rights on issues of autonomy, 
individualism and the collective, have covered many of the issues I discuss here. 
First, this section argues that the notion of sexual autonomy is helpful – with the 
qualification that sexual autonomy must be achieved relationally if it is to provide 
                                                 
278 See also B [2007], para 12, where the Adjudicator referred to a “pledge…to kill a variety of people 
who they consider offend Islamic principles,” including immodest women, substance users, and the 
unfaithful; HJ [2008], para 19, on “crimes against the public virtue” in Iran; HS [2005], para 77, 86 
for discussion of crimes publishable by death for “spreading corruption on earth.”  
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the necessary conditions for people to thrive. Before proceeding, I flag several 
cautions against advocating for autonomy. Some of these critiques are general and 
some are specific to refugee status; foregrounding these concerns will allow me to 
build an argument in support of relational autonomy.  
Sexual autonomy is “the freedom to determine one’s own sexual experiences, 
to choose how and with whom one expresses oneself sexually” (Lacey 1998, 104). 
Sexual autonomy has been conceptualised as a facet of a larger trend in what has 
been called the democratization of intimacy (Giddens 1992; cf. Jamieson 1999, 477–
482; 2005, 5–6, 10; 2012, 1.5), resulting from increasing individualisation and 
emphasis on self-determination since the 1960s (Weeks 2007, 72–85; see also Sheill 
2009, 67; Frank 2012). Autonomy (or self-determination) is a legally useful concept, 
but one also grounded in sociological changes (see further Jamieson and Simpson 
2013, 15–20). Weeks (2007, 84) writes that gay liberation was concerned with 
“freeing individuals from the burdens of history,” including “tradition, patriarchy, 
homophobia or heteronormativity,” and at the “heart is the assumption of individual 
autonomy.” Socio-economic changes also propelled the shift toward individual 
autonomy (D’Emilio 1998; Walker 2000). Crucially for refugee law, “the protection 
of individual autonomy and corporal non-interference” (or bodily integrity) is at “the 
philosophical core of human rights” (Anker 2005, 115; see also Tobin 2012, 460). 
Further, Katyal (2002, 173) proposes a sexual autonomy framework for transnational 
legal advocacy to work within and protect sexual diversity, stressing that autonomy 
“equalizes one’s sexual and identity preferences by focusing on the act of choosing, 
rather than the gender or identity chosen, as a focal point of protection” (see also 
Morgan 2006, 150–153; Wilkinson 2014, 373–374).  
In contrast, Nedelsky (e.g. 2011) and other relational autonomy theorists (e.g. 
Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000) have developed a body of social and legal theory that 
focuses not only on the protection of individual rights, but also examines how 
relationships foster autonomy. The key conceptual point of departure from traditional 
theories of autonomy is the observation “that autonomy is not a matter of 
independence, but of interdependent relationships that foster it” (Nedelsky 1996a, 
83). Relational autonomy is applicable in a number of fields (e.g. Mackenzie and 
Stoljar 2000, especially 213–299; Beiner and Nedelsky 2001; Nedelsky 2011). I 
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apply relational autonomy to questions of judgment and diversity in RSD, finding it 
highly relevant when considering the threats of persecution faced by those who wish 
to live “deviant” genders and sexualities in their countries of origin.  
A number of researchers have criticised any use of autonomy (even attempts 
to make it relational) in disciplines related to and relevant for this project. In law and 
politics, Lacey (1998) argues that autonomy is too individualistic, forgoes 
consideration of “the conditions under which choices can be meaningful” (Lacey 
1998, 117), and reinforces the public/private dichotomy of liberalism (Lacey 1998, 
72–86; see also Sherwin 2011, 13–14; Jamieson and Simpson 2013, 19). In human 
rights and refugee law in particular, critiques of sexual autonomy have included that 
it is Eurocentric, abstract, patriarchal, and ultimately fails to critique oppressive 
institutions – thus not accounting for intersectionality (Sheill 2009, 66–67; see also 
Oswin 2001, 349; Hayden 2006, 480–483). Walker (2000, 71) emphasises self-
determination “to avoid the liberal notion of the fully autonomous individual and to 
convey instead some notion of partial autonomy or agency.” Miller (1999, 298) 
cautions that although autonomy (and self-determination) has strong appeal, “[i]t is 
too impoverished an idea” to support sexual diversity.279   
Moreover, according to Butler (2004) a relational view of autonomy is 
inadequate. To argue “a relational view of the self over an autonomous one, or trying 
to redescribe autonomy in terms of relationality,” does nothing but “[suture] the 
rupture in the relation we seek to describe, a rupture that is constitutive of identity 
itself” (Butler 2004, 19; see also 1991, 14). From a social theory perspective, 
individual autonomy superficially aided by a relational conception is insufficient for 
describing how people live through one another, shaping their own identity (see 
Jamieson 2002, 508–509, 515; 2012, 1.4). Instead, Butler offers a conceptualisation 
of modes of being dispossessed (2004, 19; see also chapter six of this thesis).  
In one way or another, none of these authors necessarily rule out claims based 
on autonomy. For example, Butler (2004, 20) discusses how recourse to autonomy 
must be sought as a means to frame arguments for rights, such as protection from 
persecution in refugee status. While rejecting on theoretical grounds the notion that 
                                                 
279 Miller (1999, 288) details that in addition to self-determination, other advocates have focused on 
autonomy, non-discrimination, bodily integrity, tolerance and diversity, and sexual liberation. It seems 
to me that these concepts are interrelated and cannot be realised without conjunction with the others. 
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“autonomy” can helpfully be supplemented by “relationality,” Butler (2004, 20) 
observes the “political predicament” where rights are conferred on individuals, 
groups, and classes of people which assumes “bounded beings, distinct, 
recognizeable, delineated, subjects before the law.” Broadly, lesbians, gays and 
bisexuals argue for sexual freedoms, trans people for self-determination, and intersex 
people to be free from non-consensual medical interventions that would make them 
“fit” the normative morphologies.280 The articulation of these freedoms cannot be 
made “without recourse to autonomy,” and these claims must be made even though 
“[b]odily autonomy,” in reality, “is a lively paradox” (Butler 2004, 21). In a sense, 
one must make these claims to autonomy and frame them in the language of rights. 
Relational autonomy merely draws upon the strengths of sexual autonomy claims. 
The next section considers how reconceptualising rights as relational allows for an 
appropriately adaptable framework for RSD.  
1.3 Embodied, relational rights 
Although the role of rights in refugee law may be contested, I argue that the violation 
of relational autonomy is an appropriate ethical and practical standard for 
determining whether there has been persecution on the basis of norm deviance. Like 
identity, rights are not things that people “have” but relationships crucially embedded 
in social practice. “Rights are not fruitfully conceived as possessions” (Young 1990, 
25; see also Bentham 1987, 50), and can only be meaningfully realised, like acts and 
identities, with and through others (see Nedelsky 1996a, 71; Butler 2004, 19). 
Therefore, context is essential for the realisation of rights, which should be 
understood as “ideals [that] are relational and socially inclusive” (Somers and 
Roberts 2008, 412). International norms of human rights are “[n]onsense upon stilts” 
(Bentham 1987, 200) unless they are embodied “in a complex configuration of 
relationships and institutional arrangements” (Somers and Roberts 2008, 413; see 
also Nedelsky 1996a, 74–75). While there may be utility in deploying rights as 
boundaries for protecting the individual autonomy of asylum seekers, in reality 
                                                 
280 Consider e.g. K and Fornah [2006], especially Baroness Hale, para 96, where the practice of FGM 
was accepted to amount to persecution. In a similar way, forced alteration of an intersex person’s body 
or Tehran’s policy of encouraging sex reassignment surgeries upon sexual minorities violates bodily 
autonomy and warrants international protection. 
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autonomy cannot be achieved without conceiving “rights as structuring 
relationships” (Nedelsky 1996a, 77). As Young asserts: 
“Rights are relationships, not things; they are institutionally defined 
rules specifying what people can do in relation to one another. Rights 
refer to doing more than having, to social relationships that enable or 
constrain action” (Young 1990, 25; see also Nedelsky 1996a, 76). 
Without a social body to enable rights, including kinship, community, and a state 
willing and able to enforce them, rights are meaningless and not protective factors 
for a minority against the conflicting values of the majority. This is especially 
evident where asylum seekers have been persecuted, dispossessed of the capacities to 
develop their gender or sexuality relationally. That is to say, the loss of relational 
autonomy should constitute a well-founded fear of persecution. RSD should focus on 
how rights can be emptied of meaning and significance through the denial of 
relationships. 
The categories enshrined in Article 1A(2) and the notion of well-founded fear 
have evolved through time. I am arguing that they must further evolve to recognise 
relational autonomy, and the concept of norm deviance. When rights are viewed as 
relations existing in social practice, refugee rights to protection begin to transcend 
minimal liberal conceptions of harm such as state violence, privacy, legal 
prohibitions, and the denial of free speech and association (see Weeks 2007, 222; 
Golder 2013 on Foucault). The liberal conception of rights is useful for establishing 
“autonomy” in a traditional sense, such as the security of an individual and their right 
to life (see Oswin 2001, 360; Golder 2013, 9), but fails to ensure their rights to 
positively flourish. As Oswin (2001, 359) has argued, “[t]he reification of rights as 
boundaries draws attention away from the ongoing process of determining them.” I 
would add that to approach rights as boundaries appears to contribute to the 
specification of “normal” rights holders whose activities adjudicators find acceptable 
(Hathaway and Pobjoy 2012, 355), which excludes the “perverse,” “bad queer,” or 
uncategorisable other (see Rubin 1993; Johnson 2007, especially 109; Weber 2015; 
chapter four of this thesis).  
The relational autonomy of norm deviant asylum seekers requires assessment 
of the conditions under which one can be fully human, and would see them not 
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necessarily as an “additional” category of proprietary rights holders, but as open, 
fluid, and equal members of a heterogeneous society (Young 1990, 119–120; 
considered further below). The foundational “bare” or “boundary” rights, which 
specify an individual’s “ownership” of their body, thought, and privacy, are 
necessary for protection from state violence, but insufficient (see Ferreira 2016, 13 
on a “floor of rights”).281 When rights are seen as relational they empower choices 
that are required for norm deviance, such as those to openly live alternative 
configurations of relationships (e.g. polyamory), to control one’s own sexed body 
(e.g. trans, intersex), and to challenge and redefine what counts as consensual sex 
and harm (e.g. BDSM).  
Refugee law should embrace a wider programme of rights in the adjudication 
of persecution (Sheill 2009). As was shown in chapters four and five, persecution by 
a state needs to be defined by more than definite acts of torture, detention, and state-
sponsored discrimination, and should also include restrictions on freedom of 
expression, association, and family life in order to benefit sexual minorities (Miller 
1999, 294; Anker 2005). RSD that considers relational autonomy is an opportunity 
for asylum seekers to be repossessed of the conditions of human flourishing denied 
to them by their country of origin. Protecting relational autonomy allows people to 
be autonomous in the sense of having control of one’s body, acts, identity, but also 
the right to live openly without fear – to have and be had by a community.  
1.4 Self-determination and choosing norm deviance 
People are not born capitalists, communists, separatists, nationalists, Christians, 
Muslims, Jews, Sikhs, Hindus, or even, perhaps, into a particular race or ethnicity. 
They become religious, partisan, or members of other particular social groups; 
gender and sexuality should equally be “about choice rather than destiny” (Weeks 
1995, 5), in order to assert that individual fluidity is legitimate, genuine, and indeed 
credible in RSD (see Figure 3, below). Whether or not people’s identities are 
immutable, they should be able to choose their life scripts – accepting, rejecting, or 
recreating the narratives of gender and sexuality as means to live their lives, to 
                                                 
281 Recall, for instance, Jain [1999], considering homosexuals may be refugees if they were persecuted 
for their private, legitimate conduct. 
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understand themselves and to be understood by others (Cornell 1995; 2003, 144).282 
Protecting the choices made by sexual minorities and acknowledging how these 
deviances may result in persecution avoids any debate over degrees of immutability 
in Convention categories and precludes an implicit hierarchy of who or what is more 
legitimate or genuine and deserving of protection. Relational autonomy seeks to 
assert that the judicial authority over identity, the asylum seeker’s “inner truth,” 
should be restricted. It is the deprivation of embodied rights to choose and practice 
gender and sexuality that is persecutory.  
Therefore, people’s capacities for choice to identify with and practice 
different ways of being sexual, gendered, doing family, or being in love, as well as 
whether to be in or out of particular communities (Nedelsky 1996a, 79; Lacey 1998, 
119), should be a focal point of the PSG for sexual minorities and how this results in 
persecution.283 While the choices of gender and sexuality may be limited, configured 
by social relationships and constraints of social context (Jamieson 1999, 482; Katyal 
2002, 169–170; Jamieson and Simpson 2013, 7), the focus of RSD should shift from 
identity categories to protection of self-determination of gender and sexual 
expression (D’Emilio 1998; Walker 2000, 70). Regarding international norms, 
Walker (2000, 71–72) argues that it is through self-determination that sexual 
minorities can express themselves and develop relationships. Along the same lines, 
Katyal (2002, 168–169) argues for a framework of sexual autonomy that is 
deliberative in negotiating personal subjectivity and external expression, includes 
                                                 
282 Several commenters have voiced concern about drafts of this thesis over the suggestion sexual 
orientation is a choice; one going so far as to caution that the result is to make a mockery of 
homosexuality, when the same scrutiny is not (in reality) placed on heterosexuality. A visceral 
reaction to the idea can be immediately linked to an all-too-common coming out story, when parents, 
friends, or others outcast the individual for that person’s “choice,” and dismiss a community for 
“unnatural” perversion. Social conservatives have admittedly used framing sexual orientation as a 
choice to justify discrimination, persecution, and even destruction. Nazi physicians, for instance, 
argued that the research showing homosexuality was heritable only served the interests of “those who 
wished to believe that homosexuality was not a matter of choice,” whilst the state was moving toward 
the destruction of the “pathology” threatening public health (Proctor 1995, 186–188). In fact, “a 
degree of choice” in coming out and association was used to exclude gay asylum seekers in the UK in 
the 1990s (McGhee 2001b, 23). I empathise with sensitivity to “choice,” but argue that it is, at 
minimum, a necessary evil in this context. While I believe the following revision neuters part of the 
argument, an alternative might be: “People should be free to choose to realise their sexual orientation 
and gender identity” (suggesting it “is” already within them).  
283 See Miller’s (1999, 301) description of the similarities between Article 18 of the ICCPR and the 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion 
or Belief: the right to have or not have a belief or identity, recognition of the relationship between an 
individual and the community, and the connectedness of private and public practices (see also 
Aleinikoff 2003, 269–271; Hathaway and Pobjoy 2012, 358; Waaldijk 2013, 165–166). 
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conduct with or without attachment to particular identity categories; expressive in 
protecting public identifications; and is, therefore, more appropriate for incorporating 
gender and sexuality into domestic and international contexts (see also Schulhofer 
1998, 108). In sum, standards of protection should endorse the autonomy of 
individuals through assessment of the disembodiment of relational rights.  
1.5 Community, concealment, and material belonging 
The paradox of autonomy is that society “is the source of autonomy as well as a 
threat to it” (Nedelsky 1996a, 71). For rights to be embodied and meaningful, the 
open participation and inclusion of sexual minorities in the civic life and economy of 
any country should not be the exception but a basic expectation, stemming from, but 
not substituted by, judicial and political equality (see Stychin 1995; 1998). As argued 
above, rights are, quite pointedly, meaningless unless they are grounded in practice 
through “inclusion in a political community” (Somers and Roberts 2008, 395; see 
also Arendt 1967, 267–302; Nedelsky 1996a, 72). Waaldijk (2013) has recently 
articulated the concept of “the right to relate” as underlying the global struggle for 
sexual minority rights; “the right to establish and develop relationships” openly has 
been increasingly “recognized as one aspect of the human right to respect for one’s 
private life” (Waaldijk 2013, 168). Likewise, “[i]nstead of defining the private as 
what the public excludes,” relational autonomy in RSD should consider private life 
as that which “any person has the right to exclude others from” (Young 1990, 119; 
see also Persson 2014, 260–261).  
Private life is only achievable through a constructive relationship with the 
public sphere. In human rights law “privacy has been said to constitute a right to 
individual self-determination,” and the notion of autonomy underlies the right in 
relation to interference in both public and private spheres (Tobin 2012, 459). In 
striking down South Africa’s anti-sodomy laws, its Constitutional Court affirmed 
that the right to privacy is based on the notion of a necessary space to have one’s 
own identity, and being protected from the conflicting values of the community.284 
But the notion of privacy cannot “presuppose that a holder of rights is an isolated, 
                                                 
284 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v. Minister of Justice and 
Others, Case CCT 11/98. In using this case as an affirmative example, I should highlight it would 
seem that Sachs J did express a more socially conservative view than this thesis of when the state can 
and, perhaps, should interfere in private life, which he wrote is not without limits. 
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lonely and abstract figure possessing a disembodied and socially disconnected self” 
(Sachs J, para 117). Sachs J observed that even with regards to the right to privacy, 
society must “promote conditions in which personal self-realisation can take place” 
(para 116), because “people live in their bodies, their communities, their cultures, 
their places and their times” (para 117).285  
Young (1990, 220) suggests the aspiration for a “heterogenous public” relies 
on two principles: “(a) no persons, actions, or aspects of a person’s life should be 
forced into privacy; and (b) no social institutions or practices should be excluded a 
priori from being a proper subject for public discussion and expression.” Applied to 
refugee status, persecutory states have often excluded sexual minorities from the 
public by asserting “moral sovereignty,” where “human rights are contingent on the 
observation, especially in public spaces, of local traditional values, which are seen to 
represent the values of the majority” (Wilkinson 2014, 365). When an individual’s 
autonomy is at odds with the conflicting values of the community, “refugee law is 
concerned with an individual who wishes to dissociate herself from that consensus” 
(Anker 2005, 114). In other words, the asylum seeker “asserts that, notwithstanding 
what her culture may believe, her beliefs are in line with international [human rights] 
standards” (Anker 2005, 114), and/or those of the UK (UNHCR 2011b, 14). Public 
prohibitions of asylum seekers’ relationships, or threats that being open may result in 
persecution, deprives them of “universal” and “non-discriminatory” enjoyment of 
human rights to expression and association. To exclude sexual minorities from the 
public sphere could therefore constitute discriminatory persecution (see Young 1990, 
40–42; Parekh 2012, 274–277 on structural injustice).  
Human rights, like citizenship, require more than political tolerance. Social 
inclusion, such as a right to a livelihood, is necessary to be fully human (Somers and 
Roberts 2008, 395). Thus, the relational autonomy of asylum seekers requires 
gatekeepers to consciously make strong links between economic and social rights in 
RSD (Hathaway 1991, 117–119; Walker 2000, 72; Parekh 2012, 278). If the 
“integrity” of the Convention requires the en masse exclusion of refugees through 
                                                 
285 See further Ferreira (2016, 8–9) on “ubuntu” or “humaneness,” a notion that has “become a 
constitutional value” in South Africa that emphasises “interdependence, respect and equality;” Tobin 
(2012, 461–463) on Sachs J’s legal reasoning; Millbank (2012, 507–508) noting UNHCR Guidance in 
2008 that rejected discretion in RSD with reference to Sachs J (para 113). 
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specification of limited categories, the non-discriminatory objectives of refugee law 
should at least allow for the recognition of an asylum seeker’s right to social 
belonging and economic security (Young 1990, 53–55 on marginalisation; Miller 
1999, 295; Anker 2002, 150; Aleinikoff 2003, 290–292 on discrimination). 
Returning an asylum seeker to a state that would confine that individual’s existence 
to private life and deny them rights to open relationships essentially co-opts the UK 
in the inhuman and degrading treatment that can constitute persecution (Sheill 2009, 
63).  
A relational perspective of autonomy might be summarised as potentially 
both enabling and constraining – with the political community being the empowering 
force behind an individual’s autonomy, but also possibly the hindrance, source of 
dispossession, and persecution. RSD thus requires a nuanced consideration of 
contexts: “the power relations that shape individual action, of the subtle coercion of 
daily life which limit autonomy, as well of the greater pressers of social life that 
provide the limits as well as the opportunities for social action and individual 
agency” (Weeks 1995, 143). I have argued that choice is central to the normative 
claim to autonomy, but this should not be mistaken as a belief in the notion of 
absolute choice (Jamieson and Simpson 2013, 7). Yet, to different degrees, people do 
(or should) have agency to choose their life course. In this sense the critical question 
seems to be: how does context or structure constrain choice? In other words, RSD 
should consider how contextual constraints on the notion of autonomy can be 
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FIG 3 Relational autonomy and persecution286 
 
While these limits on autonomy affect all sexual minorities, women and trans asylum 
seekers may be particularly affected by deprivation of material security and 
economic opportunities. Citing the Montréal Principles on Women’s Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Montréal 2002), Sheill (2009, 65) highlights that the 
sexual autonomy of women in particular “cannot be separated from the material 
conditions of their lives,” which affect “their opportunities for sexual exploration, 
self-determination, and other aspects of the lesbian experience” (see also Lacey 
1998, 72; Walker 2000, 72; Inlender 2009; Parekh 2012). Similarly, trans individuals 
may be more vulnerable as they may be more visible, due to the often public 
manifestations of gendered norm deviance, and become immediate targets for the 
deprivation of economic rights (Katyal 2002, 139–140, 155). Bach (2013, 35) rightly 
criticises the current Asylum Policy Instructions on gender identity for neglecting 
that an asylum seeker’s development and expression of their gender identity “is often 
                                                 
286 This figure is my own working conceptualisation and, to my knowledge, I have drawn upon the 
literature cited but no other visual source to create it. Importantly, the lists of examples are non-
exhaustive. Moreover, choices and contexts particular to the protection needs of other Convention 
refugees could be used too, such as for religion: choices of religious conversion, apostasy, worship, or 
proselytizing, and contexts of family and local religion, state theocracy, censorship of evangelism, and 
so on. 
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not socially, medically and/or legally possible” in their country of origin (see API 
2011b; see also Jamieson 2002, 516). 
RSD “is a litmus test of our humanity and compassion” (Hale 2015), an 
indicator of community values, including the public and private intimacies of our 
relations. The individual political act of coming out and claiming asylum 
“underscore[s] the value of being beside oneself, of being a porous boundary, given 
over to others” (Butler 2004, 25; see also 2009, 13–14) in seeking “individual 
freedom and social belonging” (Weeks 1995, 29; see also Nedelsky 1996a; Lacey 
1998, 119–120). Good judgment in RSD stems from “responsibility…for the 
flourishing of the community, [and is] an assertion of what kind of associations we 
want to have with others” (Wagenaar 2004, 652; see also Hayden 2006). Part two 
will now consider how gatekeepers may exercise compassionate creativity to ensure 
the relational autonomy of sexual minority refugees. 
2 Reconceptualising judgment  
The approach proposed in chapters six and seven of this thesis takes what Hathaway 
and Pobjoy (2012, 343–344) argue is a serious fault in HJ and HT and, perhaps, 
magnifies it. “The carefully nuanced approach” that Lord Hope calls for is “as a 
practical matter unviable, leading to an extraordinary opportunity for judicial 
subjectivity” (Hathaway and Pobjoy 2012, 343–344; cf. Millbank 2012, 517). Foster 
(2014) has said that jurisprudence has moved away from the social perception 
approach proposed by Aleinikoff (2003), because it requires adjudicators to make 
sociological or anthropological assessments of the PSG (cf. Aleinikoff 2003, 272, 
279–280, 298–299). However, commentators in favour of a protected characteristics 
approach – and the case law that supports it – fail to demonstrate that a constrained, 
“immutable” approach does any differently when applied in RSD. The case law 
analytical chapters suggested that gatekeepers still make sociological assessments 
even when considering immutability, when they actively construct identity and 
persecution, especially in the evaluation of evidence (see Jacobson 2009, 316–320 on 
judicial engagement with culture) – though perhaps with more smoke and mirrors to 
prevent “fracturing the normative consensus on which the Refugee Convention is 
based” (Hathaway and Pobjoy 2012, 335). A more radical alternative is both feasible 
and beneficial.  
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Hathaway and Pobjoy (2012, 387–389) title their piece “Queer Cases Make 
Bad Law” in reference to the legal maxim “hard cases make bad law,” which implies 
that hard cases invoke one’s sympathy, and thereby distort the reasoned development 
and application of principled rules. In this final part of the thesis, I reject the 
reason/emotion dichotomy and offer an alternative that both acknowledges “persons 
whose aspirations for freedom pull at our heart-strings” (Hathaway and Pobjoy 2012, 
389) and forms a principled application of the Convention. I propose compassionate 
creativity as a mode of gatekeeping, before considering relational autonomy in 
relation to the existing jurisprudence, and conclude with an analysis of a hard case. 
2.1 Compassionate creativity  
If power, like autonomy, is understood to be relational, such as in the authority to 
know, persecute, or adjudicate, sexual minorities seeking asylum are faced with 
better or, at least, more honest terms for inclusion (see Young 1990, 32; Lacey 1998, 
9–10, 76; Oswin 2001, 355–356; Sherwin 2011, 30–31). Combining the insights that 
RSD is “constructivism in practice” (Sweeney 2007) and requires “empathy and 
imagination” (Millbank 2002), I argue that one requires compassionate creativity to 
determine whether an asylum seeker could exercise relational autonomy in their 
country of origin, or if refugee status is necessary for their flourishing (for similar 
concepts, see Nedelsky 2001a, 118; Wagenaar 2004). The legal notion of “benefit of 
the doubt” will be briefly linked into this discussion, after first setting out my 
argument for the concept of compassionate creativity.  
I use specific terms, creative and compassion, to describe a process of legal 
interpretation and judgment, but the concept is inspired by Arendt’s “enlarged 
mentality” and training one’s imagination to “go visiting” (Nedelsky 2001a, 117). If 
legal decision-making requires some degree of reification in spite of the fact that the 
persecution of norm deviance constantly challenges fixed frames of reference, 
acknowledging the communicative action of the legal process (see Nedelsky 2001a, 
108–109; 2001b, 242–244), and encouraging gatekeepers to engage in compassionate 
creativity might counteract the dehumanising effects of RSD.287  
                                                 
287 See also Lacey (1998, 120) on integrity and interdependence; Ferreira (2016, 4–13) on human-
centred analysis.  
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Relational autonomy, embodied rights, and the judgment of persecution  225 
I propose compassionate creativity as an interpretive standpoint of 
gatekeepers to determine whether or not an asylum seeker has been able to exercise 
relational autonomy and whether they have a well-founded fear of persecution (see 
Beiner and Nedelsky 2001, vii–xx). “Compassion” is an inherently relational 
emotion towards another, which, for the gatekeeper, is to feel or show concern for 
the dispossessed.288 So, compassionate creativity allows us to imagine the effects of 
dispossession of rights to a full human life (see Nedelsky 1996a, 78–79), and to see 
the persecutory intent of people seeking to suppress norm deviance. Adjudication 
processes possessed by the impulse to identify absolute truths will fail to connect the 
credibility of the “immutable” category with an “individual’s inner life” (see Sherwin 
2011, 23 on possibility; Vine 2014, 20). Alternatively, compassionate creativity 
seeks to make decisions reflexively and focuses more intently on the persecution 
feared.  
What would it look like if a gatekeeper were to exercise “creative” 
compassion? It would proceed with an awareness of the gatekeeper’s role, conscious 
of both the discursive impact of assigning categories and constantly attentive to the 
well-founded fear of harm that could befall the asylum seeker (see Nedelsky 2001a, 
111–112). In being creative, the gatekeeper should ideally be attentive to the 
consequences of deploying existing categories or constructing new ones and how 
either action may (re)produce categorical exclusions in the discourse. Therefore, 
creativity is essential in both how gatekeepers interpret case law and guidance, as 
well as how they may anticipate the ways their own decision-making may set 
precedent (see Nedelsky 2001a, 112). In this sense, creativity is the construction of 
something new with imaginative skill, reframing the old method to suit the new form 
of claim (Wagenaar 2004, 649–650).  
Furthermore, giving asylum seekers the “benefit of the doubt” is particularly 
important in credibility assessment, especially where there is a lack of evidence, and 
is a legal principle that compliments the argument for compassionate creativity in 
RSD. The UNHCR recognises that, in most cases, it will not be possible for an 
                                                 
288 While I will apply relational autonomy primarily to the asylum seeker, Nedelsky (2001a, 103–120) 
explains how the theory equally applies to the nature of judgment, negotiating subjectivity, being 
embedded in a community of reason, and reaching autonomous and valid adjudication. See also 
Sherwin (2011) and Nedelsky (2011). 
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asylum seeker to “prove” all of the facts relied on to claim international protection 
(UNHCR 2011b, 39–40). UNHCR guidance provides that the benefit of the doubt is 
appropriate where: “all the available evidence has been obtained and checked,” and 
the decision-maker is “satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility,” including 
that the asylum seeker’s statements have been “coherent and plausible,” and do “not 
run counter to generally known facts” (UNHCR 2011b, 39). However, Millbank 
(2009b, 5–6) notes that UK decision-makers have been reluctant to give claimants 
the benefit of the doubt, and instead focus on coherence and plausibility. So, the 
normative argument for compassionate creativity may be, in addition to that legal 
principle, appropriate.    
Compassionate creativity as an interpretive device of gatekeeping primarily 
seeks to shift the focus away from a conception of identity that assumes that 
experiences of sexual minorities mirror those of the “non-deviant” and that reinforces 
a hierarchy amongst sexual minorities between “good gays” versus “bad queers” (see 
Nedelsky 2001b, 234). Seeing the asylum claimant’s norm deviance and using a 
social perception approach to develop the categories of PSG and the concept of 
persecution promotes a more compassionate interpretation of the Convention. The 
dispossessed may be, simply, “nothing but human,” as Arendt writes: “a man who is 
nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people 
to treat him as a fellow-man” (Arendt 1967, 300). Yet, the “[a]bility to feel pain” and 
“humiliation” are universal human experiences, which allow us to see past 
categorical differences, and form the foundations on “which solidarity is built” 
(Rorty 1989, xvii cited in Weeks 2007, 224).  
2.2 Judgment and relational autonomy  
The final section of this chapter is organised around three applications of relational 
autonomy and compassionate creativity. The first two sub-sections consider how the 
case law could be expanded upon using these tools. A theoretical hard case of 
Kenyan sex workers is considered in conclusion to tease out some of the implications 
of relational autonomy. 
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2.2.1 Relational autonomy and equal moral worth 
The normative claim of autonomy is that finding common ground between 
conflicting values should prioritise “maximum individual freedom of choice within a 
consensus on what constitutes acceptable behaviour” (Weeks 1995, 64). Here we can 
look to international norms to find common ground for relational autonomy in 
refugee law. In its opening paragraph, the 1951 Convention states that the UN 
Charter and UDHR affirm “that all human being shall enjoy fundamental rights and 
freedoms without discrimination.”289 Article 29 (2) of the UDHR sets out that rights 
cannot be exercised to the detriment of others, and that freedoms are subject to 
limitations in “securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of 
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society [emphasis added]” (see also Tobin 2012, 472–474). 
But unless additional criteria or a baseline is clearly established, there is a danger that 
the UK might accept another state’s explanation for the apparent persecution.290 One 
solution is to interpret the UDHR more simply, particularly by removing the concept 
of morality and asserting secular freedoms of gender and sexuality as fundamental to 
the human experience.291 Recent UN Human Rights Council resolutions on SOGI 
have stated that there should be “universal respect for the protection of all human 
rights…for all,” guaranteed “without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal 
manner.”292 While noting that “various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds 
must be borne in mind,” the council recalled that “it is the duty of States, regardless 
of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human 
rights,” including those of sexual minorities.293 Normative claims to autonomy hold 
that an individual’s rights should not be limited unless the exercise of them infringes 
                                                 
289 This has been cited in cases that broadened the definition of PSG and interpretation of persecution; 
see e.g. K and Fornah [2006], para 10, 85-86. 
290 In fact, UDHR Article 29(2) was explicitly used to find that the criminalization of homosexual sex 
was not persecutory in an Australian case in 1994 (Millbank 2004, 204–205). 
291 “Secular” is used here as equivalent to international norms of religious non-discrimination. See 
also Jacobson (2009, 310–312) on the “proprietary individual.” It may also be useful to note that some 
cultural and religious institutions have alternative configurations of non-conforming genders, e.g. 
“third sex” models (see chapter one). However, I mean secular in a broader sense, including the right 
to deviate from the religiously endorsed non-conforming genders. 
292 UN Human Rights Council, Protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity, 15 July 2016, A/HRC/RES/32/2. 
293 UN Human Rights Council, Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, 2 October 
2014, A/HRC/RES/27/32. 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Relational autonomy, embodied rights, and the judgment of persecution  228 
on the rights of others or causes harm (Held 1987, 270–271; Giddens 1992; Weeks 
1995, 64–73), but what constitutes “harm” is notoriously contested (see Lacey 1998, 
77, 105–106); relational autonomy in this context may offer a partial solution to this 
dispute by positing equal moral worth through non-discrimination (see also Figure 3, 
above).  
Current case law may be used to advocate for a wider scope of relational 
rights in refugee status claims, with little modification to the existing framework 
(Eskridge 1994, 621). In perhaps an otherwise dubious statement of cultural relativity 
regarding Kylie Minogue and colourful cocktails, Lord Rodger (para 78) laid the 
groundwork for a more expansive reading of the Convention in HJ and HT:  
“[G]ay men are to be as free as their straight equivalents in the society 
concerned to live their lives in the way that is natural to them as gay 
men, without the fear of persecution.”  
What I am arguing for is an extension of this principle, over and above the current 
standard in UK asylum law (in theory, if not practice). Protection cannot simply be 
based on “what is natural to them,” if “natural” is conceived as immutable, as I 
argued in my account of norm deviance (chapter six). RSD can circumvent fallacies 
in the “logic of identity” by focusing on relational rights (Young 1990, 98–99) and 
on what asylum seekers should be free to do regardless of their particular gender or 
sexual identity, as people of “equal moral worth” (Nedelsky 2001b, 250) to “their 
straight equivalents.”294 Tobin (2012, 474) observes that Lord Rodger was not 
imagining activities, such as Kylie and cocktails, which if infringed would actually 
amount to persecution, but was demonstrating the scope of rights engaged: “[t]he 
consequence of this approach is to shift the onus back on the state to justify any 
threat of an interference with any aspect of these rights” (Tobin 2012, 474). 
However, in practice there is still a dilemma in proving an interference amounts to 
being persecuted – and the UK decides. While that cannot be rectified, a stronger 
claim for rights might still be made.  
Firstly, perhaps a reformulation of Lord Rodger’s dictum ought to be as 
follows: sexual and gender minorities are to be free in the society concerned, to live 
                                                 
294 See also Islam and Shah, 161 where Lord Hoffman discusses “persecution based on 
discrimination.” 
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their lives in any way that does not infringe on the rights of others, without the fear 
of persecution. Secondly, the “deviant” asylum seeker may often be deprived of 
relational rights that “non-deviant” citizens conforming to norms do not need or do 
not seek to acquire, yet the sexual minority’s assertion of that autonomy is consistent 
with international human rights and/or rights in the UK (Anker 2005, 114; UNHCR 
2011b, 14) – i.e. “universal” equal moral worth in addition to the society concerned.  
While social change is, perhaps always, ongoing, sexual minorities have 
made significant gains toward “the right to relate” around the world (Waaldijk 2013). 
Domestically, the UK has gradually developed a broader understanding of citizens’ 
rights to be sexual, gendered, and love differently, based on the notion that consent 
and choice are “utterly central ingredients to our ability to live dignified and 
meaningful lives” (Bamforth 2005, 12 cited in Weeks 2007, 199; see also Schulhofer 
1998, 111). The minimum standards for granting asylum seekers refugee status 
should be comparable.295 Standards of equal moral worth – universal equality and 
freedom from persecution – should consider whether sexual minorities’ rights are 
respected as “normal” rights holders in the society concerned, including whether 
autonomy is relationally possible in so far as it does not infringe on the rights of 
others, and if the rights claimed by the asylum seeker are in line with international 
and/or UK protections. 
2.2.2 The “corrupt homosexual:” Relational autonomy is political 296  
Relational rights to be public in expression and association are supported by 
international and UK jurisprudence (see generally RT and RM [2012]). The political 
act of coming out “[affirms] the public validity of one’s sexuality in order to 
safeguard one’s private choices” (Weeks 2007, 88). There do not appear to be any a 
priori reasons for isolating sexual minority refugee status from other political or 
religious acts of coming out as expressions of political opinions or religious 
beliefs.297 Seeking refugee status should not be viewed as passive victimhood, but as 
                                                 
295 See HJ and HT, para 52; Lord Rodger discussed exerting diplomatic pressure to securing sexual 
minorities’ rights “[b]ut, in the meantime [Signatory States] do not wash their hands of those at risk.”  
296 RM and BB [2005], para 39. See also Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004], para 24 on Khomeini’s 
statements; Re GJ [1995]. 
297 See e.g. HJ and HT [2009], para 37, where the Court of Appeal quotes the Tribunal’s 
determination: “It might be said that the pursuit of a homosexual lifestyle is in some ways similar to 
the pursuit of a political activity or even the pursuit of proselytes to a particular religious faith.”  
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the expressly political act that it is. The claim that the persecution of sexual 
minorities is political is particularly well supported by the CG case RM and BB 
[2005], where evidence was presented to show that Iranian Authorities only reported 
prosecutions “which satisfied their model of the corrupt homosexual” (para 39). The 
use of the term “corrupt homosexual” has an explicitly political motivation, but I 
argue that persecution is always political, whether the homosexual is perceived as 
corrupting to religious morals, the rule of law, social mores, and so on. Regardless of 
how explicit it is made in the persecutor’s intent, and whether the harm is threatened 
by a state or non-state actor, the target of persecutory conduct seems to be invariably 
perceived as “corrupting” to normativity in one form or another. The notion of the 
“corrupt homosexual” is significant, because legal strategies of claiming asylum that 
rely primarily on the vulnerability of applicants depoliticise the persecution (Parekh 
2012, 272–274, 277). Relational autonomy argues that norm deviance, whether 
“private” or more overtly “public,” is always political in its subversion of 
compulsory heterosexuality.  
In RT and RM, Lord Dyson sets out to apply the principle of HJ and HT to 
the protected category of political opinion, and its concealment. Freedom of thought, 
opinion, and expression, “whether political, philosophical or otherwise,” extends to 
“the right to believe or not to believe,” which is central to “a person’s dignity” (Lord 
Dyson, para 39). Similarly, it is the right to relate or “voluntary association” that is 
“fundamental…to human dignity” and not the “characteristic” of, for example, being 
gay (Aleinikoff 2003, 270, 283–284). In applying HJ and HT one sees an iteration of 
the established case law that, perhaps, opens a new door to de-essentialise 
problematic immutability-based determinations: 
“[T]he right not to hold the protected beliefs is a fundamental right 
which is recognised in international and human rights law and…the 
Convention too. There is nothing marginal about it. Nobody should be 
forced to have or express a political opinion in which he does not 
believe. He should not be required to dissemble on pain of 
persecution” (Lord Dyson, para 42). 
Importantly, the Supreme Court makes no distinction between “the conscientious 
non-believer, and the indifferent non-believer” but instead asserts that “[a]ll are 
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equally entitled” to protection under the Convention if they have a well-founded fear 
of persecution (Lord Dyson, para 45).  
Relational autonomy re-politicises the private sphere, which is necessary 
because a crucial component of successful claims is to avoid becoming non-political 
“victims” in the narrative (see Johnson 2011, 65; Parekh 2012). Persecutory 
discourses in some states have pronounced that human rights are a Western 
construct, and that homosexuality is a white man’s disease and a symbol of capitalist 
extravagance (see e.g. Kouri 2012; Wilkinson 2014; Rakotomanga 2015).298 Rather 
than perpetuating the monolithic category of “normal” LGBT rights holders, i.e. 
“good gays,” the discursive justifications for persecution can be appropriated and 
used to assert the legitimacy of the political choice of norm deviance to include those 
“perverse” sexual minorities and “bad queers” too (see chapter four). In the particular 
context of refugee law, this strategy also avoids essentialising homosexuality as “a 
poor second choice” (D’Emilio 1998, 244–245), whereby only a “born gay” becomes 
and is entitled to be gay asylum seeker. Whether a person’s own experience of 
gender or sexuality is immutable or not should be immaterial in RSD; the only 
evident fact is that they are entitled to the relational autonomy to choose and 
actualise norm deviance, not as a privilege but as people with equal moral worth to 
their heterosexual counterparts.299  
“There is nothing marginal” (Lord Dyson, para 42) about the relational 
autonomy of claimants with non-conforming genders and sexualities. By deploying 
the same discourses that are used to delegitimise, threaten, and oppress sexual 
minorities, RSD can attend to the public, political dimensions of persecution that are 
apparently required to qualify for refugee status: “gay rights are human rights” is 
propaganda (political opinion), homosexuality is an affliction of the soul (religion) 
and an effect of economic and social change (see Cooper 1994, 437, 443 on 
counterdiscourse).300 Rather than normalising LGBT identities in RSD, emphasising 
the discourses of persecution in gatekeeping would maintain the “public” visibility 
and political acts of being a sexual minority. The “corrupt” or “deviant” qualities of 
                                                 
298 See e.g. Amare [2005], para 3, 6; Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004], para 24. 
299 See Lord Rodger in HJ and HT, para 78. 
300 See e.g. RM and BB [2005], para 45: “Islam considers homosexuality to be a sexual deviation 
leading to a perverted act which goes against the natural order God intended for mankind.” 
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being sexually and gender non-conforming, even “in the closet,” as well as “coming 
out” and transgressing compulsory heterosexuality in the “public” sphere, are 
political acts, an exercise of free conscience, and can provoke political persecution in 
addition to the “attributes” of being a sexual minority and member of a PSG.  
2.2.3 Relational autonomy and hard cases 
A relational approach to rights and choice considers the social context and its 
implications for self-determination (see Held 1987, 271; Lacey 1998, 110–116; 
Figure 3). For example, sex workers are excluded from the construct of refugee in an 
immutable approach, because they have “chosen” the work and thus “created” the 
circumstances of discrimination and persecution.301 Yet, I argue they should still 
qualify for refugee status under the social perception approach – i.e. seeing 
persecution based on norm deviance (see Aleinikoff 2003, 286 on “circular 
constitution;” Inlender 2009, 371, 379) – and that persecution may be established by 
the deprivation of their relational autonomy as a result of the work performed. Sex 
workers and other claimants may be subjected to discriminatory persecution that, in 
the framework of relational autonomy, cannot be simply discounted as self-imposed. 
To take another example, Internet pornography has recently been the subject of 
public scrutiny and at the centre of contentious academic debates, including on the 
construction of sexualities; thus pornography is especially relevant here considering 
that greater media connectivity has expanded the scope of its production, 
consumption, and potential influence globally. As a hard case for refugee status, 
pornography raises questions about the possible extent of consent and choice, and 
troubles public and private dichotomies. The following example of same-sex African 
pornographic films amplifies these concerns like “the exaggerated propulsiveness of 
wearing flippers in a swimming pool” (Sedgwick 1991, 3).  
Nzioka (2014), a sexual minority rights activist in Kenya, writes that recently 
gay porn filmmakers have paid “young boys,” “dark and black,” to feature in risky 
                                                 
301 This is a simplified account; however, I do not envisage that sex work would be something that an 
individual “should not be required to change” under, either, international or UK law currently. If sex 
workers could be read-in as a PSG, I do not see why, prima facie, UK jurisprudence would not 
support a claim to fear persecution per, e.g., Simon Brown LJ (8) in Ahmed [1999]. 
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sex videos (see also Cervulle and Rees-Roberts 2009 on “orientalist fetish porn”).302 
Purportedly as a result of their appearance in porn, many actors have been hiding in 
fear for their lives, lost friends, and this is compounded by their HIV status (Nzioka 
2014). Whether they have a well-founded fear of persecution for refugee status 
would be an example of a hard case. Kenya has anti-sodomy laws, but few 
convictions; has denied registration of sexual minority civil society groups, yet has a 
vocal community of domestic activists; and the country hosts sexual minority 
refugees from neighbouring countries (Kalan 2011; Ali 2013; Breen and Millo 2013; 
Gitari 2014). In the same year the Kenyan President warned against homosexual 
“witch-hunts,” two men were subjected to forced HIV testing and rectal examination 
by authorities (Agutu 2015). Ugandan refugees have “regretted fleeing to Kenya,” 
where they have been harassed and attacked in camps and even mistreated by 
UNHCR employees (Igunza 2015; cf. Breen and Millo 2013). Criminalisation and 
restrictions on speech and association are common throughout Africa, and even in 
constitutionally progressive South Africa sexual minorities, including refugees from 
other parts of the continent, face systemic violence (Mudzingwa 2012; PASSOP 
2013; Jaeger 2014; see also PASSOP 2014).  
In this hypothetical case, a gatekeeper may infer that persecution resulting 
from the individual’s actions is muted by the fact that those actions were consented 
to and (apparently) unpunished by the state despite Kenya’s anti-sodomy laws.303 But 
the young men who performed now fear violent non-state retribution for their actions 
(Nzioka 2014). Relational autonomy would not disqualify their claim just because 
they had acted “rationally,” considering the constraints of the context in which those 
choices were made (see Lacey 1998, 78–80, 193–197; Nedelsky 2001b, 249; Downie 
and Llewellyn 2011, 7).  
                                                 
302 I cannot independently verify this account, however, Nzioka is well-known in the community of 
sexual minority rights advocates; e.g. Nzioka was one of ten activists pictured on a controversial 
front-page story, “Top gays,” run by a Kenyan tabloid (Morgan 2015). Regardless of the veracity of 
the claims, the example of sex workers is thought provoking and relevant to this project for expanding 
the scope of narrowly-categorised “LGBT” case law. The story is also highly relevant in the 
contemporary rights landscape of Africa, including topics of postcolonialism, health, sex work, and 
the very rights to be a sexual minority, e.g., a gay porn actor (see e.g. Cervulle and Rees-Roberts 
2009, 198–201; Rothmann 2013, 26–27; Klinken and Zebracki 2015). 
303 See also RM and BB [2005], para 11-14, 96: “E” had appeared in a safe sex education video that 
showed other participants engaging in same-sex sex. Although E had only participated as a 
“presenter,” his fear of persecution was grounded in his involvement in a film the state had allegedly 
found to be obscene. 
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The benchmark of “rationality” is problematic in RSD. Challenging the 
assumptions of how “rational” potential victims or victims of violence have acted or 
should have behaved according to the UK requires intense scrutiny. Chief Inspector 
Vine (2014, 22) finds that adjudicators are entitled to disbelieve evidence of deviant 
behaviour that might have been avoided by the asylum seeker (and, by extension, the 
identity claimed) that could have been discovered by the state and resulted in 
persecution. Generally, the UK thus continues to hold that no credible asylum seeker 
would have placed herself in a position of possible harm. For example, an applicant 
claiming to have had sex in a family home where she may have been discovered in 
spite of the consequences of persecution can be dismissed as unfounded (Vine 2014, 
21–22). As discussed in chapter four, like discretion, I would argue that these 
assumptions of rationality can be an “invidious form of victim blaming” (Millbank 
2012, 504; 2013, 37; see also McCaul et al. 1990 on “foreseeability”).  
On the other hand, a relational autonomy approach to determination would 
acknowledge that people cannot be regarded as wholly rational. The “puzzling fact” 
is that people often make choices that compromise their subsistence or very survival 
(Sherwin 2011, 17). Issues of consent and choice are particular to the circumstances 
of a case and practically difficult to assess (Lacey 1998, 93–94, 113–114). With 
respect to the example of same-sex pornography in Kenya, I would highlight that the 
ideas of consent and choice of the performers may be coextensive with the 
problematic idea of rationality (Sherwin 2011, 18–19). They consented to act, but 
other contextual constraints such as the availability of work in the economy, demand 
for risky sex in the industry, and their own sexualities, bodies, and basic human 
needs may have influenced that consent and choice (Lacey 1998, 117).  
One must also consider how relational autonomy addresses the public/private 
dichotomy. The “privacy” of norm deviance is always strapped with the anxiety and 
fear of it being made public in an unsafe space (see Lacey 1998, 71–97; Oswin 2001, 
357–358). Even in private spaces, acts and identities are potentially public. RSD 
should not focus on the expressed desires of an individual to live a quiet life or a 
political one, but on an objective analysis of the persecutory intent. That is, 
gatekeepers must consider the consequences of the norm deviance becoming 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Relational autonomy, embodied rights, and the judgment of persecution  235 
public.304 Sex work can (possibly) be hidden and unknowable, off-camera and 
confined to the closet but, like the persistent risk of discovery in more “discreet” 
deviances, the inevitable release of the film precipitated the breakdown of 
relationships leading to the risk of harm for the performers.  
Public/private dichotomies are unsustainable when considered relationally 
(see Parekh 2012, 273). The public nature of pornography is an exaggerated form of 
a broader contemporary reality: people are all, always, under constant surveillance 
(Bedoya 2014; Parkinson 2014). For example, consider the means Russian gangs 
have used to lure sexual minorities through “discreet” private networks out into the 
open. Posing as sexual minorities on social media, gangs have used deception in 
order to subject individuals to verbal harassment and assault, posted media of the 
incidents online to further humiliate the victims, and threatened to reveal them to 
friends and relatives (Essig 2013; Parkinson 2014; Stonewall 2014; VICE 2014).305 
Surveillance may have less purchase in certain localities or fewer effects on certain 
people (e.g. economic/class privileged sexual minorities), but as same-sex intimacy 
shifts from hidden relations to more open identities including the political demand 
for a “right to relate” (Waaldijk 2013), the possibilities for discovery and persecution 
may become diffuse (see also Phillips 1997, 484–486 on visibility).  
Finally, the implication of the “heteronormative panopticon” is that norm 
deviance always exists in “glass closets” (see chapter five; Kuhar and Švab 2008; 
Kuhar 2012; Švab and Kuhar 2014). The “city” should not be assumed to afford 
anonymity. While especially applicable to the Kenyan porn actors, this is also more 
widely relevant than UK adjudicators seem to recognise. The myth of cities as 
sanctuaries (see D’Emilio 1983; Young 1990, 12–13, 236–239, 247; Eribon 2004) 
and safe spaces for internal relocation is based on the notion that one could be 
reasonably expected to resettle internally without the need of asylum (Jansen 2013; 
see also Jaeger 2014 on Cape Town). However, where relationships and livelihoods 
are at risk, the very liveability of any place in the country may always be under threat 
                                                 
304 Lacey (1998, 83) observes that “the assumption that the world can be divided into separate spheres 
obscures the interdependence of those [public and private] spheres and the spill-over from oppression 
in one sphere to subordination in another.” I argue that “private” life in RSD should be carefully 
bracketed and not broadly applied despite, like identity, the strategic appeal. See also Sheill (2009, 
62–64) on gender, private life, and human rights, Oswin (2001, especially 351), and Parekh (2012). 
305 See also HJ [2008], para 21 on Iranian authorities using internet chatrooms to entrap homosexuals. 
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of the exposure of the norm deviance. Fundamentally, the relational critique attempts 
to show that maintaining the notional possibility of absolute privacy within private 
life is misguided at best, and at worst undermines the very purpose of refugee status 
for the protection from discriminatory persecution that seeks to eradicate the deviant 
“private” acts.  
3 Conclusion 
The denial of relational autonomy is not only contrary to the Convention, but should 
be considered to be at the root of the definition of persecution. An open-textured 
reading of the Convention, a commitment to human rights discourse (e.g. the rights 
to expression and association), and the use of the concept of relational autonomy, all 
help to build an appropriate framework of refugee protection. Understanding PSG 
and persecution through the lenses of norm deviance and relational autonomy, 
respectively, is more attentive to global diversity and to local and individual genders 
and sexualities. The concept of norm deviance avoids essential, immutable 
categories, and relational autonomy avoids persecution for reasons of those reified 
categories – all are entitled to relational autonomy without the fear of being 
persecuted. 
Finally, having introduced this thesis with the story of John Bosco, it is 
helpful to conclude this final chapter with the thoughts of an asylum seeker on what 
refugee protection means to him. J/HJ told adjudicators: 
“I am no longer living in fear as I was when I was living in Iran... I 
want an average life and would like to be involved in a loving 
relationship. I do not believe that I should have to go without having a 
normal life and a partner whom I can be with openly and live in a 
society where I am accepted. This is what I would be forced to do 
without if I were forced to return to Iran.”306 
J/HJ’s aspiration is, in sum, relational autonomy. Refugee status determination calls 
for “the most anxious scrutiny,” because “at stake…is fundamental rights, including 
the right to life itself.”307 The lives that sexual minority refugees have been deprived 
of in their countries of origin is one in which they can form and develop 
relationships, express themselves, and associate with others in the public sphere. It is 
                                                 
306 J [2006], para 12; see also Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004], para 15-16. 
307 Dyson LJ in Sivakumar [2001], para 30. 
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relational autonomy that enables the exercise of fundamental human rights without 
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Conclusion 
Arendt (1967, 294) wrote in 1951 that “[t]he more the number of rightless people 
increased, the greater became the temptation to pay less attention to the deeds of the 
persecuting governments than to the status of the persecuted.” Despite the 
longstanding, entrenched political impetus to focus on the narrow grounds of an 
individual claim, it is the persecutory intent (and its effects on refugees) that requires 
renewed emphasis. Understanding sexual minorities as a PSG through the concept of 
norm deviance, and seeing persecution through the lens of relational autonomy, 
achieves the aim of maintaining the integrity of the Convention, yet with a more 
appropriate interpretation of refugee status. 
 The introductory chapters in Part I first addressed whether there may be a 
transnationally recognisable “gay” identity, and then explored the history, 
international framework, and domestic implementation of refugee law. These two 
background chapters allowed for chapter three to propose an appropriate research 
design that would facilitate an exploration of the most relevant research questions. 
Chapter one concluded that “gay” identities are rooted in Western medico-legal 
discourses that have subsequently become established by “LGBT” social 
movements, and these categories have become “global” to some extent. However, in 
addition to the historical contingency of “Western” categories and the globalisation 
of those discourses, we still have cultural uniqueness, global diversity, and different 
individual experiences of gender and sexuality. The challenge in the asylum context, 
then, is how to adjudicate sexual minority claims, and what can be “known” of these 
identities, while remaining sensitive to different cultural notions of gender and 
sexuality and to individual subjectivity. 
 Turning to refugee law, chapter two summarised the origins and continuing 
significance of key instruments and institutions, as well as the core concepts of 
refugee status, namely the definition of Article 1A(2). The analysis here suggested 
that Signatory States perceived that international consensus over the meaning and 
application of the Convention was essential to share the “burden” of refugees. The 
“social group” category of the refugee definition may be an organic element of 
refugee law. Yet, analysis should still remain attentive to the limits of the construct 
of “refugeehood,” which may, like other social categorisations, simplify the social 
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world, become inflexible, and erase the personal histories and experiences of people 
fleeing persecution. Part I concluded by considering research design and 
methodology, socio-legal discourse analysis and the necessary theoretical tools to 
conduct this research. From the perspectives of constructivist and critical theories, 
the primary research question asked: how do UK legal institutions construct 
“legitimate” or “genuine” sexual minority asylum seekers in judicial discourse?  
 Part II of this thesis addressed the research questions in two chapters that 
interrogated the legal construction of the PSG and persecution, respectively, which 
are essential conditions for sexual minorities to be recognised as refugees. Chapter 
four considered the evolution of PSG, particularly the development and continued 
application of the discretion requirement in just over a decade of case law, until the 
Supreme Court recognised the expectation of discretion was contrary to the 
Convention; the decision in HJ and HT [2010] also affirmed sexual minorities’ rights 
to expression and association without the fear of persecution. An interrogation of the 
judicial construction of identity revealed that adjudicators have often sought to define 
the acceptable behaviours of “good gays” who may bring themselves under the 
Convention category of PSG, but to the exclusion of “bad queers” or “perverse” 
asylum seekers. Further questions remain regarding the “scope” of sexual and gender 
identities, and the associated behaviour that may qualify for refugee status in the UK. 
Post-HJ and HT there also remains the intractable problem of establishing the “truth” 
of one’s identity in claiming asylum, as well as the “seriousness” and “likelihood” of 
being persecuted.  
The next chapter considered the interpretation of persecution and 
determination of whether sexual minorities are at risk. The UK no longer considers 
how and what persecutory treatment may be “reasonably tolerable” or is 
“permissible” and recognises that, in an important sense, discretion is persecution. 
However, the analysis suggested that the concept of persecution remains ambiguous, 
contested, and potentially exclusionary. I argued that persecution has been and 
remains a difficult condition to assess, leaving ample opportunity for judicial 
discretion, and critically that it allows courts to hide behind international norms or 
consensus in refusing refugee status. In fact, the politics of immigration control, the 
perceived need to adhere to an international consensus, and following a lowest 
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common denominator approach in the recognition of sexual minority refugees, have 
preoccupied the legal discourse – i.e. the political imagination of adjudicators has 
kept the “floodgate” closed to the masses of the world’s “bad queers.” While the 
UK’s recognition of refugees has indeed expanded to include persecuted “gay” 
people, we should remain attentive to this “inclusive guise,” the potential for 
exclusion in the construct of refugee arising from merely adding an additional 
category, and how this may in turn be used to “pinkwash” and justify the 
maintenance of a perceived floodgate. Based on these findings, Part III elaborated 
two concepts grounded in the analysis of the case law – norm deviance and relational 
autonomy – and argued for creative compassion in RSD.  
 This thesis has found that, in practice, a sexual minority asylum seeker is 
presumed cisgender heterosexual until they prove otherwise. The general legal 
rationale may be that, in a practical sense, if there is a material fact to benefit an 
individual, they have the burden of proving that fact or status which benefits them, 
such as their being gay and the risk to them of being persecuted in order to claim 
refugee status.308 However, it is the assumption that everyone is cisgender 
heterosexual unless they prove otherwise that I have argued is sociologically, as well 
as ethically, problematic: if the sex/gender and hetero/homo binaries are scrutinised, 
there are many different ways of being sexual and gendered. Whether or not non-
normative gender and sexual identities are immutable – biologically rooted and to 
what degree – is beside the point. Determining refugee status on the grounds of 
homonormative LGBT categories is both morally wrong and a transgression of the 
ideals of international protection. What matters is not “how gay” or “what” an 
asylum seeker “is” or “does,” but whether they have a well-founded fear of 
persecution, and this can be assessed by whether and how the asylum seeker is 
normatively perceived as deviant, and whether that results in discriminatory 
persecution. 
The sociology of identity clashes with the need for “truth” in legal 
frameworks – in the present case, the question of who is a “genuine” gay refugee. 
From a sociological perspective the sexual and gendered lives of individuals are 
performative, contingent, and fluid. Legal interpretation and decision-making 
                                                 
308 Thank you to Antony Duff and Claudio Michelon for their comments which brought out these 
points in discussion of a draft (Olsen 2015). 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Conclusion   241 
translates the social reality into something static, measured, and quantifiable. In some 
respects, this thesis has attempted to frame an epistemology of what one cannot 
know in refugee status determination, which is the set of “immutable” traits or 
“characteristics” of an individual’s inner life that should not be violated. One’s 
“inner life” is subjective, based on the personal experiences of an asylum seeker, 
which cannot be fully explained or externally verified. Yet, what cannot be known is 
still immeasurably important to living and experiencing gender and sexuality. What 
may be known, on the other hand, is the persecutory intent and discriminatory 
consequences of living a non-conforming sexual or gendered life in the country of 
origin.  
In presuming that sexual and gender identity is something that can be known, 
refugee status determination has created a reified framework with unnecessary, 
potentially dire consequences. Alternatively, the Refugee Convention can be 
creatively and compassionately interpreted and applied, without the present 
exclusions or arbitrary narrowing of protection, and by using existing legal tools. My 
conclusion is that part of the solution is thinking about the problem of identity in 
asylum claims differently. And in discussing that problem I hope to have at least 
cultivated scepticism of claims to human rights and refugee status that are predicated 
solely on the immutability of identity. It does matter that people claim asylum on 
grounds of being lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, but it is more important that 
the recognition of refugees bestows upon persons – whatever identity claimed – with 
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Appendix I – List of abbreviations and 
acronyms  
AIA 2004 – Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 
AIT – Asylum and Immigration Tribunal 
API – Asylum Policy Instruction 
BDSM – Bondage, discipline (or domination), sadism, and masochism 
CFREU – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
CJEU – Court of Justice of the European Union 
CG – Country Guidance (case) 
COI – Country of origin information; country information and guidance 
DFT – Detained fast-track 
DSSH – Difference, stigma, shame, and harm 
ECJ – European Court of Justice 
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights; Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights 
EU – European Union 
EWCA – England and Wales Court of Appeal 
EWHC – High Court of Justice of England and Wales 
FTT – First Tier Tribunal 
FGM – Female genital mutilation  
HCA – High Court of Australia 
HDT – Human Dignity Trust 
HRA – Human Rights Act 1998 
HRBA – Human rights based approach (to determination) 
IAA – Immigration Appellate Authority 
IAC – Immigration and Asylum Chamber 
IAT – Immigration Appeals Tribunal 
ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
IJ – plural IJJ – Immigration Judge(s) 
IRO – International Refugee Organization 
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J – plural JJ – Justice(s); Judge(s) 
LJ – plural LJJ – Lord(s) Justice 
LGBT – Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
LGBTI – Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex 
MSM – Men who have sex with men 
NIAA 2002 – Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 
OHCHR – United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
PSG – Particular social group 
RSD – Refugee status determination 
SOGI – Sexual orientation and gender identity 
SSHD – Secretary of State for the Home Department 
TCEA 2007 – Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 
TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UK – United Kingdom 
UKBA – UK Border Agency 
UKHL – UK House of Lords 
UKLGIG – UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group 
UKSC – UK Supreme Court 
UKVI – UK Visas and Immigration 
UN – United Nations 
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme  
UNGA – UN General Assembly 
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNRRA – United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
UNTS – United Nations Treaty Series 
US BIA – United States Board of Immigration Appeals 
UT – Upper Tribunal 
VCLT – Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
.
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Appendix II – Glossary  
adjudicators – This term is used broadly in this thesis to describe decision-makers at 
all levels of the asylum appeals process, including Home Office officials, tribunals, 
and courts. But that usage should not be confused with the title formerly held by 
Immigration Judges, Adjudicators. See also “gatekeeper,” and chapters two and 
three. 
 
circular constitution or circularity – A notion crucial to the construct of what may 
constitute a PSG; the international consensus is that a PSG cannot be defined by 
“circularity” or have a “circular constitution.” That is to say the social group must 
exist independently of the persecution feared or not exist, as Lord Millet argued of 
domestic violence victims in Islam and Shah [1999], because of the persecution 
suffered. Lord Millet (172) dissented on the grounds of the appellants’ imputed 
social group: “Battered wives do not form a social group because, if the group is 
limited to battered wives, it is defined by the persecution, while if it is extended to 
include all married women, those who are battered are not persecuted because they 
are members of the group.” On the other hand, McHugh J (173) of the HCA wrote in 
Appellant A [1997] that “while persecutory conduct cannot define the social group, 
the actions of the persecutors may serve to identify or even cause [its] creation.” See 
also Good (2007, 71–84) on anthropological versus legal perspectives of a social 
group, Aleinikoff (2003) on the “social perception” approach to PSG interpretation, 
chapter four of this thesis, and Lord Rodger (para 77-79) in K and Fornah [2006] for 
further discussion of “circularity.” 
 
compulsory heterosexuality – A term coined by Rich (1980; see also Butler 1991; 
Sedgwick 1991, 81). Compulsory heterosexuality can be generally likened to the 
terms “institutionalized heterosexuality” (e.g. Weeks 2007, 12) and 
“heteronormativity” (e.g. Warner 1993; McGhee 2001b) among others. However, I 
use compulsory heterosexuality to emphasise the argument that the absence of a 
meaningful choice or outright prohibition of sexual and gendered non-conformity 
can be persecutory. 
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concealment – see “discretion.” 
 
core entitlements – This term refers to human rights and the assessment of 
persecution. In this sense persecution “is most appropriately defined as the sustained 
or systemic failure of state protection in relation to one of the core entitlements 
which has been recognized by the international community” (Hathaway 1991, 112). 
Following from this definition of persecution, Hathaway’s (1991, 108–112) widely 
cited “core entitlement” scheme comprises four tiers: the first being the UDHR rights 
translated into the ICCPR to create binding obligations, and the failure to secure 
these for citizens is persecutory. Second are the UDHR provisions within the ICCPR 
exempt in cases of a “public emergency,” when they may be infringed but not 
unexceptionally or in a discriminatory fashion. Third are UDHR rights recited in the 
ICESCR which is not binding, but these can still constitute persecution when they 
are not equally guaranteed to citizens. The fourth tier is the remaining non-binding 
UDHR rights which are not codified in international instruments and so 
infringements here alone rarely amount to persecution. See e.g. Ullah [2004], para 
32, Z [2004], para 11, Amare [2005], para 17. 
 
country assessment(s) or country of origin information (COI) – These terms are 
used in this thesis to discuss a range of evidential documents that are considered in 
determinations as, or to establish “facts” about the circumstances of a particular 
claim, including: UK Government reports, foreign governments’ reports, NGO 
research and publications, and other material relating to the social, legal, and 
economic status of sexual minorities in foreign countries. The UK has used specific 
terms for types of reports it issues but these have changed during the period from 
which cases have been sampled. Therefore, I use general terms to avoid confusion, 
and also intend to reflect on the broader scope of evidence which can be submitted to 
dispute or support a claim. Currently the UKVI refer to specific guidance as 
“Country information and guidance,” and formerly the UKBA’s Country of Origin 
Information Service produced Country of Origin Information Reports and the UKBA 
also used Operational Guidance Notes. Another key source of information in RSD is 
CG determinations of the UT; see generally Thomas (2008). 
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deviance and deviant – see “norm deviance.” 
 
discretion or concealment – The concept of “discretion” or, as Lord Hope (HJ and 
HT [2010], para 20) termed, “concealment” stipulates that the asylum seeker would 
not be at risk of persecution in the country of origin if they conducted, for example, 
their sexual lives privately and did not flaunt their sexual identity publicly. Critically, 
discretion reasoning contributes to the “production of ‘invisible’ homosexuality [and] 
perpetuates the continued social eradication of the expression, public visibility, and 
even the practice of homosexuality in the countries concerned” (McGhee 2001, 25; 
see also Millbank 2004, 214; Johnson 2007, 108). For example, in Z [2004], the 
appellant complained in the application for permission to appeal that the SSHD and 
Tribunal had failed to consider “why [he] had conducted his personal relations 
discreetly,” i.e. to avoid persecution (cited in Buxton LJ, para 20). However, Z was 
not being required, according to adjudicators, but chose to be in the closet (Tribunal 
determination, cited in Z [2004], para 6). Evidence of previous discretion was often 
used to legitimise the requirement of future discretion in the adjudication of asylum 
claims until 2010. J [2006] would later develop a test for determining whether 
discretion was reasonably tolerable (see generally Buxton 2012). As discussed in the 
case law analytical chapters four and five, the UKSC judgment in HJ and HT [2010] 
found that discretion and reasonable tolerability were incompatible with the 
Convention. See also RT and KM [2012] regarding political opinion and MT [2011] 
regarding religion. 
 
ejusdem generis – Meaning, “of the same kind.” This is a doctrine of legal reasoning 
that has been called a “legal ‘canon of construction,’” which requires that “when 
interpreting a list of items in a statute, one should read general items in the same 
spirit as those which are specified” (Good 2007, 75). Law and Martin (2014) give a 
helpful illustration of ejusdem generis: “when a list of specific items belonging to the 
same class is followed by general words (as in ‘cats, dogs, and other animals’), the 
general words are to be treated as confined to other items of the same class (in this 
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example, to other domestic animals).” This “canon of construction” has been crucial 
in the legal interpretation of Article 1A(2) and PSG. 
 
gatekeepers or gatekeeping – The concept of gatekeepers is borrowed from Bhabha 
(2002), who argues that all actors in the field are implicated in the inclusion and 
exclusion of refugees. In addition to the state’s adjudicators of asylum claims, 
solicitors, barristers, activists, and academics participate in the construction of 
refugee. For example, Zimmerman and Mahler (2011, 420) observe that academic 
research has contributed to the progressive recognition of LGBT refugees. 
Importantly, Bhabha (2002) suggests that human rights and refugee advocates 
actively participate in the sorting of genuine and non-genuine claims, facilitating 
“gatekeeping” and legitimating state practice. For instance, consider how advocating 
for an asylum seeker with, perhaps, a strategic preference for certain terms like LGB 
or T, and using the associated stereotypes to advance a claim may in turn effect the 
state’s recognition of refugees. Bhabha (2002, 161) argues that the process of 
gatekeeping “keeps migration exclusion morally defensible” or, as Luibhéid (2008, 
179–180) puts similarly, the select few that receive asylum “lend credence to claims 
of first-world humanitarianism and democratic freedom.” I use the term gatekeeping 
critically, because the literature suggests that RSD is necessarily political, and 
constitutes an appraisal of the conditions in the country of origin (see e.g. Zolberg et 
al. 1989, 272–275; Miller 2005, 143, 166). See also McGhee (2001b, 38) on 
“specific intellectuals” and the “suspension of the system” in the inclusion of sexual 
minorities as a PSG.    
 
gender identity – As defined by the preamble of the Yogyakarta Principles (2007), 
gender identity is “each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of 
gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including 
the personal sense of the body and other expressions of gender, including dress, 
speech and mannerisms.” The UKBA/UKVI use this definition of gender identity 
(API 2011, 4). Gender identity is explored in more depth in, especially chapters one 
and six. See also “sexual minority.”  
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genuine – see “legitimate.”  
 
intertextual and intertextuality – The “intertextual perspective [sees] discourse as 
the recontextualising of already existing forms and meanings, one text echoing and 
partially replaying the forms, meanings and values of another” (Jaworski and 
Coupland 1999b, 53, see also 139). Therefore, the intertextual approach aims “to 
track how various forms of discourses, and their associated values and assumptions, 
are incorporated into a particular text, why, and with what effects” (Jaworski and 
Coupland 1999a, 9). Intertextuality is used in this study to understand how cases and 
concepts are cited and deployed, for example, by other judgments, government 
policies, and in decision-making (see Benwell and Stokoe 2006, 107). 
 
legitimate or genuine – These terms are used somewhat interchangeably but a 
different connotation is intended in the use of each term. “Legitimate” more pertains 
to the accepted claim to refugee status; “genuine” is slightly broader and means to 
imply the asylum seeker’s sexual or gender identity is cognisable and “true,” not a 
fleeting desire or fantasy, but deeply felt and constitutive of human dignity. 
Regarding persecution, “legitimate” refers to the objective and established well-
founded fear of persecution, but again “genuine” may be broader and refer, in fact, to 
both the objective and subjective well-founded fear in the assessment of credibility. 
In other words, an asylum seeker may have a genuine, subjective fear of persecution, 
but an adjudicator may find that is not an objective fear necessary to make a 
legitimate claim to refugee status. 
 
logic of identity – A critical perspective of the “logic of identity” identifies in it “the 
danger of suppressing difference in the process of abstraction, generalisation or 
identification” (Lacey 1998, 154). While this notion is revisited throughout the 
thesis, see in particular the discussion in chapter one regarding the terms, acronyms, 
and categories used for sexual and gender identity. 
 
nexus requirement – This principle originates in the Article 1A(2) clause – “for 
reasons of” – which dictates that an asylum seeker’s well-founded fear of being 
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persecuted must be a direct result of their belonging to one of the five Convention 
categories (Hathaway 1991, 136–137).  
 
non-refoulement – In international human rights and refugee law, this legal principle 
stipulates that persons should not be returned to a state or territory where there is 
reason to believe they may be subjected to serious ill-treatment or persecution (de la 
Vega 2013).  
 
norm – See “norm deviance.” 
 
norm deviance or norm deviants – In my conceptualisation of norm deviance (see 
chapter six), I use the terms “norm” and “deviance” as empirical descriptors: norms 
are standards and “rules that govern social behaviour and are enforced by positive or 
negative sanctions;” whereas deviance “is the breaking of social rules” and is, 
therefore, different from the norm and may be sanctioned (Bruce 2006, 216, 69). 
While norm deviance may be broadly attributed to a number of groups or 
individuals, this thesis concerns norm deviance on the grounds of sex, gender and 
sexuality – the transgression of social conventions, such as defined sex/gender roles, 
socio-legal rules, or being attributed an identity viewed by wider society as perverse 
– which may place the asylum seeker at risk of discriminatory persecution. Chapter 
six argues that what is shared in common between “sexual minorities” (see below), 
the PSG, is a transgression of the norms of “compulsory heterosexuality” (defined 
above).  
 
obiter dicta or obiter dictum – Often shorted to obiter, the terms mean “things said 
by the way” or “a remark in passing.” This term is used to describe parts of legal 
decisions that are included without relation to the material facts and are therefore not 
binding on future courts through precedent (Holland and Webb 2010, 192–194). As 
obiter is not material to the decision it does not form part of the ratio decidendi or 
ratio (see “precedent,” below) but obiter can, however, be “persuasive authority” 
(see below; Law and Martin 2014). 
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persecutory intent – Chapters six and seven argue that the asylum seeker’s identity 
and behaviour should be understood differently in RSD, and defined in part by the 
behaviour of the persecutors – i.e. the persecutory intent to suppress non-conforming 
sex/gender and sexuality. I argue that persecutory intent is important to the “social 
perception” approach (see below) because its key critique of the dominant “protected 
characteristics” or “immutable” approach (see below) is that to adopt a “non-
triviality” requirement gives persecutors a blank check to suppress “non-
fundamental” behaviours or associations (Aleinikoff 2003, 300; see also Inlender 
2009, 359).  
 
personal narrative – Used broadly in this thesis to describe asylum seekers’ 
accounts presented to and assessed by adjudicators and includes, for example, the 
consistent recounting of life events, partners, letters of support and testimony from 
friends and family, and even the dates of birth of significant people in an asylum 
seeker’s life. These examples of “personal narrative” have appeared in the case law, 
literature, and are generally used in the assessment of credibility. 
 
persuasive authority – Unlike UK “precedent” (see below), adjudicators are not 
obliged to follow, for example, a judgment of the HCA. However, the decisions of 
lower courts, obiter dictum in previous decisions, and decisions of foreign authorities 
can influence the reasoning of a decision even if that court is not bound to follow the 
precedent (Holland and Web 2010, 158; Law and Martin 2014). 
 
precedent – Briefly, precedent is a decision of a court that is used in subsequent 
cases to reach an outcome consistent with the former’s reasoning of and answer to a 
legal question. “Precedent is, in theory, binding on all inferior courts (and tribunals)” 
(Holland and Web 2010, 23). As opposed to obiter dicta (defined above), binding 
precedent is the ratio decidendi or ratio of a decision – i.e. legal reasoning – that 
must be followed by lower courts and tribunals and, generally, courts are also bound 
to follow an earlier decision of the same court. Ratio is the law or legal reasoning 
applied to the material facts of a case. More specifically, ratio is the “principles of 
law on which the court reaches its decision,” which must be “deduced” from a 
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decision, the material facts of the case and legal reasoning (Law and Martin 2014). 
See chapter two, on the structure of the UK appeals process, and chapter three on my 
conceptualisation of legal decision-making. 
 
protected characteristics or immutable approach – This is an approach to the 
interpretation of PSG. “[T]he ‘protected characteristics’ approach examines whether 
a group is united by an immutable characteristic or by a characteristic so fundamental 
to human dignity that a person should not be compelled to forsake it” (Türk and 
Nicholson 2003, 17). In other words, “protected characteristics” or “immutability” 
considers whether a group shares an immutable characteristic which is fundamental 
to their human dignity that they cannot or should not be required to change or 
conceal it. Problematically, the approach presupposes there are “protected” or 
“immutable” behaviours intrinsic to categories, such as being gay, that should be 
used to limit the construct of refugee – i.e. it qualifies refugee protection with a “non-
triviality” requirement, such as going to Kylie concerts (see e.g. Hathaway and 
Pobjoy 2012, 335). See in particular chapters six and seven.  
 
psychological assessments – A term used in this thesis to refer to a range of 
assessments including those that consider post-traumatic stress, gender “dysphoria,” 
and so on. See further chapter four. 
 
skeleton or skeleton argument – This is a document prepared by the appellant and 
respondent for a trial or hearing that outlines the parties’ views of the facts and how 
the law applies; it is usually submitted to the tribunal or court in advance of oral 
arguments (Law and Martin 2014). In this thesis, skeleton refers to the written briefs 
submitted by the asylum seeker or their legal representative and representative of the 
SSHD, outlining for the adjudicator(s) the case each wishes to make regarding the 
claim.  
 
sexual orientation or sexual identity – As defined by the preamble of the 
Yogyakarta Principles (2007), sexual orientation is “each person’s capacity for 
profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate relations with, 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Glossary   252 
individuals of a different gender or the same gender or more than one gender.” I 
often use sexual identity in place of orientation, and it is considered in particular 
depth in chapters one and six. See also “sexual minority.” 
 
sexual minority – This term “refers to people who identify themselves largely 
around their preferred sexual acts and the communities of those who seek out similar 
pleasures” (UNDP 2012, 129). Sexual minority is considered in this thesis to be 
inclusive of gender minorities: “people who are more comfortable living social roles 
or appearances that do not conform with those conventionally assigned to their 
biological bodies; they may not in fact identify as either men or women” (UNDP 
2012, 129). See further chapter one. 
 
social perception approach – This is an approach to the interpretation of PSG. 
“[T]he ‘social perception’ approach examines whether or not a group shares a 
common characteristic which sets it apart from society at large” (Türk and Nicholson 
2003, 17). In other words, the “social perception” approach considers whether the 
group shares a common characteristic that sets it apart from society as different and 
makes those individuals vulnerable to persecution. The concept of “norm deviance” 
(see above) utilises a social perception analysis, and focuses determination on 
“persecutory intent” (see above). 
 
subjectivity – This term is used occasionally in this thesis in its ordinary meaning of 
personal judgment, such as a “subjective” belief or feeling something is true, as 
opposed to some “objective” or shared frame of reference. I also refer to subjectivity, 
especially in chapter six, in relation to gender and sexuality – one’s “particular 
perspective, feelings, beliefs, and desires” (Solomon 2005) about their sexual or 
gendered self. In relation to discourse analysis the term subjectivity may refer to “the 
site of our consciousness, but far from being a fully independent entity, it is bound up 
by the structures and discourses of institutional and interpersonal order, power and 
ideology” (Jaworski and Coupland 1999b, 413). 
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travaux préparatoires – Meaning, “preparatory works.” These are the background 
materials used to prepare and draft a piece legislation (Law and Martin 2014) or, for 
our purpose here, international treaty. The preparatory works of the Refugee 
Convention considered in this thesis consist of the minutes of the Ad hoc Committee 
on Statelessness and Related Problems and further Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons (see chapter two). The VCLT states 
that travaux préparatoires may be used as “supplementary means of interpretation” 
in Article 32 to confirm the meaning of Article 31, that a treaty be “interpreted in 
good faith.” See also McAdam (2011, 99–103) on the “secondary means for 
interpretation” of the Refugee Convention and utility of “all documents that had a 
formative effect on a treaty’s drafting.” 
 
.
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Appendix III – International instruments and 
preparatory works  
This appendix first lists references – by year – to the key international instruments 
discussed in this thesis. The select list does not distinguish between binding and non-
binding or international and regional instruments, but these distinctions are discussed 
in the thesis where it is relevant to UK obligations. The second list of references, the 
travaux préparatoires or “preparatory works” to the 1951 Refugee Convention, are 
cited and discussed in chapter two. The Refugee Convention’s preparatory works 
include the official records of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related 
Problems, and the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees which 
drafted and finalised the Convention, respectively. In both sections the acronym or 
abbreviation used in the thesis is listed first, such as “UDHR” and 
“A/CONF.2/SR.19,” followed by the official title. All of these documents can be 
found on Refworld, a UNHCR database.  
Select international instruments 
UNDR. UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 
December 1948, 217 A (III). Retrieved from Refworld.  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html. 
ECHR. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 
1950, ETS 5. Retrieved from Refworld.  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html.   
Refugee Convention. UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. Retrieved 
from Refworld. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html.  
ICCPR. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171. Retrieved 
from Refworld. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html.  
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ICESCR. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 
3.  Retrieved from Refworld. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html.  
1967 Protocol. UN General Assembly, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
31 January 1967, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267. Retrieved from 
Refworld. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html.  
VCLT. United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 
1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. Retrieved from Refworld. 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html.  
Preparatory works 
A/CONF.2/SR.19. UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Nineteenth Meeting, 26 November 
1951, A/CONF.2/SR.19. Retrieved from Refworld.  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68cda4.html.   
A/CONF.2/SR.21. UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Twenty-first Meeting, 26 November 
1951, A/CONF.2/SR 21. Retrieved from Refworld.  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68cdec.html.  
A/CONF.2/SR.22. UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Twenty-second Meeting, 26 November 
1951, A/CONF.2/SR.22. Retrieved from Refworld.  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68cde10.html.  
A/CONF.2/SR.23. UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
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Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Twenty-third Meeting, 26 November 
1951, A/CONF.2/SR.23. Retrieved from Refworld.  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68cda10.html.  
A/CONF.2/SR.33. UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Thirty-third Meeting, 30 November 
1951, A/CONF.2/SR.33. Retrieved from Refworld.  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68cde14.html.  
A/CONF.2/SR.34. UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Thirty-fourth Meeting, 30 November 
1951, A/CONF.2/SR.34. Retrieved from Refworld.  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68cdf0.html.  
A/CONF.2/SR.35. UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Thirty-fifth Meeting, 3 December 
1951, A/CONF.2/SR.35. Retrieved from Refworld.  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68ceb4.html. 
A/CONF.2/9. See A/CONF.2/SR.23. 
A/CONF.2/80. UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Holy See: 
Amendment to Article 1, 16 July 1951, A/CONF.2/80. Retrieved from Refworld. 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68ce76c.html.   
A/CONF.2/107. UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons: Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. United 
Kingdom: Recommendation for Inclusion in the Final Act, 25 July 
1951, A/CONF.2/107. Retrieved from Refworld.  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68cdb44.html. 
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Appendix IV – Select table of cases 
Recurring cases referenced in the thesis are listed chronologically below.309 The 
citations are followed by a hyphen and the abbreviated forms used in the in-text 
citations. The simplified titles include the appellant’s denoted name/pseudonym and 
the year the decision was handed-down, for example, Jain [1999]. Case citations 
containing “Secretary of State for the Home Department” are abbreviated “SSHD.” 
For clarity, the cases are divided into two lists between domestic and international 
authorities. Other cases that are considered less frequently are cited in full in the 
thesis in footnotes. Cases examined in depth, offset in bold font, are summarised in 
Appendix V.  
Domestic cases 
R v SSHD ex parte Binbasi [1989] Imm AR 595 – Binbasi [1989]. 
Islam v SSHD Ex Parte Shah [1999] UKHL; [1999] I.N.L.R. 144 (referenced) – 
Islam and Shah or Islam and Shah [1999]. 
Jain v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 3009; [2000] I.N.L.R. 71 (referenced) – Jain or 
Jain [1999]. 
Ahmed (Iftikhar) v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 3003; [2000] I.N.L.R. 1 (referenced) – 
Ahmed [1999]. 
Horvath v SSHD [2001] 1 AC 489 – Horvath [2001].  
Sivakumar v SSHD [2001] EWCA Civ 1196 – Sivakumar [2001]. 
Z and M and A v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 952 – Z and M and A [2002]. 
Sepet and another v SSHD [2003] UKHL 15 – Sepet [2003].  
R (on the application of Dawkins) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2003] EWHC 373 
Admin – Dawkins [2003]. 
                                                 
309 The chronology of the cases is general, by year, and I do not necessarily flag when they were heard 
or handed-down to correctly order where multiple cases are cited in a given year. Between decisions 
in a year, the higher levels of appeal are typically listed before lower authorities’ determinations. 
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Atkinson v SSHD [2003] EWHC 2369 (Admin) – Atkinson [2003]. 
R (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26 – Ullah 
[2004].  
Z v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 1578 – Z [2004]. 
R (on the application of Hoxha) v Special Adjudicator [2005] UKHL 19 – Hoxha 
[2005]. 
HC v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 893 – HC [2005]. 
Amare v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 1600 – Amare [2005]. 
RM and BB (Homosexuals) Iran CG [2005] UKIAT 00117 – RM and BB [2005]. 
K and Fornah v SSHD [2006] UKHL 46 – K and Fornah [2006]. 
RG (Columbia) v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 57 – RG [2006]. 
J v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1238 – J [2006]. 
B (claimant) v SSHD [2007] EWHC 2528 (Admin) – B [2007].  
XY (Iran) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 911 – XY [2008]. 
AK (Iran) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 941 – AK [2008]. 
HJ (homosexuality: reasonably tolerating living discreetly) Iran [2008] UKAIT 
00044 – HJ [2008].   
JM (homosexuality: risk) Uganda CG [2008] UKAIT 00065 – JM [2008]. 
HJ and HT v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 172 – HJ and HT [2009]. 
NR (Jamaica) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 856 – NR [2009]. 
MM (Iran) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 1167 – MM [2009]. 
OO (Sudan) JM (Uganda) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 1432 – OO and JM [2009]. 
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N (claimant) v SSHD [2009] EWHC 873 (Admin) – N [2009]. 
AJ (Risk to Homosexuals) Afghanistan CG [2009] UKAIT 00001 – AJ [2009]. 
MK (Lesbians) Albania CG [2009] UKAIT 00036 – MK [2009]. 
HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 – HJ and HT or HJ and 
HT [2010]. 
SW (lesbians – HJ and HT applied) Jamaica CG [2011] UKUT 00251(IAC) – SW 
[2011]. 
LZ (homosexuals) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 00487 (IAC) – LZ [2011]. 
MT (Ahmadi – HJ (Iran)) Pakistan [2011] UKUT 00277(IAC) – MT [2011]. 
RT (Zimbabwe) and KM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38 – RT and KM or RT 
and KM [2012]. 
Aderonke Adejumoke Apata (claimant) v SSHD [2015] EWHC 888 (Admin) – Apata 
[2015].  
International cases 
Matter of Acosta, A-24159781, United States Board of Immigration Appeals, 1 
March 1985 – In re Acosta [1985]. 
Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439 – Soering [1989]. 
Attorney General of Canada v Ward [1993] 2 SCR 683 – Ward [1993].  
Modinos v Cyprus (A/259) (1993) 16 EHRR 485 – Modinos [1993]. 
Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, Re GJ, No. 1312/93, New Zealand: Refugee Status 
Appeals Authority, 30 August 1995 – Re GJ [1995]. 
A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another (1997) 2 BHRC 143 – 
Appellant A [1997]. 
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Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Appellant 
S396/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71 – 
S395 [2003]. 
Refugee Appeal No. 74665, No. 74665, New Zealand: Refugee Status Appeals 
Authority, 7 July 2004 – Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004]. 
X, Y, Z v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel , C-199/12 - C-201/12, European Union: 
Court of Justice of the European Union, 7 November 2013 – X, Y and Z [2013]. 
A, B, C v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, C-148/13 to 
C-150/13, European Union: Court of Justice of the European Union, 2 December 
2014 –  A, B, and C [2014]. 
.  
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Appendix V – Case summaries  
In chronological order below are summaries of the main cases which are analysed in 
the case study chapters, four and five.310 The cases considered include: 3 House of 
Lords and Supreme Court, 13 Court of Appeal, 2 Upper Tribunal (Immigration and 
Asylum Chamber), 3 Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal, and 1 High Court decisions.311 The IAT determination, RM and BB [2005] 
is summarised because of the reliance many other cases in the sample placed on its 
findings; the two AIT determinations are considered as asylum claims which were 
appealed in other cases in the sample; finally, the UT (IAC) cases show how HJ and 
HT was applied. Setting out the key details of the cases here, and in some instances 
flagging other key cases in the jurisprudence, allows for the analysis in the case law 
analytical chapters to proceed with a focus on the concepts developed.312   
Case summaries 
 
Islam v SSHD Ex Parte Shah [1999] UKHL – hereafter Islam and Shah or Islam 
and Shah [1999] – The two conjoined appeals raise questions as to the interpretation 
of Article 1A(2) and the membership of a particular social group (PSG). The 
appellants were married Pakistani women forced from their homes by their husbands. 
Both contended that Pakistan would not protect them from persecution and that they 
may be subjected to criminal proceedings for adultery, a sentence for which included 
stoning to death. Both women had been given exceptional leave to remain but 
                                                 
310 As Appendix IV the chronology is general, by year, and I do not necessarily flag when they were 
heard or handed down to correctly order where multiple cases are cited in a given year. My analysis is 
of the broader, thematic trends in the legal discourse; this is similar to the point that I do not 
necessarily make the success or failure of sexual minority asylum claims a core issue. Though 
occasionally relevant, the final outcomes are not of particular interest here given the focus is not on, 
for example, the veracity of claims but the juridical construction of identity and persecution. 
311 The Supreme Court (UKSC) was created by the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 and began 
hearing cases in 2009 as the highest appellate court in the United Kingdom for civil cases. Formerly, 
Lords of Appeal in the Ordinary (“Law Lords”) were professional judges appointed to the House of 
Lords to perform its judicial functions. The AIA 2004 replaced the Immigration Appeal Tribunal 
(IAT) with the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) in 2005. See further chapter two 
312 Where available, I have used the Westlaw UK database, accessed through the University of 
Edinburgh, in finding, summarising, and cross-referencing the cases discussed here. Westlaw was 
especially helpful where there are more technical legal issues that are tangential to this thesis but 
fundamental to the decision, such as in HC [2005] regarding the Tribunal’s remit under the NIAA 
2002. While following the general format Westlaw of summaries as I found them to be logically 
organised, I omitted various details and added others where applicable from the text of the decisions. 
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appealed for refugee status. The question before the House of Lords was if they 
should be awarded refugee status for the unwillingness or inability of Pakistan to 
protect the women, or prosecute their husbands for past or possible future domestic 
violence, and whether the state’s failure to do so amounted to discriminatory 
persecution on account of their gender. Shah arrived in the UK in 1992; soon after 
she gave birth and claimed asylum in 1993 fearing her husband would accuse her of 
sexual immorality. Islam was a teacher in Pakistan with two children that arrived in 
the UK in 1991; her husband had been repeatedly violent since they were married in 
1971; after she intervened in a school fight between two rival factions, one of which 
her husband was a member of, he beat her twice to the point of hospitalisation, and 
her claim for refugee status on grounds of political opinion had also been rejected. 
The House relied strongly on In re Acosta’s construction of PSG, referring to 
people that share a common characteristic that they cannot change or should not be 
required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or 
consciences.313 The appeals were granted, and while Lord Millet dissented there was 
one point on which all of the judges agreed: homosexuals could constitute a PSG 
under the Convention. The majority found that Islam and Shah had a well-founded 
fear of persecution because, like homosexuals, they belonged to a PSG which existed 
independently of the persecution feared.314 Women in Pakistan suffered systemic 
discrimination due to their sex, and the state sanctioned, was unable or unwilling to 
prevent the discrimination and persecution feared by the appellants. 
Jain v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 3009 – Jain or Jain [1999] – The principles set out 
by the House of Lords in Islam and Shah were applied by the Court of Appeal in 
                                                 
313 See K and Fornah [2006], para 14; In re Acosta [1985]. In Islam and Shah, Lord Steyn (154) 
accepts the reasoning of the New Zealand Refugee Status Authority in Re GJ [1995] as correct.   
314 Lord Millet (172) argued that, unlike homosexuals, “[b]attered wives do not form a social group 
because, if the group is limited to battered wives, it is defined by the persecution.” Drawing upon 
Appellant A [1997], the majority discussed this point of a circular constitution of a PSG; although 
discrimination is common to all five grounds, “[t]he rule is that the Convention reasons must exist 
independently of, and not be defined by, the persecution” (Lord Hope, 167). In Islam and Shah, Lord 
Steyn (151) cites McHugh J (173) in Appellant A [1997] in discussion of this point: “If it were 
otherwise, Art. 1(A)2 would be rendered illogical and nonsensical. It would mean that persons who 
had a well founded fear of persecution were members of a [PSG] because they feared persecution.” 
See also Lord Rodger (para 77-79) in K and Fornah [2006] for discussion of “circularity,” and 
Appendix II. The preponderance of jurisprudence on the whether a group is “circular” appears to 
revolve around a fear of claimants choosing to be a member of a social group subjected to persecution 
for the sole purpose of claiming asylum. 
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Jain, and how PSG applied in claims based on homosexuality. The appellant’s sur 
place claim arose when Jain,315 an Indian national came to realise he was gay when 
living in the UK; 32 at the time of the appeal, he arrived in the UK at 23. Jain feared 
persecution if deported due to his country’s prohibition of sodomy – an infamous 
British colonial legacy, Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code – and being forced into 
an arranged marriage. The Adjudicator had dismissed that homosexuals were a PSG, 
and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) found that the probability of Section 377 
actually being enforced against the appellant was low. The Court of Appeal agreed 
with the IAT and dismissed Jain’s appeal. The court approved the IAT’s conclusions 
as to the infrequency of anti-sodomy prosecutions in India, and thus held that there 
was no risk to Jain other than possible harassment upon return, but not persecution.  
 The Court of Appeal did affirm that homosexuals constituted a PSG, but that 
in this case the IAT was entitled to find there was no reasonable likelihood Jain 
would be persecuted. As is discussed in the analysis in chapter four, commentators 
have argued that the court constructed a conduct-driven approach in Jain, which 
focused on the engagement in private, so-called “legitimate” sexual acts. The 
definition of persecution was also clarified, and the court stressed that the presence 
of anti-sodomy laws was insufficient, but that the threat of actual enforcement, or 
reasonable likelihood, was key. The court emphasised that the jurisprudence defined 
persecution as sustained and serious ill-treatment.316 The court did not engage 
questions of, for example, the broader effects of anti-sodomy laws or what 
prohibitions may indicate about the social status of homosexuality. The court stated 
that if there had been a reasonable likelihood of Jain being imprisoned or suffering 
significant harm for engaging in private sexual acts, that may amount to persecution. 
Z and M and A v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 952 – Z and M and A [2002] – The 
conjoined appeals of Z, M, and A primarily engaged the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), specifically 
Articles 3 (prohibition of torture) and 8 (right to a private and family life). The 
                                                 
315 Sur place, meaning, the grounds of asylum have arisen while the claimant was outside the country 
of her nationality. For example, a woman who has come to live in the UK and later comes to identify 
as a lesbian or wishes to live openly (see Battjes 2013). 
316 On the definition of persecution here, see also Kagema v SSHD [1997] Imm AR 137 and 
Sandralingum & Ravichandran v SSHD [1996] Imm AR 97.  
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Case summaries   264 
appeals were considered together because the appellants were alleged homosexuals 
from Zimbabwe. They argued their expulsion might have led to treatment in the 
Zimbabwe that infringed their ECHR rights,317 in addition to departing from the 
Refugee Convention principle of non-refoulement. Zimbabwe has anti-sodomy laws, 
under which A and his partner, W, were given suspended prison sentences. A and W 
migrated to the UK, and when A’s asylum claim was refused the appellant argued the 
Secretary of State (SSHD) had not considered whether his removal from W, who had 
leave to remain at the time, was proportionate under Article 8. The SSHD appealed 
the IAT decision that Z should not be deported, in which the Tribunal had found 
Zimbabwe would interfere with Z’s right to a private life under the ECHR.  
 On whether or not the conditions in Zimbabwe were compatible with the 
ECHR, the Court of Appeal set out that this had to be considered on a case-by-case 
basis. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had not outlined what duties 
were imposed on the expelling state where there may be a restriction on an 
individual’s sexual expression or conduct in their country of nationality. In the 
decision, the court declined to clarify the scope of the ECHR with their authority 
under the Human Rights Act (HRA). The Court of Appeal remitted the case of Z to 
the IAT, and directed the Tribunal to consider whether there was a reasonable 
likelihood Zimbabwe would enforce the anti-sodomy law.318 The court also remitted 
the case of A and instructed the IAT to consider if A were deported whether his loss 
of society of W would violate ECHR Article 8(1), and whether the SSHD’s reliance 
on Article 8(2), an exemption for immigration control, was proportionate. M’s appeal 
was dismissed as the claim on political opinion was found not to be credible on the 
facts before the IAT.   
Z v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 1578 – Z [2004] – The IAT subsequently refused Z’s 
application for asylum. Z appealed again to the Court of Appeal, the grounds for 
which relied heavily on a High Court of Australia (HCA) decision, S395 [2003],319 
regarding sexual orientation and the discretion requirement. The majority of the 
                                                 
317 In UK law, this would violate the obligations of the SSHD under the HRA. The court specifically 
relies on Soering [1989] in considering ECHR obligations in this appeal. 
318 While a similar reasoning is applied in Jain regarding the prospect of enforcement, in remitting the 
case of Z the Court of Appeal applied Modinos [1993]. 
319 S395 [2003]; the appellant also drew upon Refugee Status Appeals Authority of New Zealand in 
Refugee Appeal No. 74665 [2004] to assert a broader interpretation of persecution. 
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HCA decided that a gay asylum seeker would exercise discretion if returned to their 
country of origin to avoid harm; however, they should not be required to conceal 
their sexual orientation in order to avoid persecution, and so adjudicators must 
consider why they had been or would be discreet. The IAT supported the 
Adjudicator’s determination that there was no evidence homosexuals were at risk of 
persecution in Zimbabwe. Z argued that “persecution” existed where there was a 
discriminatory denial of a core human right, respect for his private life, and by 
extension that he had a right to live openly without fear of persecution. Drawing on 
S395 [2002], Z argued that the IAT had not considered why he had previously been 
discreet in Zimbabwe.  
 However, Buxton LJ of the Court of Appeal concluded that Z himself had 
given no specific evidence addressing why he had conducted his personal relations 
discreetly in Zimbabwe. The court held that “persecution” did not apply to all denials 
of human rights, and there must also be serious harm.320 The court concluded that the 
IAT did not suggest, as Z argued, that his claim to refugee status was insufficient 
because he could act discreetly.321 Z would only continue to act as he had previously, 
and thus there was no reason to believe that Z living discreetly in Zimbabwe with his 
partner, D, would result in persecution. Jacob LJ agreed with Buxton LJ’s judgment, 
but adds that there was a contradiction in the Z’s case. Z stated specifically that he 
wanted to live with D, who was in Zimbabwe, but there was no evidence that D 
could or wished to leave Zimbabwe. Therefore, the UK granting refugee status to Z 
“could not help [him] – his rights (assuming he has them) to live with D cannot be 
protected or achieved by asylum” (Jacob LJ, para 25). The appeal was dismissed. 
HC v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 893 – HC [2005] – The appellant, HC, was a 
Palestinian Muslim who was born in a Lebanese refugee camp in 1971. The SSHD 
did not dispute that HC was a homosexual. HC opened a video rental shop in his 
refugee camp; following an explosion at the shop, the police were called but there 
was no investigation. There was a leaflet distributed in the camp falsely accusing him 
                                                 
320 On the deprivation of rights the court considered Ullah [2004].  
321 Regarding whether the tribunal expected discretion of Z, court refers to Ahmed [1999] in reference 
to the Simon Brown LJ’s critical question that is whether, if returned, the claimant would behave as 
stated and suffer persecution which, no matter how unreasonable, a court cannot expect him to 
change. According to Buxton LJ, the Tribunal was only really expecting Z would act as he had 
previously and, regardless of the threat of persecution, he wished to live a quiet life anyway. 
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of having pornographic videos in the shop, and a second leaflet weeks later depicted 
a headless body and said HC’s video shop must close immediately. A man named 
“Yasser Al Khateb” told HC that he and a friend had bombed the shop and 
distributed the fliers because he was gay, this was against Islam, and he must leave 
the camp. HC argued that internal relocation to Beirut was untenable as a Muslim, 
because he could not live in a Christian neighbourhood and, as gay, he could not live 
in a Muslim one. HC arrived in the UK in 1999, claiming asylum on arrival. An 
Adjudicator dismissed HC’s appeal in 2003. The Adjudicator had determined the 
threats against the claimant had been criminal, not persecutory. Permission to appeal 
to the IAT was granted but this was also unsuccessful; a question before the Court of 
Appeal was if the IAT had overreached its remit in the consideration of evidence. 
 The Court of Appeal granted HC’s appeal, and found that both the 
Adjudicator and IAT had erred on points of law. The IAT had improperly considered 
the evidence of HC’s claim, where their authority to do so had been restricted by the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.322 For her part, the Adjudicator had 
misapplied the case law and guidance relating to non-state persecution and the 
threats against HC, whose evidence could indeed amount to persecution.323 The court 
discussed the accumulation of factors of HC being both homosexual and a 
Palestinian, and how that could affect the possibility of relocating in Lebanon.  The 
court allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal (AIT), under the new framework, for fresh consideration. 
Amare v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 1600 – Amare [2005] – Amare was a lesbian 
asylum seeker from Ethiopia. The fact she was a homosexual was accepted the 
Adjudicator, Tribunal, and Court of Appeal; they also agreed that the appellant was 
therefore a member of a PSG according to precedent, and it was noted by the 
Adjudicator that she had a genuine subjective fear of persecution. Ethiopia’s anti-
sodomy law explicitly applies to female same-sex acts, which is less common than 
                                                 
322 Applying Miftari v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 481, the Court of Appeal emphasised the limited 
nature of the IAT’s jurisdiction under the 2002 Act which extends only to errors of law and that, as in 
Miftari, the Tribunal cannot reconsider the merits or evidence of the claim. 
323 In discussion of HC’s appeal, Keene LJ (para 26) writes that it is well-established that persecution 
may be non-state, where the state is unwilling or unable to intervene, citing R (on the application of 
Adan) v SSHD [2001] 2 AC 477, and also notes that Horvath [2001] outlined state protection may be 
sufficient even where violence could still, in fact, occur.  
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the criminalisation of MSM. The Adjudicator and the IAT refused Amare’s asylum 
claim and the human rights grounds, concluding that she had not been persecuted in 
the past nor would she be in the future. In Amare’s appeal, it was argued that the 
Adjudicator and IAT had failed to consider whether living openly as a lesbian would 
attract persecution, and whether the accumulated effects of discrimination against 
women and homosexuals in Ethiopia compounded the risk of future persecution. 
Amare argued for a human rights-based approach to persecution in the appeal. 
 The Court of Appeal dismissed Amare’s appeal with reasoning similar to Jain 
[1999] and Z [2004],324 but Laws LJ also wrote extensively in response to the human 
rights-based approach advocated by the appellant. Similar to Z, specifically, the court 
affirmed that Amare could return and live discreetly; Laws LJ did not view this as 
the enforcement of a discretion requirement, but in fact as a statement of how she 
had lived previously, and that she would live a quiet life in the future. It should be 
noted, however, that the court found the IAT made an error of law in stating that “[a] 
person can properly be expected to take some steps to ensure the risk he faces is 
reduced” (cited in Laws LJ, para 11, see also 5).325 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal 
underlined discretion was not required of Amare to avoid the persecution feared, but 
that it was merely an observation on the evidence that she had previously lived 
discreetly and not suffered unreasonably as a result, or experienced persecution. 
Regarding human rights, the court responded that state obligations were limited by 
what the states had contractually agreed to, and violations must be reasonably likely 
and of a substantial level of seriousness to qualify as persecution. 
RM and BB (Homosexuals) Iran CG [2005] UKIAT 00117 – RM and BB [2005] – 
The appellants were citizens of Iran whose status as homosexuals was accepted 
previously by the Adjudicators as well as in this IAT decision.326 The appeals were 
                                                 
324 See also Jain [1999], considered in Amare; Z [2004], which bears significant similarities in the 
reasoning of discretion. 
325 According to Laws LJ, this is immaterial, because the Adjudicator had not required her to take 
steps to avoid persecution but suggested as a fact based on the evidence that Amare would be discreet; 
under the AIA 2004, an appeal must be grounded on an error of law by the Adjudicator which the 
Tribunal subsequently failed to correct. While it may be that IAT had not respected the jurisprudence 
in Ahmed [1999], applied in Z [2004], according to Laws LJ in Amare the Adjudicator made no such 
mistake. 
326 Sitting on the IAT in this case were three members all bearing the specified title Vice President. 
The decision was written by “Mr D K Allen (Vice President),” who I cite as “Allen VP” where 
relevant. It is also important to note is that this case is flagged as a Country Guidance (CG) case, and 
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heard together due to the common risk claimed of being identified as homosexual 
and involved in homosexual practices which are punishable by imprisonment, 
lashings, and death in Iran. In the decision, the appellants are identified as “B” and 
“E.” The Adjudicator had found B to be credible, in part: B was in a sexual 
relationship with another man, and they had been observed and reported for 
homosexual practises in his partner’s house; the sentence was four years and four 
months in prison in addition to one hundred and twenty lashes; and the Adjudicator 
did find sentence was served in appalling conditions and B suffered severe ill-
treatment. Following their release from prison, B was having sex with the same man 
in a secluded public space when officials approached them, and B fled but his partner 
was allegedly arrested in the attempted escape. The Adjudicator speculated there was 
no way of knowing the actual reason officials arrested his partner, whether he had 
been executed, if B’s involvement was known, or if Iran would have any interest at 
all in B if he was deported by the UK. E had no past history of sexual offenses, but in 
2002 he had made a safe sex education video with a group of friends in which there 
were several people having sex and E was the presenter. Authorities had obtained the 
video, and the Adjudicator accepted this as credible. However, E was unable to 
obtain the summons allegedly sent to his family regarding the incident as evidence, 
because he had no contact with them as they were deeply religious and ashamed. The 
Adjudicator also cited a lack of evidence for the extent to which people were 
prosecuted in Iran for the production of pornographic videos, and concluded E was 
not at risk of persecution. 
 B’s appeal was based on the past conviction, which was argued to place him 
at greater risk as a known and practising homosexual. The Adjudicator is criticised 
for not asking why E’s uncle, with whom he is in contact, could not get the summons 
for evidence; yet, it is noted the state is still aware of E and on the background 
information it could be reasonably argued he is at risk of persecution in Iran. While 
the IAT found the death penalty is rarely applied, there is substantial evidence of 
harsh punishments and the SSHD agreed that lashing breaches ECHR Article 3.  
Thus, if sentenced, the appellants “would be subjected to significant prison sentences 
                                                                                                                                          
so may have been given particular weight in Tribunal adjudications which follow it regarding 
homosexual claimants from Iran. All of the Tribunal decisions which I will discuss in depth are CG 
cases, save HJ [2008]. 
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and/or lashing” (Allen VP, para 123, see also 73; quoted to highlight the absence of 
“persecution” in the careful wording of possible harm). In passing, the IAT noted 
that “discretion” had not been argued before them; while they did not wish to impose 
that requirement, they find that private homosexual conduct in Iran is unlikely to 
come to the attention of authorities.327 As B’s credibility had been accepted in part by 
the Adjudicator, the appeal was remitted for consideration of whether he may be of 
interest to Iranian authorities following the second incident, for example, if B’s 
partner had identified him. E’s appeal was remitted on the basis that the Adjudicator 
should not have assumed the summons did not exist simply because his uncle was 
unable to send it to E, and the question of what, if any, offense E had committed 
under Iranian law should be clarified.328 
K and Fornah v SSHD [2006] UKHL 46 – K and Fornah [2006] – While not 
relating to the asylum claims of sexual minorities, this House of Lords decision is 
significant in the interpretation of PSG, and illustrates a dynamic relationship 
between the Refugee Convention and the ECHR. K feared ill-treatment or 
persecution if returned to Iran because of the circumstances of her husband’s 
imprisonment. Fornah left Sierra Leone for fear of female genital mutilation (FGM). 
The question before the House of Lords was whether their respective fears of ill-
treatment, which the SSHD accepted are violations of ECHR Article 3, constituted 
persecution within the meaning of the Refugee Convention Article 1A(2) category 
PSG, which the respondent rejected. The practical importance of the “refugee status” 
distinction is that they would be accorded additional protections and benefits.  
 The House of Lords granted the appeals, clarifying that the women were 
members of a PSG. Arriving at this conclusion the House considered a number of 
international standards including the UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Gender-
related Persecution (2002), as well as the EU Council Directive 2004/83. The fact 
that K’s spouse was imprisoned was sufficient under the above guidance and the 
jurisprudence to conclude that her family was a PSG. Regarding the asylum claim of 
                                                 
327 See Allen VP, para 124; S395 [2003] cited. 
328 However, the IAT notes in expert evidence that: “Article 639 of the Islamic Law…could give rise 
to one to ten years’ imprisonment and was appropriate for someone such as E, who had provided a 
place for others to commit these crimes. For making and appearing on the video that would be the 
range of likely sentence” (Allen VP, para 52).  
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Fornah, the group of “intact” women created a common characteristic, not 
constituted by the persecution feared, of those women offset from the majority who 
were subjected to FGM, and this also represented systemic discrimination against all 
Sierra Leonean women.   
RG (Columbia) v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 57 – RG [2006] – RG was a 
homosexual and HIV-positive asylum seeker from Colombia whose claim was, 
essentially, dismissed as bogus on the grounds he was actually here for NHS 
treatment. RG had lived more than a decade as a self-identified homosexual in 
Colombia but discreetly, and claimed to fear being killed by vigilante groups in his 
country of origin because of his sexuality and serostatus. RG also argued that there 
was increased risk of his being identified as a homosexual as he had become more 
overt in the expression of his sexuality since arriving in the UK. The Adjudicator 
found that RG had not experienced persecution in the past on account of his 
concealed sexuality, nor did he leave Colombia for this reason. The appeal was on 
the grounds that RG claimed to have a right to live openly and that the medical 
evidence showed a likelihood of psychological trauma, which deportation and future 
concealment would cause. 
 RG’s appeal was dismissed, as the court found that he had lived in Colombia 
discreetly and had not suffered actual harm nor was his fear of persecution well-
founded. RG was found to have fabricated an asylum claim in order to gain treatment 
for HIV, which the court considered to have militated strongly against his 
credibility.329 The court also found that the rejection of RG’s asylum claim did not 
require discretion but, instead, he had not evidenced why the persecution he claimed 
to fear forced him to conceal his sexuality and live differently than he would have 
chosen to otherwise.330 In addition, it was decided that the Adjudicator made no error 
of law in the qualification of persecution. RG did not evidence a sufficiently severe 
or reasonably likely harm, nor did the concealment of his sexuality engage the 
                                                 
329 See also Dawkins [2003]; Dawkins, on the other hand, did not claim asylum immediately on arrival 
(para 6, 30), and appealed the decision of the SSHD upheld by the Adjudicator “for his removal to 
Jamaica as an illegal entrant after the refusal of [the] asylum application” (para 1). While issues of his 
sexuality to make a false claim did not affect the Adjudicator’s determination, Wall J clearly expresses 
scepticism (e.g. para 10-12, 15, 18). 
330 In this respect of discretion the Court of Appeal applied Z [2004]. 
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HRA/ECHR as not all rights infringements amount to persecution.331 
J v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1238 – J [2006] – “J” first claimed asylum on arrival 
in 2001. “J” is referred to in later cases as “HJ,” but I identify the appellant as “J” in 
the context of this case to avoid confusion. See further HJ [2008], HJ and HT [2009], 
and HJ and HT [2010], below. 
 J was a homosexual from Iran, who appealed the determination of the AIT 
which dismissed his claim to refugee status.332 The grounds of well-founded fear 
referenced the death penalty, though rarely applied, as well as other significant 
punishments for homosexual offences. As a “practising homosexual,” he had been 
discreet in Iran and was later in a relationship in the UK. The AIT decided J faced no 
risk of persecution if he concealed his sexuality, citing that he had done so in the past 
without attracting the attention of Iranian authorities. J also lost his appeal before the 
AIT under ECHR Articles 2, 3, and 8 which were excluded in permission to appeal 
to the Court of Appeal and granted under the Refugee Convention only. The 
appellant argued that there had been an error of law in the lack of consideration for 
why he had previously acted discreetly, and that the evidence presented a reasonable 
likelihood of serious persecution, at minimum that of imprisonment and flogging if 
not the death penalty, in Iran.  
 The Court of Appeal allowed J’s appeal, but directed the AIT to follow a test 
which would lead to J’s appeal being dismissed in HJ [2008], perhaps because the 
Tribunal gave additional weight to Buxton LJ’s view of the test which allowed for 
the modification of identity to avoid significant harm (Buxton LJ, para 20; applied in 
HJ [2008], para 46).333 In writing the majority of the decision, Kay LJ found on 
discretion or modification that J’s behaviour in Iran may have been different than he 
                                                 
331 The case of Amare [2005] was considered and applied in reaching these conclusions in respect of 
RG. Regarding persecution, the court considered, among other cases, Ahmed [1999] and Hoxha 
[2005]. Inevitably, the discussion of discretion cited S395 [2003].  
332 The AIA 2004’s transitional provisions were in force when J’s appeal was considered substantively 
by a tribunal so the case came before the AIT rather than the IAT, which was replaced in 2005. 
Instead of members of the Immigration Appellate Authority, from this case forward I refer to tribunal 
members as Immigration Judges (IJ), which is the title members assumed under the 2004 Act. 
333 In HJ and HT [2010], para 23, Lord Hope contends Kay and Buxton LJJ were “making the same 
point.” Kay LJ, however, would later grant J/HJ permission to appeal again following HJ [2008], and 
while Millbank (2012, 520) cites this as a “testament to the misapplication of the ‘reasonably 
tolerating’ approach,” I wonder if this may actually evidence Buxton LJ taking a more hard-line 
approach in his part of the opinion than Kay LJ really agreed to.  
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would have otherwise engaged in to avoid harm; future discretion may place him at 
risk of persecution, or be persecutory, if he were deported.334 Quoting Simon Brown 
LJ in Ahmed [1999], the court found that J “cannot be refused asylum on the basis 
that he could avoid otherwise persecutory conduct by modifying the behaviour…at 
least if that modification was sufficiently significant in itself to place him in a 
situation of persecution [emphasis added]” (cited in Kay LJ, para 10). Sir Martin 
Nourse and Buxton LJ agree with the opinion of Kay LJ; however, Buxton LJ (para 
20) adds that in the remitted case, considered in HJ [2008], the AIT must determine 
if J “could reasonably be expected to tolerate whatever circumstances are likely to 
arise” if he were deported, and that he “may have to abandon part of his sexual 
identity” (i.e. be discreet or conceal it) in a situation which may expose him to 
“extreme danger” per the CG case.335 The reasoning in J [2006] was later overturned 
in HJ and HT [2010] because of the “reasonable tolerability” test.  
B (claimant) v SSHD [2007] EWHC 2528 (Admin) – B [2007] – B, a gay Algerian, 
claimed asylum in the UK and was detained in an adult prison from 1996-1997 as a 
minor after claiming asylum; the interim details following his release are unclear, 
though he appealed and spent time in Belgium. The Home Office refused his claim in 
2003, and B appealed to an Adjudicator for fear of persecution in Algeria as a 
homosexual. The Adjudicator and Tribunal dismissed his claim, and following an 
unsuccessful appeal to the Court of Appeal a fresh claim was made from 2005-2006 
in which the SSHD decided B’s additional matters could not be regarded as a fresh 
claim. Permission to appeal to the High Court was refused on the grounds of ECHR 
Article 8 and B’s current relationship, though this was eventually heard by Collins J, 
but granted in relation to the risk of persecution and whether he could not or would 
not be discreet in Algeria. Collins J writes that it was agreed that B was a 
homosexual, and the SSHD did not argue this was an attempt “as sometimes 
occurs…to establish a ground which is not a valid one” (para 9), and B was in a 
“genuine and longstanding-relationship” with S (para 33). Given that Collins J had 
                                                 
334 Ahmed [1999] and Z [2004] were applied by the Court of Appeal in respect of J’s asylum claim. 
Kay LJ (para 11) outlined the jurisprudence that purportedly supported a view of finding whether 
discretion would be “sufficiently significant in itself to place him in a situation of persecution.”  
335 Buxton refers the AIT to S395 [2003] regarding reasonable tolerability, and RM and BB [2005] for 
country guidance. 
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permitted submissions under Article 8, it may be of interest to note the substantial 
considerations of B’s relationship with S, including S’s past drug and alcohol misuse, 
B’s Muslim background, drinking little, and suffering from depression, as well as the 
periods of time the couple spent apart and living together (e.g. para 17, 22, 25-27, 
33).  
 Collins J (para 33) acknowledged B had been “wrongly treated as an adult” 
by UK authorities, and that the (calendar) year in prison “must have scarred him to 
no small extent.” This was treated by Collins J as a reasonable excuse for breaking 
the UK’s immigration laws in those circumstances. While removal for the purposes 
of immigration control would normally be proportionate, when considered this 
against the “question of whether he can discreetly exercise his homosexuality,” 
Collins J found in his judgment that B’s claim was, in fact, exceptional and that the 
SSHD erred in not treating B’s claim as fresh (Collins J, para 35). The previous 
decision was quashed, and the Home Office was directed to reconsider B’s claim, 
and any decision should be made on the basis of a fresh claim with the right of 
appeal to the AIT. 
AK (Iran) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 941 – AK [2008] – AK was a male-to-female 
trans asylum seeker from Iran, or in the words of the court: “He is [a] transsexual and 
in need of gender reassignment” (Sedley LJ, para 1). Problematically, the decision 
uses male pronouns in respect of AK without explanation – i.e. from the decision we 
cannot know what gender AK actually used – therefore, I use the terms of the court 
but with express reservations. It is noted that gender reassignment is widely accepted 
and practised in Iran, but AK fears persecution by “the ignorant as a homosexual” in 
Iran (Sedley LJ, para 1). Appealing the SSHD’s refusal of asylum, AK was accepted 
as a member of a PSG by Atkinson IJ. However, the SSHD’s application for 
reconsideration succeeded before Mather IJ, who decided the previous decision made 
a material error of law in equating the risk to transsexuals to that of homosexuals, but 
the Court of Appeal disagreed with this second analysis in the present appeal. 
Several issues arose at different stages in the appeals process over the appellant’s 
legal representation (see Sedley LJ, para 7-13). Most importantly for the present 
case, Ince IJ proceeded to hear and decide AK’s appeal in spite of the fact his 
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counsel abandoned the case a day before the hearing at which AK represented 
himself and the appeal was dismissed.  
 Before the Court of Appeal, the representative for the SSHD argued that AK 
had gathered additional evidence which placed him in a more advantageous position 
if the present appeal was granted. The court found that the appeal was only 
concerned with AK’s need for legal representation. The appeal was allowed, and the 
court ordered that the tribunal to consider AK’s credibility as established in addition 
to the evidence of the claim then available. Ince IJ should have acknowledged that 
for the claim to be justly adjudicated, legal representation for AK was necessary due 
to the complexity of the legal issues, and the hearing should have been adjourned. 
HJ (homosexuality: reasonably tolerating living discreetly) Iran [2008] UKAIT 
00044 – HJ [2008] –The remitted case of J, J [2006], was considered in HJ [2008], 
in which it was accepted that to be openly gay in Iran would attract persecution, but 
the issue before the AIT was “whether the need for the appellant to be discreet about 
his sexuality on return…would itself constitute persecution” (Hodge J, para 9). The 
details of HJ’s appeal history and evidence can be found at paragraphs 1-2, and 26-
37 of this decision; however, the legal findings are themselves substantial so I focus 
solely on the reasoning.  
 Following established precedent, the AIT found that they could not decide on 
how HJ should behave, but could find and decide on how he had conducted himself 
in the past and would, therefore, if returned. Because HJ had previously been discreet 
it was found he could reasonably tolerate the concealment of his sexuality. Applying 
Buxton LJ’s (J [2006], para 20) rationale, that the appellant may have to give up part 
of his sexual identity, the Tribunal concluded that return would not “involve 
suppression of many aspects of his sexual identity” (Hodge J, para 46). HJ’s appeal 
remained dismissed, and his subsequent appeals were conjoined with HT in decisions 
which will be summarised below, HJ and HT [2009] and HJ and HT [2010]. 
XY (Iran) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 911 – XY [2008] – XY was a gay man from 
Iran, who appealed the determination of Davies IJ, made at second stage 
reconsideration. Aged 25, XY had been in a “seven-year relationship with a friend,” 
A, and the two “had sexual intercourse at A’s house, when his family were absent,” 
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and “in a shower cubicle at the local public baths” (Stanley Burnton LJ, para 2). A 
was arrested on account of, according to XY’s father, their homosexual relationship, 
and XY believed the staff at the bathhouse may have informed authorities. XY hid at 
his aunt’s house until his father found a way to get him out of Iran. A month later, 
XY learned from his family that a court summons had been issued against him. The 
appellant feared being found guilty of homosexuality on return and death by stoning. 
Of the details above, the only accepted facts were that XY was a homosexual who 
had been in a long-term relationship; others at issue included whether the authorities 
were interested in XY, whether A was arrested, and whether XY had been 
summoned by a court. 
 XY’s primary submission before the Court of Appeal was whether Davies IJ 
had erred in law in failing to consider J [2006] on whether he “could reasonably be 
expected to tolerate the fact that he would have to conduct his sexual life 
clandestinely were he to return to Iran” (Stanley Burnton LJ, para 5). The Court of 
Appeal reviewed or, more accurately, relied on large excerpts of three previous 
decisions in reaching its conclusion: RM and BB [2005], para 123-124; J [2006], para 
10-11, 16, 20; HJ [2008], introduction, para 41-42, 44-46. The majority of XY [2008] 
was, therefore, more of a restatement of the case law and application of reasonable 
tolerability, i.e. J [2006], than significant precedent in itself. The court dismissed 
XY’s appeal because, although Davies IJ had not considered J [2006], the findings 
suggested XY had a sexual relationship with A for a number of years. XY left Iran 
not because the concealment of this relationship was intolerable, but because he 
feared arrest and punishment following the arrest of A. However, this was 
disbelieved. XY “did not establish, or even assert, facts” which established he could 
not reasonably tolerate discretion in Iran (Stanley Burnton LJ, para 14). 
JM (homosexuality: risk) Uganda CG [2008] UKAIT 00065 – JM [2008] – JM 
feared degrading treatment and persecution as a homosexual in Uganda. JM entered 
the UK as a visitor in 2000, and did not seek to renew this visa but instead claimed 
asylum in 2002; this would later militate against the credibility of his claim before an 
Adjudicator. However, all parties later accepted the appellant’s homosexuality. The 
SSHD refused the asylum claim, an Adjudicator dismissed the appeal, and the IAT 
also dismissed the appeal in 2003. When the IAT determination was quashed in 
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2004, the case was remitted for a fresh hearing to the AIT. The AIT found a material 
error of law in 2006, based on the original Adjudicator’s determination, which led to 
the present second stage reconsideration that included determination on fresh 
findings of fact based on the up-to-date evidence. The central issue put to the 
Tribunal was whether JM was in effect being required to be discreet in Uganda or 
whether, as the Adjudicator had found, he had been discreet in the UK too. 
 Counsel for the SSHD argued that the removal of JM to Uganda would not 
expose him to persecution or breach his ECHR Article 3 (ill-treatment), 8 (private 
and family life), or 10 (freedom of expression) rights (see King IJ, para 68-77). The 
SSHD’s submissions were that the evidence suggested there was no real risk to 
homosexuals in Uganda, even to those that publicly expressed their sexual identity. 
Yet, the SSHD relied on J [2006] in order to argue that even if JM may have to 
modify his behaviour to some extent that “was not sufficiently significant in itself to 
place the appellant in a situation of persecution” (King IJ, para 77). Contrary to the 
testimony of JM and other witnesses, the SSHD considered that JM had not been 
forced to conceal his homosexuality and any necessary modification of his identity in 
public in Uganda could not, therefore, be intolerable or unreasonable. On behalf of 
JM, Chelvan (barrister) submitted that JM would risk prosecution, arrest, and 
harassment in Uganda due to social hostility toward homosexuality, including the 
public pronouncements of political leaders and notorious “outings” in the tabloid 
press (see King IJ, para 79-83). Sexual identity is about more than the conduct which 
is criminalised in Uganda, and removing JM from the UK would at minimum breach 
ECHR Articles 10 and 8, where his sexual identity should be protected in the private 
sphere as well as its public expression. Chelvan argued for JM that any modification 
of conduct, and particularly that which is the result of a fear of harm, would in itself 
be persecutory. JM’s appeal relied heavily on the fact he was 32 and single, so his 
homosexuality would inevitably be discovered through the questions put to him and 
corresponding social expectations of marriage. Finally, in addition to a range of 
reports, domestic and international case law, Chelvan submitted that Article 5(2)(b) 
of the EU Qualification Directive suggests that the criminalisation of homosexuality 
appears to be in itself persecutory.336 The AIT found that there was little to no 
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evidence that Uganda enforces its laws against homosexual behaviour. Despite 
widespread social hostility, the evidence considered did not establish the persecution 
of homosexuality. See further OO and JM [2009], below. 
HJ and HT v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 172 – HJ and HT [2009] – For background 
on HJ, see J [2006] and HJ [2008]. Here, I will summarise the information relating to 
HT presented in this appeal, drawing upon HJ and HT [2010] because that case 
offers more detail of HT’s claim. The second paragraph of this summary covers the 
legal arguments made by the appellants and the outcome. HT was a 35-year-old gay 
man from Cameroon. He had two same-sex relationships in Cameroon, first a two-
month relationship in 1997, and then a three-year relationship that ended in 2005 
after HT was attacked by a mob and fled Cameroon. Having lived discreetly, 
according to adjudicators, HT and his partner were seen kissing in his garden by a 
neighbour. Upon leaving his church, HT was attacked by members of the community 
who “beat him with sticks and threw stones at him,” “pulled off his clothes and tried 
to cut off his penis with a knife,” which resulted in his being “cut just above the 
penis and on his hand” as he tried to defend himself (HJ and HT [2010], para 44). 
When the police arrived and discovered why he was being attacked, they punched 
and kicked HT until he lost consciousness; he was hospitalised for two months 
following the attack (HJ and HT [2010], para 44). A member of his church took him 
in when he was released, and made travel arrangements for HT to leave Cameroon. 
Travelling to Canada on a false passport in 2007, HT was arrested at Gatwick and 
claimed asylum, but was convicted to 12 months’ imprisonment for possession of the 
passport.  
The SSHD refused HT’s claim, as did the Tribunal in 2007, and in 2008 the 
Tribunal did not proceed to reconsideration, because Warr IJ did not find the 
previous determination to have been materially flawed. The issue in this conjoined 
appeal, according to the appellants, was “whether it is an answer to a claim for 
refugee status that the applicant be required to, or otherwise would conceal, his 
sexual identity in order to avoid harm of a sufficient severity as to amount to 
persecution” (Pill IJ, para 7). As summarised in the judgment, counsel for the 
appellants, HJ and HT described “the Anne Frank principle,” but Pill LJ (para 10) 
claimed “the validity of [that principle] is not disputed in this appeal.” It seems 
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obvious with the benefit of hindsight and the UKSC judgment in HJ and HT [2010], 
the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of this principle and its validity was indeed very 
much in question:  
“It would have been no defence to a claim that Anne Frank faced 
well-founded fear of persecution in 1942 to say that she was safe in a 
comfortable attic. Had she left the attic, a human activity she could 
reasonably be expected to enjoy, her Jewish identity would have led 
to her persecution. Refugee status cannot be denied by expecting a 
person to conceal aspects of identity or suppress behaviour the person 
should be allowed to express” (Pill IJ, para 10).  
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal concluded that the J [2006] test, and its 
consideration of S395 [2003], met the UK’s obligations under the Convention. “It is 
an appropriate and workable test” (Pill IJ, para 31). The HJ [2008] decision applied 
the test appropriately, and grounded this in the available COI in order to conclude 
that he “could reasonably be expected to tolerate conditions in Iran” (Pill IJ, para 31). 
HT’s asylum claim had been refused because he had previously been discreet, and 
the evidence suggested private homosexual relationships did not create a reasonable 
likelihood of persecution; purportedly, HT could also safely relocate in Cameroon.337 
The Court of Appeal found similarly, and decided that the Tribunal was entitled to 
find that he had been discreet and that the attack was a one-off incident. Finally, an 
additional layer of the reasonable tolerability test appears to have surfaced in this 
judgment: “in assessing whether there has been a breach of [human] rights, a degree 
of respect for social norms and religious beliefs is in my view appropriate,” and that 
“[i]n considering what is reasonably tolerable in a particular society, the fact-finding 
Tribunal is in my view entitled to have regard to the beliefs held there” (Pill LJ, para 
32). Both appeals were dismissed, and later heard by the Supreme Court in HJ and 
HT [2010]. 
NR (Jamaica) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 856 – NR [2009] – NR arrived in the UK 
from Jamaica in 1999 when she was 13. In 2005 NR was sentenced as a young 
offender to five years’ detention for drug offenses. According to the AIT, NR had 
“experimented with different types of sexual identity” after arriving in London, and 
then became “sexually active” during her imprisonment, and “took the opportunity to 
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continue her experimentations with her sexual identity: indeed, there was no 
alternative except celibacy” (cited in Goldring LJ, para 22). In the 4 years preceding 
the present appeal, NR had been in a number of exclusively same-sex relationships. 
NR claimed that she was a lesbian, had been raped in Jamaica, would be at 
significant risk of being persecuted if returned, and that her removal would violate 
Articles 3, 8, and 10 of the EHCR.  
 The present appeal concerns an AIT decision from the same year which 
upheld the SSHD deportation order against NR. Significant legal questions in this 
appeal concerned the AIT, under NIAA 2002, allowing the SSHD to withdraw 
previous concessions made in the appeals process – the Court of Appeal found that 
the Tribunal acted within its discretion, and this ground of appeal was dismissed. 
However, the concessions and history of the findings is relevant context: the SSHD 
conceded NR was a lesbian, though the first Tribunal found she was not, the SSHD 
again conceded NR was a lesbian at reconsideration, and finally at a fresh hearing 
before a Tribunal (the previous having been unable to agree) the SSHD withdrew the 
concession that she was a lesbian, and the AIT agreed in its decision being appealed 
here. Thus, NR was also challenging the AIT’s findings on her sexual identity that 
she was not a lesbian, as summarised by Goldring LJ (para 1): “It found…that her 
past lesbianism was in the nature of teenage experimentation rather than a settled 
sexual orientation; that her present lesbian relationship was motivated by a desire to 
strengthen her claim to asylum.” The SSHD agreed that the AIT made an error of 
law, and it should have considered if her sexual history would put her at risk in 
Jamaica, and whether NR could reasonably be expected to tolerate a discreet life or 
exclusively heterosexual relationships. This second ground of appeal succeeded, and 
NR’s claim was remitted to a Tribunal to consider her sexual identity afresh and 
assessment of future risk. The Court of Appeal concluded that the previous 
Tribunal’s decision was based on insufficient findings regarding NR’s sexual identity 
and that, importantly, “[i]t is of course her sexual orientation at the time of the 
hearing which is important” (Goldring LJ, para 24). 
MM (Iran) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 1167 – MM [2009] – From Iran, MM 
arrived in the UK as an irregular migrant in 2003. MM claimed asylum the same year 
on grounds of homosexuality but was refused by the SSHD on the basis of his 
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credibility and that he could be discreet in Iran. The Adjudicator’s decision in 2003 
found that MM was a homosexual, but he had not been arrested in Iran for a 
homosexual offence as he claimed. Instead, the Adjudicator found MM was arrested 
for being drunk which was the first explanation he had given, and that although 
homosexuality was illegal in Iran the COI indicated it was tolerated. MM converted 
to Christianity in 2003, baptised four days after the Adjudicator’s determination, and 
religion had not been raised at his hearing. In 2007 MM made a fresh claim, and 
sought asylum on the grounds of his homosexuality, apostasy, and mental health. 
Pullan IJ determined that MM was a homosexual, that the previous findings about 
the alleged offence were correct, and the decision referred to the appellant’s own 
evidence that “he had since his Christian conversion given up homosexual activity in 
the UK” (Rix LJ, para 7). Pullan IJ’s determination relied on a CG case,338 and found 
that MM was an ordinary, discreet convert who would still be able to practice his 
religion in Iran as opposed to an evangelist who might be at risk. The condition of his 
mental health was accepted, however, there would be access to care in Iran according 
to the decision. The appeal was therefore dismissed. Reconsideration was granted 
with respect to whether the established condition of MM’s mental health would 
impair his ability to be discreet about his religion and homosexuality. While the first 
stage reconsideration found that Iranian interrogation of MM as a failed asylum 
seeker would place him at risk given the circumstances, the second stage 
reconsideration went on to find that MM had exaggerated his sexuality, religiosity, 
and was not credible.   
Two questions were considered by the Court of Appeal here: whether MM 
was at risk of being persecuted for apostasy, and whether he was at risk of suicide if 
he was returned to Iran. The appeal was allowed on the first ground; the second stage 
reconsideration failed to consider if in these circumstances and the state of MM’s 
mental health he might be at particular risk of disclosing his apostasy as well as 
homosexuality, and the Tribunal had instead proceeded to re-evaluate the credibility 
of, especially, his religious conversion. The second ground, being at risk of suicide 
and violation of ECHR Article 3 if he were removed, was also allowed, because the 
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AIT had not stated its findings or considered any evidence of family support in Iran 
that MM denied having. MM’s appeal was remitted to the AIT for reconsideration.  
OO (Sudan) JM (Uganda) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 1432 – OO and JM [2009] – 
The background of JM’s claim is summarised at JM [2008], above. In setting out the 
details of OO’s claim, I generously quote the decision because I find the tone used to 
describe the case important. OO was from Sudan, came to the UK in 2004 and 
claimed asylum. 36 at the time of this decision, OO claimed to have “gradually 
realised that he was homosexual,” which was “repudiated by his family in Sudan” 
but he was allowed to remain in their home (Sir David Keene, para 9). Sir David 
Keene (para 9) writes:  
“The AIT seems to have accepted that he had had some form of 
sexual relationship with a man while in the Sudan but not that it was 
one involving anal penetration. The relevance of that is that it is 
penetrative anal intercourse with a man or woman which is a criminal 
offence in Sudan. Once in this country he had had a number of casual, 
discreet, homosexual relationships.” 
The AIT was satisfied that the reasonable tolerability test in J [2006] was met. On 
the evidence, the determination found that Sudan had not prosecuted sodomy, there 
was societal but not state-based discrimination, and there was therefore no risk to OO 
of prosecution or persecution in Sudan.  
The Tribunals in OO and JM had both found that the country of origin had 
anti-sodomy laws but those prohibitions were not enforced by the state; Sir David 
Keene (para 10) concludes on the background of the appeals that “[t]he laws were, 
and are, nonetheless there, and they are patently discriminatory.” Aikens LJ granted 
permission to appeal regarding a provision of the 2004 EU Council Directive, 
transposed to UK law by the 2006 regulations,339 and what in particular “constitutes 
an ‘act of persecution’ in circumstances where it is asserted that there are legal 
provisions in a country which are discriminatory so far as sexual behaviour is 
concerned but where these provisions may not be fully implemented in practice” 
(cited in Sir David Keene, para 2). In other words, are unenforced anti-sodomy laws 
persecutory? The conjoined appeal also dealt with two separate grounds of appeal for 
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each claimant, where this summary only covers the common ground. On behalf of 
the appellants, Chelvan (barrister) argued that the decision in Amare [2005] had 
acknowledged that discriminatory measures could indeed amount to persecution – if 
sufficiently severe – and since that case there had been “a shift in international 
consensus” on the criminalisation of homosexuality, which should be recognised as 
persecutory (see Sir David Keene, para 15-17). The Court of Appeal disagreed, and 
found that the appellants’ evidence did not suggest there was an international 
consensus to sufficient to conclude that Amare was outdated. Both appeals were 
dismissed. 
HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 – HJ and HT or HJ and 
HT [2010] – For further background on the case histories of HJ and HT, see J [2006], 
HJ [2008], and HJ and HT [2009], summarised above. These conjoined appeals 
revisited the question raised repeatedly in appeals already summarised, since the 
consideration of S395 [2003] in Z [2004], which was: if an asylum seeker were to be 
open about her sexual identity and therefore have a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted in her country of origin, but would in fact be discreet to avoid 
persecution, whether she would qualify for refugee status. Specifically, this case 
addressed the reasonable tolerability test constructed in J [2006] to determine 
whether an asylum seeker was a refugee when they would be discreet. The appellants 
argued that the reasonable tolerability test was incompatible with the Refugee 
Convention, and their counsel also revisited the question of whether the Court of 
Appeal had incorrectly applied S395 [2003]. 
 The Supreme Court found that the test in J [2006] was indeed incompatible 
with the Convention, was based on a misunderstanding of international authorities 
and S395 [2003] in particular, and that the test was unworkable in practice. Thus, the 
earlier decision was overruled; this decision was largely based on the UKSC’s 
interpretation and application of S395 [2003] that said if an asylum seeker had a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted if they were to live openly, the claimant was a 
refugee for the purposes of the Convention, even if the harm could be avoided by the 
concealment of their sexual identity. Lord Rodger (para 82) sets out the new 
approach to be followed: 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Case summaries   283 
• The Tribunal must first establish on the evidence whether the asylum seeker 
is gay, or whether he would be perceived to be gay in his country of 
nationality. 
• If so, are gay people who live openly likely to be persecuted in the 
claimant’s country of origin?  
• If so, what would the asylum seeker do if he were returned to that country?  
• If he would live openly and thus risk being persecuted, he has a well-
founded fear of persecution for the purposes of Article 1A(2) even if he 
could otherwise avoid the risk by living discreetly and concealing his sexual 
identity.  
• However, if in order to avoid being persecuted he would live discreetly, the 
Tribunal must ask why he would do so: 
o If the asylum seeker would be discreet because that is how he wished 
to live, or as the result of social pressures such as his family’s 
expectations, then that does not amount to being persecuted. 
o However, if the Tribunal concludes on the evidence he would live 
discreetly because he feared persecution, then he is a refugee.  
I have used “gay” and the male pronoun to reflect the decision. However, the UKSC 
also makes it quite clear that this test applies to a broader spectrum of sexual 
behaviours and identities, and the principles of the case have been additionally 
extended to questions of, for example, political opinion.340 In short, the implication 
of the HJ and HT test is that “[t]o reject his application on the ground that he could 
avoid the persecution by living discreetly would be to defeat the very right which the 
Convention exists to protect – his right to live freely and openly as a gay man 
without fear of persecution” (Lord Rodger, para 82).  
SW (lesbians – HJ and HT applied) Jamaica CG [2011] UKUT 00251(IAC) – SW 
[2011] – From Jamaica, SW was a lesbian, a fact that was uncontested by the SSHD. 
However, the SSHD had refused SW refugee status, humanitarian protection, and 
human rights grounds to remain on the basis of her sexual orientation. HJ and HT 
[2010] was decided while SW was waiting to appeal before the AIT which was 
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superseded by the UT in the same period. The UKSC decision rendered some of the 
previous legal and factual arguments made to the IJ irrelevant in this appeal. In fact, 
the SSHD declined to make further submissions in light of HJ and HT and so the 
substance of the respondent’s argument, which relied on J [2006], HJ [2008] and 
reasonable tolerability, failed before the UT in this determination. According to 
Gleeson IJ’s (para 64) summary, the SSHD argued “that although an open lesbian 
relationship may attract adverse attention in Jamaica, such attention was not at a 
level which engaged international protection, in that there is no consistent pattern of 
ill-treatment.” The SSHD invited the Tribunal to find that SW would in fact live 
discreetly if returned to Jamaica. Representing the appellant, Chelvan (barrister) 
submitted that the relevant test was whether SW would be perceived to be a lesbian 
in Jamaica, in order not to be perceived as a lesbian she would have to live a 
“heterosexual narrative,” and there was no need to show a consistent pattern of ill-
treatment because discretion, following HJ and HT, is persecution. The Tribunal 
declined to go further than the UKSC, as Chelvan had suggested, because “naturally 
discreet” lesbians would not be persecuted. A number of conclusions are drawn for 
CG on the risk to lesbians in Jamaica which, though particular to an individual’s 
circumstances, are found to be significant and include, for example, “corrective rape” 
and murder. In relation to SW’s claim, the UT was persuaded by her “coherent and 
credible account of the gradual emergence of her sexuality in Jamaica, and of the 
social, religious and family difficulties it caused her, as well as her reliance on 
antidepressants,” and SW’s account of “her continued emergence into open 
lesbianism” in the UK (Gleeson IJ, para 113-114). The Tribunal remade the decision, 
and the appeal was allowed under the Refugee Convention. 
LZ (homosexuals) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 00487 (IAC) – LZ [2011] – LZ 
entered the UK lawfully in 1998, overstayed her visa, and claimed asylum in 2009 on 
the ground of being a lesbian with a well-founded fear of being persecuted in 
Zimbabwe. In this case the SSHD contended that there was “societal disapproval” of 
homosexuality in Zimbabwe, but not persecution and therefore the HJ and HT test 
did not apply (Macleman and Holmes IJJ, para 6). The dispute before the Tribunal 
was essentially whether “the seriousness and extent of actual ill-treatment” amounted 
to persecution, which the fact-finding of this CG determination was intended to 
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resolve (Macleman and Holmes IJJ, para 24). While LZ’s appeal succeeded, this was 
based on her own, quite peculiar and specific personal circumstances according to 
the Tribunal. The findings were quite narrow, and did not establish a “general risk” 
to homosexuals in Zimbabwe (Macleman and Holmes IJJ, para 113-116). 
Importantly here, the Tribunal addressed the perennial question of whether anti-
sodomy laws are persecutory, and Macleman and Holmes IJJ (para 27) observed that 
it is “legally uncontentious” that the existence of anti-sodomy laws is not persecutory 
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Śledzińska-Simon, Anna, and Krzysztof Śmiszek. 2013. “LGBTI Asylum Claims: 
The Central and Eastern European Perspective.” Forced Migration Review 
42: 16-17. http://www.forcedmigration.org/sogi. 
Smith, Amelia. 2014. “EU Court Bans Sexuality Tests for Gay Asylum Seekers.” 
Newsweek, December 2. http://www.newsweek.com/eu-court-bans-sexuality-
tests-gay-asylum-seekers-288643. 
Smith, Emily Kent. 2015. “Say That You Are Gay to Get to the UK, Posters Tell 
Migrants.” Mail Online, August 4. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
3185508/Say-gay-UK-Posters-tell-migrants-lie-sexuality-claim-asylum.html. 
Smith, Steven R., ed. 2007. Applying Theory to Policy and Practice: Issues for 
Critical Reflection. Hampshire: Ashgate. 
Solomon, Robert C. 2005. “Subjectivity.” In The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 
edited by Ted Honderich. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Somers, Margaret R., and Christopher N.J. Roberts. 2008. “Toward a New Sociology 
of Rights: A Genealogy of ‘Buried Bodies’ of Citizenship and Human 
Rights.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 4 (1): 385-425. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.2.081805.105847. 
Souter, James. 2011. “A Culture of Disbelief or Denial? Critiquing Refugee Status 
Determination in the United Kingdom.” Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration 
1 (1): 48-59. 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Bibliography   311 
Spijkerboer, Thomas, ed. 2013. Fleeing Homophobia: Sexual Orientation, Gender 
Identity and Asylum. London; New York: Routledge. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. 
New York; London: Routledge. 
———. 1994. “In a Word: Interview.” Interview by Ellen Rooney. In The Essential 
Difference, edited by Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed, 151-185. 
Spruill, Jennifer. 2000. “A Post-With/Out a Past?: Sexual Orientation and the Post-
Colonial “Moment” in South Africa.” In Sexuality in the Legal Arena, edited 
by Didi Herman and Carl F. Stychin, 3-16. London: Athlone. 
Stanbridge, Nicola. 2013. “Asylum Seeker: ‘I Had to Prove I’m Gay.’” Radio 4 
Today Programme. BBC News, February 27. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
21601803. 
Stein, Edward, ed. 1992. Forms of Desire: Sexual Orientation and the Social 
Constructionist Controversy. New York; London: Routledge. 
Steiner, Niklaus. 1999. “Arguing about International Legal Norms in Parliamentary 
Asylum Debates.” Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International 
Relations 13 (3): 349-366. 
Stewart, Colin. 2012. “Advice for Pseudo-LGBT Asylum Seekers.” 76 CRIMES, 
May 9. http://76crimes.com/2012/05/09/advice-for-pseudo-lgbt-asylum-
seekers/. 
———. 2015. “79 Countries Where Homosexuality Is Illegal.” 76 CRIMES. July 9. 
http://76crimes.com/76-countries-where-homosexuality-is-illegal/. 




Strudwick, Patrick. 2015. “This Is What Happens In Detention Centres If You’re 
Lesbian Or Gay.” BuzzFeed News, June 23. 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/patrickstrudwick/this-is-what-happens-to-lesbian-
and-gay-asylum-seekers-in-de. 
Stychin, Carl F. 1995. Law’s Desire: Sexuality and the Limits of Justice. London; 
New York: Routledge. 
———. 1998. A Nation by Rights: National Cultures, Sexual Identity Politics, and 
the Discourse of Rights. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Švab, Alenka, and Roman Kuhar. 2014. “The Transparent and Family Closets: Gay 
Men and Lesbians and Their Families of Origin.” Journal of GLBT Family 
Studies 10 (1-2): 15-35. doi:10.1080/1550428X.2014.857553. 
Sweeney, James A. 2007. “The ‘Lure’ of Facts in Asylum Appeals: Critiquing the 
Practice of Judges.” In Applying Theory to Policy and Practice: Issues for 
Critical Reflection, edited by Steven R. Smith, 19-35. Hampshire: Ashgate. 
Swiebel, Joke. 2009. “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Human Rights: The 
Search for an International Strategy.” Contemporary Politics 15 (1): 19–35. 
doi:10.1080/13569770802674196. 
Tabak, Shana, and Rachel Levitan. 2013. “LGBTI Migrants in Immigration 
Detention.” Forced Migration Review 42: 47-49. 
http://www.forcedmigration.org/sogi. 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Bibliography   312 
Taylor, Diane, and Mark Townsend. 2014. “Gay Asylum Seekers Face 
‘Humiliation.’” Guardian, February 8. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2014/feb/08/gay-asylum-seekers-humiliation-home-office. 
Taylor, Jerome. 2013. “‘Gay? Prove It Then – Have You Read Any Oscar Wilde?:’ 
Judges Accused of Asking Lesbian Asylum Seekers Inappropriate 




Tebble, Adam James. 2011. “Homosexuality and Publicness: Towards a Political 
Theory of the Taboo.” Political Studies 59 (4): 921-939. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9248.2011.00884.x. 
Telegraph. 2010. “Gay Asylum Seekers Win Right to Stay in Britain.” Telegraph, 
July 7. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/7876634/Gay-
asylum-seekers-win-right-to-stay-in-Britain.html. 
Terry, Jennifer. 1995. “Anxious Slippages between ‘Us’ and ‘Them:’ A Brief 
History of the Scientific Search for Homosexual Bodies.” In Deviant Bodies: 
Critical Perspectives on Difference in Science and Popular Culture, edited by 
Jennifer Terry and Jacqueline L. Urla, 129-169. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Terry, Jennifer, and Jacqueline L. Urla, eds. 1995. Deviant Bodies: Critical 
Perspectives on Difference in Science and Popular Culture. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
Thiam, Selly. 2012. Seeking Asylum: John Bosco Nyombi. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLwSZaTAHWg. 
Thomas, Robert. 2006. “Assessing the Credibility of Asylum Claims: EU and UK 
Approaches Examined.” European Journal of Migration and Law 8: 79-96. 
———. 2008. “Consistency in Asylum Adjudication: Country Guidance and the 
Asylum Process in the United Kingdom.” International Journal of Refugee 
Law 20 (4): 489-532. doi:10.1093/ijrl/een034. 
———. 2009. “Refugee Roulette: A UK Perspective.” In Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication and Proposals for Reform, by Jaya 
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Ian Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag, 146-186. 
New York; London: NYU Press. 
Thompson, John B. 1991. “Editor’s Introduction.” In Language and Symbolic Power, 
by Pierre Bourdieu, 1-31. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Tobin, John. 2012. “Assessing GLBTI Refugee Claims: Using Human Rights Law to 
Shift the Narrative of Persecution within Refugee Law.” New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 44: 447-484. 
Townsend, Mark, and Diane Taylor. 2014. “Home Office Wouldn’t Believe I Was 
Gay: How Do You Prove It?” Guardian, February 8. 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/feb/08/home-office-gay-asylum-
seekers-questioning. 
Tsourdi, Evangelia (Lilian). 2013. “Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 
Developments in EU Law.” Forced Migration Review 42: 20-21. 
http://www.forcedmigration.org/sogi. 
Tucker, Angela. 2011. (A)sexual. Documentary. FilmBuff. 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Bibliography   313 
Tuitt, Patricia. 1996. False Images: Law’s Construction of the Refugee. London; East 
Haven: Pluto Press, 1996. 
Tunstall, Kate E., ed. 2006. Displacement, Asylum, Migration: The Oxford Amnesty 
Lectures 2004. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Türk, Volker, and Frances Nicholson. 2003. “Refugee Protection in International 
Law: An Overall Perspective.” In Refugee Protection in International Law: 
UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection, edited by Erika 
Feller, Volker Türk, and Frances Nicholson, 3-45. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
UKLGIG. 2010. “Failing the Grade: Home Office Initial Decisions on Lesbian and 
Gay Claims for Asylum.” UKLGIG, April. http://uklgig.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Failing-the-Grade.pdf. 
———. 2015. “Parliamentarians Criticise Bullying, Harassment and Abuse of 
LGBTI Asylum Seekers in UK Immigration Detention Centres.” UKLGIG, 
March 3. http://uklgig.org.uk/?p=1701. 
UNDP. 2012. “Global Commission on HIV and the Law: Risks, Rights, and Health.” 
United Nations Development Programme, July. 
http://www.hivlawcommission.org/.  
UNHCR. 1996. “Protecting Refugees: Questions and Answers.” Quoted in Kristen L. 
Walker 2003, 253; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2001, 43. 
http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/refugee_en.pdf. 
———. 2002. “Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution 
within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention And/or Its 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.” The UN Refugee Agency. 
HCR/GIP/02/01. http://www.unhcr.org/3d58ddef4.pdf. 
———. 2008. “UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity.” Retrieved from Refworld. 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/48abd5660.html. 
———. 2010. “Introductory Note.” Statute of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 4-5. Retrieved from Refworld. 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3628.html. 
———. 2011a. “Working with Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender & Intersex 
Persons in Forced Displacement.” Retrieved from Refworld. 
http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4e6073972. 
———. 2011b. “Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.” HCR/1P/4/enG/Rev. 3. 
Retrieved from Refworld. http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html. 
Urla, Jacqueline L., and Jennifer Terry. 1995. “Introduction: Mapping Embodied 
Deviance.” In Deviant Bodies: Critical Perspectives on Difference in Science 
and Popular Culture, edited by Jennifer Terry and Jacqueline L. Urla, 1-18. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Verkaik, Robert. 2009. “Deporting Gay Asylum-Seeker ‘Was Unlawful.’” 
Independent, February 20. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/deporting-gay-asylumseeker-was-unlawful-1627052.html. 
VICE. 2014. Young and Gay in Putin’s Russia. VICE News. 
http://www.vice.com/video/young-and-gay-in-putins-russia-full-length-vice. 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Bibliography   314 
Viloria, Hida. 2013. “Op-Ed: Germany’s Third-Gender Law Fails on Equality.” 
Advocate, November 6. 
http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2013/11/06/op-ed-
germany%E2%80%99s-third-gender-law-fails-equality. 
Vine, John. 2014. “An Investigation into the Home Office’s Handling of Asylum 
Claims Made on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation.” ID 15101401 10/14. 




Waaldijk, Kees. 2013. “The Right to Relate: A Lecture on the Importance of 
‘Orientation’ in Comparative Sexual Orientation Law.” Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law 24 (1): 161-199. Retrieved from Leiden 
University Repository.  https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/24927. 
Wagenaar, Hendrik. 2004. “‘Knowing’ the Rules: Administrative Work as Practice.” 
Public Administration Review 64 (6): 643-655. 
Waites, Matthew. 2013. “United Kingdom: Confronting Criminal Histories and 
Theorising Decriminalisation as Citizenship and Governmentality.” In 
Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in The 
Commonwealth: Struggles for Decriminalisation and Change, edited by 
Corinne Lennox and Matthew Waites, 145-181. 
http://commonwealth.sas.ac.uk/publications/house-publications/lgbt-rights-
commonwealth. 
Waldron, Jeremy, ed. 1987. “Nonsense upon Stilts:” Bentham, Burke, and Marx on 
the Rights of Man. London: Methuen. 
Walker, Kristen L. 1996. “The Importance of Being Out – Sexuality and Refugee 
Status.” Sydney Law Review 18: 568-597. 
———. 2000. “Capitalism, Gay Identity and International Human Rights Law.” 
Australasian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 9: 58-73. 
———. 2003. “New Uses of the Refugee Convention: Sexuality and Refugee 
Status.” In The Refugees Convention 50 Years on: Globalisation and 
International Law, edited by Susan Kneebone, 251-278. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Wallace, Mike. 1967. The Homosexuals. Documentary. CBS Reports, March 7. 
Columbia Broadcasting System.  
Warner, Michael, ed. 1993. Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social 
Theory. Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press. 
———. 1993. “Introduction.” In Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social 
Theory, edited by Michael Warner, vii-xxxi. Minneapolis; London: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Weber, Cynthia. 2015. “Queer Intellectual Curiosity as IR Method: Developing 
Queer IR Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks.” Paper presented at 
the University of Edinburgh, February 9. 
Weeks, Jeffrey. 1981. Sex, Politics and Society: The Regulation of Sexuality Since 
1800. London: Longman. 
———. 1990. Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain, from the Nineteenth 
Century to the Present. London: Quartet Books. 
———. 1995. Invented Moralities: Sexual Values in an Age of Uncertainty. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Bibliography   315 
———. 2007. The World We Have Won: The Remaking of Erotic and Intimate Life. 
London: Routledge. 
Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 46 (2): 391-425. 
———. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Weßels, Janna. 2013. “Discretion in Sexuality-Based Asylum Cases: An Adaptive 
Phenomenon.” In Fleeing Homophobia: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity 
and Asylum, edited by Thomas Spijkerboer, 55-81. London; New York: 
Routledge. 
Whitehead, Harriet. 1993. “The Bow and the Burden Strap.” In The Lesbian and Gay 
Studies Reader, edited by Henr Abelove, Michele A. Barale, and David M. 
Halperin, 498-527. New York; London: Routledge. 
Wilcox, Daniel T. 2000. “Application of the Clinical Polygraph Examination to the 
Assessment, Treatment and Monitoring of Sex Offenders.” Journal of Sexual 
Aggression 5 (2): 134-152. doi:10.1080/13552600008413304. 
Wilets, James D. 1997. “Conceptualizing Private Violence Against Sexual Minorities 
as Gendered Violence: An International and Comparative Law Perspective.” 
Albany Law Review 60 (3): 989-1050. 
Wilkes, Sybella. 2010. “UNHCR Urges Tolerance of Displaced People Persecuted 
for Their Sexuality.” UNHCR, October 1. 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ca5ff566.html. 
Wilkinson, Cai. 2014. “Putting ‘Traditional Values’ Into Practice: The Rise and 
Contestation of Anti-Homopropaganda Laws in Russia.” Journal of Human 
Rights 13 (3): 363-379. doi:10.1080/14754835.2014.919218. 
Wilkinson, Matt. 2014. “Say You Are Gay If You Want to Stay in UK.” Sun, April 
22. http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/5582162/illegal-
immigrants-told-to-lie-they-are-gay-to-stay-in-uk.html. 
Wood, Linda A., and Rolf O. Kroger. 2000. Doing Discourse Analysis: Methods for 
Studying Action in Talk and Text. Thousand Oaks; London: Sage. 
Woolf, Virginia. 2008. Orlando: A Biography. London: Vintage Classics. 
Yeo, Colin. 2013. “Are Asylum Appeal Hearings the Same Wherever They Are 
Heard?” Free Movement, November 30. 
http://www.freemovement.org.uk/2013/11/30/are-asylum-appeal-hearings-
the-same-wherever-they-are-heard/. 
———. 2014. “Questions to a Bisexual Asylum Seeker in Detention.” Free 
Movement, January 24. 
http://www.freemovement.org.uk/2014/01/24/questions-to-a-bisexual-
asylum-seeker-in-detention/. 
Yin, Robert K. 2009. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Los Angeles: Sage. 
Yogyakarta. 2007. “Yogyakarta Principles – Principles on the Application of 
International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity.” International Commission of Jurists. Retrieved from 
Refworld. http://www.refworld.org/docid/48244e602.html. 
Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton; Oxford: 
Princeton University Press. 
  The inclusive guise of “gay” asylum 
Bibliography   316 
Zaccour, Amélie. 2015. “Gay Refugees From ISIS.” Daily Beast, March 30. 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/30/gay-refugees-from-
isis.html. 
Zimmerman, Andreas, and Claudia Mahler. 2011. “Art. 1A, para. 2 1951 
Convention.” In The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary, edited by Andreas Zimmermann, Jonas 
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